Wikileak Cable on VP Machar & on Nhial Deng and on cleaning Corruption in the SPLA

O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 001297 SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2013 TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: GOSS VP MACAHR CONTINUED OBJECT OF SUSPICION BY MANY IN THE SPLM

Classified By: A/CDA Mark Asquino for reasons 1.4 (b) and (c)

1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) Vice President Riek Machar is the object of continued reports by SPLA intelligence sources accusing him of conspiracies to undermine GOSS President Salva Kiir and assume leadership of Southern Sudan. This deep level of distrust of one of the principle leaders of the SPLM portends troubling tensions within the GOSS presidency.

End summary.

2. (SBU) According to a recent report passed to ConGen Juba by Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) Military Intelligence, GOSS Vice President Riek Machar and Ex-Foreign Minister of Sudan Dr. Lam Akol held a clandestine meeting with Second Vice President of Sudan Ali Osman and other unidentified high-ranking members of the National Congress Party (NCP) in Khartoum on August 7, 2008. The report maintains that a number of topics were discussed, but that the primary reason for this meeting was to reconcile Akol with Machar, as their relationship had supposedly become strained. It was also supposedly agreed at this meeting that Machar would assume the presidency of Southern Sudan if Salva Kiir was assassinated.

3. (SBU)) The use of students as political tools was also reportedly discussed, and it was allegedly agreed that certain secondary and university students in Juba, Malakal, and Wau would be utilized to propagandize, distribute materials, and stage protests to criticize the Government of Southern Sudan.

4. (SBU) The funding of militias was also allegedly a topic of discussion. According to the report, there are militias in the Greater Equatoria region, Upper Nile and Unity states that have received financial support from the NCP in the past. Allegedly, these militias would be granted additional financial support in the near future to ensure their continued loyalty. Another earlier SPLA intelligence report accused Machar of meeting on August 5 with Akol, Former GNU State Minister for Justice Alieu Alieu, and former GNU presidential advisor Telar Deng to discuss the distribution of NCP funds. It was reported that in that meeting funds were allocated to co-opt select SPLA generals. (NOTE: Deng and Alieu became the first-ever SPLM members stripped of
their party affiliation in October 2007 following their removal from the party on grounds of insubordination. Akol narrowly escaped the same fate when he apologized directly to
Kiir in a Juba-based meeting. END NOTE.)

5. (SBU) An August 7 SPLA intelligence report alleged Machar devoted most of his discussion with his interlocutors to the topic of re-establishing a Council of Chiefs office in Juba. The Council of Chiefs is described as an organization of leaders of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) that re-located to the North. In the past this council has supposedly received funds from the NCP to resettle their people in the South. This Council of Chiefs office is reportedly intended
to be a political organization controlled by the NCP but operating within the South. The reported motivation for the opening of this office is to have a political organization that is not overtly allied with the NCP to lobby for a Border Defense Force that will respond to National Government taskings. The establishment of this office is to be allegedly financed with 150 Million Sudanese Pounds.

6. (C) Comment: Although there may be good reason to remain suspicious of Machar,s overall political intentions in the South, this constant stream of reporting by SPLA military intelligence against him cannot be verified. The rumors fuel conspiracy theories that there are elaborate plots being hatched against the GOSS with large amounts of NCP money supposedly being funneled to Machar to carry them out. Machar,s history of receiving funding from the North to fight the SPLA during the 1990s (and the slaughter of Dinka by his troops at the time) makes him for many in the South a man who cannot be trusted. The presence of Nuer oil militias paid for by Khartoum in Unity State adds to the perception that some Nuer are working against the interests of the South. While there may be little truth in the latest rumors, it is significant that they are being presented in reports from SPLA intelligence to Kiir. This, in turn, contributes to the continued deep mistrust and bitterness that persist in the SPLA and SPLM against Riek Machar. If the rumors in fact have no basis, it would be in Machar,s interest to dispel them, demonstrate he is a team player in the SPLM, and work to repair his relationship with Kiir.
ASQUINO

Cable on cleaning Corruption in the SPLA.

———————
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000252 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/E NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON

ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS EFIN MOPS MARR KDEM KCOR SU SUBJECT: NEW MINISTER ATTEMPTS TO CURB SPLA CORRUPTION Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (U) This is an action request – see para. 8

2. (C) SUMMARY: SPLA Affairs Minister Nhial Deng Nhial is attempting to move against commanders he suspects of corruption within the SPLA’s senior echelons less than one month into his ministerial tenure. The Minister’s political cover for the initiative is increasingly far-reaching: President Kiir has been briefed, and Nhial and Finance Minister Kuol Athian Mawien are due to meet the week of February 23 to review corrective measures required to bring
the SPLA’s budget-busting spending habits in line with standing GOSS regulations. The Minister has already placed Chief of General Staff Oyai Deng Ajak and his immediate staff under a microscope, and has requested USG assistance to isolate “problematic” SPLA commanders. Both the Finance Minister and Minister for SPLA Affairs lauded USG assistance to date in improving SPLA contracting mechanisms via a USG-facilitated SPLA Acquisitions Review Board and other initiatives. However, Nhial notes that until he is able to crack the mentality of some of those who are supposed to be his most-trusted advisors, his reform efforts risk being undermined from within.

END SUMMARY.

3. (C) Following their introductory meeting on February 17, SPLA Affairs Minister Nhial Deng Nhial noted to Consul General his concerns over a recently-awarded US$70 million contract to Harris Radios, and solicited USG assistance in “confirming his suspicions” regarding who within the SPLA was most intimately involved in the transaction. Nhial claims the contract was awarded without his review or approval, despite standing directives to the contrary. The Minister was particularly disturbed about the contract’s finalization so soon after his initial discussions with the Chief of General Staff and his deputies about planned changes to the SPLA’s procurement and accounting mechanisms. He regarded the maneuver as one designed to intentionally keep him in the dark, and his subsequent review of documents linked to the transaction “raised significant concerns.” (NOTE: USG-contracted advisors kept close watch on Harris representatives during their two most-recent visits to Juba. However, neither the SPLA’s Signals Director, Procurement Director, or their counterparts within the USG-funded Training/Advisory Team were consulted on the contract. The first time the Signals Director learned that the SPLA was considering procuring Harris equipment was following a
discussion with the USG-funded Communications Advisor.

END NOTE.)

4. (C) GOSS Finance Minister Kuol Athian Mawien told ConGen PolOff February 18 that he was personally leading his ministry’s efforts to assist Nhial with a review of contracts awarded by the SPLA since the start of the 2008 fiscal year. He noted that contracts awarded after the May 2008 death of the SPLA Affairs Minister would come under particular scrutiny. PolOff cited repeated criticism by the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly (SSLA) and state-level governments regarding perceived SPLA malfeasance, and asked if specific individuals were under investigation. Mawien hedged on the response, finally noting that “SPLA procurements have become so consistently irregular that to be irregular is to be consistent.” While Mawien maintained that over-expenditures were unlikely to have impacted SPLA ability to pays it troops
(a claim we find to be specious at best,) he stressed that the emphasis of the contract review will be less on over-expenditures and more on a comparison of products
delivered against cost payouts.

5. (C) Mawien, whose own ministry overspent its budget by 612 percent in the first half of the 2008 fiscal year, is unlikely to heavily criticize the SPLA for any “legitimate” over-expenditures discovered. The SSLA and GOSS Council of Ministers have given the SPLA carte-blanche to spend on defense procurements, with full recognition that the bulk of the military’s debt carry over is tied to the US$260,000/tank arms purchase from the Ukraine dating to 2006. Despite its
vocal criticism of the 2008 supplemental budget bill, the SSLA’s Select Committee on Finance and the Economy repeatedly invoked NCP stonewalling on CPA implementation and the
“precarious” nature of the North/South peace as “the only reason one needs to vote for this bill’s passage.”

6. (C) It remains difficult to establish whether SPLA corruption is limited to individuals or has become institutionalized. Anecdotal evidence abounds of senior SPLA commanders in Juba and beyond providing financial backing for KHARTOUM 00000252 002 OF 002 gasoline stations and of brigade and division-level general officers using their positions to forcibly seize land, and in some instances, infrastructure. While the senior command in Juba are candid with ConGen Juba staff about their expenditures, and (unlike other SPLA contacts) have not complained of going without pay, it is hard to discern whether spending sprees have been irregular or routine. The SPLA as an institution still remains largely devoid of codified and respected regulations. This stems from tribal factionalism, capacity and literacy issues, and an over-emphasis on unnecessary compartmentalization related to information-sharing and decision-making — a hold-over from the SPLA’s days as a guerrilla force. These same weaknesses have made the SPLA vulnerable to manipulation: both from less scrupulous elements within its ranks and from regional and international businesses seeking to prey on the SPLA,s naivet to make a quick buck. To date, more than 1,000 vehicles purchased by Dim Deng in 2007 have still not arrived in Sudan, a recently-awarded, multi-million dollar ID card contract stemming from the Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration Salva Mathok resulted in the delivery to Juba of less than one dozen laptops, a desktop scanner, and a handful of trainers. Nhial admitted to CG on February 16 that the only “definite information” he had on the Harris contract was that it originated from within the office of the Chief of General Staff, and it wasn’t listed in documents outlining procurement requirements for the 2009 fiscal year.

7. (C) Although displeased that his commanders are seemingly resistant to his initial directives, Nhial affirmed to ConGen PolOff February 21 that he will continue to act in a consultative fashion until give “indisputable proof that he should desist.” While he acknowledged that current in-house USG advisors focused on financial management and procurement are likely be located within his ministry, and may help him in his attempts at broad-based reform, what he needs most from “our friends” is either actionable information about corruption within the SPLA’s ranks or a list of individuals who bear further scrutiny. In particular, he sought additional information on the parties involved in the Harris Radio contract.

8. (C) Comment and Action Request: We need to do everything we can to support Nhial on corruption in general and the Harris Radio contract in particular. While we do not wish to intervene in what may well be a legal contract, post seeks Washington’s guidance on the status of the OFAC license for the Harris contract, to find out if in fact proper procedures have been followed. Providing such support to Nhial will underscore our desire for more GOSS officials to take the risks posed by combatting corruption, which is seriously threatening the South’s nascent and fragile institutions at a time of great financial and political pressure.

By FERNANDEZ

 

Wikileak on Gen. Oyai Deng Disagreemnt with Salva Kiir

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000470

Date March, 25, 2007  SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2017 TAGS:

PRELPGOVMARRSUUG

SUBJECT: SUDAN: SPLA CHIEF OF STAFF SAYS HE MIGHT BE REPLACED REF: A. A) KHARTOUM 0461 B. B) KHARTOUM 468 classified By: DCM ROBERTO POWERS for reason 1.4 (b) and (d)

 Summary

1. (C) Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Oyai Deng has had a history of disagreement with Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) President Salva Kiir, and admits that Kiir may replace him. Deng blames Kiir for inaction on problems facing the SPLA, and denies rumors that he is plotting a coup. He admits, however, that the SPLA senior command is riven by suspicion and mistrust. End Summary.

The President and the Chief of Staff

2. (C) “Everybody knows that we have had problems,” Deng said of his relations with GOSS President Kiir. “We have disagreed on many things. There have even been times when I have had to do things he did not want, which is not good for a military–but it was necessary.” Deng spoke to PolOff March 23, amidst speculation that Kiir may replace Deng as chief of staff.

3. (C) Deng said he is ready for anything. He was appointed chief of staff by the late Dr. John Garang, Deng recounted. Garang made the appointment after “consultations”, but “I don’t know if Salva agreed.” After Kiir took power, the GOSS president offered Deng an appointment as Minister of SPLA Affairs. “I told him it would be a promotion, and everyone would like to be a minister,” Deng recalled, “but I would prefer to stay and help him reorganize the SPLA.”

4. (C) Kiir let the matter drop for several months but raised it again recently, Deng continued. “I said okay, I could become a minister,” Deng said. “I told him that I recommended he appoint someone from within the senior ranks of the army as the new chief of staff. I said it should come from the deputies–someone like James,” he continued, referring to Maj. Gen. James Hoth Mai, the SPLA’s deputy chief of staff for logistics. The remaining deputy chiefs of staff all have shortcomings, Deng said. Maj. Gen. Isaac Mamur Mette (“Mobutu”) is corrupt, Deng said, and was suspended and placed under house arrest March 20 (Ref. A). Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration Maj. Gen. Salva Mathok has also misappropriated funds, Deng claimed. Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations Maj. Gen. Bior Ajang “is a good man,” Deng added, but cannot “push things.”

5. (C) “Salva told me that appointing the chief of staff is his prerogative,” Deng continued. “I told him I understood that but I was obligated to give him my advice.” Subsequently Deng learned that the president would like to appoint Domminic Diim Deng, a retired SPLA commander now serving in the South Sudan Legislative Assembly (SSLA). Like Kiir, Diim is from Warrap State in the Bahr-el-Ghazal region. “Diim is from Salva’s home area, which is not good,” Deng commented. “He has spent most of the last ten years in London and other places. We need someone from within who knows the army.” Deng said he has no political ambitions and that he remains reluctant to leave the command of the SPLA and take up the post of Minister of SPLA Affairs (effectively,  the GOSS’s defence minister). Eighteen months after the GOSS was inaugurated, the portfolio has never been filled.

 No Coup

6. (C) Various figures, including two of his four deputy chiefs of staff, have repeated rumors to the president that Deng is plotting a coup, Deng said. He dismissed the rumors as nonsense. The two deputies, Mamur and Mathok, are corrupt and unreliable, Deng stressed. One rumor has it that Deng wants to seize power and hand it to GOSS roads minister Rebecca Garang, wife Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) leader John Garang,  who died in July 2005. “I told the president, why would I do that?” Deng said. “Why would anyone take power just to give to someone else?”

Corruption and Inaction

7. (C) Deng also provided an elaborate account of the KHARTOUM 00000470 002  OF 002 circumstances that led to the arrest of Deputy Chief of Staff for Political and Moral Orientation Maj. Gen. Isaac Mamur Mette (“Mobutu”). Mamur’s dismissal was an “administrative”, not political matter, Deng claimed. Mamur was given USD $13 million last year to provide food and other assistance to thousands of members of the former South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF) militia who had joined the SPLA. “The troops complained they never saw the food,” Deng alleged. When Mamur was asked to provide an accounting of the funds, his report was “rubbish”. The SPLA then formed a committee to review the issue and oversee future funding. Unchastened, Mamur signed another contract for USD 20 million for more food, Deng claimed.

8. (C) Deng learned of this contract only when he was summoned to a meeting with President Kiir and the now-jailed GOSS Minister of Finance, Arthur Akuein (Ref. B). At the meeting, which took place about a month ago, Deng complained that the finance ministry was not disbursing funds adequately to the SPLA, creating problems in paying troops and vendors. Akuein defended the ministry’s actions, and claimed the SPLA was overspending. As an example, he produced the USD 20 million food contract signed by Mamur. Deng had been complaining about Mamur for months, he alleged. Yet when Deng went to see the President privately, or at night, “I often found him sitting with Mamur.” When Akuein showed him the contract, Deng said, he hit the roof. “I cannot continue like this,” Deng told the president in front of the finance minister. “If this is the way we are doing business I am ready to resign.”

9. (C) Kiir subsequently directed Deng to arrest Mamur and he did so, Deng said. Though Mamur was responsible for other transgressions, including the dispatch of a platoon of 47 soldiers to Uganda for unauthorized training, Deng said that financial misbehavior led to Mamur’s arrest. The president had known of these problems “for months” but took no action, Deng complained. Similarly Kiir has dithered over other key issues concerning the reorganization of the SPLA. On some issues, such as the need for national rather than regionally-based forces, Kiir had come to accept Deng’s advice. And though there are still points of friction, Deng’s relationship with Kiir “is okay now,” Deng said unconvincingly.

Comment

10. (C) The relationship between GOSS President Salva Kiir and SPLA Chief of Staff Oyai Deng is clearly very troubled. Though Deng provided only one side of the story, what he says is obviously disturbing. The SPLA is the bedrock of GOSS’s authority. The SPLA senior command is currently riven with suspicion and mistrust, and rivalries inside the army echo the ethnic and political divisions of the larger society. The ultimate responsibility for correcting this problem, and forging a professional, inclusive and loyal army, rests with Salva Kiir. We hope he is up to the task.

By HUME

 

Wikileaks on Nhial Deng’s resignation

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001323 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/SPG E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2016 TAGS: PGOVPINRSU

SUBJECT: SOUTHERN SUDAN: SHIFTS WITHIN THE SPLM FAVOR SALVA KIIR REF: (A) KHARTOUM 849 (B) KHARTOUM 887 Classified By: CGJ R. Whitehead for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D)

1. (C) Summary. The internal dynamic within the SPLM has shifted gradually since the March meeting of the reconstituted Politburo in Rumbek (ref a). The balance between the two most powerful factions (ref b) ) followers of GoSS President Kiir and those loyal to the late John Garang ) has altered in favor of Kiir. Nhial Deng, a Garang stalwart, has resigned from government and gone abroad. Rebecca Garang has also been absent from Juba for a protracted period, reportedly suffering from ill health. Other former Garang loyalists appear to be hedging their bets by moving closer to Kiir. End summary.

———– Nhial Deng Nhial Decamps —————

2. (C) SPLM insiders have been tight-lipped about the resignation of Minister of Regional Affairs Nhial Deng Nhial, who abandoned both his ministry and his seat in the South Sudan Legislative Assembly, although he did not resign from the SPLM. Deng is currently in Nairobi and has told friends that he plans to rejoin his family in the United Kingdom, where he will pursue an unspecified course of academic study.

3. (C) His letter of resignation did not specify the reason for his departure, but acquaintances say that his motives were threefold. First and foremost, Deng felt that he and his ministry had been purposely marginalized, with Kiir and Machar taking the lead in GoSS relations with neighboring countries. Secondly, Deng was reported to be upset by growing levels of corruption within the GoSS. Finally, Deng, one of the architects of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), was frustrated by the GoSS, inability to implement the CPA. Behind the scenes, a number of senior SPLM officials have reportedly made overtures to Deng to return.  He has not accepted. His departure has provoked a deep rift within the SPLM, with his supporters acclaiming his actions as principled and his detractors accusing him of self-interest and betrayal.

————–Rebecca Garang out of Circulation —————–

3. (C) Rebecca Garang, widow of John Garang and the GoSS Minister of Transportation, has also been out of Juba for several weeks. Her parliamentary colleagues recounted that upon her return from an April visit to President Museveni in Uganda, the normally resolute Rebecca expressed great public grief over the loss of her husband. She subsequently traveled to Nairobi and was reportedly hospitalized there for exhaustion. She left for England on June 4 for two weeks of treatment there. Her absence has triggered a spate of rumors about her health and her future intentions, including whether she would continue with the very demanding transportation portfolio. Of late, she has been increasingly criticized for a lack of progress in this sector.

———- Other Shifts toward Kiir —————

4. (C) Other Garang loyalists who once predicted a power struggle between their faction and those loyal to Kiir, most notably Pagan Amum, have held their peace. Amum, now the number two behind Kiir in the SPLM hierarchy, has been less visible since Rumbek, although he did deliver one of the speeches at the April 16 SPLM day celebrations, which neither Nhial Deng nor Rebecca attended. Pagan has reportedly put out feelers to Kiir backers and stands ready to support Kiir,s candidacy for the presidency in the next elections. Other former Garang followers, such as Michael Makwei, have apparently opted for pragmatism and rapprochement rather than confrontation, although Makwei frequently echoes Nhial Deng,s concerns about growing corruption and weak GoSS performance.

————— The Conclusion —————

5. (C) Kiir has steadily strengthened his position within the SPLM over the past ten months. It is too soon to declare that the Garang faction has collapsed. However, in the absence of Rebecca, with the departure of Deng, and through KHARTOUM 00001323 002 OF 002 the seeming shift by Amum, three of the most influential leaders of the Garang faction are for now out of the mix. In addition to Kiir, Riek Machar, who remains in the limelight through his hands on governance and his high-profile attempts at conflict resolution, also benefits from the SPLM,s shifting internal dynamics.

By STEINFELD

 

Wikileak on Kiir’s intention toward militias leaders

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001808 SIPDIS SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PRELPGOVMOPSSU

SUBJECT: Unaligned SSDF Lay Out Conditions for Peace 1. (SBU)  

SUMMARY:

On July 19, Embassy PolOff was invited to meet the leaders of the South Sudan Defense Force (SSDF) militia groups that did not align with the Sudanese Peoples’ Liberation Movement (SPLM) and will not be integrated into the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The meeting including all four major hold-outs from the Juba Declaration: Gordon Kong Chol, leader of the SSDF coalition, Ismail Kongi, Tom Al-Nur Galgum, and Gabriel Tangyang Tang. The men said they were men of peace who support the CPA, despite what Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) President Salva Kiir might tell the U.S.  President. Their views ranged from the more conciliatory Kongi to the hard-line Kong, but all expressed support for the CPA and wanted the South-South dialogue to continue, despite their deep distrust of the Dinka-dominated SPLM. End Summary.

——————— Still Proud to be SAF ———————

2. (U) All the assembled leaders fought with the north during the war and were open about their SAF affiliations. They are considered unaligned groups because the SAF has no capacity to absorb them and they refuse to redeploy North with the other SAF troops. In addition to Kangi, Kong, Tang and Al-Nur, three other SSDF leaders sat in on the meeting: Elia Lado from Central Equatoria, John Jeat, from north Upper Nile, and Vincent Kuany  from Bentiu. None of these three control significant fighting forces, although Kany is a respected elder who co-founded Anyanya II. All seven carry the SAF rank of Major General, with Kangi, Kong, Tang, and Lado in SAF uniform.  

———— Kongi: Clear Path to Peace ———–

3. (SBU) Murle leader Ismail Kongi, from Jonglei, spoke first and longest, saying he would disarm his militia immediately if there were a proper Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) process. He said the SSDF accepts the CPA, but does not trust the SPLA. Kongi explained he has no problem working with the SPLA to disarm, indeed he is a Member of the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly, but the clumsy disarmament in Jonglei last spring looked like a Dinka power grab that led him to question the SPLA’s motives.  

——————- Tang: Ready to Deal ——————-

4. (SBU) Gabriel Tang, also known as Tangyang, said he too was willing to deal, although he was less clear about his demands. The problem with the Juba Declaration negotiations, he said, was that then-SSDF leader Paulino Matiep, now Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the SPLA, did not consult with his staff and abandoned the SSDF’s demands in exchange for a high personal position in the SPLA. Tang believed a resumption of the South-South dialogue could resolve the outstanding issues.

———– Al-Nur: Peace on SSDF’s Terms ————–

5. (SBU) Tom Al-Nur’s plan for Southern unity was equal representation between the SPLA and the SSDF. He said that the SSDF was stronger than the SPLA, so the SSDF should at least have equal representation in the army, the police, and the government. The alternative, Al-Nur explained, was to forcibly dislodge him from outside of Wau, something the SPLA could not do during the war. Al-Nur feared that an SPLA-controlled security apparatus would continue to menace non-Dinka southerners and fix the upcoming elections, which the SSDF planned to contest.

———— Kong: SPLA Will Kill Us All ————–

6. (SBU) Gordon Kong, leader of the SSDF’s loose coalition and former deputy of Matiep, took the hardest line. Although he also said he was a man of peace, he talked of war. Harboring a deep distrust of the SPLA, and all Dinka, Kong said that the only reason the GoSS wants to disarm them is to make it easier to kill all the non-Dinka. While ethnic rivalries are a problem, Kong also believes the SPLM will never forgive the SSDF for siding with the north during the war. Kong, known to personally hate the late SPLM leader John Garang, said that he actually preferred Garang to Kiir. At least you knew where you stood with Garang, he explained, whereas Kiir will say nice things and then go behind your back to kill you. Kong emphasized that the SSDF was not a proxy militia to destabilize the south. He said they have refused to move north because they are southerners. Kong declared there would be no peace in Southern Sudan until the government and the security forces represented all the people and not just tribal interests.

KHARTOUM 00001808 002 OF 002

 ———Questions About the U.S. Role ————–

7. (SBU) According to the SSDF leaders, the SPLM had said that the U.S., the UN, and the entire international community were in the SPLM’s pocket. The SPLA had warned the SSDF that they would be wiped out by UN forces if they continued to resist. PolOff explained that the USG was only interested in helping bring peace, stability, and prosperity to the Southern Sudanese. He explained that while the U.S. had developed a strong   relationship with the SPLM by working together to achieve these goals in the past, the USG wanted to work with a broad spectrum of tribal leaders and political parties to build civil society and democracy in Southern Sudan. PolOff also assured the leaders that UNMIS remained a neutral force.  The SSDF leaders expressed gratitude for this meeting, their first with a U.S. official since the CPA was signed, and said they were now more reassured about the United States and its impartiality. They encouraged the Embassy to maintain contact to help facilitate South-South dialogue and to confront what they described as SPLM lies about their intentions.

By STEINFELD

 

Wikileaks on SPLM Factions: Garangists vs. Kiirists vs. Macharists vs. Separatists vs. Unionists

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000887 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR INR/B AND AF/SPG E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2016 TAGS: PGOV PINR PINS PREL SU  SUBJECT: SOUTHERN SUDAN: POLITICAL FACTIONALISM WITHIN THE SPLM REF: 

KHARTOUM 849 Classified By: CG Juba R. Whitehead, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (C) Summary:

The Sudan People,s Liberation Movement (SPLM) has become the dominant  single political movement in Southern Sudan, and the potential genesis of a one-party state. The July 2005 death of John Garang and the formation of the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) have given the SPLM opportunities to bring rivals and former adversaries into the fold. The enlargement process has intensified factionalism within the SPLM )- by no means a new phenomenon — as the former inner circle of John Garang competes with a bloc coalescing around GoSS President and SPLM Chairman Salva Kiir, and a smaller faction headed by Riek Machar. GoSS President and SPLM Chairman Salva Kiir,s commitment to consensus has  kept the situation in check, although internal tensions remain. Presidential Advisor Malwal reportedly leads a sub-faction within Kiir,s group that was a major factor in the agitations between Kiir and Garang faction. Malwal,s influence over Kiir now seems to be on the decline, to the satisfaction of the Garangists. The following paragraphs chart alliances and internal dynamics.

End summary.

———— SPLM Rampant ————

2. (U) During two decades of civil war, the SPLM experienced a series of internal splits generated by traditional ethnic rivalries, differences over secession, and the autocratic leadership style of John Garang. The Government in Khartoum took full advantage of this process to use factions that hived off from the SPLM as Khartoum,s proxies in the war. Despite its fissiparous tendencies, the SPLM remained the dominant political and military movement in the South. As the Naivasha peace process gained traction, various factions began to return to the fold, beginning with the Equatoria Defense Force in 2004.

3. (SBU) The signature of the CPA in January 2005 accelerated this process. The historical political parties of the South) atrophied, with largely geriatric leadership) provided no serious counterweight. Other forces such as the South Sudan Defense Force (SSDF) remained in the field but were more military than political in nature, although the personal animus of some militia leaders toward John Garang posed a daunting challenge to southern unity, and thus the implementation of the CPA. Garang,s death offered opportunities for compromise that had not been possible before. Since Salva Kiir cut a deal with the most powerful leader of the SSDF, Paolino Matiep, many of the followers of other factions, such as that of Gordon Kong, have reportedly defected to the SPLM.

4. (C) The formation of the GoSS further strengthened the position of the SPLM, which is largely synonymous with the GoSS. With jobs, patronage, and) most importantly) a large infusion of resources at its disposal, the SPLM has consolidated its position as the de facto single dominant party of the South. GoSS ministers from the National Congress (NCP) and other smaller parties have cooperated with their putative SPLM partners; in fact, a number of NCP supporters have defected to the SPLM. USAP, the only other political grouping that can claim even limited support throughout the South, has also fallen into line. Perhaps out of fear of renewed conflict, perhaps due to collective mistrust of the North, the South is more politically unified, and the SPLM more powerful, than it has been in fifteen years.

———– In Place of Inter-Party Politics, Factionalism —————––

5. (C) While the SPLM has no serious political rival in the South, there are internal strains. Three major factions exist on the basis of ethnicity/regionalism and allegiance to the memory and the vision of the late John Garang. The first faction counts those who were closest to Garang and who continue to support to varying degree his vision of a unitary Sudan and the SPLM as a national party. This faction includes Garang relatives, the most senior officers in the SPLA, and prominent SPLM Ministers in the Government of National Unity. Ethnically, this group draws support from Garang,s Dinka Bor clan and most other Dinka groups along the Nile, and the majority of the Shilluk. It also has the allegiance of the small southern tribes along the eastern portion of the border with Kenya and Uganda, although these groups have traditionally vied for greater political power for Equatoria and supported Equatorian politicians within SPLM.

——- Garang Faction: Support for Unity Only if CPA Implemented ———-

6. (C) The Garang faction enjoys the broadest base of any SPLM faction, but it is also the only faction that still pays lip service to Garang,s vision of a unified  Sudan, a concept that is unpopular with a majority of Southerners. As the NCP is increasingly blamed by the GoSS for the laggardly pace of CPA implementation, the Garang faction appears to shifting its stance to support unity only if CPA implementation proceeds. No clear-cut leader has yet emerged within the faction to replace John Garang; his widow Rebecca, SPLM Secretary General Pagan Amum, and GoSS Minister of Regional SIPDIS Cooperation Nhial Deng Nhial appear the most likely candidates. A brief sketch of major members of the Garang faction follows.

— Rebecca Garang:

A Dinka Bor, Rebecca reportedly influenced her late husband,s decisions on whom to advance, or impede, within the SPLM. Opinions are split over her qualifications or ability to seek or manage SPLM leadership. Her stewardship of SPLM finances during the war is frequently raised. She favors a secular, unified Sudan.

— Pagan Amum Okich:

A Shilluk from near Malakal with royal antecedents, he recently replaced Riek Machar as number two in the SPLM hierarchy. The charismatic Amun was one of Garang,s most trusted insiders. He is close to both Rebecca and Nhial Deng. He espouses unity, but not with the vigor of Garang. Noted SPLM lawyer Ghazi Suleiman recently commented to an embassy official that Amum would be a great leader, except he is &too short and too Shilluk.

8 — Nhial Deng Nhial:

A Dinka from Tonj, Bahr el Ghazel, Nhial was a chief negotiator of the CPA. He is highly respected with the SPLM and viewed by many as the de facto leader of the Garang faction, although he has done little to reach out in the public. He supports the unity of Sudan, but only if the North respects full implementation of the CPA.

— Paul Mayom Akec:

The GoSS Presidential Advisor for Legal Affairs, he a Dinka from Rumbek.

— Edward Lino Abyei:

An Ngok Dinka from Abyei, Lino was the long-time head of SPLA external security and intelligence, and as such was feared and disliked by many. He was close to Garang, but has reportedly shifted toward Kiir, possibly in hope of being named Governor of Abyei. Separatists accuse him of being pro-North.

— Gen. Kual Manyang Juuk:

A Dinka Bor from Bor town related to John Garang, he is  GoNU Minister of Transport, Roads and Bridges. He once espoused unity, but has reportedly sought closer ties with Kiir.

— Elijah Malok:

A Dinka Bor and the uncle of John Garang, Malok is Deputy Governor  of the Central Bank and Governor of the Bank of Southern Sudan. His appointment to that position by Garang caused great consternation in the SPLM; many are surprised that he remains in place

— Gen. Oyai Deng Ajak:

A Shilluk from Upper Nile, he is currently Chief of Staff (COS) of the SPLA. He is married to Garang,s daughter. Deng frustrated Kiir,s attempt to move him from the COS slot to Minister of SPLA Affairs.

— Maj. Gen. Salva Matok Deng:

He is SPLA A/COS for Administration. He is a Dinka from Bahr el Ghazel who does not support Kiir.

— Maj. Gen. Bior Ajang:

A Dinka Bor from Upper Nile, he is SPLA A/COS for Operations. Ajang was related to Garang; some claim he was Garang,s son by the widow of Garang,s deceased brother.

— Maj. Gen. Oath Mai:

The SPLA A/COS for Administration, he was one of the few influential Nuer supporters of Garang.

— Maj. Gen. Beng Deng Kuol:

A Dinka Ngok from Abyei, he is a Southern member of the Joint Defense Board (JDB).

— Maj. Gen. Augustino Jadallah:

Of mixed race from Equatoria State, he is a member of the JDB. An erstwhile Garang supporter,  Jadallah has reportedly adopted a more neutral stance of late.

— Maj. Gen. Ahmad al Umdah:

A Nubian from Nuba Mountains, he is a member of the JDB and was close to John Garang.

— Deng Alor Kuol:

The Minister of Cabinet Affairs in the GoNU, Kuol is a Dinka from Abyei. He participated in the Abyei Boundaries Commission and has held a number of senior SPLM jobs. He reportedly favors secession, but only if Abyei is attached to the South.

— Yassir Sa,id Arman:

The former spokesman of the SPLM is from Gezira, in North Sudan, one of the relatively few &Arabs8 in the SPLM. Formerly a member of Garang,s  inner circle, he favors unity and the concept of the New Sudan.

— Malik Aggar Ayar:

From the small Ingasana tribe of Southern Blue Nile, he is currently Minister of Investment in the GoNU. Aggar was critical of Kiir,s initial perceived concessions to the North, but has reportedly moved closer to Kiir. He is said to favor unity because he knows that with separation, Southern Blue Nile would end up in the North.

— Michael Makwei:

A Dinka Bor, Makwei is Minister of Legal Affairs. He is close to both Nhial Deng and Pagan Amum but has reportedly moved away from Rebecca and toward Kiir. Recent comments indicate that he is increasingly leaning toward separation due to the North,s stalling tactics on the CPA.

— Other members of the Garang faction are GoSS Information Minister Samson Kwaje (Fajalla) and Public Service Minister David Deng Athorbei (Dinka from Yirol). Speaker of the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly James Wani Igga, a Bari, has distanced himself from the Garang faction and toward Kiir, partly because of his ambitions in Equatoria, and partly because of his preference for secession.

——- Kiir Faction: Broad SPLA, Ethnic Support; Favors Secession ———

7. (C) The second major SPLM faction consists of those who support Salva Kiir and were put off by the autocratic style of Garang. Most remained within the SPLM throughout the struggle despite their differences with Garang, but a few, includin  Matiep, actively fought against the SPLM. Kiir,s past rivalry with Garang, which came to a head at a December 2004 meeting in Rumbek, has allowed Kiir to court former Garang foes such as Matiep, bring them into the SPLM, and in the process strengthen his own following. 8. (C) The Kiir faction enjoys support among the Dinka in the northwest, especially the Rek and Malual, and from Bahr el Ghazel. Kiir also draws support from the Fertit and Zande — the latter because of conflicts with displaced Dinka Bor in Zande lands in Western Equatoria State ) and, increasingly, the Nuer from Upper  Nile. The SPLA rank and file as well as many junior and mid-level officers support  Kiir, who is perceived more as soldier than politician. In the 2004 confrontation in Rumbek, fifty SPLA commanders reportedly sided with Kiir, and four with Garang. 9. (C) As First Vice President of the GoNU, President of the GoSS and titular head of both the SPLA and the SPLM; Kiir is indisputably the most powerful person in Southern Sudan today. Kiir,s position on Southern secession — which he privately  favors ) is popular with most southerners. He is also the least divisive SPLM leader in ethnic terms: he satisfies the ambitions of the plurality Dinka groups that form the core of the SPLM without raising the specter of Dinka Bor hegemony that troubled other ethnic groups during Garang,s tenure. Most observers think that the Garang faction will nonetheless challenge Kiir,s control of the SPLM, although not necessarily his leadership of the GoSS. Members of Garang,s faction have told Embassy officials that they have no problem following Kiir, but they were  worried about the influence exercised by Presidential Advisor Bona Malwal. Malwal,s influence is reportedly waning as Kiir accedes to the demands of the Garangists.

10. (C) Kiir is well respected in the South, but he does not have the large coterie of powerful followers in the political class or the popular adulation formerly accorded to Garang. The following individuals number among Kiir,s chief supporters.

— Remy Oller Itorong: A Latuka born in Torit in 1944, he is Deputy Speaker of the Council of States. He lived in Khartoum for many years and has limited influence in the South. He leans toward secession.

— Dr. Justin Yac: A Dinka from Bar el Ghazel, as GoSS Minister of Cabinet Affairs,  Yac is arguably the most influential force in day-to-day governance. Yac was SPLM Minister of Health and the one-time head of the SRRC until a falling out with Garang, reportedly over accusations of corruption. He is close to Kiir, but anathema to the Garang faction. He is said to favor separation.

— Bona Malwal: The Minister of Information and Culture under President Nimeiri in the 1970s, Malwal is Dinka Twic. A controversial figure in the South due to his  Northern connections, he is now a Presidential Advisor to President Bashir. The influence Malwal exercises over Kiir, a source of great concern for the Garang faction, seems to be lessening, and Malwal recently denigrated Kiir,s leadership in front of a U.S. diplomat. Malwal reportedly favors unity.

— Albino Akol Akol: A Gogrial Dinka from Bahr el Ghazel, he was a professional army officer in the SAF and was affiliated with SANU and the Southern Front. As the GoSS Minister of Industry, Mining and Industry, he is involved in the all-important petroleum portfolio. Akol leans toward secession if CPA implementation is not respected.

— Anthony Lino Mukana: A Zande from Yambio, Makana is GoSS Minister of Commerce, Trade and Supply. A former SPLA commander, he leans toward secession.

— Maj. Gen. Obutu Mamur Mette: A Latuka from Torit, he is the A/COS of Political Orientation and a member of the JDB. Mamur is the highest-ranking long-time SPLA officer supportive of Kiir, but he reportedly refused to support a rumored Kiir plot to mutiny against Garang. He seems to favor separation.

— Maj. Gen. Paul Malong Awan: A Dinka from Bahr el Ghazel, he was COS of the SPLA 3rd Front in Upper Nile. A Garang dissident and strong supporter of Kiir, he now ensures the personal security of the GoSS President.

— Gen. Thomas Cirilo: A Bari from Equatoria, he commands SPLA forcesCommitted to the JIU.

— Aleu Ayieng Aleu: A Dinka from Bahr el Ghazel, he joined the SPLA in the 1980s and is now State Minister of the Interior in the GoNU. His views on secession/unity are not known.

— Paulino Matip: A Nuer, he was bitterly opposed to John Garang. Kiir surprised the North by convincing Matiep to rejoin the SPLM and bring with him the majority of SSDF fighters under the terms of the Juba Declaration of early 2006. With Matiep moved to the newly created number two position in the SPLA chain of command, Kiir has strengthened his base with the Nuer of Upper Nile, to the detriment of Riek Machar.

— Mary Kiden Wani: A Kuku from Equatoria known for her objectivity, the Minister of Gender and Social Welfare has gravitated toward Kiir.  

— Samuel Abu John: A Zande from Western Equatoria, Abu John is Kiir,s Presidential Advisor for security. Frank and pragmatic, he supports Kiir and favors separation.

— Other reported Kiir supporters are James Kok (Dinka from Aweil), GoSS Telecommunications Minister Gier Cuang Malong (Dinka from Aweil), GoSS Presidential Political Advisor Lual Ding Woll (Dinka Tonj), and Advisor on Gender and Human Rights Awut Deng Achuil (Dinka Tonj), one of the most influential women in the SPLM. Minister of Finance and Economic Development GoSS Arthur Kuein Chol (Dinka Aweil) supported Kiir in the 2004 confrontation with Garang.   

——– Machar Faction: Nuer Chameleon as Southern Wild Card ————

11. (C) The third SPLM faction is headed by GoSS Vice President Riek Machar, a much traveled veteran of southern politics who has cycled in and out of the SPLM. A Nuer from Western Upper Nile, Machar was founder or co-founder of Southern Sudan Democratic Forum, Coordinating Council of South Sudan, and United Democratic Sudanese Forces. Machar,s ambition to lead Southern Sudan is not a secret to anyone, but his frequent switch of allegiances during the war and his signature of the Khartoum Peace Agreement with the National Islamic Front in 1997 alienated many Southerners.

12. (C) Matiep,s alliance with Kiir has reduced Machar,s influence among Machar,s traditional Nuer constituency. Machar has recently sought to bolster his profile by pursuing a series of reconciliation initiatives and by traveling to Nuer areas in the company of Matiep. Pagan Amum,s ascension to Secretary General of the SPLM has somewhat reduced Machar,s influence there. Machar normally pursues his own self-interest by seeking alliances of convenience. He initially worked closely with Kiir, but is believed to be gravitating more toward Rebecca Garang in recent months.

Once a proponent of separation, Machar has recently gone mute on this issue. The following politicians support him:

— Theophilus Ochang Lotti: A Lokuya from Eastern Equatoria, Lotti studied medicine in Italy. He was the founder of the Equatoria Defense Force, an anti-SPLM group, in 1997 and was a co-signatory of the Khartoum Peace Agreement. He was once a separatist.

— John Luk Jok: A Nuer from Upper Nile, Jok is Minister of Culture, Youth and Sport, an MP, and a southern member of the National Petroleum Commission (NPC). He was the SPLA Representative in London in 1985, but in 1994 threw his lot with the South Sudan Liberation Movement.

— Joseph Malwal: A Dinka from Bahr el Ghazel, Malwal is now GoNU Minister of Tourism and Wildlife Resources. He was a founder of the Salvation Democratic Front and later joined the South Sudan Democratic Front. He is reportedly inclined to side with whoever happens to be on top.

— Angelina Teny: A Nuer and the wife of Machar, Teny is GoNU State Minister of Energy and a NPC member. She is one of the most influential women in the SPLM.

— Lam Akol: A Shilluk, Akol is GoNU Foreign Minister, the SPLM,s most significant  national ministry. Perceived in the South as a sell-out to the North, Akol seems largely motivated by his own interests rather than any past ties to Machar. Akol has limited influence in the SPLM.

———————– A Strategy of Consensus ———————–

13. (C) In contrast to Garang, Kiir cultivates a leadership style of consensus and compromise. While Kiir does not have the stature or popular mandate of Garang in the South, he has not been a polarizing force. Kiir,s expansion of the Politburo and elevation of Pagan Amum to the number two slot is a good example of his conciliatory style. Kiir,s willingness to reach out to rivals has helped calm internal turmoil within the SPLM, although tension remains as the Garang faction seeks to regain the status that it collectively and individually enjoyed under the leadership of Garang. Kiir initially maintained good relations with Machar, but there are indications that Machar has pulled back and is seeking to work more closely with Rebecca Garang to prevent Kiir from solidifying his grip on power. A SPLM Minister privately remarked that Kiir, who is frequently outside of the South, has been increasingly unable to control Machar.

14. (C) John Garang,s dominating and autocratic style may have allowed him to succeed as both the First Vice President in the GoNU and the President of the GoSS.  The two positions, however, are not a good fit for Kiir,s inclusive, consultative style. When he is in Juba serving as the GoSS President, he is largely unable to influence actions in the GoNU, and when he is in Khartoum, the factions of the SPLM, most notably Machar, use the opportunity to solidify and increase their power.

———- Internal Dynamics and Looking Ahead ——————

15. (C) While verbal sniping takes place between factions behind closed doors; most observers of the southern scene do not expect imminent seismic upheaval within the SPLM. The three main factions have circled the wagons out of necessity due to the belief that the common adversary remains in the North, and the understanding that delivering the peace dividend to the population must be the SPLM,s top priority if it is to maintain its popular appeal. For now, at least, politics have taken a back seat to governance.

16. (C) A traditional military coup against Kiir seems unlikely, although the old maxim of &never say never8 applies. A few supporters of the Garang faction in the senior ranks of the SPLA reportedly still harbor animosity over Kiir,s 2004 challenge to Garang, but there is no indication of serious plans to use force to topple Kiir. A far more likely scenario for instability would be a spontaneous military mutiny at some SPLA garrison sparked by GoSS/SPLM failure to pay salaries, to improve training and physical conditions in which soldiers live, and to maintain discipline in the ranks.

17. (C) Machar is expected to contest SPLM leadership with Kiir at the next SPLM congress, but senior members of the Garang faction may be prepared to bide their time and challenge Kiir,s control of SPLM mechanisms rather than his leadership. Upcoming events will help gauge where the fault lines run, and how far various factions are willing to push. The SPLM Politburo meeting in early April featured Pagan Amum acting for the first time as second in rank to Kiir in his role as SPLM Secretary General (SG). As the SG, Amum is responsible for convening the SPLM party congress by the end of the year, potentially as early as May but more likely later. During the recent meeting (reftel), factional in-fighting seemed to be kept to a minimum. While the Garang faction will continue to strive for increased control of the levers of power, smart money has it that Kiir will remain the party,s chosen leader, and not just the custodial heir of John Garang.

By STEINFELD

 

Wikileaks on LRA and Riek Machar

S E C R E T KHARTOUM 000713 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR L, S/CT, IO, AF/RSA E.O. 12958: 
DECL: 03/20/2016 TAGS: PREL PTER MARR MOPS PINS PGOV PINR SU UN 

SUBJECT: SPLA CHIEF OF STAFF SAYS GOSS OFFICIALS KNOW WHERE KONY IS AND ARE NEGOTIATING  Classified By: P/E Chief Eric Whitaker for reasons: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)  

1. (S) Summary: During a meeting between Consul General (CG) Juba and SPLA Chief of Staff Oyai Deng on 
March 18, Deng said that the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) is in direct contact with Lord's Resistance
 Army (LRA) chief Joseph Kony. He said that GoSS Vice President Riek Machar is negotiating with Kony, 
and that Kony is currently in a camp "a few miles" off the road between Maridi and Lafon. End Summary. 

2. (S) When CG asked if rumors of SPLA operations against the LRA around Maridi and Yei were true,
 Deng replied that the SPLA in fact was engaged in more friendly contacts. GoSS Vice President Riek Machar 
had contacted Kony, who had agreed to talks. Deng deflected questions about what was on the table, noting 
only that "we want to find out what they want." He continued that the SPLA had in fact launched operations 
against LRA elements around Maridi and Yei in response to LRA attacks. Deng thought it was strange that
 the LRA continued to attack while engaged in friendly talks with the GoSS, and thought this might 
indicate a command and control issue in the LRA. He then said Kony was based a "few miles" off the 
road between Maridi and Lafon. Deng appeared reticent to offer more; CG did not press. 

3. (S) COMMENT: This conversation raises several troubling questions: If Riek Machar indeed knows Joseph
 Kony's location and is not assisting in his capture, does this make Machar complicit in continuing LRA
 atrocities? If so, does this make Machar indictable by the International Criminal Court? What are the 
legal ramifications for the GoSS if, as it appears, it refrains from pursuing Kony, so as to pursue a 
peace agreement with him?

End comment. STEINFELD

Wikileaks on SPLM Leadership under Salva Kiir

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000513 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958:  DECL: 02/28/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR SU SUBJECT:  SUDAN: AN ANALYSIS OF THE NEW SPLM LEADERSHIP LINE-UP REF: A. KHARTOUM 219 B. KHARTOUM 229 Classified  By: DCM Andrew Steinfeld for reasons: Section 1.4(b) and (d) 

——————- Summary and Comment ——————-

1. (U) SUMMARY and COMMENT: In preparation for an upcoming national convention, SPLM Chairman and Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) President Salva Kiir announced the  reformation of the SPLM leadership council, dissolved by John Garang just before his  death in July 2005. The leadership council, broken down into an Interim Executive Committee and a more senior Interim Political Bureau, is an important step in the  restructuring of the SPLM into a political party (Note: The committees are interim  until confirmed by a convention). Kiir also announced the formation of the SPLM Secretariat and secretariats for Southern Sudan and southern sector states. SIPDIS No separate secretariat for northern Sudan was announced, although northern states South Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile are included in the southern sector states secretariat.

2. (C) The committees may be a response to calls for reform made by former members of Garang’s inner circle as outlined to Assistant Secretary Frazer during her last visit to Khartoum (ref A). During that meeting, the group mentioned two things they wanted Salva Kiir to do: publicly complain about the NCP stalling CPA implementation, and form a new leadership committee to reform and refocus the SPLM. A month later, he has done both (ref B). 3. (U) While Kiir’s list generally follows the ranking set by Garang before his death, there are a few significant variations, most notably giving the number 2 position to Pagan Amum. Rebecca Garang is number 32 on the Executive Committee and number 21 on the Political Bureau. It is also worth noting that no active duty SPLA soldiers are on the list. End Summary and Comment.

————————– A Mixed Bag for Garangists ————————–

3. (C) Although the formation of these two councils seems to be at the behest of the Garang inner circle, the listing shows both good and bad for those closest to the former leader. While the announcement does not specifically say that the Executive Committee list is numbered according to rank order within the party, the SPLM has been very hierarchical and the list is nearly identical to the ranking put out by John Garang and used to determine leadership after his death. The listing is completely independent of position within the GoSS or Government of National Unity (GNU), with some GNU ministers listed lower than State Ministers and GoSS Advisors.

4. (C) The most significant change from the previous list, and the only change in the top 15, is the position of Pagan Amum, a close associate of Dr. Garang, who maintains the title of Secretary General but is listed at number 2, up from number 11. However, other members of Garang’s inner circle do not necessarily fare as well. Most remain unchanged, but Rebecca Garang, previously unlisted because of the role she held while her husband is alive, is listed as number 32.

The other notable additions to the list—

Telar Ring Deng (17), Aleu Ayieny Aleu (18), Dr. Tabithat Butrus Shokia (19), Rev. Dr. Harun Lual Ruun (20), John Luk Jok (36), and Remy Oler (42)– are thought to be close to Salva Kiir.

— — Political Bureau Better for Garangist and North ——————

5. (C) The more senior, 23-member Interim Political Bureau follows the ranking of  the Interim Executive Committee exactly for the first 18 positions. However, the final five positions give a bump to Rebecca Garang, Awut Deng Acuil, and northern party members Dr. Mansour Khalid and Yassir Arman. All are part of the Garang inner-circle; they would not have been in the Political Bureau had Kiir taken only the top 23 names from the executive committee list. Northern SPLM spokesperson Walid Hamid serves on neither committee.

—– Text of the Chairman’s Resolutions ———————

6. (U) The following is the text of SPLM Chairman’s Resolution No. 5 establishing the Interim Political Bureau and signed by Salva Kiir on February 21, 2006.  

KHARTOUM 00000513 002 OF 003

(Begin Text) Considering His Excellency, the late leader and Chairman of the SPLM, Council’s Resolution No.1 of July 2005, dissolving the Leadership Council; In view of the Chairman’s Resolution Lt. Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit, Resolution  No. 3 of August 2005, re-instating the Leadership Council and focusing on the  importance of realizing effective political leadership of the SPLM to the transitional process, I, Lt. Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit, Chairman of the SPLM hereby re-institute and expand the SPLM Leadership Council and forming it to serve as an Interim Political Bureau and National Executive Council pending holding of the Second National Convention.  

I – Interim Political Bureau

1. Lt. Gen Salva Kiir Mayardit, SPLM Chairman 2. Mr. Pagan Amum Okiech, SPLM Secretary General 3. Dr. Riek Machar Teny, Member 4. Mr. James Wani Igga, Member 5. Mr. Daniel Awet Akol, Member 6. Mr. Kuol Manyang Juk, Member 7. Mr. Lual Ding Wol, Member 8. Mr. Nhial Deng Nhial, Member 9. Mr. Samuel Abu John, Member 10. Mr. Malik Agar Iyre, Member 11. Mr. Deng Aloor Kuol, Member 12. Mr. John Kong Nyuon, Member 13. Mr. Abdel Aziz Adam El Hilu, Member 14. Dr. Lam Akol Ajawin, Member 15. Dr. Theopholus Ochang, Member  16. Dr. Peter Nyot Kok, Member 17. Mr. Telar Ring Deng, Member 18. Mr. Aleu Anyieny Aleu, Member 19. Dr. Mansour Khalid, Member 20. Mrs. Awut Deng Acuil, Member 21. Mrs. Rebecca Nyadeng de Mabior, Member 22. Dr. Tabitha Butrus Shokai, Member 23.  Mr, Yasir Saeed Arman, Member

II – SPLM Interim Executive Committee

1. Lt. Gen Salva Kiir Mayardit, SPLM Chairman 2. Mr. Pagan Amum Okiech, SPLM Secretary General 3. Dr. Riek Machar Teny, Member 4. Mr. James Wani Igga, Member 5. Mr. Daniel Awet Akol, Member 6. Mr. Kuol Manyang Juk, Member 7. Mr. Lual Ding Wol, Member 8. Mr. Nhial Deng Nhial, Member 9. Mr. Samuel Abu John, Member 10. Mr. Malik Agar Iyre, Member 11. Mr. Deng Aloor Kuol, Member 12. Mr. John Kong Nyuon, Member 13. Mr. Abdel Aziz Adam El Hilu, Member 14. Dr. Lam Akol Ajawin, Member 15. Dr. Theopholus Ochang, Member 16. Dr. Peter Nyot Kok, Member 17. Mr. Telar Ring Deng, Member 18. Mr. Aleu Anyieny Aleu, Member 19. Dr. Tabitha Butrus Shokai, Member 20. Rev. dr. Harun Lual Ruun, Member 21. Mr. Paul Mayom Akee, Member 22. Fr. George L. Kinga, Member 23. Mr. Kosti Manibe, Member 24. Prof. George Bureng Nyombe, Member 25. Dr. Justin Yaac Arop, Member 26. Mr. Michael Makuei Lueth, Member 27. Mr. David Deng Athorbei, Member 28. Mr. Timothy Tot Chol, Member 29. Mr. William Ajal Deng, Member 30. Dr. Mansour Khalid, Member 31. Mr. Yasir Saeed Arman, Member 32. Mrs. Rebecca Nyadeng de Mabior, Member 33. Mrs. Awut Deng Acuil, Member 34. Mr. Anthony Lino Makana, Member 35. Arthur Akuen Chol, Member 36. Mr. John Luk Jok, Member 37. Dr. Samson L. Kwaje, Member 38. Mr. Gier Chuang Aluong, Member 39. Dr. Ann Itto, Member 40. Dr. Festo Kumba, Member 41. Mrs. Mary Kiden, Member 42. Dr. Remy Oler, Member 43. Mr. Atem Garang Deng de Kuek, Member 44. Dr. Luka Manoje, Member 45. Dr. Luka Biong Beng, Member 46. Mrs. Jemma Nunu Kumba, Member 47. Dr. Prescilla Nyanyang, Member

KHARTOUM 00000513 003 OF 003

48. Mr. Hussien Mar Nyut, Member 49. Mr. Ramadan Shemeila, Member 50. Mr, Deng Monydit, Member 51. Mr. Peter Bashir Bandi, Member 52. Mrs. Abuk Paiti Ayiik, Member 53. Mr. Kom Kom Geg, Member 54. Mr. William Wur Derdor, Member 55. Mrs. Mary Nyawulang, Member 56. Prof. Barry Wanji, Member  57. Mr. Nartisio Loloke, Member Done under my hand on this day (21.2.06) February, 2006, Juba, Southern Sudan (Signature) Lt. Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit Chairman, Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) (End Text) 7. (U) The following is the text of SPLM Chairman’s Resolution No. 4 establishing the SPLM Secretariat, the Southern Secretariat and the Southern Sector States Secretariat, also signed by Slava Kiir on February 21, 2006. SIPDIS

Begin text

Reflecting on the SPLM Chairman’s Resolution, His Excellency our late leader Dr. John Garang de Mabior Resolution No. 1 of July 2005, dissolving the SPLM Leadership Council, and Resolution No. 2 of July 2005 appointing supervisors for Southern and Northern Sectors, I, Lt. Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit, Chairman of the SPLM hereby make the following dispositions and appointments: 1) Interim Secretariat for the purpose of preparing and organizing the SPLM in preparation to holding of the SPLM National Convention 2) Interim Southern Sudan Secretariat and 3) Interim Southern Sector States Secretariat  

I- Interim SPLM Secretariat

1. Mr. Pagan Amum Okiech, Secretary General 2. Mr. Abdel-Aziz Adam El-Hilu, Deputy Secretary General Northern Sector 3. Dr. Luka Manoja, Deputy Secretary General Southern Sector 4. Dr. Luka Biong Deng, National Treasurer 5. Mr. Peter Agoth Liol, Deputy National Treasurer

II- Interim Southern Sudan Secretariat

1. Dr. Luka Manoja, Deputy Secretary General 2. Mr. James Lual Deng Kuel, Secretary for Political and Organizational Affairs 3. Mr. Gabriel Alaak Garang, Secretary for Administration 4. Mr. Lawrence Korbandi, Secretary for States Affairs 5. Mr. Martin Majut, Secretary for Syndicated Organizations 6. Mr. Mading Deng Kuol, Secretary for Information and Culture 7. Mr. Henry Wani Rondiang, Secretary for External Affairs 8. Mr. Simon Kiman Lado, Treasurer

III- Interim Southern sector States Secretariat

1. Mr. Antipas Nyok, Jonglei 2. Mr. Felix Otudaha, Eastern Equatoria 3. Mr. Bukulu Edward, Western Equatoria 4. Mr. Stephen Wondu, Central Equatoria (Note: Currently known as Bahr el-Jabal, although an official name change is expected soon. End Note.) 5. Mr. Khor Diew Gai, Upper Nile 6. Mr. John Mangok, Warrap 7. To be appointed after consultation with the state, Unity 8. Mr. Samuel Mathiang Keer, Lakes 9. Mr. Efisio Kon Uguak, Western Bahr el Ghazal 10. Mr. Ajou Garang Deng, Northern Bahr el Ghazal 11. Simon Kalu, Southern Kordofan 12. Mr, Jabir Bakheit, Southern Blue Nile Done under my hand on this day February, 2006, Juba, Southern Sudan (Signature) Lt. Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit Chairman, Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM)

End Text

By HUME

 

Wikileaks on John Luk and Lou Disarmament in 2006

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000292 SIPDIS SIPDIS, SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV MOPS PINR SU  SUBJECT: SOUTHERN SUDAN: Fighting in Jonglei State  1. (U) SUMMARY: In a meeting with CG Juba, Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) Minister of Culture, Youth, and Sports John Luc Jok spoke about the recent fighting  in the Jonglei area. The minister is from Jonglei state, and has been in contact with all the parties involved. According to Jok, on February 3, fighting broke out during an SPLA mission to disarm locals in Yuai, Jonglei state. The disarmament had been pre-arranged and approved by a local militia leader and village chief. However, many youths, who believed they needed their guns to protect their cattle during the  upcoming migration, refused to be disarmed. Local militia ambushed an SPLA force,  and a firefight left 60 dead, mostly in the SPLA (Note: some papers have been reporting over 200 dead, while South Sudan Defense Force Chief of Staff Paulino Matip  claims only 12 dead. End note.) There have been no reports of retaliation, and the situation is now calm but tense, according to Jok. All sides will meet in a conference to try to resolve outstanding issues. End Summary.  -------- Disagreement over Disarming --------------------- 2. (U) During a conference with the SPLA/SSDF in January, local Dinka and Nuer chiefs agreed to disarmament of non- military personnel, with regional security provided by a united SPLA/SSDF force. The SPLA decided began with Nuer cattle herders around Yuai, the are from which the "White Army" originates (Note: the original White Army was responsible for the Bor massacre in 1991, although it is unclear what relationship this group in Yuai shares with that White Army, if any. End note.) This force of 1,200 went in after receiving permission from the White Army commander on the ground, Lt. Col. Yousef Biliu, and the local chief. 3. (U) Although Nuer leaders had approved, young Nuer men from the area decided not to disarm. With Yuai completely dry, these herders were planning a seasonal migration to Ayod and Bor, and they believed they would  need their weapons to protect their cattle from theft by the Merle in Ayod and the Dinka in Bor, neither of whom had been disarmed. After an initial argument between local armed herders with SPLA advance officers in a local market, a larger  SPLA contingent arrived, expecting no trouble. Upon arrival, the locals, joined by members of the White Army and affiliated elements of the South Sudan Defense Force (SSDF), attacked the arriving SPLA group. According to Jok, the ensuing firefight left at least 60 dead, mostly from the SPLA. Not all casualties were from direct combat, as some SPLA troops fled into the bush, became lost, and subsequently died of thirst. Several SPLA troops were captured, but have since been released. -------- Gatwick Called to Restore Order; Nuer Prophet Killed --------------- 4. (SBU) UNMIS coordinator for the south, James Ellery, agreed to fly Major General Simon Gatwick, a former White Army commander who has now joined the SPLA  but had periodically been allied with the SSDF, to mediate in Yuai. Gatwick, who  has great influence in the region, defused the situation and managed to bring the  detained SPLA officers back to Juba. 5. (U) The Nuer prophet Wut Nyang Garakek  was killed while taking part in the mediation effort. Reputedly a member of the White Army who led the troops on the ground during the Bor Massacre, Nyang believed  he still had influence in the area. However, last year, a different self-proclaimed prophet had led a group of Nuer from Jonglei to the "Promised Land" near Akobo, and established a cult that engaged in strange  rituals, such as women walking around naked. After this experience, Minister Yok reported that Nyang was killed because the already overwrought locals were no longer tolerant of such prophets.  --------------- The Way Forward --------------- 6. (SBU) General Gatwich is in Juba assembling a delegation of pastors, SPLA, SSDF, and the governor of Jonglei, with plans to return to Yuai to help defuse the situation and find a durable solution to permit the Nuer migration. The Merle and Dinka have heard about the SPLA ambush, and reportedly have said that they would attack armed Yuai cattle herders who come to Ayod or Bor. Migration is essential for the survival of thirsty Yuai  KHARTOUM 00000292 002 OF 002 cattle. Current plans are for a robust SSDF/SPLA force to secure the area, disarm, and provide protection for the Nuer. Gatwich also plans to meet with the local armed elements to explain the Juba Declaration and regarding their commanders' decision to join the SPLA, which seems to be poorly understood. SPLA soldiers involved in the original incident have reportedly been called back to Juba for an investigation of what happened and who started it. ---------------- Stirring the Pot ---------------- 7. (SBU) COMMENT: Minister Jok's detailed account of the events in Jonglei matches  other credible accounts. On February 7, SSDF Chief of Staff Paulino Matip held a press conference in Khartoum and gave a similar story (only the casualty count  varied). A spokesperson for Gordon Kong has claimed that it was a larger massacre  of over 200 civilians, including women and children, as part of an effort to neutralize the "new" SSDF. His account claimed that SPLA forces are roaming the area, robbing and killing with impunity. However, he is an unreliable source. The locals that the SPLA were attempting to disarm had not joined Kong's forces, and in fact had joined, theoretically, the SPLA. The National Congress Party (NCP) has cited Kong's account of events and called for a full investigation of this "CPA violation." Jok claims this is another case of the North blowing an incident out of proportion to "stir the pot." Southern Sudan remains a highly charged stew of tribes, militias, cattle raiders, prophets, and profiteers, so future incidents, exaggerated press reports, and ongoing accusations are likely to continue.  HUME

Wikileak on Bona Malwal

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000914 SIPDIS DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A/S, AF/C, AF/E
NSC FOR MGAVIN
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/07/2019
TAGS: PINS PHUM PGOV UN AU SU SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR BONA MALWAL DISCUSSES
ELECTIONS, SOUTHERN WOES KHARTOUM 00000914 001.7 OF 002 Classified By: CDA Robert E. Whitehead, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (C) Summary:

Charge d’Affaires Whitehead met with
Presidential Adviser Bona Malwal on July 29 at the latter,s
request. A former minister in the late 1970s under Nimeiri
and a long-time antagonist of the late John Garang, Malwal
continues to pursue politics in the South while maintaining
strong contacts with the North. He addressed the national
political landscape in the context of upcoming elections, and
delivered his usual blistering critique of governance in the
South. Malwal pitched the option of extending the 2005
Comprehensive Peace Agreement’s six year interim period for
two more years, until 2013. However, this is a proposal that
will find no support from the south’s Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement (SPLM). End Summary.

ELECTIONS

2. (C)  Malwal opened the discussion by stating that the
National Congress Party (NCP) strongly supports 2010 national
elections due to their  huge advantage in organization and
resources.  The NCP also believes, he said, that the
elections will serve as referendum on the International
Criminal Court (ICC) indictment of President Bashir.  He
noted  that as things now stand, Bashir would emerge
victorious from the polls because the traditional political
parties in the North are moribund and no new political
groupings have emerged.  He was dismissive of Mirghani and
the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) as a spent force, and he
said that he was increasing puzzled by the “bizarre” behavior
of Sadiq Al Mahdi and his Umma Party.  Malwal said that he
had broken contact with al Mahdi after a “wasted” meeting in
which the former prime minister described his intention to
form an alliance between Umma and the NCP, only to announce a
few days later that he had come to an agreement with Khalil
Ibrahim’s Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).  Malwal added
that al Mahdi was interested in changing the government but
not the system, and Ibrahim was intent only on taking over
the system by force.

WOE IS THE SOUTH—————-

3. (C) Malwal further asserted that the SPLM has no
competitive candidate to run for the national presidency in
2010 and that the South would prefer that there be no
elections at all.  He continued that the senior leadership of
the SPLM was intent on moving straight to the referendum
instead, because the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS)
could not run on its record of four years of governance:
“there is no semblance of a government in Juba able to evolve
into an independent state.”  He accused the SPLM of having no
sympathy for the average person in the South, and said that
the only way to avoid a “Somaliazation” of Sudan was to
protect the “victimized” population of the South by encamping
the Sudanese People,s Liberation Army (SPLA).  He claimed
the SPLA was the only southern institution with any real
power, and that the 2005 CPA interim period should be
extended by two years to 2013.  In his view, the latter would
give the South more time to prepare to govern itself.

4. (C) Malwal,s few good words were reserved for GOSS
President and Government of National Unity (GNU) First Vice
President Salva Kiir. (Note.  Malwal and Kiir are reportedly
close due to common ties to Warrap State.  End note)  Malwal
said that Kiir was hard to read and had few original ideas of
his own, but that he would be the “ideal” leader of the South
in a peaceful period.  Unfortunately, Malwal continued, Kiir
was ill-suited for the difficult environment that currently
prevailed.  He went on to describe the SPLM,s inability to
quell tribal conflicts throughout its territory and
criticized authorities in Juba for preventing other political
parties from operating.  He described the travails of his own
South Sudan Democratic Forum (SSDF), claiming that the GoSS
had blocked his vehicles from carrying him into the
countryside and had arrested his bodyguards.  He said that
during the SSDF,s last congress in Juba, police had
physically wrestled away his microphone to prevent him from
delivering his thirty-page, two-hour concluding speech (Note:
Quite possibly to the relief of what he claimed was an
audience of 4,000. End Note.)  KHARTOUM 00000914  002.3 OF 002

5. (C) Comment: We provide Malwal,s comments for what they
are worth.  His description of the state of political parties
in the North encapsulates the pre-electoral period
accurately, and there are indications that the SPLM is not as
enthusiastic about elections as its putative GNU partner, the
NCP.  The SPLM has struggled with governance issues, although
not as badly as Malwal claims, and he was hopelessly off the
mark in his belief that there is any possibility that the
SPLM would be willing to wait until 2013 to schedule a
referendum in the South.  He was also off target about his
own appeal in the South and the popularity of the SSDF.  A
long-time antagonist of John Garang with close ties to the
North, Malwal  is widely-viewed by most Southerners of our
acquaintance as a stalking horse for the NCP, the Lam Akol of
yore.

Charge d’Affaires Whitehead

Wikileak on Dr. Lam Akol

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000422 SIPDIS DEPT FOR A A/S CARTER, SE GRATION, AF/SPG, 
AF/E NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON DEPT PLS PASS TO USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958:
 DECL: 03/24/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO SOCI KDEM ASEC AU SU SUBJECT: WILY LAM AKOL CLAIMS SPLM WILL STAND 
WITH BASHIR UNTIL 2011 REF: 

A. KHARTOUM 326 ¶B. KHARTOUM 315 ¶C. KHARTOUM 313 ¶D. KHARTOUM 306 ¶E.

KHARTOUM 250 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Alberto Fernandez, reasons 1.4(b) and 

(d) 1. (C) Summary. 

Dr. Lam Akol, well-known Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement (SPLM) turncoat and former Government of National
 Unity (GNU) Minister of Foreign Affairs, told CDA that he would pass a message to the National Congress 
Party (NCP) that if it wants to engage with the new U.S. administration, it must communicate that clearly 
to USG officials sooner rather than later. Akol said that engagement with the U.S. is a central part of
 Sudan's foreign policy and that in private the NCP has always stated that it wanted dialogue with the U.S.
 Akol said that the NCP believes that the USG is still "bent on" Government of Sudan (GoS) regime change 
and is frustrated by past U.S. promises that were never kept. Akol, who was recently ridiculed by the 
SPLM for veering from the party line, said that the SPLM would stand with Bashir until 2011 because of the 
importance of the referendum on southern self-determination. He criticized the Government of Southern 
Sudan (GoSS), stating that it had not done a good job of delivering peace dividends to the people of the 
South. He also criticized the leadership of GoSS President Salva Kiir Mayardit and GNU Minister of Foreign
 Affairs Deng Alor. While admitting that the South is not without its problems, the CDA told Akol that the
 U.S. stands firmly behind Salva Kiir in his leadership of the GoSS and the SPLM and stands ready to
 single out the NCP or any of its "actors" (e.g, Lam Akol) should they try to provoke unnecessary conflict
 in the South. End Summary. 

2. (C) CDA Fernandez met with infamous Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement (SPLM)
 "turncoat" and former Government of National Unity (GNU) Foreign Minister Dr. Lam Akol on 24 March 
at Akol's impressive new Southern Khartoum digs, which boasted armed Sudanese police presence. 
Akol, who was accused (again) by the SPLM on March 17 for "departing from the party line" and threatened 
with expulsion, had just returned from a trip to London and was in good spirits. CDA asked Akol for his 
sense of the post-ICC situation, particularly regarding the National Congress Party's (NCP's) recent 
actions, including the INGO expulsions, and its perceived attitude of disinterest in engagement with the
 USG. (ref D) 

3. (C) Akol told the CDA that the "whole thing" boils down to the historically unfriendly
 relationship between the NCP and the USG. He said that the NCP was disappointed that the USG did not 
follow through on many of its earlier promises, such as Sudan's removal from the state sponsor of 
terrorism list and the lifting of sanctions, after the NCP signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA) in 2005. "They don't believe anything has changed; they believe that the U.S. treats them the same 
way it did pre-CPA," explained Akol. While they are grateful to the countries that stood behind the CPA, 
they have not changed their opinion that America is bent on overthrowing the regime," continued Akol.

 4. (C) CDA explained that the new U.S. administration has been open-minded, has not set the policy in
 stone yet and is willing to talk to the NCP, but that the NCP's reckless and provocative actions since 
the ICC's March 4 issuance of an arrest warrant for GNU President Bashir communicate a message to the USG
 that Sudan prefers to escalate and isolate rather than engage. Akol explained that President 
Bashir's heated and anti-Western rhetoric since March 4 was a tool to mobilize the Sudanese public in his 
defense; something that former National Islamic Front (NIF) leader turned political opposition figure 
Hassan Al-Turabi wielded in the early 1990s for the same purpose (ref B). "The President says things 
that are impromptu sometimes," yet as a Head of State he must weigh what he says, said Akol. He felt that 
the NCP's actions in expelling the NGOs from Darfur were caused by a need to appear strong before the
 world after the ICC arrest warrant. CDA countered that the decision made the regime look 'emotional,
 weak, and incompetent." 

AKOL PROMISES TO PASS MESSAGE TO NCP - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
KHARTOUM 00000422 002 OF 003 

5. (C) Akol agreed with the CDA that the NCP should engage the new U.S. administration. It is important 
to establish a dialogue, he said. He suggested that a dialogue about the INGO expulsions would be valuable,
 but that the USG must approach and engage the NCP wisely (i.e. - in a face-saving way) on the issue in 
order to get a successful response. CDA told Akol that the USG had indeed privately proposed a face-saving 
way for the two nations to discuss the expulsions right after the action was taken, but that the NCP would 
not meet or talk with USG officials in the aftermath of the March 4 ICC verdict. (refs A and B) The way we 
see it is that the NCP had slammed the door in our face, said the CDA. They were sending us the perhaps 
erroneous message that they wanted to escalate, he suggested. If they want dialogue with the Americans, 
then they should tell that to the U.S. administration, said the CDA. Akol responded that the
 NCP's post-ICC behavior is strange because they always tell us that they want dialogue with the Americans.
 I will tell them - how dare you cut off dialogue with the U.S., said Akol, noting that he was sure
 "the smart ones" among the NCP will soon reassert themselves. Engagement with the U.S. is part of our 
central foreign policy; we must always engage with the U.S., said the former GNU Foreign Minister.
 Akol went on to criticize one of his SPLM rivals and successor as GNU Foreign Minister Deng Alor. 
"Where has Deng been?" he asked. "Why has he not done anything in response to this?" "When I was Foreign
 Minister (2005-2007) the lines of communication between the U.S. and Sudan were always open," he stated, 
conveniently forgetting his own past of sloth and obfuscation. Akol promised CDA that he would pass the 
message on to GNU presidential advisors and Bashir's close confidants Ghazi Salah Eddin and Nafie Ali Nafie.

 THE SOUTH JUST WANTS TO GET TO 2011, SAYS LAM - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

 6. (C) Dr. Akol told CDA that the CPA "is the first and last opportunity" for Southerners to have the 
right to self-determination and suggested that it must do whatever it takes to get to 2011. Our priorities 
are not your priorities sometimes, he explained. We believe there is a disproportionate amount of focus 
from the international community on democratic transformation and change in the North, said Akol.
 Yes, democratic transformation and respect for human rights are important, but our (i.e., southerners')
 priority now is the referendum and breaking the cycle of military government-rule, said Akol.
 "Our loyalty to the CPA makes us stand with Bashir as the President of the GNU," he announced.
 We are with Bashir until 2011 when the referendum occurs - if he doesn't allow the referendum to happen,
 then we'll fight. He noted that the SPLM fears that if elections are delayed, the referendum also will 
be delayed. After 2011, "you can do to Bashir whatever you want." 

7. (C) As the SPLM and partners in the GNU, we are dealing only with the consequences of the ICC now, 
not the legality of it. Akol asserted that Bashir will not be arrested in Sudan by his own people and that
 the NCP is not divided in his support for Bashir. "They (the NCP) know that today it's Bashir 
(being hounded by the ICC), but that tomorrow it could be any one of them," he said. According to Akol, 
the UNSC has two options: to defer the issuance of the ICC warrant for up to a year or to endorse the
 issuance of the warrant and move forward with the consequences it may bring. He explained that in the 
short-to medium-term, the arrest warrant has increased Bashir's popularity significantly.
The NCP will no doubt play on this, he said. And if Bashir wins national elections - which he will, 
said Akol - it is just another action that will serve to prove his legitimacy in the eyes of the NCP. 
Reiterating his message, Akol said, "Until 2011, we (the SPLM), need to keep the GoS regime on track; 
we need to make sure there is no regime change." 

8. (C) Akol lambasted the GoSS for lack of progress in implementing the CPA in the South. 
He pointed to the GoSS' inability to provide services to its people, lack of good governance, 
and problems related to insecurity. "If the CPA is to win or fail, it will be in the South," he said.
 We fought a war in order to improve things, but there has been a lot of "mal-administration" in the
 South since the war ended, opined the wily Akol. CDA told Akol that the USG is aware of and concerned 
about the South's internal problems - managerially, economically, and politically - and said that the 
new U.S. administration would likely focus even more on southern Sudan than U.S. administrations had in 
the past.

 KHARTOUM 00000422 003 OF 003 

Akol stated that the Bush Administration's policies were problematic because they divided the Government 
of Sudan into "good guys and bad guys" and did the same within the SPLM/GoSS. "This is not good for the 
SPLM, nor the country," he said. 

9. (C) Akol also took the opportunity to jab at his own party - "If you 
criticize them, they think you are bought by the Arabs or the NCP," he said. The CDA subtly cautioned 
Akol not to intentionally create friction within the SPLM or problems in the South. "We are aware of the
 problems in South Sudan and we are watching hard to see if the NCP or any NCP actors are fishing in 
troubled waters," said the CDA. If the NCP plays this game with actors such as General Gordon Kong or 
Gabriel Tanginiya, there will be a price to pay, the CDA warned (ref E). In a thinly-veiled reference to
 Akol himself (who is highly susceptible to NCP persuasion), the CDA said that if the USG sees NCP agents 
purposefully destroying the South, the USG will single those people out. Akol responded that the problem 
lies within the SPLM itself. "There is a lack of tolerance and views permitted," he alleged. They are 
dividing themselves and they don't suffer criticism, he added. CDA told Akol that the USG is committed to
 helping the SPLM/GoSS overcome its problems. Spoken like a true turncoat, "My personal opinion is that 
Salva Kiir will not deliver," said Akol. Kiir has a position in Juba, a position in Khartoum, a position
 in Kampala, he continued. "This is not the way to lead," concluded Akol. CDA advised Akol that the USG 
fully supports Salva Kiir in his position as GoSS President and Chairman of the SPLM and made it clear
 that the USG will not undermine his authority. 

COMMENT - - - - 

10. (C) While some things the slithery Akol says need to be taken with a grain of salt, particularly
 when it involves the SPLM or the GoSS, he does have useful insider information about the NCP's thinking 
and can communicate important messages to NCP heavyweights using his direct channels of communication 
within the regime. As a former GNU Minister of Foreign Affairs, Akol is aware of the danger posed by 
a lack of dialogue between the USG and the GoS and realizes the importance of the NCP indicating interest
 in engagement with the new U.S. administration. His assessment that the South is more interested in the
 2011 referendum on self-determination than any other aspects of the CPA, and that it will do what is 
necessary to get there is probably true. An indicted, delegitimized Bashir and an SPLM that desperately 
wants its referendum are likely to strike political deals that put both parties where they want to be. 
The CDA's thinly-veiled hint that the USG will act against NCP agents that negatively interfere in the 
South was partly aimed at Akol, who is known for his sometimes-nefarious, NCP-inspired activities meant 
to create divisions within the SPLM and create chaos in the South. Unfortunately, he is not the only tool
 the NCP can use against the South. 

FERNANDEZ

Wikileak On SPLM/A’s Internal Struggle.

Viewing cable 06KHARTOUM219, A/S FRAZER BREAKFAST WITH SPLM

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
06KHARTOUM219	2006-01-29 10:58	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Khartoum

Viewing cable 06KHARTOUM219, A/S FRAZER BREAKFAST WITH SPLM

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
06KHARTOUM219	2006-01-29 10:58	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Khartoum

VZCZCXRO5307 PP RUEHROV DE RUEHKH #0219/01 0291058 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 291058Z JAN 06 FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1222 INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE RUEHTRO/USLO TRIPOLI 0022
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000219 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, AF/SPG E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR SU SUBJECT: A/S FRAZER BREAKFAST WITH SPLM KHARTOUM 00000219 001.2 OF 002 Classified  By: POL: Michael Honigstein for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (C) Summary. On January 25, Assistant Secretary Jendayi Frazer, Roger Winter, and the Charge met with three senior SPLM officials resident in Khartoum: Yassir Arman, Chairman of the SPLM National Assembly Caucus; Malik Agar, Government of National Unity (GNU) Minister of investment; and Deng Alor,  GNU Minister of Cabinet Affairs. They said that the SPLM was drifting due to the leadership of GNU First Vice President Salva Kiir. They explained that Kiir is the only one who could lead the SPLM, but said he did not represent the mainstream, and warned that the party could collapse if Kiir did not take action. The trio also said the NCP has attempted to divide and neuter the SPLM leadership in the GNU. A/S Frazer responded that the U.S. interest was the transformation of the governance of Sudan and emphasized that SPLM officials should  manage their ministries to effect this change. On Darfur, Arman,  the SPLM representative in Abuja, said that a new dynamic is linking the rebels with Chad and Eritrea. End summary.  SPLM Drifting Apart 2. (C) The three SPLM leaders explained the dynamics within the SPLM and its growing lack of cohesion. Deng said that Kiir had inherited absolute power,  but seemed unable to handle it. A number of SPLM leaders from Garang's inner  circle -- which includes Arman, Deng and Agar - discussed this drift with Kiir  on January 9 in Juba. 3. (C) Deng described the January 9 meeting as positive.  The Ganrangists allayed Kiir's fears that they were trying to remove him, and Kiir had agreed to create an interim body to manage the SPLM.  According to Deng, Kiir had been getting bad advice from Bona Malwal and Lam Akol,  which has caused chaos in the SPLM and risked splitting the movement. The three requested U.S. assistance in sensitizing Kiir to the need for greater SPLM coherence, a request they have also made to influential African heads of state.  4. (C) Arman referenced the 2004 struggle between Garang and Kiir factions, the latter supported by Malwal and Akol, and acknowledged that Kiir had inherited  an SPLM/A dominated by Garang supporters. Kiir had chosen to move his own people  into various sensitive positions, including the GNU Foreign Minister. Unfortunately, this played into the hands of the NCP and northern security forces. Arman acknowledged that Kiir was the only logical leader of the SPLM, and the Garang loyalists were prepared to follow Kiir if he started to lead  the mainstream. NCP Seizes Opportunity 5. (C) Arman said that the NCP had wasted no time in exploiting the change of leadership in the SPLM. NISS Chief Salah Ghosh had passed Kiir a report on an internal SPLM conspiracy to replace Kiir. It was the tested NCP tactic of dividing opposition. Kiir was also told that the Americans did not want him.  However, Arman said their goal was to reform the SPLM and keep Kiir, and they  have made headway toward this goal. Kiir had agreed to establish a leadership  convention that would establish clear policies, including a position on Darfur. The interim working group that Kiir agreed to establish would set policy until the SPLM convention, which had been moved from March until June. 6. (C) Deng said that the NCP was also unhappy that other African leaders were talking to the SPLM. Ghosh had personally entered one of Kiir's meetings during the AU summit to see who was there. The NCP believed that the SPLM had helped frustrate Bashir's quest for the AU Chairmanship (all three expressed satisfaction at Bashir's failure). Deng concluded that the NCP wanted the South to separate so the NCP could rule without constraints in the North. Arman asked A/S Frazer to help convince Kiir that Garang's vision of Sudanese unity should prevail, in spite of Kiir's known position on separation. Arman said that Uganda, South Africa, and Ethiopia could also help in this manner, especially Obasanjo and Mbeki. SPLM Challenges  7. (C) The trio described some current problems facing the KHARTOUM 00000219 002 OF 002 SPLM/A, most seriously the fact that the SPLA soldiers had not been paid, including the southern JIU forces to be paid by the GNU.  Deng said the problem was now resolved and the SPLA would be paid three months' back salaries. 8. (C) Another problem was the viability of the SPLM as a national  party. In the North, the SPLM had started registering large numbers, which alarmed  the NCP. However, Kiir had refused to release funds to Abdel Aziz, SPLM organizer in the North. Six months earlier, Deng said the party was gaining strength, but the failure to take clear positions and meet overly high expectations had undercut its appeal, which could jeopardize the entire movement. 9. (C) Arman believed that clarity was the paramount issue. The NCP had taken advantage of SPLM policy drift to counter SPLM growth in the  North. The group around Kiir has played into NCP hands by eschewing national issues. Arman stressed that the SPLM could not meet its stated goals unless it remained a formidable source in the center. Arman said that even the choice for succession would only be possible if the SPLM was strong in the GNU.  The USG Position 10. (C) A/S Frazer responded that many in the U.S. believed Garang's vision of national unity was not widely supported in the South and Kiir was seeking to consolidate his position with his constituency. While a leadership vacuum was inevitable considering Garang's strength, the party should be strong enough  to continue, and party development was therefore critically important. Frazer pointed out that every member of the Politburo in South Africa was qualified to assume the top position, if this were necessary.  11. (C) Frazer continued that while friendship between the SPLM and USG officials was important, the interests of the U.S. were her first priority. State transformation and the weakening of the NCP are jeopardized by an ineffective SPLM. She noted that those who produced, not those who complained, would help keep the SPLM united and assist Kiir's leadership. Good results were the test, and it was essential that the SPLM leadership in the GNU not be, in Charge's words, "me too" partners. The SPLM must take control of their portfolios and strengthen their place in government.  SPLM on Darfur 12. (C) On Darfur, Yassir Arman described an emerging dynamic that had created an Eritrean, Chadian, and rebel axis, with Turabi playing a supporting role in Khartoum. All were united by their opposition to the  NCP. Arman described the Abuja talks as a "bazaar" with too many negotiators that would "take us nowhere." Nonetheless, negotiations were strengthened by the NCP's fear of a UN military force being deployed. Arman felt that the priority should be disarming the militias and the jinjaweed. He believed that the 7,000 SPLA troops still in the East could be integrated into Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) and sent to Darfur for this purpose, a concept that Garang had repeatedly espoused. The Charge noted that it would take six months to stand up the JIUs, at the rate of a battalion a month. By this calculation they could be in place by the end of the year, which would be an affirmative step to resolving  the crisis. 13. Deng interjected that Obasanjo had advised Kiir to brief Sassou-Nguesso on the SPLM view of Darfur. Obasanjo told Kiir that "someone" from the NCP indicated that the South was only focused on separation and therefore not interested in Darfur. Arman, the SPLM representative in Abuja,  felt that the SPLM could do more on Darfur but said he was only empowered to  act on direct orders from Kiir. 13. A/S Frazer has cleared on this cable. 14. Tripoli minimize considered. HUME