RUMBEK CITIZENS MOST LIKELY TO END UP IN IDPs CAMP IN JUBA

RUMBEK CITIZENS MOST LIKELY TO FORM A IDPs CAMP IN JUBA BECAUSE OF INSECURITY IN LAKES STATE

By Dominic Dut

Transcending the trappings of hatred and war; artwork by Deng Forbes

December 31, 2014 (SSB) —The issue of revenge attacks in the three Rumbek counties has led to mass exodus of Rumbek citizens from Lakes state. Almost 90% of the youths population from Rumbek have fled to Juba for safety. Others left their jobs and families behind to save their lives from the hands of revenge perpetrators whose aims/dreams are to kill for targeted revenge.

Another endangered population, according to my observation, are the politicians ranging from honorable members of parliament and other political sections. These people escaped the tyrannical, cruel leadership of Lakes state under the current governor who does not understand the administrative reforms at the local levels to dovetails the tradition institutions of governance.

Sooner or later the community of Agaar Dinka will have to form an IDPs camp in Juba due to the fact that the majority have already left their Jobs that used to put a plate on their tables. Hitherto, the majority under trees and tea places in Juba are from the three counties of Rumbek. Most of these people are squatting around Juba having left their families behind due to fear of losing their lives. This is a result of the absence of the establishment and implementation of a credible peace within the people of Rumbek.

In my view, the main reason of having a state government is to protect civilians under threat of physical violence and to stabilize security situation rather than sitting back and watch the lives of its citizens dwelling on bloodshed each day.  An example is the recent clashed between Kook community of Rumbek East that took the lives of more than 40 people according to the news this morning.  Athoi community also happened to have lost lives some few days back.

Yet, no appropriate measures were taken by neither the state government nor the national government. Oh god you are the only answer to this community crises.

We are free to blame most of our societal ills on corruption and failed leadership for its results affects us not them and our opinionated views are rightfully deserved. No matter how wretched the corruption and poor leadership is creating havoc to our developmental ambitions; we are only to blame the national government for providing sanctuary to these societal ills whose aims are creating life of luxury for the leadership, while forgetting the suffering of its citizens.

The life of daily cries and women being raped in the absence of their husbands seems to have become a musical instrument in the ears of the so called government in Juba and Rumbek.

When the citizen of lakes state preach for peace it seems the leadership preach the language of violence; it only does more damage to people. We remain very confused, torn between what we hear and what we see. Sometimes I remain dumbfounded, asking myself of who is to blame on this crises. Is it the leadership or the citizens of lakes state that are to blame for the endless violence? But the answer I get to myself is that it seems the leadership starting from the national level have a problem in common and would want to completely destroy the whole existent of Agaar community. Otherwise state of insecurity could have an answer if indeed there was a quick respond and major security measures were taken by the government.

However, the distribution of power remains a serious concern. The considerable, often unchecked, internal authority given to leaders is often the very reason why our crises shall not have an end. Even in business, a drop in company performance and profitability always relies in the hands of poor management and this always leads to a collapse of business. Therefore, the community has to be managed just as the business are being managed.

It is about time the people of Lakes State and particularly Rumbek transform this tragedy into peace and unity. Last but not the least, it is time for we the youth to fight for this unity rather than looking at the leadership to take actions that will bring peace.  Our brothers have decided to take up arms against themselves with some of them being influenced by political incitements.

Therefore we the youth of Lakes are the only solution that can bring back peace among our brothers.

To end here, let’s meditate over this and other important issues pertinent to service delivery to our people and Nation Building.

The Author of This Article is a South Sudanese from Lakes State, Rumbek Central County, Mayom Payam. Find him on domiano87@gmail.com

PROTEST LETTER TO H.E PRESIDENT SALVA KIIR MAYARDIT

Mark Dut Malual, Melbourne, Australia

South Sudan on life support machine

PROTEST LETTER TO H.E PRESIDENT SALVA KIIR MAYARDIT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN

“Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere”, Martin L. K. Jr., Dec. 1960

December 31, 2014 (SSB) — I am writing to your Excellency on behalf of my people – the Thuyic Community– to protest the designed-extermination-process of our people (Thuyic Community of Maleng-agok Payam) in Eastern Rumbek County.

This process is dated back to 2001 beginning with elimination of our cattle youths leader; Bech Dong Manguen, then late Chief Maker Mabor Riak – that continued unabated till the hour I author this letter for your attention, your H.E.

There is no community in Lakes State or South Sudan for that matter, which has been subjected to these heinous acts, and no attention drawn for their cause by state government, but only Thuyic Community, who still believe that there exists a government in South Sudan, Juba, but not in Lakes state.

Our people have been exposed to the following suffering and unbearable pain:

1. Our youth leaders have been their first targets, to which the mission of their elimination has been succeeded. Bech Dong Manguen and Diengdul Maliec are just two examples of this design, because they come from Thuyic Community.
2. Our people’s chief late Maker Mabor Riak was the first chief to be murdered in cold blood in 2002 because he comes from Thuyic Community of Maleng-agok Payam!
3. Our people’s individual youths (P.S. Turguau Makoi Ayuek) have been ambushed and killed because he hailed from Thuyic Community of Maleng-agok Payam!
4. Our people as a community have been assaulted, killed, and dislodged from their villages of Agukuel, Maleng-agok, Makuac, Panbarkou, Gorok, Malual etc for more than five times; for days, months, and as I write, it is going a year having been sent off their homes!
5. Our people’s women and girls have been gang-raped since 7^th August 2014, and state government for offenders to answer these charges has not apprehended culprits of these offenses. Is this the state that my community could be part of?
6. Our people’s livestock have been raided, property of all forms looted, and other assets destroyed, including their housing and no one (among these wrong-doers) has ever been arrested or even asked to account by state government!
7. Our people’s elderly (Makur Chol Ayup, Mapuor Majur Mathet etc) and children (Akoi Wuol Mabor –14 months old girl-child-killed), all have not been spared during this last attack of 27^th December 2014, just because they come from Thuyic Community when attack has been reported to state government agencies seven days before assailants matched on my community, but there was nothing done to prevent it!
8. Our people’s school-going pupils caught up at homes were not spared (Deng Maker Makuer, Muorwer Mapuor Akuckuer, Maweer Mapuor Akuckuer, Mayor Bol Akuckuer & Kaman Thuch Manyang), are example of bad intent of elimination by Gony section in Aliemtooc west against our people at the watch of the state government.
9. Our Community five schools (of Maleng-agok, Panbarkou, Agukuel, Gorok, Ayen-Paciec) have been closed since 6^th August 2014. Our pupils did not sit any exams beginning from class seven to nursery, when our assailants schools were functional and their pupils took their exams, and no one including the state education minister made any efforts to have them opened or even any word of care to signal that we are being part of this community of Lakes state.
10. Our community pregnant woman (Akuac Wuol Deng) was assaulted in her house by the daughter of Governor Maj. Gen. Matur Chut Dhuol (Alek Matur Chut), no any investigation has been launched to ascertain why did she assault her neighbor and killed her innocently? This is because she is the daughter of Governor Matur Chut, who both belief that Thuyic Community members are premier enemies.
11. Our community cattle youth – Mangang Manyang Deng was attacked within Maleng-agok Payam market and killed instantly. None of his attackers has been detained and no one has made query of why no justice for his life.
12. On 27^th December 2014, our Thuyic Community members chattered a plane to airlift six victims of this ethnic cleansing to Juba. On hearing this information, Director of Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Mr. Deng Malual Majak ordered for a shoot down of this plane, fortunately, the Lt. who was ordered defied on the ground that he has not been served with written letter of shoot down to act on, thus the plane reached Juba later evening. One of these victims is currently being denied flight to Nairobi for better care by Governors’ brother in SPLA Juba, alleging that the victim is a culprit. Culprit in what form when he is a casualty of ethnic cleansing in pursuit by Governor and his relatives. Mr. President, send your team to investigate this order, you would be shock of how bad the leadership here is! Oh! Lord God, come to the aid of our people in Maleng-agok Payam and her surrounding villages.
13. On 26^th August 2014, our Thuyic Community made every effort to arrest one of their own, who retaliated on late Paramount Chief Aparer Chut Dhuol. He is the only one now, investigated within three months period, and sentenced to death, when those other culprits remain at large! Is the state government not part and parcel of the state’s troubles if perpetrators are not arrested?
14. Key elements of state government led by Director of CID with his cousin in-charge of state capital Criminal Investigation unit have been found supplying their clan-men with ammunitions and weapons, and no one cares or asks why? Is this state one’s authority to use against a particular community?

Is there any justice here in Lakes state?

Your Excellency, we were expecting a little sense of humanity and leadership from Lakes state Governor Major General Matur Chut Dhuol in dealing with insecurities of Lakes, and especially with his own armed clan men including those who assaulted our people, either to use necessary force to prevent them from assaulting their perceived enemies of Thuyic in their villages or he gives way to any other person, in tendering in his resignation letter to your high office; even when his daughter has murdered innocent pregnant woman. This did not happen.

Earlier on, Matur Chut has been a suspect of instigating this sectional feud since 2001. This is now proven beyond reasonable doubt, yes indeed he is. He has never made any efforts to prevent his clan-men in planning for seven solid days to attack our people in their villages.

On 16^th August 2014, three youth leaders of our Thuyic Community of Maleng-agok Payam petitioned your government, making necessary recommendations as redemption, but there was no action, but rather poorly plan of disarmament during which 107 lives of our dear soldiers were lost in their battle with Pakam pastoralists. The state government is responsible for all the harms befalling this state, and that your Excellency should consider top leadership of the state is one core factor fuelling the crises because it is not involving other stakeholders like chiefs, intellectuals, civil society, MPs, some of whom remained arrests for months now in unclosed location. If MPs could not be brought for justice, can any common man know justice?

The 27^th December 2014 death toll on our people went to 17 persons dead including a 14 months old girl child – Akoi Wuol Mabor, caught up with her mother in Panbarkou village of Maleng-agok Payam. This child—unoffending, innocent and beautiful was a victim of one of the most vicious, heinous crimes ever perpetrated against humanity. I call on Wuol Mabor, the father of Akoi, that in spite of the darkness of this hour, you must not despair, you should not become bitter, nor must you harbor the desire to retaliate with violence – allows God to retaliate!

May our 14 months old girl-child Akoi Wuol Mabor’s soul rest in eternal peace!

I am writing on behalf of our Thuyic Community of Maleng-agok Payam, who has suffered in their dignified end and for their existence!

Mark Dut Malual lives in Melbourne, Australia, and he is reachable on: markdutmalual@gmail.com

OIL FUELS THE WAR IN (SOUTH) SUDAN

PART II: OIL FUELS THE WAR

OIL DEVELOPMENT AND DISPLACEMENT

IN BLOCK 5A, 1996-98

Overview

The situation in the oil concession area known as Block 5A is quite similar to the situation in the GNPOC concession, Blocks 1, 2, and 4, in that they are both oil-rich areas of Western Upper Nile/Unity State and the government has displaced civilians from them to clear the way for foreign oil operations. However, the oil companies investing in the two concessions are different, with one exception, Petronas. The time frame has been different, too. No oil-related forcible civilian population displacement took place in Block 5A until about 1998, when the new consortium led by the Swedish company Lundin started oil exploration there. Indeed, no war-related displacement at all took place there until 1998, according to relief agencies operating out of Ler for a decade.²⁶²

Unlike its counterpart in Blocks 1, 2, and 4, Lundin’s security team at first worked with the local government officials who were Riek Machar loyalists. Lundin hired persons this local government recommended, including some police as security guards for its operations.

In 1998, Paulino Matiep’s government-supported militia attacked towns and villages in Block 5A, weakening the position of Riek Machar. Riek Machar’s SSDF, although also government-backed, was kept short of arms and supplies by the government and did not have adequate means to defend against the Paulino Matiep attacks. The latter’s forces looted most larger villages and towns and burned down the main structures, including clinics run by NGOs. Residents, unused to any fighting in their area, fled to the toic during the wet season to wait out the fighting; many died of malaria there. Most returned home at the beginning of the dry season to salvage what they could and prepare for planting.

Lundin (IPC) Enters the Scene, 1996

Chevron had explored in Block 5A. The Nuer of Block 5A naturally were aware of its activities there. According to one Nuer chief, the company discovered oil in Bang (also known as Darchiem Chuol), four hours northwest of Koch, in 1982.²⁶³ But shortly after the February 1984 rebel killing of three expatriate oil workers, the oil exploration activity ceased.

On February 6, 1997, the International Petroleum Company, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Lundin Oil AB, signed an exploration and production-sharing agreement with the Sudanese government, granting IPC (Lundin) rights to Block 5A, adjacent to and south of Unity oilfield in Block 1.²⁶⁴ IPC, the operating or lead partner, held 40.375 percent of the Block 5A partnership. Petronas Carigali Overseas Sdn Bhd, owned by the Malaysian state oil company, held 28.5 percent; OMV (Sudan) Exploration GmbH, owned by OMV AG, one of the largest companies in Austria, held 26.125 percent; and Sudapet Limited, owned by the Sudanese government, held 5 percent.²⁶⁵ Lundin (IPC) also owned 10 percent of Arakis’ stock until Arakis was acquired by Talisman in October 1998.

In May 1998, IPC, a Canadian corporation, was folded into its parent, Lundin Oil AB,²⁶⁶ a Swedish corporation owned by a “well-known name in the oil business, the Geneva-based oil and minerals investor Adolph Lundin and his family.”²⁶⁷ In 2002 a corporate asset shuffle with Talisman occurred, but the Sudan assets of Lundin remained in the control of and under the same family management as before 2002.²⁶⁸

The Significance of the GNPOC Pipeline

The development of Block 5A was related to the approaching completion of the oil pipeline facilities nearby in GNPOC’s concession.²⁶⁹ Without the pipeline, the oilfields in Block 5A would have remained as Chevron left them, undeveloped, attracting little military attention. This was an area the government had long ago conceded to the rebels as of no strategic interest and having a particularly difficult, swampy environment; but with the GNPOC pipeline only a short distance away, it became economically feasible to develop oil there. Block 5A shot up in strategic importance and became a military priority for the government.

Lundin’s own promotional material stressed the value of the GNPOC pipeline to Block 5A²⁷⁰: the GNPOC export pipeline, with its large (100,000 barrels per day) reserve capacities available for third party users, was “the most important technical achievement for the future of the project,” which lay approximately seventy-five kilometers southeast of the GNPOC Unity field.²⁷¹ Talisman also admitted that the pipeline was necessary to make development of Block 5A feasible, and that on several occasions representatives of Lundin had informally discussed tying production areas in Block 5A into the GNPOC pipeline.²⁷²

Block 5A Operations in 1998

The most visible early Lundin explorations in Block 5A took place in the toic, in a location the Jagei Nuer know as Ryer, ²⁷³ about ten miles west of the Nile and a distance east of Duar. Lundin gave this drilling site the name “Thar Jath”; Thar Jath is a village or port on the Nile not far away.²⁷⁴

The consortium also had a seismic operation based on a barge with containers on the Nile, in the vicinity of the port. The headquarters of Lundin’s operations in Block 5A were at this port (Thar Jath) southeast of Ryer. According to local sources, the temporary center of these operations in 1998 had been in Guk,²⁷⁵ with company buildings but no rigs.²⁷⁶

Lundin (IPC) sent out staff in October-November 1997, including security consultants from Rappaport, a private security company in London, to set up the operation some seventy-five to one hundred kilometers south of Bentiu, in Block 5A. They intended to start with seismic tests; although they had such data from Chevron, it was fifteen years old.²⁷⁷ “Seismic acquisition commenced in 1998 and to date [October 2000] over 1,485 kilometres of data have been acquired,” according to Lundin.²⁷⁸

Lundin had two exploration locations, called “highland” (Ryer/Thar Jath) and “lowland” or “swamp” (barges on or near the Nile). In 1998 and 1999, the oil company cleared a non-tarmacked road from Bentiu to Duar, Guk, and Ryer/Thar Jath. Ryer was forty minutes by car east from Guk over this road, according to a security consultant working for Lundin. He said that they built the road parallel to the old road but did not use the old road because it had been landmined. In 1998, the oil company began to use helicopters, which cut the travel time from Heglig to the Lundin Thar Jath/Ryer location down to one hour from five or six hours, and avoided the danger of landmines.²⁷⁹ One Nuer observer reported that the government of Sudan put in a military airstrip to defend the oil company at Ryer/Thar Jath.²⁸⁰

Lundin and its subcontractors employed some Guk villagers for manual work but, according to one chief, Chinese and Arab workers were brought in “by the hundreds” to replace the Nuer.²⁸¹ Chinese subcontractors working for the Lundin consortium reportedly were doing surveys, explorations, and road-building around the Nile, east of Duar and Koch, starting in 1998.²⁸²

At different times security for this project was provided by practically everyone—the SSDF, local police, the government army, and private consultants—until May 1999, when the SSDF attacked the Ryer/Thar Jath facility.²⁸³

After the Sudanese government army retook the Ryer/Thar Jath drilling site in May 1999, the rebels never recaptured it. Nevertheless, that location has not produced any oil to date, on account of the war.

Fighting and Displacement of Nuer Communities in Block 5A, May-October 1998

In 1998, as the oil exploration was getting off the ground again in Block 5A, Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep’s government-backed militia pushed the civilians out of the main area of exploration. As his forces swept across Block 5A from north to south, temporarily displacing tens of thousands, there was some fighting with Riek Machar’s SSDF (also allied with the government at this time but short on ammunition), but most fighting involved contact with unarmed civilians.

Paulino Matiep and Riek Machar were, on one level, continuing their struggle for the governorship of Unity State. At the bottom, however, the fight concerned whether Riek Machar’s group would share in the rewards of the concession through providing security for oil companies working in oil-rich Block 5A.

The UDSF/SSDF was determined not to be passed over as it had been with Blocks 1 and 2.²⁸⁴ Lundin’s own mixed security service included guards selected by Khartoum and police from Bentiu (UDSF/SSDF). Lundin also had its own expatriate security consultants.

But the army and the Sudanese government’s minister of mining in Khartoum were not happy with Lundin’s association with the UDSF Unity State government, according to the governor.²⁸⁵ It seemed that powerful persons in the central government and armed forces wanted forces under their direct control to be the exclusive security provider for all oil operations. ²⁸⁶ Khartoum’s definition of security, as demonstrated later, was an extensive cordon sanitaire, cleared of all civilians, stretching for kilometers beyond each oil rig, oil road, and piece of equipment. Riek Machar’s definition of security was to leave his constituents in their homes and provide local police with their ears to the ground to guard against attacks. Riek Machar lost this battle. The northern government used the Lundin presence on the ground as a platform on which to build its first military toehold in the oilfields south of Bentiu.

Government Depopulates Block 5A, 1998

After a Chinese subcontractor installed a large compound in Ryer/Thar Jath in 1998 and moved in its employees, the people living in the area were told to move by Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep, who gave this message to the chiefs. As one of them reported, Paulino Matiep gave no reason other than that the oil “operations were going to be here so you have to go away, the cows will destroy everything.”²⁸⁷ Everyone left the Ryer/Thar Jath area and Paulino Matiep’s men tore down or burned all but two houses, according to the same Nuer chief. Those who moved received no assistance with trucks or tents and no compensation of any kind. Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep gave them only a brief time to leave, then burned the houses. The people were allowed to take only their cows, the chief said.

While a devastating famine among the Dinka in Bahr El Ghazal to the west was gripping the attention of relief agencies in Sudan in mid-1998, Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep turned his Bul Nuer militia on Riek Machar’s SSDF troops and on civilians, looting and engaging in scorched earth warfare. According to relief agency records, Paulino Matiep’s militia attacked Nhialdiu (south of Rupnyagai) and two other villages in February 25, 1998. In April 1998 six other villages in the Nhialdiu area were burned and looted. This attack occurred before the May 7, 1998 NGO assessment was to take place in two villages to the west and south of Nhialdiu. The NGO assessment recorded these fact, and noted that the health center in Nhialdiu was looted, burned, and destroyed, along with all its health records. ²⁸⁸

This fighting took place away from the Bul Nuer home area, and as described below much occurred where Lundin intended to drill and where Chevron had earlier explored, down into Ler and Adok, the Dok Nuer area. Bul Nuer, according to one Nuer chief, did not traditionally fight the Dok Nuer, except when women were raped or disputes arose between families. Yet the government continually attempted to pass off this fighting between Paulino Matiep and Riek Machar as “traditional tribal fighting,” which the chiefs insisted it was not.²⁸⁹

The raids and looting continued. On June 27, 1998, , the civilians fled a Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep attack on Duar town, a Jagei Nuer area. Paulino Matiep’s forces burned the compound of the medical NGO Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), the building housing the local authority (called the parish), and the school (assisted by UNICEF). The soldiers followed this pattern—looting and burning the important structures—in all Jagei Nuer locations, observed a local relief official. Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep’s troops raided three big Jagei cattle camps, taking all the cattle they found in the camps. They killed goats and cows for food; they stripped captured women of their clothes.²⁹⁰ The WFP calculated that about 25 percent of the original population of Duar moved out of the area following this fighting and these attacks, some to islands in the Nile river, ²⁹¹ thought safe because they were inaccessible.

Even oil company workers were not exempt: one night, Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep’s men ambushed one of Lundin’s trucks and took prisoner the four Sudanese employees in it. Two escaped and two were summarily executed. The police found their bodies the next day: they had been stripped, bound, gagged, and shot in the back of the head. It appeared that Paulino Matiep’s men had been looking for the two, who were “from the wrong tribe.”²⁹²

People displaced from Koch, another Jagei Nuer area, said Paulino Matiep’s forces attacked the area three times in 1998. In Koch, the troops burned churches, and in the surrounding villages they destroyed an estimated fifty small chapels, both Catholic and Presbyterian, four clinics, five schools, and six local government posts (called stations). This destruction began on or about June 28, 1998.

Some civilians fled just once, and stayed away during the wet season, from June to December 1998, in the toic not far from their homes. Families split up. Some family members, particularly the elderly, children, and adolescents, remained behind; in one family in the village of Patit, five to ten-year-old children were left in hiding with their grandmother, who was too old to move. Young men fled to avoid forced recruitment. Many young women, afraid of abduction and rape by Paulino Matiep’s soldiers, ran into hiding.²⁹³

Government Army and Paulino Matiep Militia in Ler, 1998

In early 1998, the government sent its troops south into Riek Machar’s home area in Ler. Up to that time Ler town had been untouched by the war and by combat, except for one instance in 1992.²⁹⁴ A large brick hospital built by the British prior to independence still provided facilities for medical teams; MSF-Holland had worked in the region since 1988.²⁹⁵ Everything south of the government garrison town of Bentiu, including the towns of Duar, Koch, and Ler, had been abandoned or lost by the government to rebel forces by 1986. Riek Machar had about 9,000 troops in this area of Western Upper Nile/Unity State.

An officer present in Ler town in April 1998 reported that he and Cmdr. Peter Paar Jiek of the SSDF heard at the last minute that a company of “Arab” (government) soldiers were on their way to Ler from Bentiu. On April 20, 1998, the SSDF forces intercepted the government army company (about eighty soldiers) three hours north of Ler, in Koch.²⁹⁶ The northern army contingent, asked for written orders, could produce nothing but claimed that UDSF Unity State Gov. Taban Deng had cleared the troop movement and had assigned them a seventy-person SSDF escort. They said they were going to Ler in order to receive and guard a visit by President Omar El Bashir on April 21, 1978, the one-year anniversary of the signing of the Khartoum Peace Agreement.²⁹⁷

Around the same time some fifteen Sudanese government troops arrived at Lundin’s “highland” location, Ryer/Thar Jath, where Lundin was readying to drill for oil. The soldiers demanded fuel to get to Ler so that they could protect President Bashir for his visit. The army contingent brought four-ton trucks and pickups with 50 mm canons. Lundin’s security consultants gave them half a drum of diesel for their trucks to be rid of them.²⁹⁸

When government soldiers and trucks full of weapons arrived near Ler, the SSDF commanders assigned them an exposed place outside Ler town, in Payak (this since became the location of the military garrison and airstrip); they would not let the army occupy the Ler school as requested.²⁹⁹

President Bashir did not arrive in Ler on April 21, 1998, nor ever. Nor did Governor Taban Deng or Riek Machar arrive on that day.³⁰⁰ The local SSDF commander then asked the government troops to leave Ler, but the second lieutenant in charge refused. According to one SSDF commander, “[t]hey tricked us: they said Omar Bashir wanted to visit Ler. . . . Our forces told them to go back to Bentiu and they refused.”³⁰¹ Meanwhile, the local SSDF kept these northern troops under tight control. They would not let them deploy their guns, unload weapons from the trucks, go to the market, or mix with local women. The government soldiers were outnumbered and afraid. They radioed their commanders that they had been captured.³⁰²

SSDF Cmdr. Tito Biel then arrived with two northern army officers and said that the government soldiers could stay in Ler. He said that Gov. Taban Deng had promised they would be there only for the celebration of the signing of the Khartoum Peace Agreement.³⁰³

The local SSDF set a deadline for the government soldiers to pull out: ten days from April 27, 1998. The soldiers did not meet that deadline. They never left Ler, although for the first year they did not move from Payak, where they created an airstrip and a garrison. Upon noticing that northern troops would bring additional soldiers back with them when they were allowed to go to Bentiu for rations, the local SSDF forbade this, and the number of government soldiers was reduced back to seventy.³⁰⁴ The army contingent, however, was strategically positioned to shelter and resupply General Paulino Matiep in his attacks on Ler that started two months later.

The SSDF regarded the location of Sudanese government troops in Ler as “a clear violation of the Khartoum Peace Agreement,”³⁰⁵ under which the army’s movement was to be restricted and coordinated by a joint military technical committee from Khartoum and the SSDF. But none of the military committees envisaged in the Peace Agreement had been established, according to the SSDF: “Not even a ceasefire committee was formed. Nothing was done regarding security arrangements as promised in the Peace Agreement.”³⁰⁶

Ler town was attacked and captured three times in 1998 by Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep’s government forces, in June, July, and August, with considerable damage to the infrastructure, as well as burning and looting of homes. By July 1998, 250 houses, fifty shops, and 2,500 cattle compounds had been destroyed in Ler town, according to a government-run newspaper quoted by Associated Press.³⁰⁷ Paulino Matiep’s soldiers burned the roof of the large brick hospital (built by the British and run by MSF). They looted the hospital and NGO compounds. They burned the Catholic church and its grinding machine. A witness saw them put grass over an NGO car and set it on fire. The Paulino Matiep forces demolished seven permanent buildings and used fuel canisters, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and 60mm mortars to burn down the market.³⁰⁸ They also destroyed Riek Machar’s brick house in Ler, according to a relief coordinator.³⁰⁹

A chief who stayed in Ler until his house was burned said of Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep’s soldiers:

They are Nuers like us. I saw them burn Ler. We know all their names. They were once with us, part of the SSIM [Riek Machar forces 1994-97], before. The reason why they have occupied our land is they do not want peace between Riek [Machar] and the jallaba [northerners], or peace between the Nuer and Dinka. The only government they know is the Khartoum government.³¹⁰

The civilians fled rapidly while the attackers were looting and there was not a great loss of life. Paulino Matiep’s government forces in Ler reportedly killed an old man, Amilo Chuol. A witness who saw the body, wearing a UNICEF water services uniform, said that he apparently had been shot in the back as he was fleeing. The bullet had pierced through his lungs and he had fallen on his face. Another observer saw the body a few days later, still face down.³¹¹

The SSDF, chronically short of ammunition, evacuated Ler, while the government soldiers stayed in their garrison. Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep’s forces did not remain in the area but withdrew after a few days of plundering and burning;³¹² they looted the nongovernmental organizations of property such as generators, some of which were reportedly given to the garrisoned government soldiers to make their Payak barracks more comfortable.³¹³ The Paulino Matiep militia abducted women and girls, according to an Adok chief.³¹⁴

Because of the fighting and destruction, and despite the need, relief agencies had to pull out of the Western Upper Nile/Unity State region on June 29, 1998.³¹⁵ An Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) security officer and several NGO representatives, who visited Ler on July 6, 1998 to inspect the damage to the NGO and U.N. compounds, confirmed that all had been looted and burned.³¹⁶ A relief worker observed that the Sudanese government sent Antonov aircraft carrying soldiers, weapons, and ammunition to Ler after the June fighting began. The government cargo aircraft came in two rotations with reinforcements after the SSDF fled the town.³¹⁷

Lundin’s security consultants had been accustomed to driving to Ler, where they made friends with some of the NGOs. They had supplied one medical NGO in Ler with gas for its refrigerators. Later, they returned to Ler and saw that the NGO facility had been destroyed and abandoned, and the Ler hospital had been razed to the ground. Similar destruction was evident in the other larger towns, including Duar. Many smaller villages had been abandoned.³¹⁸ A Sudanese relief worker estimated that fifty-nine villages outside Ler had been burned and looted; soldiers had forced women and girls to be porters, sometimes stripping them of clothing.³¹⁹

With little delay, Riek Machar denounced Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep’s attack on SSDF forces in Ler and elsewhere,³²⁰ describing the fighting as “fierce.”³²¹ A Paulino Matiep spokesman claimed that Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep had agreed to a ceasefire that Riek Machar had broken by preemptively attacking Paulino Matiep’s forces at a camp near Bentiu; the attack, he said, had been repelled.³²² The spokesman denied that Paulino Matiep’s forces had burned villages or caused loss of life.³²³

The SSDF later claimed that it had made a point of fighting against Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep, but not against the government troops, out of a desire to maintain the 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement. Paulino Matiep himself described the fighting as a disagreement between him and Riek Machar over the military leadership of the SSDF.³²⁴ The Sudanese government sent a fact-finding mission to Western Upper Nile/Unity State in early July 1998 to investigate what it referred to as “clashes” between Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep’s forces and Riek Machar’s SSDF. The delegation attributed the attacks strictly to southern rivalries, even though it found “vast damage was inflicted on government installations and development projects while 49 people have been killed.”³²⁵

Yet the army garrison at Ler (Payak) had acquiesced in the assault, noted by witnesses who spoke to Human Rights Watch. Although the fighting was going on near their base, the Sudanese army made no move to intervene or stop the fighting. It was the war of their ally Paulino Matiep, and they benefited from Paulino Matiep’s actions. One chief from Ler observed that the cattle stolen by Paulino Matiep’s troops were kept in the army garrison,³²⁶ and another chief reported, “When we were defeated, the government of Sudan soldiers found our cows, goats, and furniture when they were burning the houses. They brought these goods to the base. They [the army soldiers] profited from the fighting in 1998, and they did not even fight!³²⁷

Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep again attacked Ler on July 16, after many residents had returned and the WFP had arrived to distribute food. Two WFP workers had to flee the July 16 attack, wading waist-deep through mosquito-infested swamps at night, guided by members of the local community. They were evacuated to safety by OLS on the morning of July 17.³²⁸

The Sudanese government announced on July 21, 1998, that Paulino Matiep and Riek Machar had agreed on a “cessation of hostilities” and had pledged not to fight each other.³²⁹ Some civilians who evacuated Ler on July 4 returned after July 26 when Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep’s forces pulled out. The wet season was well under way.

But Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep’s government-backed forces attacked Ler yet again in August, for the third time that year, despite the ceasefire. People reported abductions and random killings of livestock. “The Matiep troops had finished off all the goats in the area in three months,” one young man complained. “It began with the bulls. They ate from them until the evacuation and took some as loot. They cut down crops for passage as they crossed, leaving.” The older boys, taken previously for heavy portering, had gone into hiding. Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep’s troops therefore pursued others to serve as porters—boys as young as nine or ten, who had stayed behind because they thought they were safe.³³⁰

Conditions in the toic, where the civilians hid, were miserable during the wet season; it rained heavily and malaria-carrying mosquitoes thrived. The displaced often had to sleep on woven grass mats floating on the water. There was not enough food for everyone. One woman, who went into hiding in the toic that year with twenty family members, came out with fifteen: five died in the toic, three adults and two children.³³¹ The civilians did not rebuild houses in Ler because they feared Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep’s forces would burn them again. Instead, they settled for less rain-resistant coverings under the trees.

On October 12, 1998, the SSDF attacked Paulino Matiep’s forces in Nhialdiu, “killing a good number [before they] fled across the river to a place six hours from Nhialdiu.” Then Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep declared peace, which lasted from October 12, 1998 until May 1999.³³²

Relief Agencies Note Forced Displacement and Devastation in Western Upper Nile, 1998

Witness accounts of the forced displacements were borne out by the reports of relief agencies. The WFP reported that the fighting around Nhialdiu, which it said lasted from June 1997 to November 1998, displaced around 70 percent of the Nhialdiu community, who went to Bentiu and Mankien. After the hostilities diminished, some returned to Nhialdiu, joined there by displaced persons from other areas.³³³

U.N. and private relief agencies also issued appeals and press releases to bring attention to the acute situation in the oilfield areas of Western Upper Nile/Unity State. On May 1, 1998, Oxfam announced that it was setting up an emergency program in that state “to respond to 25,000 displaced people through insecurity.”³³⁴

On May 5, 1998, CARE, which worked in the government garrison towns of Bentiu and Mayom, reported that “20,000 Sudanese have fled the war-wracked towns of Unity State in Southern Sudan.” According to CARE, Unity State had “been the center of fighting between rival factions of the South Sudan Independence Movement [Riek Machar forces],” while “[g]overnment-controlled Bentiu, Mayoum and Rubkona are mostly inaccessible to aid workers providing relief in the South.”³³⁵ On May 13, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) announced that it was sending emergency aid to assist famine victims in Sudan, while the government would “continue to put pressure on all parties to achieve a negotiated settlement.”³³⁶

On July 7, 1998, MSF-Holland declared in a press release that insecurity in Western Upper Nile/Unity State was seriously hampering the delivery of urgently needed food assistance. The fighting had forced MSF, the WFP, and other humanitarian agencies to evacuate the area, and looting of compounds by government soldiers had forced the shutdown of key programs, including the MSF hospital in Ler,³³⁷ bringing MSF’s kala azar, tuberculosis, and mobile clinics there to a halt.³³⁸ Subsequently, the government of Sudan reported increased cases of kala azar, particularly in the endemic areas of government-held Mayom and Pariang.³³⁹

On July 10, 1998, the WFP made a special appeal to the “international community to take urgent measures and do everything it can to persuade all the combatants to put down their weapons and end this senseless suffering” in Western Upper Nile/Unity State. It said the fighting was preventing delivery of badly-needed food to thousands of people and in many areas it was so constant that WFP could not even gain access to assess how many people might be in need of food.³⁴⁰ Fighting did not subside until a few months later.

The OLS reported in late July 1998 that Western Upper Nile/Unity State “experienced pre-famine conditions, in almost all cases as a result of military activity.”³⁴¹ In Western Upper Nile/Unity State, the OLS warned, “where intra-factional fighting caused constant displacement, global malnutrition rates reached as high as 40 percent at mid-year.”³⁴²

In December 1998, the WFP delivered the first food in more than four months to tens of thousands of hungry Sudanese in Ler and Mankien. A WFP representative observed:

Over the past months thousands of people have fled without food or belongings. They’ve been forced to hide for days at a time in the surrounding swamps and outlying villages, living in constant fear and surviving on just water lilies [a wild food] and fish. Their own villages have been burned down and their grain stores have been looted.³⁴³

The WFP said that Ler, once a hub for food and health services, “is now a ghost town.” Although some residents were returning, they feared future attacks. The WFP confirmed that “militia factions have raided Ler three times since June [1998], looting and burning homes and destroying schools, a hospital and clinic. Crops have been trampled, burned and eaten by the raiders. Renegade forces have also stolen and slaughtered thousands of cattle.” The WFP estimated that the fighting forces had stolen a total of 24,000 cattle, leaving families with no assets to trade or slaughter. The salvaged grain had been shared with others and was almost entirely depleted.³⁴⁴

The initial U.N. appeal for emergency funding for Sudan in 1998 anticipated that in Western Upper Nile/Unity State it would need to provide relief food for “27,290 displaced and war-affected beneficiaries during the hunger gap period from April to July.”³⁴⁵ Following the destruction and displacement caused by government and Paulino Matiep’s militia’s attacks on villages of the Leek, Jagei, and Dok Nuer, the appeal was revised upward and called for relief food to 151,850 beneficiaries in Western Upper Nile/Unity State, ³⁴⁶ more than five times the number of beneficiaries initially projected.

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) classified Western Upper Nile/Unity State as one of two “areas of acute emergency” in all of Sudan, the worst classification possible.³⁴⁷ The other area was Bahr El Ghazal, where famine struck almost a million people that year.³⁴⁸ And it was the area of Unity/Upper Nile/Jonglei that topped the list for more OLS personnel evacuated due to fighting than anywhere else in 1998. As a result, by the end of 1998, humanitarian coverage in this region was the lowest of all major OLS areas.³⁴⁹

This time of “acute emergency” was the very time Talisman was reviewing the possibility of becoming lead partner in GNPOC, which concession included Mayom, Bentiu, Rubkona, and Mankien, all affected by the displacement, disruption, and hunger caused by the fighting—funded on both sides by the government.

²⁶² Distant from the oil explorations in Block 5A, intermittent but deadly civilian fighting over cattle occurred between the Nuer and the Dinka on their Western Upper Nile/Bahr El Ghazal border after 1991. See Jok and Hutchinson, above.

²⁶³ Chevron also discovered oil among other places in Adok, a port on the Nile, south of Bentiu; in areas south of Adok and north of Nyal; in Marol, in the Sudd one hour on foot southeast of Ler; and in Makuir, south of Ler and east of Adok. Gideon Bading Jagei, head chief of an Adok section, Human Rights Watch interview, Nyal, Western Upper Nile, August 20, 1999. Most of these were in Dok Nuer areas. Bang is in Leek Nuer and Nyal in Nyuong Nuer territory.

²⁶⁴ In Sudan, Lundin Oil AB initially used its wholly owned subsidiary, the International Petroleum Company (IPC), and then used its wholly owned subsidiary IPC Sudan Ltd. Later its successor company used the name Lundin Sudan.

²⁶⁵ Lundin Oil press release, “Lundin Oil Spuds First Well in Sudan,” Business Wire (Vancouver), April 8, 1999.

²⁶⁶ After the Canadian NGOs began pressing the Canadian government to act on Arakis, IPC (then listed on the Vancouver Stock Exchange (VSE) of Canada) merged with Sands Petroleum AB of Sweden. Sands, the surviving corporation, was not listed on the VSE. Both were controlled by the Lundin family, and the company was renamed Lundin Oil AB in May 1998. With its head office in Geneva, it was listed on the U.S.-based NASDAQ and the Stockholm Stock Exchange until the reshuffle with Talisman in June 2001, below. Adolph Lundin “controls a web of small exploration companies, some of which are run by his Vancouver-based son Ian.” Mathew Ingram, “Signs of Life on Planet Arakis,” Globe and Mail (Toronto), Calgary, June 23, 1998.

²⁶⁷ Muriel Allen, “Sudan: Oil A Political Weapon,” July 11, 1997.

²⁶⁸ In June, 2001, Talisman and Lundin agreed to a corporate rearrangement whereby Talisman would buy the outstanding shares of Lundin and Lundin would spin off to a new company its Sudan and Russian assets, to be owned by the Lundin family and others. The Sudan assets included Lundin’s interests in Blocks 5A and 5B and its 100 percent interest in the Halaib Block in northeast Sudan bordering (and contested by) Egypt. The new company, called Lundin Petroleum AB, started trading on the New Market at Stockholmsborsen but was not listed on any U.S. stock exchange. At that time proposed legislation on Sudan oil-related capital market sanctions that might apply to Lundin was pending in the U.S. Congress. Lundin Petroleum retained the same board and.management team as Lundin Oil. For simplicity, Lundin Petroleum is also referred to as Lundin. Lundin Petroleum, “Report for the period ended December 31, 2001,” http://www.Lundin-petroleum.com/Documents/qr_4_2001_e.pdf (accessed May 28, 2002); Lundin Oil press release, “Lundin Oil Recommends Acceptance of Public Cash Offer from Talisman and Spins Off Key Exploration Assets into a New Swedish Oil Company,” Stockholm, June 21, 2001.

²⁶⁹ Lundin noted that the GNPOC 1,540 kilometer-long pipeline, with capacity to pump 250,000 barrels of oil per day (and an expected maximum capacity of 450,000 barrels per day with the addition of several pump stations), was completed in August 1999. Lundin Oil, “Sudan: Operation Fact Sheet—October 2000,” http://www.Lundinoil.com/eng/sudan.html (accessed November 28, 2000).

²⁷⁰ Lundin Oil press release, “Lundin Oil Spuds First Well in Sudan,” .

²⁷¹ Lundin Oil AB: Sudan, http://www.Lundinoil.com/eng/operations/sudan/index.html (accessed November 28, 2000).

²⁷² Talisman CEO Jim Buckee, Human Rights Watch interview, Calgary, Alberta, Canada, February 3, 2000.

²⁷³ When the U.N. Special Rapporteur on human rights in Sudan in 2001 cited oil-related destruction near Rier [Ryer], Lundin responded that “Rier” was not in Block 5A. Human Rights Watch has concluded that Ryer is the same location where the company had its first drilling operation, which the company called “Thar Jath.”

Not only do former residents identify the location of the drilling operation—and Lundin admittedly had only one drilling rig in place at the time—but the Nuer forces which attacked the drilling rig in 1999 said that it was in Ryer.

A 1939 map drawn up by the British War Office shows that Ryer is the only village identified in that vicinity. Map, “Sudan,” by Geographical Section, General Staff, No. 2692, Published by the War Office, London, 1914, 4th Ed. 1939.

A British district commissioner in the area, Percy Coriat, listed “Tharjath & Ryer” in his handing-over notes to his successor in 1931, where Ryer was listed as a Jagei Nuer area of about 5,195 (male) taxpayers. Document 4.1, reprinted in Percy Coriat, Governing the Nuer: Documents in Nuer history and ethnography, 1922-1931, ed. D. H. Johnson (Oxford: Journal of Anthropology Society of Oxford, 1993), p. 161. The spelling Human Rights Watch uses for the location of the first Lundin exploratory drilling in Block 5A is “Ryer.” This is the oldest spelling found.

Ultimately Lundin discovered that its rig was indeed in a place known as Ryer. Christine Batruch, Lundin, Human Rights Watch interview, Washington, D.C., November 21, 2001. Another Rier, a relief delivery location in Bul Nuer territory near Mayom, was heavily bombed by the government in May 2002. See below. Rier or ryer means “big shady tree” in Nuer.

²⁷⁴ Map, “Sudan: Tribal Map, Sheet 3,” Sudan Survey Department, Khartoum (1946, corrected 1969) (U.S. Library of Congress collection).

²⁷⁵ Guk is about two hours east of Koch on foot, about a seven hours’ walk (for the Nuer) north of Ler town. Ler chief, Human Rights Watch interview, Khartoum, July 26, 1999.

²⁷⁶ William Magany, interview, August 18, 1999; Ler chief, interview, July 26, 1999.

²⁷⁷ According to Paul Wilson, a twenty-five-year British army veteran working for Rappaport as security consultant to Lundin, the oil company did not gain access to Block 5A from the authorities until late December 1997, due to obstruction by lower level government officials. The company’s equipment arrived in January-February 1998 from Khartoum by barge. Paul Wilson, Human Rights Watch telephone interview, Nigeria, May 16, 2001.

²⁷⁸ Lundin Oil, “Sudan: Operation Fact Sheet—October 2000,” http://www.Lundinoil.com/eng/sudan.html (accessed November 28, 2000). Increasingly sophisticated seismic techniques—the reflection and refraction of sound waves propagated through the earth—reveal details of the structure and interrelationship of various layers in the subsurface that point to the probable presence of petroleum. Microsoft Encarta Encyclopedia, “Petroleum: Exploration.” http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/refpages/RefArticle.aspx?refid=761576221&sec=5#s5 (accessed May 2, 2001).

²⁷⁹ Paul Wilson, interview, May 16, 2001.

²⁸⁰ William Magany, interview, August 18, 1999.

²⁸¹ Isaac Magok Gaalwak, Ler paramount chief (Dok Nuer), Human Rights Watch interview, Paliang, Tonj County, Bahr El Ghazal, southern Sudan, August 14, 1999.

²⁸² Michael Wal Yang, RASS coordinator Ler province, Human Rights Watch interview, Nyal, Western Upper Nile, August 18, 1999.

²⁸³ SSDF officer, interview, August 3, 1999.

²⁸⁴ Riek Machar, interview, August 8, 2000.

²⁸⁵ Taban Deng, interview, July 26, 1999. Taban Deng and others frequently referred to Lundin by its old name, IPC.

²⁸⁶ The Sudanese government authorities said that Lundin (IPC) needed the protection of their troops. Lundin’s security consultant Paul Wilson who was opposed to the Khartoum approach and argued against it, believed that, in retaliation, the Khartoum government started to block the Lundin (IPC) supplies coming overland through Bentiu, including food for the work crews. Lundin then successfully resorted to helicopters for supplies. Paul Wilson, interview, May 16, 2001.

²⁸⁷ Ler chief, interview, July 26, 1999.

²⁸⁸ Relief agency assessment in Nhialdiu, Leek district, Western Upper Nile, May 12-15, 1998, dated May 16, 1998 (anonymity requested).

²⁸⁹ Ler chief, interview, July 26, 1999.

²⁹⁰ William Magany, interview, August 18, 1999.

²⁹¹ WFP, “Sudan Bulletin No. 83: April 18-24, 1999,” Rome, May 11, 1999.

²⁹² This took place in the first half of 1998. Paul Wilson, interview, May 16, 2001.

²⁹³ William Magany, interview, August 18, 1999.

²⁹⁴ SPLA Cmdr. William Nyuon Bany, a Nuer, held Ler for twelve hours in 1992 against Riek Machar’s government-aligned forces. William Nyuon was then the highest-ranking Nuer in the SPLM/A, before he defected in August 1992 to Riek Machar’s forces. He rejoined the SPLM/A in 1995 and died in operations in early 1996, fighting against SSIM Cmdr. Elijah Hon Top. Elijah Hon Top, interview.

²⁹⁵ MSF, Violence, Health and Access to Aid in Unity State/Western Upper Nile, Sudan, April 2002, p. 10. MSF-Holland opened a kala azar treatment center in Ler town in 1989 when it discovered that all 800 kala azar cases it was treating in Khartoum originated in Western Upper Nile/Unity State, north of Ler. Ibid.

²⁹⁶ Sharon E. Hutchinson, Human Rights Watch telephone interview, Madison, Wisconsin, March 22, 2000. The officer, whose name cannot be disclosed, told Hutchinson in June 1999 about the incident.

²⁹⁷ Ibid.; Elijah Hon Top, interview, July 26, 1999.

²⁹⁸ Paul Wilson, interview, May 16, 2001.

²⁹⁹ S.E. Hutchinson, interview, March 22, 2000.

³⁰⁰ Elijah Hon Top, interview, July 26, 1999; S.E. Hutchinson, interview, March 22, 2000.

³⁰¹ Elijah Hon Top, interview, July 26, 1999.

³⁰² S. E. Hutchinson, interview, March 22, 2000.

³⁰³ Ibid.

³⁰⁴ Ibid.

³⁰⁵ Elijah Hon Top, interview, July 26, 1999.

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

³⁰⁷ “Civilians Displaced by Sudan Fights,” AP, Khartoum, July 27, 1998.

³⁰⁸ Michael Wal, interview, August 18, 1999.

³⁰⁹ William Magany, interview, August 18, 1999.

³¹⁰ Isaac Magok, interview, August 14, 1999.

³¹¹ Michael Wal, interview, August 18, 1999. Others who were killed in June 1998 in Ler included local traders and one old woman who was burned inside her house. In addition, when Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep’s forces suddenly arrived, three boys were killed in cross fire. Martha N., Human Rights Watch interview, Nyal, Western Upper Nile, southern Sudan, August 18-20, 1999.

³¹² Michael Wal, interview, August 18, 1999.

³¹³ S.E. Hutchinson, interview, March 22, 2000.

³¹⁴ Gideon Bading, interview, August 20, 1999.

³¹⁵ “Aid Agencies Pull Out of Sudanese Region,” AFP, Nairobi, July 7, 1998; MSF press release, “Insecurity Hinders Provision of Humanitarian Assistance in Southern Sudan,” Nairobi, July 7, 1998.

³¹⁶ U.N. OLS (Southern Sector), “Emergency Update No. 12,” Nairobi, July 17, 1998. OLS is the U.N. umbrella agency coordinating the relief effort for Sudan.

³¹⁷ Michael Wal, interview, August 18, 1999. Two rotations means two round-trip flights in one day.

³¹⁸ Paul Wilson, interview, May 16, 2001.

³¹⁹ Michael Wal, interview, August 18, 1999.

³²⁰ Alfred Taban, “Pro-government Factions Clash in Sudan,” Reuters, Khartoum, July 7, 1998.

³²¹ “Inter-faction Fighting Reported in Southern Sudan,” AFP, Khartoum, July 7, 1998.

³²² “Pro-government Factional Fighting Still Rages in South Sudan,” AFP, Khartoum, July 12, 1998.

³²³ “Nearly 50 Die in Sudan Clashes,” AFP, Khartoum, July 19, 1998.

³²⁴ “Faction Fighting in Southern Sudan Kills 49,” AFP, Khartoum, July 15, 1998.

³²⁵ Ibid.

³²⁶ Isaac Magok, interview, August 14, 1999.

³²⁷ Ler chief, interview, July 26, 1999.

³²⁸ “Aid Workers Hiding in Bush after Sending SOS,” AFP, Nairobi, July 16, 1998; WFP, “Sudan Daily Bulletin No. 10, July 18-20, 1998,” Rome, July 20, 1998.

³²⁹ “Pro-government Factions Reach Ceasefire in Southern Sudan,” AFP, Khartoum, July 21, 1998.

³³⁰ RASS official, Human Rights Watch interview, Nyal, Western Upper Nile/Unity, August 18, 1999.

³³¹ Elizabeth N., interview, Nyal, August 18-20, 1999. In 1998, the civilians generally did not flee too far from their homes. The women and children ran four hours “very deep in the toic, where we could not be seen,” but there was not enough wild food there. They would sneak back to the village to see if it was safe to fetch clothes or food, or to gather wild food.

³³² William Magany, interview, August 18, 1999.

³³³ WFP, “Sudan Bulletin No. 74: February 6-13, 1999,” Rome, February 25, 1999. One Nuer military man said that the Leek Nuer, who lived in the Nhialdiu area, did not want to leave their area because they were afraid their property—huts, grain, and cattle—would be looted in their absence. Often they switched sides and joined whoever was in control of the area, be it Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep or SSDF Cmdr. Tito Biel. Thomas Duoth, interview, July 22, 1999. Many Leek Nuer had already been displaced from their land north of Bentiu.

³³⁴ Oxfam, “Briefing Document on the Emergency in the South of Sudan,” May 1, 1998.

³³⁵ CARE, “CARE Responds to the Crisis in South Sudan with Emergency Aid,” Atlanta, May 5, 1998.

³³⁶ Canadian International Development Agency press release, “Canada Sends Emergency Aid to Sudan,” Ottawa, May 13, 1998.

³³⁷ U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Sudan, January-December 1999, New York, January 25, 1999.

³³⁸ MSF-Holland press release, “Insecurity Hinders Provision of Humanitarian Assistance in Southern Sudan,” Nairobi, July 7, 1998.

³³⁹ WFP, “Sudan Bulletin No. 73: February 1-6, 1999,” Rome, February 7, 1999.

³⁴⁰ WFP press release, “WFP Executive Director Catherine Bertini Calls on International Community to Help End Fighting in Southern Sudan,” New York, July 10, 1998. Other WFP press releases included: “WFP Staff Evacuated Safely Out of South Sudan After Out-running Militia Attack,” Nairobi, July 18, 1998; “WFP Issues Urgent Appeal for Funds to Expand Emergency Food Aid to Needy Sudanese,” Rome, July 27, 1998.

³⁴¹ U.N. OLS, “An OLS Position Paper: The Humanitarian Emergency in Sudan,” Nairobi, July 31, 1998.

³⁴² OCHA, Consolidated Appeal, 1999.

³⁴³ WFP, “WFP Delivers First Food in Months to Tens of Thousands of Sudanese Cut Off by War in Southern Sudan,” Nairobi, December 8, 1998, quoting David Fletcher, acting WFP Representative and Deputy Coordinator, OLS.

³⁴⁴ Ibid.

³⁴⁵ OCHA, Consolidated Appeal, 1998.

³⁴⁶ WFP, “Emergency Report No. 26 of 1998: Sudan,” Rome, June 26, 1998.

³⁴⁷ OCHA, Consolidated Appeal, 1999.

³⁴⁸ The Bahr El Ghazal famine had one natural cause – a two-year drought caused by El Niño – and several human ones. Muraheleen and government-backed militias pauperized the northern Bahr El Ghazal Dinka by raiding, burning fields and homes, and looting. The government’s years of obstruction of relief efforts along with the SPLA’s looting of the few relief goods available and “taxation” of the citizens led to a full-blown disaster. By late 1997 the U.N. projected that approximately 250,000 people in Western Upper Nile/Unity State would be at risk for starvation in 1998. Human Rights Watch, Famine in Sudan, pp. 2-3.

³⁴⁹ OCHA, Consolidated Appeal, 1999.

—————

SUDAN: OIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS

SUMMARY

The first export of crude oil from Sudan in August 1999 marked a turning point in the country’s complex civil war, now in its twentieth year: oil became the main objective and a principal cause of the war. Oil now figures as an important remaining obstacle to a lasting peace and oil revenues have been used by the government to obtain weapons and ammunition that have enabled it to intensify the war and expand oil development. Expansion of oil development has continued to be accompanied by the violent displacement of the agro-pastoral southern Nuer and Dinka people from their traditional lands atop the oilfields. Members of such communities continue to be killed or maimed, their homes and crops burned, and their grains and cattle looted.

The large-scale exploitation of oil by foreign companies operating in the theatre of war in southern Sudan has increased human rights abuses there and has exacerbated the long-running conflict in Sudan, a conflict marked already by gross human rights abuses—two million dead, four million displaced since 1983—and recurring famine and epidemics.

Forced displacement of the civilian population, and the death and destruction that have accompanied it, are the central human rights issues relating to oil development in Sudan. The government is directly responsible for this forced displacement, which it has undertaken to provide security to the operations of its partners, the international and mostly foreign state-owned oil companies. In the government’s eyes, the centuries-long residents of the oilfields, the Nuer, Dinka, and other southern Sudanese, pose a security threat to the oilfields because control and ownership of the south’s natural resources are contested by southern rebels and government officials perceive the pastoral peoples as sympathetic to the rebels. But the Sudanese government itself has helped to create the threat by forging ahead with oil development in southern territory under circumstances in which its residents have no right to participate in their own governance nor share the benefits of oil development. Brute force has been a key component of the government’s oil development strategy.

The oil in the ground and flowing through the pipeline to the Red Sea supertanker port has driven expulsions from Western Upper Nile/Unity State, the area of the main oil production today. In earlier campaigns in the 1980s government troops and horsebacked militia of the Baggara, Arabized cattle nomads of Darfur and Kordofan, invaded from the northwest, destroying communities and expelling much of the population from the initial exploration areas, in Blocks 1, 2, and 4, dangerously situated on the north-south border of Sudan. (Map B)

In the 1990s the government embarked upon a more sophisticated displacement campaign, through the use of divide-and-conquer tactics: it bought off rebel factions and exacerbated south-south ethnic differences with arms supplies. Mostly Nuer factions with political and other grievances against the Dinka-officered rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A, referred to as SPLA when discussing the military wing), emerged and a bloody south-south war ensued, concentrated in the oilfield areas. Campaigns of killing, pillage, and burning, enabled by government troops and air support for their southern allies who served as front troops, cleared the way for Western and Asian oil corporations to develop the basic infrastructure for oil extraction and transportation: rigs, roads, pumping stations, and pipelines.

The relationship of the war and displacement campaign to oil development is evident: the oil areas targeted for population clearance are those where a concession has been granted and a pipeline is imminent and/or nearby. The availability of the means of transport of oil to the market makes the nearest undeveloped block economically viable. The agro-pastoralists living there then become the target of forced displacement. Since 1999, when the pipeline was nearing completion and Blocks 1, 2, and 4 came on line with 150,000, then 230,000 barrels of crude oil produced daily, the main military theatre has been in the adjacent Block 5A. Oil revenues enable the government to increase its military hardware: it tripled its fleet of attack helicopters in 2001 with the purchase abroad of twelve new helicopters—used to deadly effect in the killing of twenty-four civilians at a relief food distribution site in early 2002, to cite only one example.

In a number of cases, international oil companies in Sudan have denied that any abuses were taking place in connection with oil exploration and production. Despite considerable evidence to the contrary, oil company executives have claimed that they were unaware of any uncompensated forced displacement as a result of oil operations. They have also claimed to have undertaken investigations establishing that abuses are minimal or nonexistent. As noted below, such efforts do not stand up to scrutiny. Increasingly, under pressure from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and some concerned governments, oil company representatives have claimed instead that they are playing a positive role in difficult circumstances to monitor and rein in abuses. As detailed below, such claims have consistently been self-serving. Human Rights Watch believes that oil companies in Sudan, seeking to make a profit in areas of the country wracked by civil war and often brutally cleared of indigenous peoples, have an obligation to see that rights abuses connected with oil production cease.

This report is about the human cost of the oil—and corporate complicity in the Sudanese government’s human rights abuses, including its policy of sponsored ethnic conflict and forced displacement to clear tens of thousands of southern Sudanese from their homes atop the oilfields.

The first part of this report describes early developments in the oil sector in Sudan, summarizing the experience of Chevron beginning in 1974 and Arakis beginning in 1992 in Blocks 1, 2, and 4. Part one also details the historical evidence that, contrary to oil company and Sudanese government assertions, southern Sudanese had long lived in the oilfields, and were displaced as a result of the oil operations. The second part of the report covers oil development by Lundin (IPC) in Block 5A starting in 1996 and the role of Talisman Energy starting in 1998 in continued development of Blocks 1, 2, and 4, examining the large-scale displacement that continued to accompany oil development and intensified civil war in the region. The third part of the report provides a detailed account of the human rights consequences of oil development in Sudan, including population displacement, ethnic manipulation, aerial bombings of civilians, property destruction, waste, and, especially for many Nuer and Dinka, human misery and despair. The fourth part considers what oil company representatives knew and the extent of their complicity, and their governments’ all too common preference for business as usual over policies aimed at ending abuses.

The Displaced

According to information provided by the United Nations (U.N.) World Food Program (WFP) and others, as of March 2002 an estimated 174,200 civilians remained displaced as a result of the conflict between the government and its southern militia proxies, and the rebel SPLM/A in the oilfields of Western Upper Nile/Unity State (roughly Blocks 1, 2, 4, 5A, and 5B). Numbers are at most estimates, and hard to come by, but the displacement continues as of the writing of this report, in spasms of military attacks by government army forces and Nuer militia (or armed groups, as they now prefer to be called), joined in by militia of the Baggara tribes to the northwest. The uprooted civilians’ movements in search of safety and food took them in different directions, sometimes to the edge of another oil concession, sometimes to the toic (seasonally flooded grasslands), sometimes to a garrison town or relief airstrip, and sometimes outside of Western Upper Nile/Unity State. This count did not include many others who fled to areas inaccessible to the U.N. and other relief organizations, or to northern towns such as Khartoum.

The estimated numbers break down as follows: 1998-99: 70,500 displaced from/within Western Upper Nile/Unity State; and 2000-February 2001: 134,000 displaced; as noted above, by March 2002 a total of 174,200 civilians were listed as displaced from the oilfields in two regions, Lakes (part of Bahr El Ghazal) and Upper Nile. This is a conservative estimate as it does not include the oilfield displaced that went to other parts of Bahr El Ghazal or to Khartoum. The displacement has continued in sporadic surges of tens of thousands ever since.

The Nuer and Dinka people, members of the two largest ethnic groups in the south, have borne the brunt of the war in their home territories, through war-caused displacement, death, disease, dislocation, asset destruction, and recurring famine.

The year 1999 saw a significant escalation of conflict and displacement, shortly after the Canadian company Talisman Energy Inc. became the operating company for the concessions in Blocks 1, 2, and 4 and brought much greater financial muscle and technical expertise to bear on opening up oil production in Sudan. In mid-May 1999, the Sudanese government launched an all-out attack lasting several weeks on Dinka communities in the eastern part of Block 1. The assault commenced with aerial bombardment, followed by ground troops who looted freely and burned everything. Tens of thousands of people were displaced.

The completion of the pipeline from Block 1 to the Red Sea in May 1999 meant that Block 5A became commercially viable in a way it had not been before. A government offensive into the block followed ineluctably. Survivors described to Human Rights Watch the exodus of Nuer civilians being chased by pro-government militia from Block 5A’s oilfields in late 1999. The displaced Nuer carried fishing spears, but most left behind even such basic necessities as kitchen spoons and cooking utensils. Some had a few implements and mosquito nets but they could not carry much because they were carrying their children. They tried to save their cattle, their main asset, but those cattle that were too exhausted to keep up and straggled behind were attacked by lions.

On the long walk through the wetlands to Makuac, in Dinka territory, “There was so much water on the way, and we were walking with children, that it took a week,” said a Nuer chief of Ler, who took part in the flight. “Hunger was the main problem,” he said, while the cold and rain were both a curse and a blessing: “The rain saved our lives. It stopped them from chasing us, and we kept walking through the rain. Small children died of cold on the way, and had to be left on the road.” He said there was hunger and sickness, such as relapsing fever, malaria, and skin diseases. “The main thing was the mosquitoes eating us alive, leaving rashes, scabies. We drank the water from the road and toic. There were rivers with water lilies and fish; we ate both.” Twenty-three people from one group died of hunger, exposure, and disease on the way to safety in Bahr El Ghazal.

We slept on the grass, outside. This is what killed some children. A boy aged eight and a girl of ten years were lost on the way. I do not know if the wild animals got them. When they were missing we searched for them and could not find them. We lost both in the toic after crossing the Dinka border, near the cattle camp Ngot. The girl’s name was Nyanit Biel.

These were not the only abuses. Boys were conscripted and women raped. One boy soldier forcibly inducted by Nuer pro-government militia said, “If they captured you and then took your sister as a wife [raped her], if you were angry, they would beat you. They are serious about raping.” A young woman who had never been captured described her fear. “They are abducting girls and making them their ladies [raping them],” she said, to explain why she had been in hiding before leaving her village of Ger. She knew some of the girls who were abducted, including a young woman of her age—eighteen—who was taken with three girls from a village one hour away.

Their mother came to our house and told us of the abduction by the renegades [pro-government militia]. No one knows what happened to them. Their mother tried to follow but she could not find them.

This young woman had been hiding in the forest and going home at night to sleep. After hearing of the abductions, she fled south.

This suffering has continued in the same pattern to date. In February 2000, the Swedish company Lundin Oil AB, lead partner in Block 5A, announced that the lack of a road had delayed its drilling operations. The government’s dry season military activities in 2000 in Block 5A appeared designed precisely to capture land for, construct, and secure a road leading to Lundin’s fields and the Sudanese army garrison at Ler. In the ensuing months of fighting, most of it between Nuer rebels opposing the government and the government’s Nuer militias, tens of thousands of civilians in the Block 5A and adjacent Block 4 oil areas were uprooted. During this time, with the rebels distracted and on the defensive, the oil companies forged ahead with construction of a north-south all-weather road from Bentiu, on the border of Blocks 1 and 5A, to an exploratory drilling site at Ryer/Thar Jath, and Ler, reaching the Nile port of Adok in southern Block 5A in January 2001.

By July 28, 2000, thousands of civilians were on the move from both the pro-government militias and the rebel forces. Relief workers in a plane flying over the fifty kilometers between Nimne and Nhialdiu in Block 5A saw few people, huts, or cattle, because a wide swathe of land, as far as they could see, had been burned to the ground. Many civilians from the area fled or were driven west and north; many thousands were seen with their cattle and mats (but no other possessions) camped on the banks of the Jur River in late July 2000. Those who could manage to swim across with their cattle did so. A separate mass of up to 60,000 people made it to the relative safety of Bentiu, a garrison town.

By early 2001, the oil road south of Bentiu was heavily defended by military patrols and guard posts. While the oil companies said that civilians were living there and enjoying the road, the tens of thousands of people already displaced from there to other less militarized areas told an entirely different story—one of people forced from their land, their cattle stolen, homes and possessions destroyed by government agents without the least notice or compensation. They were abandoned to the over-extended and under-funded international relief network, whose operations were the object of a government cat-and-mouse game in which a government “win” meant that the newly displaced were cut off from international aid altogether.

In late 2001-early 2002, newly reunited rebel forces—including a previously government-allied militia that had been guarding the Block 5A installations—went on the offensive. The rebels succeeded in ambushing several large government military convoys on the oil road in Block 5A, stymieing oil operations for a period.

The government used heavy bombing—including a total of sixteen new attack helicopters, purchased abroad in 2001-2002 with oil revenue—in an attempt to retake and secure the oil road and operational area. It also deployed Baggara militia for the first time south of the Bahr El Ghazal (Nam in Nuer) River. The Lundin-built bridge at Bentiu made it possible for the first time for the government-armed Baggara horsebacked raiders to attack in this area of Block 5A. Civilians ran for shelter further south and west, into a marshy area crossed by streams where the horses could not reach; from there the newly-purchased government attack helicopters often picked up the chase. The civilians were scattered and isolated, hungry, thirsty, and tired, beyond the reach of aid agencies, which the government prohibited from searching for them. Many of those who were uprooted and dispossessed of all means of survival faced famine and death in the unfamiliar areas to which they fled. Block 1 was also a target of Sudanese army offensives and SPLA counter offensives throughout 2001, including a government attack with new helicopters and ground troops in October in Ruweng (Panaru) County, in which an estimated 80,000 persons were displaced.

Ongoing armed conflict has led to continued flight; establishment of government garrisons has prevented the displaced from returning to their homes. While both sides employ modern weapons, the government has produced and purchased more and better weapons with its new oil money, including sixteen new attack helicopter gunships in 2001-2002, more than tripling its military helicopter fleet.

The government made civilian suffering worse by banning relief flights from reaching those who try to cling on in areas the government wants cleared. The government repeatedly refused international relief access to Nuer and Dinka oilfield areas that were in rebellion against the government, calculating that the civilians, who have lost everything in attacks on their villages, would be forced by famine to migrate elsewhere—anywhere—in search of food. It also prohibited humanitarian access to those recently displaced, if they remained in areas near the oilfields.

Even as the government entered into peace negotiations in 2002, it stepped up its attempts to close off Western Upper Nile/Unity State to all relief except that which went to its garrison towns. Finally, under extreme foreign pressure and in the middle of peace talks, the Sudanese government relented on humanitarian access in October 2002. The ceasefire, signed that same month, was broken mostly in Western Upper Nile/Unity State’s oilfields.¹

Sudan’s Land and Peoples

Sudan’s 2.5 million square kilometers make it the largest country in Africa, more than one quarter the size of the United States (U.S.). Because of lack of water in the vast northern desert part, half the population lives in just over 15 percent of the land, along the Nile and, in the south, along its many tributaries and annually flooded areas.

Sudan’s estimated 30.3 million people are even more varied than its desert-savannah-floodplain-swamp-rainforest terrain. (Map A) They are divided among nineteen major ethnic groups and some 600 subgroups who speak more than one hundred languages and dialects. In the first and only ethnic census taken (1956), Arabs were 39 percent, and Africans 61 percent, of whom Dinka were the largest group at 12 percent of the total population. Perhaps 70 percent of the population is Muslim, most living in the northern two-thirds of the country. The rest of the population practices traditional African religions or Christianity.

The African non-Muslim citizens who populate the south have been at war with the central government, dominated by an Arabized Muslim elite, since independence in 1956. State power remains in the hands of this elite, which dominates the officer corps of the army, security agencies, and other implements of power—although poverty-stricken Africans from the Nuba Mountains, west and south of Sudan make up the bulk of the soldier class.

Although there was a decade of peace and southern autonomy in 1972-83 after the separatist southern rebels laid down their arms, it came to an end when the central government abolished the southern autonomous region and made shari’a (Islamic law) the law of the land in 1983. The civil war flared up again, but with a different political agenda. While southern sentiment remains strongly separatist, Dr. John Garang, the leader of the main rebel force, the SPLM/A calls for a “united, secular Sudan.”

The human rights catastrophe in Sudan’s oilfields cannot be seen in isolation from the larger conflict between the ruling riverain Arabized and Muslim elite and the vast economically, politically, and socially marginalized sections of the population, west and east, north and south. It is difficult to overstate the historical differences and special distrust that divide the south from the northern or ruling elite. The south has been starved of development resources, its economy one of pastoral and agricultural subsistence, its children uneducated, and health clinics almost nonexistent. Without doubt it is one of the most underdeveloped regions in the entire world. Sudan has enjoyed democracy only sporadically, and even then southerners have been in the minority in a country where respect for minority rights and cultural diversity is decidedly lacking.

Therefore, when oil was discovered in the south in 1978, control over it became a hot issue. Leaders of the autonomous Southern Region protested the northern-dominated central government’s plans to locate the pipeline through the north, to build a refinery in the north and, they feared, to divert all profits and jobs away from the south to the north. This is exactly what has come to pass by means of the debilitating and never-ending war in the south (1983 – present).

Oil in Sudan: The Corporate Holdings

The large oil reserves in Sudan, which are located almost entirely in the southern third of the country, make it potentially a producer in the Brunei/Colombia range. It is not considered a potential megaproducer on the level of Saudi Arabia or Iraq.² But, if properly managed, its oil resources could be a godsend to a country as poor as Sudan, where the annual per capita gross domestic product is an estimated U.S. $ 424.

The main area of oil exploration and production in Sudan to date, the Muglad Basin, stretches southeast down across the midsection of the country, from El Muglad in Western Kordofan through Bentiu and Western Upper Nile, known by the government as Unity (al Wihda) State, to Juba on the White Nile and Eastern Equatoria.³

The Western Upper Nile/Unity State area was traditionally the homeland of the Nuer people. Oil exploitation in southern Sudan began north of Bentiu, in Western Upper Nile/Unity State—in Blocks 1, 2, and the southernmost parts of Block 4, the sites of Unity and Heglig oilfields. (See Map B.) The oil history and development of Block 5A, which is a continuation of the Muglad Basin to the south east of Blocks 1 and 4, has been controlled by the developments in these blocks. Blocks 1, 2, and 4 total nearly 19,500 square miles (50,500 square kilometers or 12.5 million acres). ⁴ Block 5A totals 8,076 square miles (20,917 square kilometers or 5.2 million acres), and Block 5B totals 7,768 square miles (20,119 square kilometers or 5 million acres).⁵

Petroleum exploration in Sudan began in the early 1960s. Activity was originally concentrated offshore in the Red Sea. In 1974, two years after the peace accord that ended the first civil war (1955-72), the Sudanese government granted the Chevron Oil Company (U.S.) large oil concessions in Sudan. Chevron discovered and named the Muglad and Melut basins. It drilled for and found oil near Bentiu town in 1978. The government named the oilfield “Unity.” It was located in Block 1, inside Upper Nile province, part of the autonomous Southern Region. Soon after, Chevron discovered the Heglig field, in Block 2. Chevron spent about U.S. $ 1 billion on exploration but never recovered it costs. It suspended activities in southern Sudan in 1984 due to a rebel attack that killed three expatriate oil workers and other security concerns. The French firm Total, which acquired various oil concessions around 1980, also suspended its onshore exploration activities, but retained its rights, including to Block 5, which, at 120,000 square kilometers, is larger than the size of Blocks 1, 2, 4, 5A, and 5B combined.

The Islamist-military government that took power in 1989 was determined to develop Sudan’s oil potential. It forced Chevron to sell its concession and sub-divided it into smaller exploration blocks. In 1993 Canadian independent Arakis Energy acquired the portion of Chevron’s concession north of the town of Bentiu, namely Blocks 1, 2, and 4. In June 1996, Arakis brought eight wells on stream in the Heglig field, subsequently trucking low levels of crude oil to a small refinery at El Obeid in Northern Kordofan for domestic consumption.

On December 6, 1996, in need of cash for the project, Arakis sold 75 percent of its interest to three other companies, with which it formed a consortium called the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Corporation (GNPOC), whose value Arakis put at approximately U.S. $ 1 billion. Arakis was to be the operational partner. The three other companies were state-owned: the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), Petronas Carigali Overseas Sudan Berhad (a subsidiary of Petronas Nasional Berhad, the national petroleum corporation of Malaysia), and Sudan’s state-owned oil enterprise Sudapet Limited. They would own 40 percent, 30 percent, and 5 percent of the project, respectively. CNPC and Petronas put up project financing until mid-1998.

Although Arakis had been working proven oilfields in Sudan since 1992, by mid-1998 it had relatively little to show for it. The Sudanese oil industry remained in rudimentary form, producing only for local consumption. The country still imported most of its petroleum needs.

On October 8, 1998, Canada’s largest independent oil and gas producer, Talisman Energy Inc.,⁶ acquired Arakis and Arakis’ main asset, the Sudan project. Talisman, with its superior technology and experience, brought major improvements for the benefit of the war-stressed and cash-poor Sudanese government. It took only one year after Talisman joined the consortium to boost development of the Heglig and Unity fields in Blocks 1 and 2, to finish a 1,540-kilometer (1,000-mile) pipeline to the Red Sea, to build a new marine terminal for oil supertankers, and to pump and export the first crude oil from Sudan. This project transformed Sudan from a net hydrocarbon importer into a potential member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the cartel of oil-exporting countries. In August 1999, the first oil for export earned the Sudanese government U.S. $ 2.2 million in one shot. Much more was to come. Talisman estimated that, over the life of the Heglig and Unity fields alone, the government of Sudan would earn approximately Canadian $ 3 billion to $ 5 billion (more than U.S. $ 2 billion to $ 3 billion), depending on the international price of oil.⁷

Because of Talisman’s successful exploration, by 1999 reserves in Blocks 1 and 2 were discovered to be much larger than previously thought—403.6 million barrels in 1998 and an increase to 528 million barrels in reserves in 1999. ⁸ In 2002, a breakthrough in exploration on Block 4 indicated that there might be an additional 160-240 million barrels of oil in the GNPOC concession.⁹ By April 2002, it was estimated that current proven plus probable ultimate recovery of the GNPOC concession would be one billion barrels of crude oil.¹⁰

From 150,000 barrels per day of oil pumped by GNPOC in 1999 (annualized), production increased to 230,000 barrels per day (b/d) by year end 2001.¹¹ Actual output for 2002 reached 240,000 b/d.¹²

Talisman’s projections indicate a peak production from the GNPOC blocks at 250,000 b/d in 2005 and the sharp and continual decline in production to 40,000 b/d in 2020.¹³ This projected decline in production meant that the government needed to bring new blocks on line, in order to maintain at least a steady flow of oil revenue.

On October 30, 2002, Talisman announced that it had agreed to sell its Sudan interests to ONGC Videsh Limited, a subsidiary of Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited, India’s national oil company, for a net return on investment of 30 percent. International human rights pressure greatly contributed to the pressure for Talisman to leave Sudan. Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Jim Buckee said, “Talisman’s shares continue to be discounted based on perceived political risk in-country and in North America to a degree that was unacceptable for 12 percent of our production.”¹⁴

The disastrous human rights developments in Block 5A from 1999 onward were related to GNPOC’s successful production in Blocks 1 and 2 and the approaching completion of pipeline facilities in GNPOC’s Blocks. Without the pipeline, the oilfields in Block 5A would have remained as Chevron left them, undeveloped, attracting little military attention. Block 5A was an area the government had long ago conceded to the rebels, as of no strategic interest and having a particularly difficult, swampy environment; but with the GNPOC pipeline completed only a short distance away, it became economically feasible, gained strategic importance, and became a military priority for the government.

On February 6, 1997, the International Petroleum Company (IPC), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Lundin Oil AB, signed an exploration and production-sharing agreement with the Sudanese government, granting IPC (referred to here as Lundin, the name of the Swedish family controlling IPC) rights to Block 5A, adjacent to and south-southeast of Block 1. IPC (or Lundin), the lead partner, held 40.375 percent of the concession, and the Malaysian state oil company Petronas held 28.5 percent; OMV (Sudan Block 5A) Exploration GmbH, owned by OMV AG, one of Austria’s largest listed industrial companies, held 26.125 percent; and Sudapet held 5 percent. Lundin also owned 10 percent of Arakis’ stock.¹⁵ (In 2000 Lundin and OMV also acquired a 24.5 percent interest each in Block 5B.) Lundin estimated there were 115 million barrels in reserve in Block 5A, but nothing has been produced so far from the concession.¹⁶

Lundin’s explorations in Block 5A were suspended twice due to insecurity, last in January 2002. On March 27, 2003, Lundin announced the resumption of activities.¹⁷ In June 2003, Lundin sold out its interest in Block 5A to Petronas, while retaining its interest in Block 5B.¹⁸ A few months later, in September 2003, OMV agreed to sell its interests in both blocks to ONGC Videsh Limited of India.

Government Strategy of Divide and Displace

In order to control the production of oil, the unelected government of Jafa’ar Nimeiri (1969-85) adopted a two-pronged strategy, division and displacement of the southern population. It has taken almost two decades and various governments to develop and refine this strategy, but the division and displacement strategy has accomplished what direct military action from the central government alone could never achieve: clear control of certain oil areas in southern Sudan.

The political tactic was to conceal the hand of the government by encouraging government proxies—land-hungry neighbors—to attack the agro-pastoralists of the oilfields. With the population thinned out, the government could erect a “cordon sanitaire” around the producing areas in Blocks 1, 2, 4 and 5A for foreign oil companies to exploit in peace and security—while those who had lived for generations on the land were robbed of their peace, security, homes, animals, crops, families, and often their lives.

In the 1980s, the government of dictator Nimeiri (1969-85) and then the elected government of Prime Minister Sadiq al Mahdi of the Umma Party (1986-89) armed militias of the Baggara, Arabic-speaking cattle-owning nomads, to drive southerners from their own land, in particular the Nuer and Dinka ethnic groups to the south and east of the Baggara, steadily clearing out Blocks 1, 2, and 4 for oil development. The north-south border drawn by the British cuts through Blocks 2 and 4. (See Map B)

The Baggara horse-backed militias, known as muraheleen, with state and central government-supplied automatic weapons, were allowed full impunity in Western Upper Nile/Unity State to loot cattle and burn, and to kill, injure, and capture Nuer and Dinka, whose men resisted on foot, mostly with spears.¹⁹ The government granted impunity to its proxies for what they stole and whom they murdered. Government soldiers in trucks later came through, with equal brutality and greater thoroughness, to erect garrisons and stay, occupying the land and preventing most of those displaced from returning.

Inside Block 4, west of Bentiu, and probably not far from what later became an oilfield, there were schools attended by hundreds of Leek Nuer children in 1983, according to a man who then served as school administrator. These Nuer were pushed by the Baggara in the mid-1980s to cross the Bahr El Ghazal (Nam) River for safety. The school administrator said:

The Baggara looted the Nuer cattle, and sold it to traders. They killed people, abducted girls and boys to be slaves, and sold some to Libya. If a person were lucky, his children would be in Khartoum. Most of those abducted disappeared. This started . . . when the government of Sudan gave guns to the Baggara.²⁰

The schools the administrator was managing closed from 1983 until 1991 because the Baggara raiders destroyed them. Whole communities fled; many families were separated.

In 1983, mutinies by southerners within the Sudanese army led to the creation of the SPLM/A, and then the full-scale resumption of the civil war. By 1986, the SPLM/A dominated most of Western Upper Nile—except for the government garrison towns, some oilfields north of Bentiu town, and the Bul Nuer area, which was loyal to the commander of a pro-government militia, Paulino Matiep, who had never joined the SPLM/A and to whom the government referred as a “friend” of the army.²¹

In the face of SPLM/A successes, the Sudanese government further developed its preferred strategy of divide and rule. In addition to deploying the army and Baggara militia to protect the oilfields, the Sudanese government also implemented a strategy of dividing southerners and buying off those occupying strategic territory. It cultivated Cmdr. Paulino Matiep as its primary surrogate force to keep the SPLM/A presence—and that of other hostile forces—in the oilfields at a minimum. Paulino Matiep’s role was to become ever more important in the years that followed.

The government took advantage of a 1991 split in the SPLM/A—which broke into two factions mainly along Dinka/Nuer ethnic lines—to begin covertly aiding the mostly-Nuer breakaway faction led by prominent Nuer leader Dr. Riek Machar Teny Dhurgon. This force changed names as it changed alliances, and was last known as the Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SPDF). (In January 2002, the SPDF and the SPLM/A signed a unity agreement, reuniting many of the forces that split in 1991.²²)

The Nuer were the key ethnic group as far as oil development was concerned. Nuer territory extended to most of the Muglad and Melut basins, with Dinka being the second largest ethnic group in the southern oilfield regions.

In 1996, Riek Machar and one other commander signed a Political Charter with the government. In 1997, the Khartoum Peace Agreement was signed between the government, the Machar faction, and other political and armed groups at odds with the SPLM/A. The Khartoum Peace Agreement provided for a referendum on self-determination, a widely-held southern aspiration. But the referendum was to be held four years after conditions were right, and has not been held to date. Instead, the Nuer became victims of extensive displacement at the hands of their government “allies.”

The Khartoum Peace Agreement of 1997 was what the government needed to show foreign oil investors. It supposedly put an end to the war that had driven Chevron away; it provided African “ex-rebel leaders” to meet with and to assure oil investors that Chevron’s bad experience would not be repeated; and it supplied ex-rebel forces with arms and ammunition to brush away the rebel “remnants” who might venture too close to the oilfields.

But the northern-based government fundamentally mistrusted southerners. It would neither rely on southerners as firm allies nor allow them to grow too powerful. It directly provisioned various smaller Nuer commanders, thus winning them away from Riek Machar’s forces. In addition, the government issued renewed calls to students and others in the north to join militias known as “Popular Defence Forces” (PDF), including one known as the “Protectors of the Oil Brigade,” that it then deployed to the oil areas of the south.

When the pro-government Nuer militia of Paulino Matiep began attacks in late 1997 into the territory of Riek Machar, supposedly a government ally, the government publicly dismissed the fighting as “tribal clashes.” Since all these forces were southern, the government claimed it was remote from “inter-factional” fighting between southerners and could not control it. But the government did not lift a finger to stop it. The government itself promoted the myth of the “ungovernable south” sure to plunge into anarchy that would end in a “Rwanda” scenario, unless there was steady oversight from Khartoum.²³ By selectively arming ethnic factions—providing arms and ammunition to Nuer pro-government militias to fight against another Nuer factions and the SPLM/A—the government’s actions were actually making that Rwanda scenario more, not less, likely. The strategy of fielding southern forces as its proxies was a government attempt to evade accountability for its actions. The creation and nurturing of southern proxies also helped to prevent unification of the southern political and military forces opposing the government.

The government’s ethnic divide and displace strategy was especially devastating for the Nuer: it encouraged and armed them to fight each other in scorched earth campaigns—at home. They were skilled in familiar terrain, as the government troops were not, at lightning raids conducted regardless of the harsh geography and weather, including during the wet season when government troops, vehicle-bound, could not engage.

With heightened development interest in Block 5A, as Talisman was completing the pipeline to the Red Sea in 1999, the strategy of arming southern proxies to fight the war became even more important to the government. The Block 5A oilfields did not border the Baggara or the north-south divide; they were deep inside the south where rivers traditionally barred the advance of the Baggara militias on horseback. The government’s proxy for clearing those Nuer-populated oilfields therefore would have to be Nuer. But Riek Machar’s forces, instead of cooperating with the government, challenged the government’s right to control the Block 5A oilfields. First, Riek Machar tried negotiations. In February 1999, Sudan’s minister of defense met him, and insisted that Sudanese army forces must guard the oilfields, including Lundin in Block 5A. Riek Machar disagreed, insisting that his forces had guarded Lundin since 1997 and should continue.

In April 1999 Lundin drilled an exploratory well at Thar Jath (known to locals as Ryer) in Jagei Nuer territory of Western Upper Nile/Unity State in Block 5A. Representatives of the Khartoum government held a meeting in Bentiu (Block 1 and capital of Western Upper Nile/Unity State) with Riek Machar’s United Democratic Salvation Front/South Sudan Defence Force (UDSF/SSDF) in late April 1999. At this meeting, Sudanese ministry of defense representatives again told Riek Machar and his colleagues that the government army would protect all the oil areas in Western Upper Nile/Unity State. There was no agreement, however. Elijah Hon, an SSDF commander and later its chief of staff, described the discussion in an interview in July 1999:

We said the oil workers can go there [Block 5A], but not the government of Sudan. The government of Sudan refused this. We said the presence of two armies would involve problems. They said that the [government] army should be free to go anywhere in Bentiu [Unity State]. This is a violation of the Khartoum Peace Agreement, [we said,] which requires [our] consultation and approval.

Within days, a campaign of forced displacement from the Block 5A oilfields had started up again, in which the government army, government-backed Paulino Matiep’s Nuer militia, and northern militia all participated. It ranged through Block 5A, chasing the Machar forces—which had run out of ammunition—and Nuer civilians out of the area to Dinka land in the west or to other Nuer areas to the south and east. Government forces occupied the Block 5A drilling location, Thar Jath (Ryer).

In 1999, the Sudanese army also began operations to displace civilians remaining in and around an oilfield area north of Bentiu. Beginning May 9, 1999, the army launched an offensive against Dinka villages in Ruweng County, in eastern Blocks 1 and 5A. The attack was an all-out effort by the Sudanese government. It first used Antonov bombers and helicopter gunships and then tanks and armored personnel carriers backed by militia and army soldiers from garrisons at Liri in the Nuba Mountains and Pariang in Block 1. A local SPLM/A commissioner commented, “The reasons for the attack are clear: they want to exploit the oil in this area without fear of local resistance, so they are clearing the area and removing all the people.” The Sudanese government offensives of 1999 into the oil producing areas pushed several previously opposing forces from the south back into alliance against the government. Riek Machar’s zonal commander in Western Upper Nile/Unity State, Cmdr. Tito Biel Chol, sought and received ammunition from the SPLA, from which he and others had split in 1991. He launched two attacks to roll back government forces in Block 5A, but by August 1999 his forces were again pushed back. The government militia and forces ran over the same small towns and villages three times, repeatedly displacing civilians. As the numbers of displaced rose, the government tightened the noose by refusing relief access to their places of refuge until tremendous international pressure was brought to bear.

It was at this time, September 1999, that most of Paulino Matiep’s forces, led by his Western Upper Nile/Unity State zonal commander Peter Gatdet, mutinied against the government, disgusted with the Nuer-Nuer fighting while the government drained off Nuer oil. Peter Gatdet, Tito Biel, and many other Nuer commanders in November 1999 formed a military command council, the Upper Nile Provisional United Military Command Council (UMCC), which was to have supreme military authority over all the antigovernment forces in Upper Nile. The commanders were also dissatisfied with the role of Riek Machar in cooperating with the government despite the government’s refusal to give his forces the right to control the oilfields, and its refusal to honor the Khartoum Peace Agreement.

The new alliance radically and formally changed the military and political situation in Western Upper Nile/Unity State, with a sizeable increase in the number of antigovernment Nuer forces—Tito Biel’s and Peter Gatdet’s. This left the government with far fewer Nuer troops to front for it there. In response, the government initiated a heightened drive to recruit more young “volunteers” from universities for the more reliable, Islamist-inspired militias.

Just when it seemed that there was a chance that Nuer rebels opposed to the government would gain unity under the UMCC, however, Riek Machar resigned from the government and returned to the southern rebel area. He then created yet another political/military movement, the Sudan People’s Defence Forces/Democratic Front (SPDF) in February 2000. His personal maneuvers in exile to retain a significant political and military role in the affairs of Sudan played straight into the hands of the government.

For a while, Machar’s Nuer forces (including many who had signed on with the UMCC) and those of Peter Gatdet, who had since joined the SPLM/A, combined. Their actions included impeding the construction of the oil roads for Blocks 5A and 4, which were guarded by the government troops and the Paulino Matiep militia. But in April 2000, the Sudanese government launched a new offensive supported by hundreds of muraheleen (Baggara militia) on horseback. Backed by artillery, gunships, and Antonov bombers, they advanced into Block 4. Another government force advanced from Bentiu south to their military stronghold at the Block 5A oil exploration site at Thar Jath (Ryer).²⁴

The working alliance among the Nuer rebels did not last long; its end was hastened by the government’s ready supply of ammunition to the Riek Machar commanders to fight the SPLA/Gatdet troops in a mutual fury of grievance-settling and revenge-taking. In July-August 2000 fighting between government-supplied and antigovernment Nuer forces left a wide swath of territory between Nimne and Nhialdiu burned to the ground and tens of thousands of civilians displaced.

This fighting, with scores of civilian casualties and substantial destruction of civilian property, continued between Cmdrs. Peter Paar Jiek (SPDF, backed by regular Sudanese government forces) and Peter Gatdet (SPLA) until August 2001—more than a year of scorched-earth tactics displacing Nuer civilians by the tens of thousands—with killing, rape, and abduction as well. A February 2001 attack by SPLA Cmdr. Peter Gatdet on the SPDF Nuer area of Nyal, Western Upper Nile/Unity State, a U.N. relief hub, threatened the West Bank Nuer-Dinka peace agreement concluded in March 1999 at Wunlit.

When in August 2001 the two “Peters” reached a standstill agreement, Cmdr. Peter Paar Jiek ceased to serve as a local guard for the Lundin Thar Jath (Ryer) Block 5A oilfield. The two commanders formally reached a peace covenant in February 2002—a few weeks after the SPLM/A and SPDF leaders, Dr. John Garang and Dr. Riek Machar, announced their unity at a press conference with much fanfare in Nairobi.

With Cmdr. Peter Paar Jiek no longer on the Sudanese government’s side, the situation of Lundin’s project became precarious. The pro-government Paulino Matiep Bul Nuer militia, based in the government garrison town of Mayom, was not native to the Jagei Nuer area where Paar Jiek had drawn many troops—and where the Thar Jath (Ryer) rig was located. In response to the SPLA’s increased forays into this area following the Paar/Gatdet standstill, the Sudanese government launched a dry season offensive to protect the Block 5A Lundin Thar Jath (Ryer) project. In the meantime, however, on January 22, 2002, Lundin suspended operations on Block 5A due to insecurity; its helicopter had been shot down in December (reportedly by an angry member of the Paulino Matiep militia).

The Sudanese government’s early 2002 attack on Block 5A adjacent to Block 1 (the Nimne/ Nhialdiu corridor), and near its garrison in Ler made use of Nuer pro-government militias and Baggara. The Baggara crossed the Bahr El Ghazal (Nam) River into Block 5A via the Lundin-constructed bridge at Bentiu, and began their “standard” raids, destroying villages, looting cattle, and capturing women and children. The government forces followed up and/or paved the way with Antonov bombing and helicopter gunships, forcing more tens of thousands to move, some for the second or third time. They moved southwest, towards rivers and toic dividing Dinka and Nuer in Bahr El Ghazal. In May 2002, the same displacement process started in Bul Nuer territory between Mayom and Mankien, as efforts to build a second bridge, this one in GNPOC’s Block 4 at the military garrison at Wangkei, proceeded.

The U.N. special rapporteur on Sudan reported to the March/April 2002 session of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights that: “the overall human rights situation has not improved” since 2001.²⁵ He stated his belief that “oil exploitation is closely linked to the conflict which . . . is mainly a war for the control of resources and, thus, power.”²⁶ He further stated that “oil has seriously exacerbated the conflict while deteriorating the overall situation of human rights,” and said that he had received information whereby “oil exploitation is continuing to cause widespread displacement . . . .”²⁷

By 2002, the government had apparently reached a strategic balance point in this process. It was able to generate enough income from the relatively small GNPOC areas already producing oil to start a domestic arms industry and purchase sixteen new attack helicopters in two years and armaments from abroad that would enable it to target, clear populations, and secure the next oil concession area with road building and garrisons. Thus, the circle was completed, providing a government strategy that could be reproduced successively until all oil areas and transport corridors could be brought under heavy government guard—protecting the oil which in turn funds a larger guard.

Government Revenue from Oil and Expenditures on Arms

Before the oil project went on-line, Sudan’s economy was in dire straits. In 1990, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) issued a declaration of noncooperation against Sudan due to the government’s unpaid IMF debt and debt service. Sudan agreed to a schedule of payments to the IMF in 1997 and made progress in fiscal reforms that ultimately led the IMF to lift its declaration on August 27, 1999—just days before Sudan exported its first crude oil.²⁸

Government oil revenues rose from zero in 1998 to almost 42 percent of total government revenue in 2001.

Oil revenue has made the all-important difference in projected military spending. The president of Sudan announced in 2000 that Sudan was using the oil revenue to build a domestic arms industry. The military spending of 90.2 billion dinars (U.S. $ 349 million) for 2001 was to soak up more than 60 percent of the 2001 oil revenue of 149.7 billion dinars (U.S. $ 580.2 million). Cash military expenditures, which did not include domestic security expenditures, officially rose 45 percent from 1999 to 2001. This was reflected in the increasing government use of helicopter gunships and aerial bombardment in the war.

In U.N. mandatory filings, Russia confirmed that in 2001 it had exported to Sudan twenty-two armored combat vehicles and twelve attack helicopters. In 2002, Russia sold eight amoured combat vehicles and four attack helicopters to Sudan, and Belarus sold Sudan fourteen large-caliber Russian-made artillery systems.

This represents an increase in Sudan’s attack helicopter fleet from six in 2000 to twenty-two in 2002—more than tripling the fleet.

Corporate Responsibility

The major oil operators in Sudan are all partners of the government’s state-owned oil company, Sudapet.

Human Rights Watch believes that the companies in the two oil consortiums during the 1998-2002 period covered by this report, Talisman (Blocks 1, 2, and 4) and Lundin (Block 5A), and their partners CNPC, Petronas, and OMV, have benefited from the government’s continued abuses of human rights. (Chevron was also a beneficiary, but suspended operations as of 1984. Arakis benefitted and was able to put several wells into production before it ran out of money and withdrew in 1998.) Some of these oil companies denied that violations took place, and hosted journalists on tours of the oilfields. In 2001, Talisman paid for a costly project: selective satellite photographs and analysis by an expert reader that “proved” that there had never been any displacement—carefully limiting the scope of the project to several small areas inside its concession. Modern technology was used in lieu of conducting interviews with any people who were actually forcibly displaced or were eyewitnesses to this brutality and its visible aftermath.

From the beginning of its involvement in Sudan, Talisman resolutely refused to speak out against or to seriously investigate the Sudanese government’s policy of forcibly displacing civilians from areas designated for oil extraction and the human rights abuses that have been an essential element of this policy.²⁹ Yet, under modern concepts of corporate responsibility that Talisman claims to endorse, it had a responsibility to ensure that its business operations did not depend upon, or benefit from, gross human rights abuses such as those that have been committed by the government and its proxy forces in Sudan.

From the outset, Talisman had ample warning of human rights abuses in Sudan: even before Talisman became involved, Canadian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) had been campaigning for the Canadian government to force Talisman’s Canadian predecessor investor, Arakis, to pull out of Sudan because of the Sudanese government’s record of gross human rights abuses. These Canadian NGOs then wrote to Talisman and publicly called for the company to stay out of Sudan. Senior Talisman officials later had meetings with Riek Machar and other southern leaders. Although Talisman denies it, these southern leaders say that early on they told Talisman about the forcible displacement of civilians from its oilfield areas.

In a letter to Talisman shareholders dated March 10, 1999, Talisman CEO Jim Buckee acknowledged that Canadian NGOs and others had raised troubling questions about human rights abuses by the Sudanese government, but stated:

Because Sudan presents significant challenges, we realized that this project would attract questions from varied sources. However, careful study last summer [1998] persuaded management that this is a sound business investment and our involvement could be carried out in a responsible, ethical manner. Experience to date confirms that judgment.

We recognize that Sudan’s chronic troubles, including poverty and conflict running along political and tribal “fault lines”, create special challenges. . . . Talisman is taking the necessary steps to ensure the safety of our employees. . . . ³⁰

In July 1999, Human Rights Watch asked Talisman’s Khartoum-based general manager for the GNPOC pipeline division if he had received any information about forced civilian displacement from the GNPOC concession area. He said that he had received some reports but that he had not investigated them because of the frenetic pace of work that Talisman was maintaining in order to meet its pipeline and production deadlines.³¹

U.N. Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Sudan Dr. Leonardo Franco presented a report to the U.N. General Assembly on October 14, 1999, in which he noted that the May 1999 government assault on Ruweng County (in Block 1) had caused many people to become displaced, adding that the offensive had lasted ten days.³² Jim Buckee rejected this report as “hearsay”³³ and indicated that he might present contradictory evidence, though he did not do so. In late 1999, after months of pressure from the Canadian government, Talisman finally signed the International Code of Ethics for Canadian Business; this committed the company to the “value” of “human rights and social justice” and to “support and respect the protection of international human rights” within its “sphere of influence” (undefined), and “not be complicit in human rights abuses.”³⁴

Talisman justified its presence in Sudan—and argued even that its withdrawal would be “immoral”—on the grounds that it undertook community development programs for the dwindling population, and because of the unsubstantiated claim that “development” would be beneficial and would bring peace.

But, while Talisman provided clean water to several communities, these and other charitable contributions amounted to only a fraction of one percent of Talisman’s post-tax revenue.³⁵ Talisman spent about $ 1 million in fifteen Sudanese community development projects in 2000,³⁶ the majority of which, in fact, were located in the northern part of Sudan.³⁷ It spent an additional U.S. $ 469,070 (estimated) on GNPOC community development projects in 2000,³⁸ or a total of approximately U.S. $ 1,469,070 in social spending in Sudan in 2000. This is equal to 0.12 percent of Talisman’s post-tax revenue.

The percentage was almost the same in 2001, when it spent less: U.S. $ 819,541 (of which $ 190,687 was carried over from 2000) in its own projects, and U.S. $ 662,545 (estimated) on GNPOC community development projects, or a total of approximately U.S. $ 1,482,086 in all in 2001.³⁹ This is equal to 0.12 percent of Talisman’s 2001 post-tax revenue.⁴⁰ These benefits represent the positive side, but they are insignificant compared to the impact of Talisman’s involvement in Sudan’s oil extraction on those communities in the south who have been targeted for forcible displacement and other human rights abuses in order to clear them from actual and potential oilfields.

One of the oft-repeated charges was that GNPOC did not hire local southern Sudanese laborers, even for the most menial work. The Chinese CNPC-related subcontractors that predominated admittedly brought in thousands of Chinese and some northern Sudanese laborers to build the pipeline. Thus even the small spin-off that communities ordinarily realize from foreign oil investment, jobs in infrastructure construction, was denied to the southern Sudanese.

Talisman’s defense of its presence was challenged both by southern rebel organizations and by the government’s civilian opposition. The United Sudanese African Parties (USAP), a southern political party registered under the government’s political association system in Khartoum and operating within the Sudanese political system, issued a declaration in 1999 calling on the government to suspend immediately all oil operations. It condemned not the government, however, but the oil companies, and singled out Talisman for hiring agents in Europe, North America, and elsewhere to launch “foolish propaganda that claims that people of Southern Sudan are incapable of appreciating the economic advantages which petroleum exploitation” will offer them.⁴¹ It accused Talisman of knowing full well:that the Dinka and Nuer national groups were suffering brutal death, wanton destruction of their homes, and unprecedented displacement of whole families and clans. “Their ancestral land has instead become a theatre of war, fueled with inputs from oil interests in Canada, China, Malaysia and some European countries.”⁴²

The Christian church leadership in Sudan, in the government and rebel areas, also condemned the presence of foreign oil companies and oil development in the absence of a just peace:

Since it started the exploitation of the oil last year 1999, the government of the Sudan has however not used the revenues from the oil for the development of the people of Sudan and in particular those in the oil areas who throughout history were neglected in terms of equitable allocation of the national resources. Instead, the oil revenues have been used for the purchase of military necessities and weapons used for killing and displacing people in these oil areas. The government has assumed that it can end the conflict militarily.

Further, the government is using the roads and airstrips of the multi-national oil companies engaged in the production of oil in the Sudan, for military purposes, carrying out aerial bombardment on civilian targets . . . . ⁴³

Like other oil companies engaged in Sudan, Talisman knew or should have known that oil production was taking place in areas where local pastoral populations lacked the basic rights necessary to defend their interests. Talisman also knew or should have known of government displacement and attacks on civilians in its and adjacent concessions prior to its investment in Sudan; it knew or should have known that the government was attacking civilians in Talisman’s GNPOC concession in May 1999 and thereafter, and that forced displacement of civilians by government forces was occurring in this and adjacent concessions. Although Talisman would occasionally protest to the government of Sudan (for instance, on the use of the airstrip), it also knew or should have known that government forces were targeting civilian infrastructure, including aerial bombings of hospitals, churches, and schools throughout the south and the Nuba mountains.⁴⁴

Talisman’s complicity in the government’s abuses was not limited to its inaction in the face of the continued displacement campaign rolling through the oil areas. Its activities in some cases assisted forcible displacement and attacks on civilians. For example, it allowed government forces to use the Talisman/GNPOC airfield and road infrastructure in circumstances in which it knew or should have known that the facilities would be used to conduct further displacement and wage indiscriminate or disproportionate military attacks that struck and/or targeted civilians and civilian objects. Its activities also allowed the government to expand its program of forced displacement into Block 5A, which had been overlooked in the conflict until the pipeline neared completion just seventy-five kilometers from Block 5A’s first drilling site.

The military use of the transportation infrastructure built by the oil operators in the concession areas has raised particular issues of corporate responsibility. The long all-weather airstrip at the oil operators’ camp at Heglig is confirmed to have been used by the Sudanese military, as have the roads built from north to south and east to west through the concession areas. A large military base at Heglig intended to protect the oilfield operations sits almost on top of the oil operators’ enclave and airstrip. A Canadian human rights delegation concluded that government helicopter gunships and Antonov bombers have taken off from the oil company airstrip at Heglig “with their payloads of death and displacement.”⁴⁵ The Sudanese army also makes military use of the excellent road system installed by the oil companies to move their heavy equipment; armored personnel carriers are able to reach the government’s targeted villages by surprise, in much less time than before.

Far from bringing peace, prosperity and security, in Sudan oil development has brought conflict, displacement and widespread abuse. After Talisman came on the scene in 1998, fighting and displacement in Western Upper Nile/Unity State drastically increased. As documented in several human rights reports by international NGOs, non-Sudanese government commissions, and international agencies, Western Upper Nile/Unity State became the focal point of the war, where the Sudanese government has invested large amounts of soldiers and aviation resources in the see-saw battle for control of the oilfields. Talisman admitted, when it sold off its interest in GNPOC, that it was “unsuccessful in . . . attempts to finalize a protocol [with the Sudanese government] that endeavoured to address the provision of security and the appropriate use of oilfield infrastructure.”⁴⁶

Human Rights Watch believes that CNPC and Petronas, Talisman’s partners, share complicity with Talisman. Indeed, they began investing money and expertise some years before Talisman, and they laid the groundwork for the project that Talisman then completed. They have shown little interest in corporate responsibility, however; they are state-owned corporations based in countries, Malaysia and China, whose governments have shown little interest in human rights accountability. At Talisman’s urging, GNPOC signed a code of corporate conduct, but CNPC and Petronas did not individually sign any codes.

Lundin has followed Talisman’s lead, and also failed to investigate or acknowledge forcible displacement of tens of thousands of civilians from its concession area in the years after it began active exploration. Lundin scarcely acknowledged that there was a war anywhere in Block 5A—despite the fact that a May 1999 rebel attack at its only exploratory rig caused it to suspend all operations for more than a year. On the day of the attack, it withdrew its one hundred employees and subcontractors from the Thar Jath (Ryer) rig to Bentiu, a twenty-minute helicopter ride north. The government, using proxy Nuer militias followed up by army and Islamist militias, then ousted tens of thousands of civilians from their homes in Block 5A, some more than once, in three sweeps lasting months in 1999. But Lundin in its public statements about its 1999 suspension of activities disclosed only that operations were suspended because of the “rainy season,” later referred vaguely to “logistics,” and much later made a passing comment on “insecurity” as reasons for withdrawing.

Lundin and its partners, Austrian OMV and Malaysian Petronas, made no public statement condemning this displacement, destruction, or other abuses brought about by oil development. The U.N. special rapporteur and international NGO reports of continuing displacement in Block 5A have proliferated from 2000 to date, however, evidencing the stepped-up expulsion.

Lundin claimed that upon completion of the road to its Thar Jath (Ryer) drilling rig in January 2001, its representatives visited the (militarized) “habited areas along the road” to assess their basic needs, and claimed that people were grateful for the road. A Swedish journalist visiting in April 2001, however, found that “the road is bordered with misery and military.”⁴⁷ But traditionally Nuer did not live along that new road or any other. While denying the existence of any displacement from Block 5A, Lundin took full advantage of the heavy army presence to develop its concession.

Lundin was forced to suspend its operations in Block 5A again in early 2002, as a “precautionary measure to ensure maximum security for its personnel and operation.”⁴⁸ Lundin is also invested in Block 5B, with the same partners as Block 5A; Petronas is the managing partner on Block 5B, where it appears that no exploration activity has taken place since Chevron pulled out almost two decades ago.

Lundin announced on March 27, 2003 that because of progress in the peace talks it would “carry out work on the existing infrastructure within Block 5A and the equipment stored in the Rubkona base camp, as a first step towards and eventual recommencement of activities.”⁴⁹ A month later, however, Lundin announced that it would sell off its interest in Block 5A to Petronas. The sale was complete on June 23; Lundin retained its interest in Block 5B.⁵⁰

Based on the findings of our research, Human Rights Watch concludes that CNPC and Petronas operations in the GNPOC Sudanese oil concession Blocks 1,2, 4 (and the operations of Talisman Energy prior to the sale of its interest), and Lundin, Petronas, and OMV operations in Block 5A have been complicit in human rights violations. Their activities are inextricably intertwined with the government’s abuses; the abuses are gross; the corporate presence fuels, facilitates, or benefits from violations; and no remedial measures exist to mitigate those abuses. Human Rights Watch believes that a corporation should not operate in Sudan if its presence there has an unavoidable, negative impact on human rights. Human Rights Watch therefore recommends that all foreign oil companies immediately suspend their operations in Sudan, and agree to resume them only when certain minimum human rights benchmarks are met.

Talisman and the Canadian Government

Although the Canadian government acknowledged the ethical dilemma faced by any Canadian company operating in Sudan, it never provided clear direction or took effective action in the case of Talisman. According to the statements of Canadian officials in early 1999, the optimum time for Talisman to have brought pressure on the Sudanese government to reach a negotiated solution to the civil war, or to bring about human rights improvements, was before the pipeline was completed (June 1999) and oil exports began (late August 1999).⁵¹

But the Canadian government did not make a Sudan policy statement until October 26, 1999. It then hinted that sanctions on Sudan might be appropriate on human rights grounds and appointed a Canadian government human rights delegation led by consultant John Harker to visit Sudan, mandating it to find whether oil exploration had exacerbated the conflict.⁵² The report came back in the affirmative. The delegation found, in February 2000, that

We can only conclude that Sudan is a place of extraordinary suffering and continuing human rights violations, even though some forward progress can be recorded, and the oil operations in which a Canadian company is involved add more suffering.⁵³

Despite this finding by its own commission, the Canadian government failed to impose any penalties or restrictions on Talisman. In mid-2000, the Canadian government attempted to put Sudan on the agenda of the U.N. Security Council, of which it was then a member and chair. But its proposal was forestalled by Chinese threats to bring up the U.S. bombing of the pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum in 1998 in any discussion of Sudan, leading the U.S. to ask its Canadian ally not to move forward on this item. Thereafter, the Canadian government took no further concrete action on Sudan or Talisman’s involvement there.

The Role of the U.S.

After 1989, when a coup deposed the elected government and imposed a military-Islamist junta on Sudan that committed gross human rights abuses, the U.S. administration was legislatively mandated to vote against such a government in international lending institutions, and it did so. Under President Bill Clinton (1993-2001), the U.S. government gradually adopted a policy of isolating the Sudanese government; Sudan was placed on the State Department’s list of countries supporting terrorism in 1993. In 1997, U.S. sanctions were escalated through an executive order barring any U.S. person from doing business with the government of Sudan or its entities.⁵⁴ The only exception was for the import of gum arabic from Sudan (an exception under U.S. anti-terrorism legislation made by the State Department for Occidental Petroleum in 1996 was dropped after it came to light).

Under the George W. Bush administration starting in January 2001, two domestic U.S. lobbies flexed their muscles in seeking to influence U.S. policy toward Sudan: one extremely powerful—the oil industry—and one just beginning to test its foreign policy strength, on Sudan—a conservative religious grouping concerned about treatment of Christians. This conservative religious lobby scored a victory over the oil and business community when the Sudan Peace Act passed the U.S. House of Representatives by 422-2 on June 13, 2001. This act contained an amendment imposing capital market sanctions on foreign companies doing oil business in Sudan, prohibiting them from any access to U.S. capital markets. This would have required that Talisman Energy be de-listed from the New York Stock Exchange.

The oil and financial industries prevailed, however. The Senate subsequently passed a version of the bill lacking these capital market sanctions. In October 2002, in light of Bush administration hostility to any capital market sanctions, the House passed another version of the Sudan Peace Act, one which omitted such controversial sanctions. This passed the Senate also and was signed by the president.

A year earlier, on September 6, 2001, President Bush named former U.S. senator John Danforth as his special envoy for peace in Sudan. Days later, on September 11, 2001, Islamic militants belonging to al-Qaeda attacked New York and Washington, D.C. With terrorism becoming the main focus of U.S. foreign policy following these attacks, the Sudanese government—which had hosted al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden from 1990 to 1996—moved quickly to attempt to improve bilateral relations, publicly offering to cooperate with the U.S. in its efforts to combat terrorism.

With assistance from the State Department and U.S. AID, peace envoy former senator Danforth devised a four-point plan to test the willingness of the Sudanese government and the SPLM/A to come to a peace agreement. These four points, although not conceived as such, were essentially human rights points, and the two parties agreed to all of them and began to comply with some of them, thus convincing the U.S. administration that they were sufficiently committed to peace that the U.S. should stay deeply involved in the international diplomatic push for peace.

Perhaps the single most important human rights agreement of the four Danforth points, signed by both government and rebel forces in March 2002, was the agreement not to target civilians or civilian objects, with the provision that a team of international monitors could operate freely in Sudan to verify compliance with that agreement. The monitoring of this agreement, to be undertaken by the U.S. State Department, did not begin until late 2002.

Postscript: Peace Talks Update 2003

The U.S. peace agenda, in which several U.S. agencies played roles supporting Danforth’s efforts, proceeded with noticeable momentum. The peace talks, pending under the auspices of the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) since 1994, when the government and the SPLM/A signed a Declaration of Principles,⁵⁵ were taken up again in June 2002, with the renewed engagement of several international partners, particularly the U.S., the U.K., and Norway (the “Troika”).

On July 20, 2002, in Machakos, Kenya, the Sudanese government and the SPLM/A signed a protocol agreeing to settle two of the most contentious issues in the Sudanese conflict: self-determination for the south and the role of religion in the state. This Machakos protocol was reached as a first step in the peace process. In it, the government agreed to a referendum for southern self-determination after a six-year interim period following the signing of a final peace agreement. The government also agreed that—for the six-year interim period—shari’a or Islamic law would not be applied in the south, which could have its own legislation. As of the writing of this report, the difficult issues of resource and power sharing are still being negotiated, as are security and the fate of three African-populated marginalized areas in the transitional area just north of the north-south border (and in which the SPLA has also been waging war): Abyei, the Nuba Mountains, and Southern Blue Nile.

When the July 20 Machakos agreement was reached, many Sudanese groups who were not included in the peace talks protested that this agreement would never last because it was an agreement between minorities (the Islamist government and the SPLM/A) and would—notwithstanding written agreements for democracy, good governance, and human rights during the six-year interim period—consolidate two dictatorships. The dictators would be Sudanese President Omar El Bashir and SPLA Cmdr.-in-Chief Garang, neither of whom had been elected in free elections, both of whose forces were guilty of gross human rights abuses.

On October 4, 2002, after the Sudanese government returned to the peace talks—following an evident power struggle within the Islamist ruling party and the capture of Torit by the SPLM/A and its recapture by the Sudanese government—the parties agreed to a cessation of hostilities. An October 15, 2002 memorandum of understanding provided for “a period of tranquility during the negotiations by ceasing hostilities in all areas of the Sudan and ensuring a military stand down for their own forces, including allied forces and affiliated militia.” There was no provision for this ceasefire to be monitored. Following on this agreement, on October 26, the government and SPLM/A agreed with the U.N.-coordinated umbrella relief agency Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) that humanitarian access would not be impeded by either.⁵⁶

The peace talks in August 2003 were to discuss the outstanding issues. The parties were to decide, among other things, on deployment of troops and police during the interim period; the SPLM/A wanted two armies (the SPLA and that of the Sudanese government) and the government wanted a united army.

The future role of the pro-government southern militias, mostly Nuer, is crucial for a lasting peace, as this report illustrates. As of the writing of this report, the parties to the peace talks do not seem to have reached this vital topic. The government-backed southern militias, now organized under the umbrella of the SSDF, are not party to the talks, and their political counterparts, some of which are technically in the government, have not been allowed to play any role at the IGAD talks. An SSDF delegation was permitted to attend security talks in April 2003 and tabled a proposal for three armies during the interim period (the third being the SSDF). This proposal was not discussed nor addressed by the parties to the talks.

The mostly Nuer militias remain a stumbling block for the SPLM/A, which lays claim to govern the entire south. These militias (or armed groups, as they ask to be called) are also a challenge to the government, which does not trust them because they are southerners and continue to insist on the right of self-determination as outlined in the Khartoum Peace Agreement of 1997. Although the SPLA seems to have a position, from time to time, within Block 5A sufficient to block its development, the government militias are situated in different parts of Blocks 1, 2, 4, 5A, and 5 in Western Upper Nile/Unity State, and in Blocks 3 and 7 in the Melut Basin in Eastern Upper Nile also. These areas have changed hands often, even after the October 2002 ceasefire, demonstrating the parties’ and the militias’/armed groups’ continued high interest in controlling the valuable oil resource.

If peace is reached, it should mean that there will be no more fighting or displacement of civilians from the oilfields or elsewhere, and that the displaced may return to their homes. Whether they will return with compensation for the losses suffered and international monitoring of the parties’ respect for human rights is not yet known. The serious human rights abuses detailed in this report have never been accounted for by any of the parties to the conflict.

Nor is it clear that the fighting and the abuses will end with a peace agreement. If peace means that the SPLM/A is the sole government of the southern region and it refuses to compromise or reconcile with the other southern military and political forces, it is likely that Sudanese government hard-liners will continue to use the SSDF militia/armed groups to foment war in the south—in order to frustrate the goal of a self-determination referendum. In these circumstances, displacement and death in the oil war will continue to be the fate of southern Sudanese, even if a peace agreement is signed by the Sudanese government and the SPLM/A.

——–

¹ See reports of the Civilian Protection Monitoring Team established by agreement of the parties, http://www.cpmtsudan.org.

² Saudi Arabia has 261 billion barrels of oil in reserves, Iraq 112.5 billion barrels. The U.S. has 21 billion barrels, the U.K. has 5.2 billion, and Canada has 4.9 billion. Sub-Saharan African countries rank 11^th in the world (Nigeria, 22.5 billion barrels) and 17^th (Angola, 5.4 billion). Libya is 8^th in the world with 29.9 billion barrels, and Algeria, ranked 14^th, has 9.2 billion barrels of oil reserves. Petronas, “Oil & Gas Reserves Ranking” (as at 1 January 2000), http://www.Petronas.com.my/internet/Business.nsf/dbcf3db8a4c05acbc825671c0017634c/ (accessed June 19, 2002). Congo Brazzaville has 1.5 billion barrels, and Brunei has 1.4 billion barrels of proved reserves. Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, “World Crude Oil and Natural Gas Reserves” (as at January 1, 2001), http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/iea/table81.html (accessed June 26, 2002). Sudan’s oil ministry estimated that it had 1.2 billion barrels of oil reserves, but this is not proven reserves. “Sudanese Oil Reserves Surpass 1 Billion Barrels,” Xinhua, Khartoum, May 3, 1999. Proven reserves are 643.6 thousand barrels as of the end of 2002 for the principal producing fields in Blocks 1, 2, and 4. Talisman Energy, 2002 Annual Report, p. 64. See the glossary for definitions of probable and proved reserves.

³ The Melut Basin (including Blocks 3 and 7), running north and south of Malakal, west to the Muglad Basin, and east to the Ethiopian border, remains less developed than the Muglad Basin and is not covered in this report.

⁴ Talisman Energy, powerpoint presentation, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, D.C., April 2002. Talisman provided the figures of 19,500 square miles and 12.5 million acres, from which the square kilometers were calculated. See http://www.csis.org/africa/index.htm (accessed October 30, 2002).

⁵ Lundin Petroleum website, http://www.Lundin-petroleum.com/eng/sudan5a.shtml, http://www.Lundin-petroleum.com/eng/sudan5b.shtml (accessed June 26, 2002). The concessions vary in size over time based on arrangements with the government of Sudan to give back undeveloped areas. Lundin provided the figures for Blocks 5A and 5B in square kilometers, from which the square miles and acreage were calculated. Together Blocks 1, 2, 4, 5A, and 5B total some 35,344 square miles; 91,536 square kilometers; or 22.7 million acres.

⁶ Talisman Energy was operating in Sudan through its wholly-owned Netherlands subsidiary, Talisman (Greater Nile) B.V.

⁷ J.W. Buckee, “Talisman in Sudan,” Globe and Mail (Toronto), Calgary, October 21, 1999. See Talisman Energy, “Sudan—The Greater Nile Oil Project. Background Paper,” December 1998, p.6.

⁸ Proved gross reserves according to Talisman were, for the years ending December 31, 1998: 403.6 million barrels; 1999: 528 million barrels; 2000: 562.8 million barrels; and 2001: 625.2 million barrels. Based on Talisman Energy 2001 Annual Report, p. 57.

⁹ “Talisman Makes Sudan Discovery,” The Oil Daily (New York), May 3, 2002.

¹⁰ Talisman Energy, CSIS presentation, April 2002.

¹¹ Talisman Energy, excerpt from 2001 Annual Report, p. 13.

¹² This figure is calculated from Talisman’s share of 60,000 b/d in 2002. Talisman Energy, 2002 Annual Report, p. 21.

¹³ Talisman Energy, CSIS presentation, April 2002, http://www.csis.org/africa/0208_SudanPFCSum.pdf (accessed August 21, 2003).

¹⁴ Talisman press release, “Talisman to Sell Sudan Assets For C1.2 billion,” Calgary, October 30, 2002, http://micro.newswire.ca/releases/October2002/30/c6739.html (accessed October 30, 2002).

¹⁵ Due to corporate restructuring, the owner of the Lundin interest in Block 5A became Lundin Petroleum (also “Lundin”).

¹⁶ Lundin Petroleum AB press release, “Lundin Report for Nine Months ended September 30,2002;” C. Ashley Heppenstall, president and CEO of Lundin, letter to shareholders, November 15, 2002, http://www.lundin-petroleum.com/Documents/pr_corp_15-11-02_e.pdf (accessed November 18, 2002).

¹⁷ Lundin Petroleum AB press release, “Update on activities in Block 5A, Sudan,”March 27, 2003.

¹⁸

Lundin Petroleum, “Lundin Petroleum completes sale of Block 5A Sudan,” June 23, 2003.

¹⁹ This style of displacement—here for the purpose of gaining control of land and grazing areas—had already been practiced by the Baggara in the Dinka Abyei area of southern Kordofan, with disastrous results for the people of Abyei. David Keen, The Benefits of Famine: A Political Economy of Famine and Relief in Southwestern Sudan, 1983-1989 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). The story of Abyei is beyond the scope of this report.

²⁰ Relief Association of Southern Sudan (RASS) officer and former school administrator, Human Rights Watch interview, Nairobi, Kenya, August 1-2, 2000.

²¹ Most southerners’ names include the “proper” name first, the father’s name (second), and the grandfather’s name (last). To refer to Paulino Matiep as “Matiep” is to refer to that commander’s father. Therefore the first and second names are used for southerners in this report, although in conversation southerners routinely refer only to the first name, i.e., “Paulino,” with some exceptions such as using the father’s name when the proper name is widely used, or a title, i.e., John Garang de Mabior may be referred to as “Garang”—or as “Dr. John.”

²² See http://www.usinternet.com/users/helpssudan/.

²³ Ghazi Salah Eldin Atabani, State Minister of Foreign Affairs, Human Rights Watch interview, Khartoum, May 4, 1995.

²⁴ Human Rights Watch interview, Elijah Hon Top (deceased 2000), chief of staff, South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF), Khartoum, July 26, 1999.

²⁵ Report of the special rapporteur, Gerhart Baum, to the Commission on Human Rights, “Situation of human rights in the Sudan,” E/CN.4/2002/46, January 23, 2002, http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/64639579934bf6dcc125669d002cfbcd?opendocument (accessed June 20, 2002).

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ International Monetary Fund, “IMF Lifts Declaration of Noncooperation from Sudan,” News Brief No. 99/52, Washington, D.C., August 31, 1999.

²⁹ The only known exception occurred when Jim Buckee joined the international chorus of protest of the government helicopter gunning of an emergency food relief distribution location near Ler that killed twenty-four civilians in February 2002. He wrote a private letter to President El Bashir.

³⁰ James W. Buckee, Talisman CEO, “President’s Letter to Shareholders,” March 10, 1999, http://www.Talisman-energy.com/ar98pres.html (accessed February 3, 2001).

³¹ Ralph R. Capeling, General Manager, GNPOC, Pipeline Division, Human Rights Watch telephone interview, Khartoum, July 28, 1999.

³² Leonardo Franco, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Sudan, “Report on the situation of human rights in Sudan,” prepared for the UN General Assembly, A/54/467, October 14, 1999, http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.54.467.En?Opendocument, (accessed August 13, 2003).

³³ Steven Edwards, Claudia Cattaneo, and Sheldon Alberts, “Calgary firm tied to Sudan ‘atrocities’,” National Post (Toronto), Khartoum and Ottawa, November 17, 1999.

³⁴ International Code of Ethics for Canadian Business, http://www.uottawa.ca/hrrec/busethics/codeint.html (accessed June 6, 2001).

³⁵ The pre-tax segmented revenue was U.S. $ 1,768 million in 2000, of which U.S. $ 184 million was attributable to its Sudan operations. The comparable amounts were revenue of U.S. $ 1,616 million in 2001, with U.S. $ 210 million derived from the Sudan operations, and revenue of U.S. $ 1,352 million in 2002, with U.S. $ 310 million derived from Sudan. Talisman Energy, 2002 Annual Report, March 4, 2003, p. 55.

³⁶ Talisman Energy, Corporate Social Responsibility Report 2000, p. 23.

³⁷ Talisman (Greater Nile) B.V., “Community Development Strategy – 2001,” undated, pp. 6-8.

³⁸ Talisman Energy, Corporate Social Responsibility Report 2000, p. 23. The GNPOC project expenses were deducted as expenses to the project.

³⁹ Talisman Energy, Corporate Social Responsibility Report 2001, pp. 11, 23. Talisman approved a U.S. $ 2 million community development work plan for 2001, but because it was not all expended, it put the balance (U.S. $ 581,515) into a trust. Ibid., p. 11.

⁴⁰ For the year 2002, in which Talisman sold out its interest in Sudan, it issued its Corporate Social Responsibility Report 2002 that did not include comparable information.

⁴¹ “Statement by USAP on Oil,” as reproduced in Sudan Democratic Gazette, Year X, no. 115, London, December 1999, p. 9.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC), “Statement of the Sudanese Churches on the Oil Factor in the Conflict in the Sudan,” press release, Geneva, April 12, 2000, http://www.pcusa.org/pda/sudanoil.htm (accessed June 24, 2001). The statement was signed by the chairmen and other officers of the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC) based in Khartoum and the NSCC based in Nairobi, April 14, 2000, the temporary branch of the SCC.

⁴⁴ “Human Security in Sudan: The Report of a Canadian Assessment Mission,” prepared for the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ottawa, January 2000 (“Harker report”), p. 63: “But the point is that by seeking the truth, we think we have found it, &, within limits, were Talisman to actively seek the truth of what was/is going on around it, it too would find the truth as we have. And the truth can be uncomfortable.”

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 16.

⁴⁶ Talisman Energy, “Corporate Responsibility Report,”March 4, 2003, p. 8. ONGU Videsh Ltd. completed its purchase of Talisman’s interest in GNPOC on March 12, 2003. http://www.talisman-energy.com/operatingareas/africa/sudan.html (accessed July 28, 2003).

⁴⁷ See Anna Koblanck, “Lundin Oil’s road/DN in Sudan: On flight from the war over oil,” Dagens Nyheter (Stockholm), April 28, 2001 (translated by Human Rights Watch).

⁴⁸ Lundin press release, “Lundin Petroleum Announces a Temporary Suspension of Activities in Block 5A Sudan,” Geneva, January 22, 2002.

⁴⁹ Lundin press release, “Update on activities in Block 5A, Sudan,” Geneva, March 27, 2003.

⁵⁰

Lundin press release, “Lundin Petroleum completes sale of Block 5A Sudan,” Geneva, June 23, 2003. The announcement of the agreement to sell was made on April 28, 2003. Lundin press release, “Lundin Petroleum Sells Interest In Block 5A, Sudan To Petronas For USD 142.5 Million,” Geneva, April 28, 2003.

⁵¹ Madelaine Drohan, “Sudan play bad timing for Talisman,” Globe and Mail (Toronto), Ottawa, October 27, 1999.

⁵² Talisman did even not sign on to the code of conduct for Canadian businesses until after the Canadian government human rights investigative mission was actually on the ground in Sudan in late 1999.

⁵³ Harker report, p. 15.

⁵⁴ U.S. President William J. Clinton, Executive Order 13067, “Blocking Sudanese Government Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Sudan,” Washington, D.C., November 4, 1997, http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri‑res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1997/11/5/2.text.2 (accessed February 24, 2000). These sanctions were renewed by the Bush administration in November 2001 and 2002.

⁵⁵ The parties agreed to the Declaration of Principles (DOP) in 1994 and the Sudanese government spent considerable effort backing away from it until the Machakos Protocol was signed in Machakos, Kenya, on July 20, 2002. In the DOP the parties affirmed the “rights of self-determination of the people of South Sudan to determine their future status through a referendum” and agreed that a “secular and democratic state must be established in the Sudan.” Declaration of Principles, articles 2 and 4, signed by representatives of the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A, Nairobi, May 20, 1994.

⁵⁶ The unimpeded access agreement was between the government, the SPLM/A, and U.N. Operation Lifeline Sudan. “Meeting Held On The Implementation Of Clause 5 Of The Machakos MOU On Unimpeded Humanitarian Access,” Nairobi, October 25-26, 2002.

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November 2003

————–

OIL IN SOUTHERN SUDAN – THE STORY OF “CROOKS AND NANNIES”
Date: 2006 November 13, 11:17 (Monday)	Canonical ID: 06KHARTOUM2654_a

1. (SBU) Summary: The history of oil exploitation in Sudan has been marked by northern domination, killings, displacement, community destruction, environmental degradation, arms purchases, and accusations of cheating on revenue sharing. To break with this legacy, the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) is working to establish an indigenous oil industry independent of Khartoum. Southern initiatives include exploration and production contracts, and ambitious plans for refineries and pipelines serving central and eastern Africa. Nile Petroleum Company (NilePet), the GOSS-owned oil company, has signed international production sharing agreements (IPSA) with British, German, Moldovan, Dutch, and Chinese companies. The GOSS believes a strong southern oil industry will help them enforce the wealth-sharing protocols of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and yield more transparency in the oil sector. The GoSS also hopes this will allow for either unity with the north on more equal terms or independance. End Summary.

2. (U) The November 1-4, 2006 visit to Juba of a USG-hired oil expert, Phil Garrison, and a member of the Sudan Programs Group (SPG), Pamela Fierst, provided an opportunity to meet with a wide spectrum of GOSS officials, civil society, and private oil sector members, and obtain extensive documentation on oil contracts in the South. (Note: All documents were provided to SPG Officer Fierst for Washington. End Note). As one speaker said in a Freudian slip at an oil conference in Juba that coincided with the visit, we must look at all the “crooks and nannies” to understand the oil situation in Sudan.

General Overview —————-

3. (U) The GOSS has moved quickly to try to establish an independent oil industry that it asserts is consistent with the wealth-sharing provisions of the CPA. The GOSS-owned NilePet has signed at least five production sharing agreements for oil exploration, development and sales. These controversial contracts have created divisions within the GOSS over their legality, their lack of transparency, and their ramifications for CPA. Oil experts believe that Southern Sudan may cover one of the largest under-explored oil basins in the world. Southern Sudan and Abyei already account for more than 90 percent of Sudan’s approximately 330,000 b/pd of current oil production.

4. (U) Sudan’s current oil production is controlled by Khartoum and is dominated by three foreign oil companies, all state-owned — the Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC), Petroliam Nasional Berhad (Petronas, Malaysia) and ONGC Videsh (India). According to a recent Wood Mackenzie report, Sudan is the largest overseas operation for all three of these companies.

5. (U) In addition to its production agreements, the GOSS has begun to explore prospects for a pipeline to “connect to the Kenya-Uganda pipeline somewhere in Uganda” and then transport refined oil to Mombasa, according to one official. Others speak of building a pipeline to Matadi in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The GOSS sees NilePet eventually supplying an African market which includes southern Sudan, parts of Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Northern Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, Eastern DRC and Central African Republic.

Southern Sudan Players ———————-

6. (SBU) NilePet: NilePet was established in 2003 as a subsidiary of the “New Sudan Public Corporation,” which was itself created by the “Civil Authority of the New Sudan” (CANS) under the Chairmanship of then-Vice Chairman of the SPLM, Dr. Riek Machar. The legal status of CANS is uncertain. NilePet was subsequently incorporated in Yei, southern Sudan in July 2004. NilePet’s purpose was to facilitate the development of the mining industry of “New Sudan,” including the petroleum industry, and to find partners with appropriate technical and financial resources. In 2004, the CANS awarded NilePet all unassigned blocks in southern Sudan. This includes the enormous superblock B, which Khartoum awarded to a Total-led consortium in 1980. The GOSS claims block B was available because the Total contract had expired and was not renewed until December 2004, after they had given the block to NilePet. NilePet’s directors are Dr. Bullon Bol, a petroleum engineer; Kuol Manyang Juuk, Government of National Unity (GNU) Minister of Transportation; and Simon Kun Puoch, a current member of the National Petroleum Commission and Director of the South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC). Since the signing of the CPA in January 2005, NilePet has become wholly-owned by the GOSS.

7. (SBU) White Nile Limited (WNL): WNL is registered in the KHARTOUM 00002654 002 OF 003 Guernsey Islands and traded on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) of the London Stock Exchange since February 2005. It owned equally by NilePet and the Central African Mining and Exploration Company (CAMAC). A “shell company,” it acquired oil exploration rights from NilePet for Block Ba, a GOSS-created section of block B that Total believes has the greatest potential. WNL has no oil expertise or proven development capacity, but it may be able to deliver significant returns for the GOSS. NilePet’s initial capital ownership share value of WNL was USD 27.9 mil the day before its WNL agreement went public; it reportedly jumped to USD 279 the day after.

8. (U) WNL and Total are currently in litigation in the UK over Block B, which Total continues to claim as part of a consortium which includes Marathon Inc. and Kuwait Petroleum. WNL asserts that its claim is based on the August 2004 CANS award to NilePet. Total was originally awarded Block B by Khartoum in 1980 but abandoned this huge area of savannah and marshland when war erupted in 1983. Total pulled out in 1984 following the killing of one of its workers but kept paying the north an annual fee to maintain its claim. Total then renewed its contract with Khartoum in December 2004, just before the signing of the CPA. While the CPA states existing oil contracts cannot be renegotiated, because the NilePet deal preceded the Total renewal, GoSS officials claim their deal is the valid existing contract.

9. (SBU) SET Energy Gmbh (SET)/Industrial and Financial Group ASCOM S.A. (ASCOM): SET is a German company headquartered in Hamburg, while ASCOM is a Moldovan company. This consortium signed an IPSA with NilePet on June 28, 2005, covering Block 5b, a block that Khartoum had previously assigned to a Petronas-led consortium. ASCOM has already brought in drilling rigs and other heavy equipment and has reportedly begun construction of an airstrip to access its block.

10. (SBU) Shaanxi Yan Chang Petroleum Group (SYC): SYC is a partnership between the Provincial Government of Shaanxi and Yan Chang International, Ltd (YCI), a Hong Kong-based company. NilePet signed an IPSA with SYC for block Bc, a GOSS-created sub-block on the southern edge of superblock B, in November 2005. SYS is also preparing a feasibility study for the design, construction and operation of a 150,000 b/pd refinery in the south and is interested in the production of liquefied natural gas (LNG).

11. (SBU) Apex Petroleum N.V. (APEX) and Supex Petroleum N.V. (SUPEX): APEX and SUPEX, based in Curacao, each signed separate contracts with NilePet in 2005 for Blocks Dc and 7S respectively. These blocks were previously unassigned by the north.

12. (SBU) Taken together, Nilepet has already netted signing bonuses from these contracts totaling at least USD 25 million, the majority of which is purportedly being held in international banks. The contracts provide fairly generous terms for the GOSS over time, high quotas for training and employing southern Sudanese, large amounts of funding for community development projects, and strong environmental protections. The contracts also give the government of the producing states 7 percent of net revenues, more than the 2 percent provided for under the CPA.

13. Nevertheless, there are rumors and recriminations among senior SPLM members who want an accounting of the bonuses paid and more transparency in the deals. Many suspect Vice President Riek Machar, among others, of profiteering, although a key minister, albeit with reported ties to Machar, assured CG Juba officials that the bulk of the funds are banked. Several GOSS contacts have asserted that President Salva Kiir has ordered these contracts nullified, but there is no evidence that such an order has been carried out. The SPLM leadership says they have set up an investigative committee to get more answers on oil deals. Many in the party admit the deals lack transparency, but assert that the SPLM had the right to sign these contracts and say they want to handle the corruption issues internally.

CPA Compliance: Blame to go Around ———————————–

14. (SBU) The GOSS asserts that its contracts are legal under the CPA, as they cover areas controlled by the SPLM/A before January 2005 and not otherwise assigned (they did not recognize Total’s continuing claim before the new contract in 2004). Other contracts, GOSS claims, are justified post-CPA as falling under the Interim Southern Sudan Constitution Article 183 (2) which allows for the “development and management of . . . petroleum development in KHARTOUM 00002654 003 OF 003 Southern Sudan in consultation with the relevant communities, within the overall framework of petroleum development during the interim period.”

15. (SBU) The GOSS also argues that because NilePet was awarded all unassigned blocks in 2004, its agreement is an existing oil contract under the CPA and not subject to renegotiation or ratification by the National Petroleum Commission (NPC). The GOSS position is that it will, however, submit its contracts for review by the NPC to determine how much “profit oil” is available for division between the Government of National Unity, GOSS, and the Oil Producing States of Southern Sudan.

USG Help Sought —————-

16. (SBU) The GOSS is seeking USG technical assistance to help them develop policies and capacity to monitor existing northern oil contracts and participate fully in the NPC when it becomes operational. Southern officials question the usefulness and objectivity of a Norwegian oil advisor who consults with both Khartoum and the south. The Garrison/Fierst visit provided insight into potential areas of assistance that would be supportive of the CPA. There are growing concerns that oil could become the source of separation or renewed violence.

A full trip report is being prepared by the USG oil expert for Washington’s review.

HUME

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November 2003

Names of Those Killed in the 2013 Bor Massacre by Riek Machar

RIEK MACHAR’S POWER HARVEST IN GREATER BOR

The evolution from Community of Concern to Community of Indifference

By Maker Lual Kuol, Bor

In adopting Niccolo Machiavelli principle of the end justifies the means, Riek Machar, twice carried out with impunity the genocidal massacre of the innocent people of Greater Bor. Instead of facing justice for the killings and atrocities he inflicted on the people of Greater Bor, he is being rewarded and groomed for high positions in the expected Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU).

The legally elected Government of the Republic of South Sudan is being intimidated, pressurized and threatened to face military and economic sanctions if Riek Machar is not reinstated with all honors and medals. Death of hundreds of thousands and plight of millions of South Sudanese people is not of much concern to him (Riek) neither to some unscrupulous members of the International Community. And why not, if he is the dear child of the Troika!

As the imposed solution is at the door steps of our nation, what will be the fate of the ever soft targets of Riak Machar of Greater Bor?

• If the imposed solution of the Transitional Government of National Unity is implemented with a governor of Riek Choice?

• If the trusteeship or protract rate is imposed with the Greater Bor engulfed by their adversaries and killers; the Nuers?

• What is the guarantee that the Nuers will not repeat the massacre of the people of Greater Bor under any circumstances?

Currently, three categories of affiliates exist among the people of Greater Bor;

1. Those openly supporting Riek.

2. Those lying low ready to abandon the boat if seen sunk by the Troika and associates.

3. And the majority who are with the government which they elected.

We appeal to our legitimate government under the leadership of our President Salva Kiir Mayardit to critically determine the fate of the people of Greater Bor before the implementation of the expected solution, such that they do not fall a victim in the hands of Riek Machar and his associate for the third time.

Sometimes back, a proposal of granting a separate administration for Greater Bor was being discussed in political corridors but it suddenly died out. The question is who is to spearhead the quest for that special status; the Jieng, Community, the Greater Bor Representatives to various houses of assemblies or the Community leaderships on both the greater or individual Counties levels?

Then worst of all is that people of Greater Bor are scattered over all South Sudan, neighboring countries and in Diaspora. How do we bring them back home? Greater Bor currently has 13 geographical constituencies to both the National and State Legislative Assemblies. Are we sure we will still maintain them intact in the coming elections?

The binding is composed of the following contents:

1. Prologue

2. Narrative about the massacre of 15th December 2013 – 18th January 2014

3. Names of the victims of the massacre

4. Some snapshots of the victims

Maker Lual Kuol

 

THE SUCCESSIVE GENOCIDAL MASSACRES OF RIEK MACHAR ON THE PEOPLE OF GREATER BOR

Introduction

Two successive genocidal massacres have been committed by Riek Machar on the people of Greater Bor within a period of two decades. In 1991 when he split from SPLM/A, he ordered his kinsmen from the White Army composed of Lou Nuer to invade Greater Bor with the political intention of tearing the heart of John Garang, the leader of the movement by the time. In that invasion, over 20,000 people were massacred, thousands abducted, the whole wealth of the area composed of livestock was driven away leaving the destitute population without option except to seek refuge and displacement to the neighboring countries and other parts of Sudan. The rest who remained at home starved to death as there was no way to deliver any humanitarian assistance to them (Run ca poth in Dinka.) translated as the year when death was escaped and literarily by few.

With the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the consequent independence of South Sudan, People of Greater Bor forgot and forgave the perpetrator Riek Machar and his kinsmen and allies. A good display of that reconciliatory spirit was the apology he made in Bor in 2011 in front of a big gathering of political and community leaders and as a sign and a gesture of that good will he hugged himself with the Jonglei State Governor by the time, Kuol Manyang Juuk. Again in Juba, he apologized to Greater Bor Community at the house of Nyandeng Chol, widow of late Dr. John Garang de Mabior and one of Riek current closest allies.

Unfortunately all those apologies from Riek Machar were crocodile tears. On the 15th of December 2013, the same day shooting took place in Juba Town, Riek tentacles of Conspiracy started to engulf Bor Citizens in Bor Town and gradually the conspiracy flared into an all out genocide on the people of Greater Bor.

Who are the perpetrators of the Second Genocidal Massacre on the people of Greater Bor

Before sailing into the details of the second Riek’s massacre, Greater Bor Community would like to point hand in accusation of the following perpetrators for the role they played in the intentional and unprovoked death, maiming, rap, displacement, abduction and destruction of property.

1. Riek Machar Teny Thuorgon, Former Vice President of the Republic of South Sudan.

Riek arrived Bor at around 4 pm on the 18th December in three motor boats after sneaking out of Juba following the shoot out on the 15th December. Immediately on his arrival, an attack took place all over Bor Town. This means, the forces allied to him were waiting for the arrival of their leader Riek from Juba. Militarily, most attacks are launched at dawn as a cover up for the advancing forces. Attack was not launched in the morning hours as Riek’s allied forces wanted to secure the safe arrival of their leader. When he arrived, Riek straight went to the auxiliary police force base camp behind the UNMISS Compound to direct the operations. Later at 10 pm, Riek entered the UNMISS Base Camp with Angline Teny, one of his several wives in the company of some of his close associates. Riek and some of his associates were airlifted out of the UNMISS Compound after three days by a UN chopper. On the 31st December, Riek militias of the white army stormed Bor Town and the massacre intensified.

2. Hussein Mar Nyot, former Deputy Governor of Jonglei State.

Hussein Mar Nyuot, was the Jonglei State deputy governor for 8 years before appointment of the current Jonglei State Governor, John Koang Nyuon. Hussein expected himself to replace his former governor Kuol Manyang Juuk who got appointed as national minister of defense in the July 23rd 2013 reshuffle. Missing the position made him to shift allegiance to Riek. Some days before the fight in Juba, Hussein shifted the state administration to his house. Throughout the period to the attack, Hussein kept meeting Peter Gadet separately at the watch of the other cabinet ministers within his residential compound. He also continued to give instructions to the finance minister in order to release funds and fuel to the army on request of Gadet. The army is supposed to access its finances directly from the army headquarters at Bilpam in Juba not from the state.

3. Gen. Peter Gadet, former SPLA Division 8 Commander

Peter Gadet, famously known for his desertions or shifting sides, was transferred to the SPLA headquarters but intelligently made his way back to Division 8 in Bor. Upon returning to Bor, he started to strategize for his attacks and massacres. He surveyed all the routes leading in and out of Bor County on the 17th of December. He killed his deputy Major General Ajak Yen in cold blood on the 17th of December. When the SPLA and the other government forces were dislodged, Gadet took charge of Bor Airport. He was the one who used to approve permits for those fleeing out of Bor Town to Juba by air. In general, Gadet was the operational commander of Riek Machar in Jonglei. All the killings and destruction were ordered and executed under his direct command.

4. Gabriel Duop Lam, former Jonglei State Minister for Law Enforcement.

Duop who is supposed to protect the citizens, turned against them and butchered them. Upon Riek arrival in Bor, Duop signaled the beginning of the fight by ordering the shooting of the Police Captain Chau Mayol. Duop Lam is appointed Military Governor in waiting for Jonglei State by Riek Machar.

5. The UNMISS unit in Bor Town

Riek Machar arrived Bor at 4 pm 18th December 2013 and the shooting and massacre started. At 10 pm, he was driven to the UNMISS compound with a mounted vehicle provided definitely by his lieutenants in Bor. At the UNMISS gate, the convoy was prevented by the security guards to enter but a senior UNMISS personnel intervened instructing the guards to allow the convoy to enter but the guard stood his ground though later he gave in to instructions from his superior officer. According to reports, Riek was in the company of eight others of his supporters. The guard collected all the pistols; 24 in number and removed all the magazines and dumped the pistols into the mounted vehicle which was left parked at the main gate. On the morning of 19th, Riek convened a meeting which was attended by Hussein Mar, John Koang, the newly appointed Governor for Jonglei State, Gabriel Duop Lam, the Jonglei Law Enforcement Minister, Stephen Par, Jonglei Minister of Education, Gabriel Gai Riem, Jonglei Minister of Cabinet Affairs, Beshir Deng, the Director General for the Ministry of Local Government, Moses Gatkuoth Lony, a member in the Jonglei State Assembly and others the reliable witness could not identify. Taban Deng Gai is reported to have been in the company of Riek but the witness did not know him before. Governor Koang and Gabriel Gai flew out of Bor to Juba, an indication that they refused to follow Riek Machar. After the meeting, Riek went out of the camp in Hussein Mar vehicle accompanied by other two vehicles. The number plates were wrapped up with pieces of cloth to conceal the numbers from the may be inquisitive onlookers. Outside the compound, other military vehicles were waiting for him to escort him to Malual Chat and other military posts around Bor Town. This episode of moving out of the UNMISS Compound continued for 3 days. Duop Lam, who was later appointed military Governor for Jonglei State by Riek, used to sleep inside the UNMISS Camp but early left every morning to Bor Town to participate in directing the operations under the command of Peter Gadet.

On the 21st December 2013, the basketball pitch were removed by the UNMISS soldiers and the UNMISS helicopter landed and picked Riek with a lady dressed in (Thob garment). The helicopter carrying Riek took off from the compound and headed towards the east, possibly to Gadiang or Waat, Riek strong holds. At the same time, another helicopter took off from Bor Airstrip and moved towards the north but after a short while, it reversed and straight headed for Juba. May be the movement of the two helicopters simultaneously was meant to distract the attention of people from the conspiracy of the UNMISS against the Government of South Sudan.

On the 22nd December 2013 after the departure of Riek, a drama happened when the compound was overcrowded and the facilities became scarce for the thousands of those who flocked into the compound especially the toilets and water points, the UNMISS force began to screen the displaced from the UN and NGOs personnel through ID cards. The displaced were being pushed and pulled to the other section of the camp. Hussein Mar unknown to the UNMISS soldiers was forcefully pulled out and while being dragged away, he cried out that he was the deputy Governor of Jonglei State and that he deserved a dignified treatment. In order to cool his nerves, an officer from UNMISS Contingent intervened and allowed him to sit under the tree. Hussein denied his leader Riek in few seconds like when the disciple Peter denied Jesus immediately after Jesus arrest.

On the 23rd December, when the SPLA were advancing towards Bor Town from Juba, Hussein boarded his car and tried to go out of the compound but was refused exit by the UNMISS soldiers. He then craned out his neck from the car and threatened the peacekeepers that if they did not allow him to go out, he would order the rebels to enter and kill anybody in the compound. Fearing for their lives, the peacekeepers moved their tank slightly out of the way and allowed Hussein to peacefully pass and possibly to be airlifted to Nairobi. This is how UNMISS maliciously, openly and dubiously participated in the genocidal massacre of the people of Greater Bor.

The worst is that UNMISS is sheltering the killers from Nuer as well as storing their weapons in its containers. Not that but forcefully grabbing and annexing traditional cattle camps to their base camp to shelter the killers of the owners of the land. The sheltered celebrate whenever the rebels attack SPLA positions anywhere in South Sudan. They are waiting to join Riek when he return victorious and continue the massacring of those they can lay hand on.

One of the reasons the hundreds of thousands of displaced are not returning home is the presence of the over 5,000 sheltered combatants Nuers in UNMISS Compound in Bor. Of course UNMISS is more concern with the success of Riek on the account of the innocent owners of the land (the people of Greater Bor )

From the above few facts, the genocidal massacre inflicted on the people of Greater Bor was not provoked in any way such that the UNMISS Human Rights try to be intelligent and ambiguous in its report. The genocidal massacre of 2013/2014 was more brutal than the one of 1991 which was orchestrated by the same Riek Machar using his usual super market shopping trolleys, the White Army from the Lou Nuer and Gawer.

Chronology of the Events in Bor from 15th of December 2013 to 18th January 2014

One fact should be known to all that the massacre that took place in Bor was not ever, ever provoked by anybody or situation from neither the citizens of Greater Bor nor the Government authorities as evidently proved by the following:

1- On the evening of 15th December 2013, two soldiers from the auxillary police force; namely Sgt. Mawut and Pvte. Mayor were wounded by their own colleagues. That was before the fight erupted in Juba on the night of 15th December 2013 and that was a clear evidence that there was a planned plot to overthrow the government in Juba

2- Two brothers from Twic East were killed in their house in block 4 on the night of 16th December 2013. Block 4 is adjacent to block T. which was mostly settled by citizens from Nuer Ethnic group. Block T was renamed (Ci Nuer ben) meaning Nuers have come, when they forcefully settled on it.

3- At 11 am on the 16th December 2013, Dr. Agot Alier, Bor County Commissioner, narrowly escaped an assassination attempt on his life as his vehicle was sprayed with bullets and the holes caused by two bullets can still be seen at the rear back.

4- At 4 pm 16th December 2013, two youth from Makuac Payam were shot at   Makuac Junction resulting in the death of one and injury of the other.

5- On the night of 16th December 2013, Gadet deployed his forces around government installations and houses of some senior government officials possibly the ones planned to be killed when time came.

6- On the 17th December 2013, General Gadet inspected routes leading in and out of Kolnyang Payam. That inspection was a prelude to movement of the rebel and White Army forces when the fight intensified later on Bor- Juba Road.

7- At 9 pm 17th December 2013, Gadet killed his deputy Major General Ajak Yen and marched towards Bor Town in a number of mounted vehicles.

8- On the night of 17th /18th December 2013, news spread about the movement of Gadet to Bor Town and the population started fleeing the town.

9- At 4 pm 18th December 2013, Riek arrived Bor by motor boats from Juba and upon landing at the queue, shooting started and that was when Captain Chaw was shot by a colleague from Nuer Ethnic Group accompanying Gabriel Duop, the Jonglei State minister of Law Enforcement and a conspirator in the rebellion (Duop is currently appointed the military Governor for Jonglei State in waiting by Riek Mahar.

10- The poor and innocent population of Bor Town as well as the rural one aimlessly took to any direction in order to escape the death. Most people crossed to Guolyar in Awerial County, others hid in the marshes along the river and others took cover in the bushes. Those who remained in the town whether elderly, sick or insane were butchered to death. Theft, rampage raping and destruction of properties and installations were the practice during the invasion days.

11- The invaders even went to look for their victims who were hiding in bushes and marshes such as:

• Attacking those fleeing the death at motor boats’ docking stations such as the 7 people killed at Jarwong south of Bor Town..

• Crossing the gullies (Wak) and streams to seek lives of people such as what took place twice at Baidit Payam that resulted in the massacre of 29 people and driving away of over 500 heads of cattle..

• Shooting at those who sought safety across the river at Malek village where 14 people were killed including an infant.

• Attacking Kolnyang and massacring of 31 people and abduction of 11 children.

• Attacking those who took refuge in the bush at Mareng killing 25 people

• The whole town of Bor was ransacked, burnt and government and NGOs Institutions looted and destroyed.

• Mathiang, Baidit, Makol Cuei, Mareng, Wungok, Kolnyang, Thianwei, Werkok villages were burnt down.

• The usual sacred places such as churches and hospitals were not spared. Women were raped and later killed and sticks or wood inserted into their private parts.

• Thousands of people were forced to cross the river to the western bank. Others sought refuge in the marshes and high lands in the sudd area.

• In attack at Duk Payuel in Duk Payam, Riek forces from the White Army killed many people, burnt houses, cut down trees. Worst in all was the exhumation of the grave of late Paramount Chief Deng Malual who died in 1946.

The total death from this genocidal massacre reached over 2,000 people though many are still not accounted for as many are scattered over South Sudan and the neighboring countries. The massacred were buried later in four mass graves at Bor Town Cemetry.

Conclusion

It should be known to all that the massacre of Greater Bor People was:

• That what took place in Juba was a coup d’état evidently proved by the disarmament of the auxiliary police in Bor of their commanders from the Dinka ethnic group at 5 pm 15th December before the breaking out of fight in Juba on the evening of 15th December 2013.

• The successive massacres which took place in Bor were not provoked in any way by the citizens of Greater Bor.

• UNMISS evidently enhanced the massacre of the people of Greater Bor by supporting, sympathizing and facilitating Riek Machar and his associates.

Attached:

– Photos of the inhuman massacres.

– Some names of the massacred.

Compiled by:

1- Maker Lual Kuol.

ANYIDI PAYAM

BOR COUNTY

List of Civilians Killed by Riek Machar’s Rebels since 18th December, 2013

S/No. Name In Full Clan particular Age Sex Remark

1 Piok Ajak Kur Pajhok Pakom 55 m

2 Amer Garang Atem Pajhok Pakom 35 f

3 Mayen Aluong Mayen Police Pakom 64 m

4 Ajith Nook Anyang Police Pakom 68 m

5 Anyang Ajith Nook Police Pakom 18 m

6 Nyanman Jok Abuoi Police Pakom 62 f

7 Mabat Aguto Jool Apierwuong 69 m

8 Mawut Nyok Ding Apierwuong 55 m

9 Adongwei Kuol Deng Police Pakom 45 f

10 Deng Majok Kur Apierwuong 19 m

11 Ayen Kuol Kuai Apierwuong 21 f

12 Mading Jok Mayen Police Pakom 70 m

13 Dit Deng Gong Pajhok Pakom 70 m

14 Nyanthiec Awar Dit Police Pakom 62 f

15 Aman Maker Guut Police Pakom 62 f

16 Aluel Riak Keer Police Pakom 65 f

17 Leek Deng Chol Pajhok Pakom 38 m

18 Achiek Lueth Kulang Apierwuong 61 m

19 Maler Gai Kuai Police Pakom 38 m

20 Mawut Ayen Kuol Police Pakom 55 m

21 Ayen Jok Yuang Police Pakom 61 f

22 Garang Ayom Mach Pajhok Pakom 66 m

23 Appolo Pach Gar Leekrieth 76 m

24 Majok Akhau Leek Leekrieth 62 m

25 Machol Ngong Agok Leekrieth 72 m

26 Amuor Agoot Madol Leekrieth 81 f

27 Ayuen Jok Madol Leekrieth 65 m

28 Madol Kom Bior Leekrieth 58 m

29 Mayola Anyieth Akhau Leekrieth 69 m

30 Yar Anyieth Akhau Leekrieth 71 f

31 Apieu Biar Leek Leekrieth 80 m

32 Nyankor Pach Lukuac Leekrieth 60 m

33 Goop Ateny Kuereng Leekrieth 56 m

34 Nyok Bior Nyok Leekrieth 15 m

35 Piel Mayen Deng Leekrieth 62 m

36 Chol Nyok Ayook Leekrieth 76 m

37 Alier Maror Anyang Leekrieth 54 m

38 Nyuon Achien Pach Leekrieth 71 m

39 Bior Deng Yong Leekrieth 63 m

40 Amuor Deng Kuot Leekrieth 71 f

41 Ngong Chol Ajith Leekrieth 6 m

42 Yar Chol Ajith Leekrieth 4 f

43 Agok Machar Mayen Leekrieth 66 m

44 Manyok Dut Akuang Leekrieth 73 m

45 Mangar Leek Buol Leekrieth 31 m

46 Agot Leek Ateer Chuei-Magoon Chot 70 f

47 Nyanwut Achol Kon Chuei-Magoon Chot 65 m

48 Achok Nyueny Dot Chuei-Magoon Chot 45 m

49 Nyalueth Thiong Anyuat Chuei-Magoon Chot 61 m

50 Aluel Borong Anaai Chuei-Magoon Chot 72 m

51 Ajah Buol Manyang Chuei-Magoon Chot 45 m

52 Yar Awuol Deng Chuei-Magoon Chot 62 m

53 Bol Machol Mayen Chuei-Magoon Chot 35 m

54 Ayen Achiek Nhial Chuei-Magoon Chot 55 f

55 Ayuen Reng Mayom Chuei-Magoon Chot 75 m

56 Riak Reng Mayom Chuei-Magoon Chot 62 m

57 Alier Makol Bior Keer 65 m

58 Deng Angui Deng Chot 65 m

59 Makol Agou Makur Keer 80 m

60 Aleek Biar Mach Keer 71 f

61 Aliet Deng Akol Keer 62 f

62 Garang Deng Gar Keer 80 m

63 Achuerwei Deng Bior Keer 92 f

64 Keny Dekbai Riak Keer 37 m

65 Athieng Garang Alith Keer 80 f

66 Tholhok Yuang Nyieth Keer 87 m

67 Tiit Mabior Dekbai Chuei-Magoon Chot 3 f

68 Ayuen Kuol Kur Chuei-Magoon Chot 38 m

69 Ayuiu Mach Ngong Chuei-Magoon Chot 75 m

70 Akuol Kelei Ayol Chuei-Magoon Chot 68 f

71 Abiar Deng Chuei-Magoon Chot 76 m

72 Amoth Wuoi Agot Chuei-Magoon Chot 72 m

73 Erjok Machar Achuoth Chuei-Magoon Chot 37 m

74 Madol Lueth Mayen Chuei-Magoon Chot 80 m

75 Diing Deng Pakam Chuei-Magoon Chot 37 f

76 Mayen Madol Lueth Chuei-Magoon Chot 2 m

77 Nyanluak Alueng Ajuoi Chuei-Magoon Chot 61 f

78 Ayak Athiek Kur Chuei-Magoon Chot 74 f

79 Akuac Akuot Achuil Chuei-Magoon Chot 81 f

80 Mach Magon Awal Chuei-Magoon Chot 50 m

81 Achol Mach Lual Chuei-Magoon Chot 80 f

82 Awuoi Gai Nai Chuei-Magoon Chot 80 f

83 Abiei Malual Ayom Chuei-Magoon Chot 87 f

84 Ajah Yom Doot Chuei-Magoon Chot 102 f

85 Mach Gar Mach Chuei-Magoon Chot 81 m

86 Gar Kuek Gar Chuei-Magoon Chot 30 m

87 Awan Kuol Lual Chuei-Magoon Chot 41 m

88 Yar Ajok Geu Chuei-Magoon Chot 50 f

89 Nyankoor Leek Deng Chuei-Magoon Chot 50 f

90 Nyalueth Deng Bol Chuei-Magoon Chot 78 m

91 Nyabol Mach Wel Chuei-Magoon Chot 52 m

92 Ayuen Akhau Wel Chuei-Magoon Chot 37 m

93 Mamer Garang Tuung Chuei-Magoon Chot 31 m

94 Abiok Garang Deng Chuei-Magoon Chot 83 f

95 Achol Achiek Thok Chuei-Magoon Chot 5 f

96 Ngong Achiek Thok Chuei-Magoon Chot 2 m

97 Agok Kuol Deng Chuei-Magoon Chot 40 f

98 Chol Akol Bol Chuei-Magoon Chot 3 m

99 Akuek Deng Garang Chuei-Magoon Chot 80 f

100 Maluak Kang Jang Chuei-Magoon Chot 35 m

101 Jombo Apeech Ngong Chuei-Magoon Chot 77 f

102 Atong Diing Thok Chuei-Magoon Chot 3 m

103 Matuur Akech Chaboc Chuei-Magoon Chot 35 m

104 Achol Mach Chiek Chuei-Magoon Chot 66 f

105 Chol Garang Kur Chuei-Magoon Chot 31 m

106 Keth Guet Chuei-Magoon Chot 68 f

107 Akon Majok Luil Chuei-Magoon Chot 50 f

108 Angau Mach Ngong Chuei-Magoon Chot 76 m

109 Aliet Jual Anyang Chuei-Magoon Chot 61 f

110 Deng Nyok Anyieth Chuei-Magoon Chot 28 m

111 Nyabol Jok Deng Chuei-Magoon Chot 53 f

112 Mach Mayen Mayen Chuei-Magoon Chot 2 m

113 Jok Malek Deng Chuei-Magoon Chot 40 m

114 Abuui Mawut Abui Chuei-Magoon Chot 43 m

115 Abui Pur Abui Chuei-Magoon Chot 51 m

116 Gai Kelei Gai Chuei-Magoon Chot 51 m

117 Kuol Kuei Kur Chuei-Magoon Chot 67 m

118 Yar Gai Akuei Chuei-Magoon Chot 82 f

119 Deng Gaak Goch Chuei-Magoon Chot 61 m

120 Ngor Ayor Abui Chuei-Magoon Chot 28 m

121 Geu Yar Jok Chuei-Magoon Chot 30 m

122 Ayuen Achuei Gureech Chuei-Magoon Chot 28 m

123 Aguorjok Achiek Duot Chuei-Magoon Chot 90 f

124 Ding Ajith Nyok Mareng Apierweng 28 m

125 Mach Bol Ding Mareng Apierweng 60 m

126 Nyanchol Yuot Piel Mareng Apierweng 45 f

127 Akuut Pach Nai Mareng Apierweng 50 m

128 Akeer Riak Achien Mareng Apierweng 61 m

129 Aluel Leek Atuongjok Mareng Apierweng 45 m

130 Mach Lueth Mach Mareng Apierweng 50 m

131 Kuol Mathiang Deng Chuei-Magoon Chot 51 m

132 Mamer Garang Ayol Chuei-Magoon Chot 35 m

133 Mabiei Mayom Abuk Mareng Apierweng 32 m

134 Akech Makuei Ding Thianwei Boma 35 m

135 Bheer Kuol Anyieth Thianwei Boma 40 m

136 Agau Makol Ayath Thianwei Boma 32 m

137 Mach Madol Deng Thianwei Boma 40 m

138 Alier Ayuel Chengkou Thianwei Boma 70 m

139 Kelei Deng Ding Thianwei Boma 80 m

140 Kuec Tuung Lual Thianwei Boma 70 m

141 Kuei Nhial Lual Thianwei Boma 90 m

142 Achol Tong Kur Thianwei Boma 82 m

143 Akol Lukuac Bior Thianwei Boma 90 f

144 Ayong Deng Achuk Thianwei Boma 87 f

145 Yar Thiong Ayuel Thianwei Boma 81 m

146 Abuoi Jool Garang Thianwei Boma 50 m

147 Athieng Aguto Chol Thianwei Boma 106 m

148 Ajok Anyieth Achuoth Thianwei Boma 56 m

149 Abuol Garang Chol Thianwei Boma 83 f

150 Mayom Ngong Deng Thianwei Boma 79 m

151 Koor Jok Lieth Thianwei Boma 86 f

152 Athiek Anyier Akok Thianwei Boma 79 m

153 Chuti Yuol Aguto Thianwei Boma 69 m

154 Akueth Jok Ding Thianwei Boma 80 m

155 Adum Magaar Thianwei Boma 71 f

156 Ding Mangok Chol Thianwei Boma 68 f

157 Ngong Majok Ngong Thianwei Boma 50 m

158 Aluet Deng Garang Thianwei Boma 95 f

159 Maluk Mach Ding Thianwei Boma 70 m

160 Ajuong Ding Majuc Mareng Apierweng 34 m

161 Ayom Mayen Deng Mareng Apierweng 29 m

162 Ayuen Magot Bol Chuei-Magoon Chot 46 m

163 Lual Magot Bol Chuei-Magoon Chot 38 m

164 Achol Mach Achol Chuei-Magoon Chot 60 m

165 Lako Bol Mach Mareng Kucdok 38 m

166 Thon Mach Maluk Mareng Kucdok 41 m

167 Mabiel Kuei Mach Mareng Kucdok 50 m

168 Garang Mading Eguei Mareng Kucdok 30 m

169 Thon MalukMach Mareng Kucdok 30 m

170 Kuei Juac Kuonjok Mareng Kucdok 50 f

171 Guguei Majier Kuei Mareng Kucdok 26 m

172 Ayen Manyang Mach Mareng Kucdok 2 f

173 Garang Chuang Thiong Mareng Kucdok 50 m

174 Yom Ateng Dhelic Mareng Kucdok 60 f

175 Ding Lual Mareng Kucdok 90 m

176 Mach Long Mach Mareng Kucdok 90 m

177 Jambo Guec Mach Mareng Kucdok 50 f

178 Bior Arou Mareng Kucdok 88 f

179 Ateng Dhelic Mareng Kucdok 41 m

180 Makoi Wel Magot Mareng Kucdok 5 m

181 Ayen Mangar Ayuen Mareng Kucdok 40 f

182 Ayak Majok Geu Apierwuong 2 f

183 Ayoom Adiir Ayoom Chuei-Magoon Chot 82 m

184 Philip Achol Mach Achol Chuei-Magoon Chot 50 m

185 Mamer Garang Ayool Chuei-Magoon Chot 30 m

186 Mabiei Akol Deng Thianwei Boma 40 m

187 Thon Jok Nyuop Thianwei Boma 30 m

188 Mayen Amoth Nyuop Thianwei Boma 28 m

LIST OF THE PEOPLE WHO HAVE BEEN KILLEDBY THE REBEL of RIEK MACHAR

IN BAIDIT PAYAM OF BOR COUNTY

FROM/18/DECEMBER/2013 TO 18/JAN/2014

S/No Name in full Age Sex Boma

1. Ajak Yen Alier 54 M Macdeng

2. Panchol Garang Mabiei 52 M Machdeng

3 Maluak Panchol Lual 25 M Machdeng

4 Awuoi Anyang Bior 84 M Machdeng

5 Kuol Nyok Athieu 68 M Machdeng

6 Deng Alier Monyror 38 M Machdeng

7 Nyiel Ayuen Machar 28 F Machdeng

8 Panchol Guet Kur 67 M Machdeng

9 Adol Geu Guguei 56 F Machendg

10 Makuei Anyieth Aleer 75 M Machden

11 Aker Maloch 36 F Machdeng

12 Mabior Ajak Lueth 69 M Machdeng

13 Kuai Ajak Alier 82 M Machdeng

14 Aguto Ngong Dot 86 M Machdeng

15 Alier Garang Alier 75 M Machdeng

16 Mayendit Ayuen Mayen 45 M Machdeng

17 Mayenthi Ayuen Mayen 37 M Machdeng

18 Achol Kuai Ajak 86 M Machdeng

19 Apen Deng Yom 73 F Machdeng

20 Aman Angeth Ajak 85 F Machdeng

21 Deng Kuany Angeth 34 M Machdeng

22 Achiek Kuai Deng 37 M Machdeng

23 Alier Kuai Deng 30 M Machdeng

24 Nyanjok Yuang Agoot 78 F Machdeng

25 Nyanjur Deng Malek 52 F Machdeng

26 Akuei Kuot Kwai 48 M Machdeng

27 Yuang Aluong Changkou 20 M Machdeng

28 Ajith Jongkuch Angok 24 M Machdeng

29 Mawut Garang Arou 75 M Machdeng

30 Maker Gai Duk 64 M Machdeng

31 Bol Mayen Yuang 5o F Machdeng

32 Ayuen Aluong Chol 80 M Machdeng

33 Alier Abuong Chaw 67 M Machdeng

34 Majuot Kuol Bior 68 M Machdeng

35 Malueth Gai Deng 50 M Machdeng

36 Yom Aluong Deng 79 F Machdeng

37 Mabuol Chiew Lual 83 M Machdeng

38 Mabior Buol Duk 50 M Machdeng

39 Geu Agaau Kuany 35 M Machdeng

40 Chol Niop Chol 45 M Machdeng

41 Mabior Atheiu Achuei 78 M Machdeng

42 Tier Jok Deng 66 M Machdeng

43 Athiak Goop Bior 86 F Machdeng

44 Apar Kuol Nyuon 84 F Machdeng

45 Jur Kur Ariik 54 M Machdeng

46 Ajak Alier Malual 35 M Machdeng

47 Jok Alier Jok 36 M Machdeng

48 Ariik Ajak Luol 49 M Machdeng

49 Mabut Anyieth Anok 43 M Machdeng

50 Nyanlueth Reng Ajuong 76 F Machdeng

51 Nyankor Jarlueth Ajak 69 F Machdeng

52 Leek Jok Ajak 54 M Machdeng

53 Chuti Yar Leek 06 F Machdeng

54 Mabior Lual Anyieth 89 M Machdeng

55 Alier Diing Alaar 76 M Machdeng

56 Ajak Kur Achuoth 05 M Machdeng

57 Alier Thiong Alier 07 M Machdeng

58 Apiel Gong Bior 25 F Machdeng

59 Makuac Whel Kuot 39 M Akayice

60 Malok Kok Maguen 46 M Akuak

61 Ajak Jombo Kuol 32 M Akayice

62 Awiel Alier Malith 55 M Mathiang

63 Akuol Kon Deng 28 F Akayice

64 Adut Makuac Whel 09 F Akayice

65 Kuot Makuac Whel 07 M Akayice

67 Mac Makuac Whel 05 M Akayice

68 Achol Makuac Wel 03 F Akayice

69 Garang Dut Mathiang 70 M Machdeng

70 Yar Majok Chaath 10 F Mathiang

71 Chaath Majok Chaath 08 M Mathiang

72 Anai Nyok Anya 78 F Mathiang

73 Kudum Alith Akuei 80 F Mathiang

74 Akuany Malual Nai 60 F Machdeng

75 Anyieth Achol Jalueth 50 F Machdeng

76 Deng reng Deng 45 M Machdeng

77 Akon Jangthok Kur 47 F Machdeng

78 Kuch Alier kuch 48 M Machdeng

79 Anok Kuch Kuol 46 F Machdeng

80 Ajah Malut Barach 54 F Machdeng

81 Akur Til Makol 48 F Machdeng

82 Yar Dot Jok 49 F Machdeng

83 Apiou Anyieth Angok 81 M Machdeng

84 Gaar Malual Gaar 46 M Machdeng

85 Guut Alier Guut 20 M Machdneg

86 Adol Barach Kuc 67 M Machdeng

87 Nyalueth Thorony Agut 78 F Machdeng

88 Mawel Kuol Majok 50 M Machdeng

89 Bol Mawhel Hok 30 M Machdeng

90 Ayuen Riak Bol 43 M Machdeng

91 Hok Leek Hok 25 M Machdeng

92 Mawut Machar Ajak 44 M Machdeng

93 Kueth Reng Garang 78 M Machdeng

94 Athiak Kuch Lual 50 F Machdeng

95 Duany Akol Ajak 74 M Machdeng

96 Alier Achiek Jok 45 M Machdeng

97 Apull Atem Mabior 57 F Machdeng

98 Anai Jiel Nai 92 M Machdeng

99 Yom Mading Angok 63 F Machdeng

100 Tong Alier Tong 72 M Machdeng

101 Agot Riak Deng 70 F Machdeng

102 Adut Leek Bior 86 F Machdeng

103 Makec Alier Arou 42 M Makolcuei

104 Ateny kou Thiong 46 M Makolcuei

1o5 Panther Kuol Ayool 34 M Makolcuei

106 Anai Thuc Machar 67 F Makolcuei

107 Apat Kucha Apat 48 F Makolcuei

108 Panchol Awan Kuorwhel 53 F Makolcuei

109 Deng Majak Deng 32 M Makolcuei

11o Awuol Deng Diing 58 M Makolcuei

111 Akur Ajieu Arou 67 F Makolcuei

112 Majuang Garang Kuol 37 M Makolcuei

113 Ayuen Athieu Achuei 64 F Makolcuei

114 Dit Alou Dit 61 M Makolcuei

115 Mading Nyuon Kur 54 M Makolcuei

116 Koor Barach Deng 39 F Makolcuei

117 Ayak Luk Ngong 55 F Makolcuei

118 Kur Deng Kur 69 M Makolcuei

119 Aluel Gureech Nyuon 42 F Makolcuei

120 Amuor Juuk Kuch 35 F Makolcuei

121 Nhial Jok Nhial 40 M Makolcuei

122 Lual Nyanreeh Majok 48 M Makolcuei

123 Akech Madit Dhuol 38 M Makolcuei

124 Malual Nyok Chengkou 23 M Makolcuei

125 Jongkuc Awan Bior 78 M Makolcuei

126 Malith Abuol Barach 38 M Makolcuei

127 Adau Ajak Atem 53 F Makolcuei

128 Ayuen Kuol Mayen 12 F Makolcuei

129 Majok Nyok Panjok 81 M Makolcuei

130 Achiek Kuc Aneet 42 M Makolcuei

131 Akham Deng Akham 90 M Makolcuei

132 Lith Achiek Dot 71 F Makolcuei

133 Awhel Anyuon Anai 49 F Makolcuei

134 Mac Kur Anyangdit 66 M Makolcuei

135 Alaak Keech Buol 37 F Makolcuei

136 Malueth Riak Mading 38 M Makolcuei

137 Agook Tohol Deng 54 F Makolcuei

138 Majok Mam Maluth 70 M Makolcuei

139 Anyang Nhial Lual 58 M Makolcuei

140 Mabior Dhuka Mabior 48 M Makolcuei

141 Wal Apeech Adol 45 M Makolcuei

142 Matiop Chol Mach 34 M Makolcuei

143 Achol Joh Deng 36 F Makolcuei

144 Ajuur Chol Lueth 45 F Makolcuei

145 Adum Deng Makeer 43 F Makolcuei

146 Nyandit Magot Ariik 29 M Makolcuei

147 Nyanlueth Riak Mading 20 F Makolcuei

148 Thon Ayuen Nhial 33 M Makolcuei

149 Garang Jam Lual 67 M Makolcuei

150 Ajoh Ajok Ajak 38 F Makolcuei

151 Alith Awan Deng 48 M Makolcuei

152 Nyanlueth Deng Biar 32 F Makolcuei

153 Chuir Lueth Alier 26 F Makolcuei

154 Nyok Piel Ajak 68 M Makolcuei

155 Achol Nyok Piel 28 F Makolcuei

156 Makuei Nyok Piel 51 M Makolcuei

157 Ayom Madul Arou 30 M Makolcuei

158 Ateny Bul Angeth 48 M Makolcuei

159 Aluel Kuol Kuai 19 F Makolcuei

160 Gai Joh Akuok 37 M Tong

161 Agoot Thiel Beny 68 F Tong

162 Akuol Whel Akhau 73 F Tong

163 Lual Buol Lueth 09 M Tong

164     Mach Bior Maghot 21 M Tong

165 Awuol Makuei Manyan 45 M Tong

166 Guet Apiou Anyuon 75 F Tong

167 Yuang Aguto Alith 35 M Tong

168 Mairar Dot Alith 44 M Tong

169 Kelei Gai Nai 68 M Tong

170 Abeny Dhuol Angeer 78 F Tong

171 Ayuen Jongkuc Kuoi 38 F Tong

172 Mayar Jupuur Anyieth 63 M Tong

173 Akuol Amac Lual 73 F Tong

174 Anyieth Apiou Makur 65 F Tong

175 Manyok Machaar Akuok 35 M Tong

176 Yom Gai Mach 64 F Tong

177 Achol Mooch Mathiang 52 M Tong

178 Akech Athiak Machar 32 M Tong

179 Moch Garang Moch 35 M Tong

180 Peer Maluil 63 F Tong

181 Yom Akuei Mach 61 F Tong

182 Nyang Dhaal Akol 79 F Tong

183 Garang Parach Garang 16 M Tong

184 Manyok Akuok Anyang 70 M Tong

185 Nyankoot Jok piel 75 F Tong

186 Apiou Anyieth Yuang 49 F Tong

187 Atong Deng Akhau 56 F Tong

188 Thongboor Nyuon Bil 63 M Tong

189 Machar Dheiu Machar 54 M Tong

190 Deng Njuotnyin lual 84 M Tong

191 Panchol Mach Jok 37 M Tong

192 Deng Abuol Deng 39 M Tong

193 Mawhel Thiong Kut 66 M Tong

194 Manyok Ajiok Kut 53 M Tong

195 Amuor Deng Khom 52 F Tong

196 Kuir Makol Mawan 03 M Tong

197 Ayak Ajak Kuer 02 F Mathiang

198 Anyieth Kelei Anyinyot 35 M Mathiang

199 Bol Ayuen Thiong 40 M Mathiang

200 Akec Mayen Ajuoi 35 F Mathiang

201 Mabior Majak Kou 41 M Mathiang

202 Amoch Arou Deng 51 F Mathiang

203 Maluk Anyinyot Kuot 59 M Mathiang

204 Nhial Buol Ajuong 20 M Mathiang

205 Majok Buol Ajuong 25 M Mathiang

206 Kuei Leek Mayen 50 F Mathiang

207 Diing Nyang Aliet 67 F Mathiang

208 Awur Garang Reng 60 F Mathiang

209 Maker Goor Athou 54 M Mathiang

210 Maker Deng Mathiang 67 M Mathiang

211 Panchol Anyieth Bol 54 M Mathiang

212 Aguto Mac Ruar 61 M Mathiang

213 Atet Jok Atet 65 F Mathiang

214 Goop Maluak Kuot 02 F Mathiang

215 Mamer Mayen Nuer 35 M Mathiang

216 Madel Lueth Nuer 43 M Mathiang

217 Mading Ayuen Madol 38 M Mathiang

218 Machar Lual Kur 31 M Mathiang

219 Lual Koryom Lual 42 M Mathiang

220 Deng Majok Ajuoi 51 M Mathiang

221 Panchol Reng Ajah 68 M Mathiang

222 Areng Majak Ayuen 02 F Mathiang

223 Akon Nyuon Kelei 32 F Mathiang

224 Pandek Mamour Kuc 06 M Mathiang

225 Diing Kureng Ajiok 67 F Mathiang

226 Ajoh Nuer Mach 58 F Mathiang

227 Ayuen Agoot Akoi 53 M Mathiang

228 Awur Garang Ayiik 54 F Mathiang

229 Awiel Alier Malith 45 F Mathiang

230 Alier Chot Leek 91 M Mathiang

231 Nyok Jok Marial 92 M Tong

232 Aliet Chiengkou Anyang 76 F Tong

233 Anak Riak Abuong 63 M Tong

234 Abit Mamer Deng 80 F Tong

235 Mabior Amol Dor 57 M Tong

236 Akuach Yuom Pach 95 F Tong

237 Akur Gop Ayuen 84 F Tong

238 Akon Rech Thiong 78 F Tong

239 Ayen Kurwel Ahou 100 F Tong

240 Akut Kuol Marial 90 F Tong

241 Garang Awan Nyok 18 M Tong

242 Manguak Aguto Mayen 58 M Tong

243 Majur Kon Riak 36 M Tong

244 Gai Deng Mayen 65 M Tong

245 Ayen Riak Goor 75 F Tong

246 Achiek Mayen Alier 2mths M Tong

247 Kuol Alaak But 81 M Tong

248 Biar Ngor Deng 25 M Tong

249 Aleek Mayen Adeng 37 F Tong

250 Ajah Agoot Madol 49 F Tong

251 Jool Mayen Yuang 36 M Tong

252 Ayuen Deng Mayen 72 M Tong

253 Achol Aborich Angeth 39 F Tong

254 Maror Atong Kur 25 M Tong

255 Ayuen Makec Kur 15 M Tong

256 Ateny Alaar Awan 37 F Tong

257 Akut Kuol Marier 36 F Tong

258 Ayuen Alier Chot 57 M Tong

259 Yen Abuoi Yen 15 M Tong

260 Mangar Alier Dot 65 M Tong

261 Garang Deng Dhel 71 M Tong

262 Panchol Kuol Anyuch 41 M Tong

263 Ayom Giet Anyang 65 M Tong

264 Alier Bol Makol 27 M Tong

265 Achol Deng Akook 48 F Tong

266 Angeth Thongbor Kur 42 F Tong

267 Ayen Kucha Apar 45 F Tong

268 Whel Jil Ajak 91 M Tong

269 Ajak Muoth Ajak 38 M Tong

270 Kelei Makol Riak 81 F Tong

271 Alier Chiek Kok 25 M Mathiang

272 Makuac Maketh Agol 68 M Mathiang

273 Atit Akuei Nyang 71 M Mathiang

274 Aguek Achilim Juuk 65 M Mathiang

275 Ngor Ayuen But 38 M Mathiang

276 Chaw Mayol Juuk 48 M Mathiang

277 Achiek Malith Bol 24 M Mathiang

278 Manyuon Alier Adol 25 M Mathiang

279 Kuot Angau Juuk 26 M Mathiang

280 Ayollo Kur Ayom 45 M Mathiang

281 Joh Dot Joh 14 M Mathiang

282 Akec Majok Leek 25 M Mathiang

283 Adol Thongbor Maketh 12 F Mathiang

284 Agok Makuac Maketh 07 F Mathiang

285 Abiei Kang Ayool 73 F Mathiang

286 Awut Ayuen Majok 05 F Mathiang

287 Ajok Mayol Mabior 08 F Mathiang

288 Lual Thiak Bol 26 M Mathiang

289 Ayuen Mabior Kuac 38 M Mathiang

290 Awuok Lual Gak 30 M Mathiang

291 Anyang Ayuen Thon 60 M Mathiang

292 Mach Ajak Mayen 49 M Mathiang

293 Akuei Amool Aluel 45 M Mathiang

294 Garang Deng Majak 72 M Mathiang

295 Akuel Alith Kur 78 M Mathiang

296 Thiak Ayuen Mach 67 M Mathiang

297 Mayen Panchol Ayuen 17 M Mathiang

298 Abuoi Akuei Nyok 61 M Mathiang

299 Jok Gai Jok 42 M Mathiang

300 Agoot Alith Kuot 79 F Mathiang

301 Duom Deng Mabior 60 F Mathiang

302 Bior Thon Agoot 20 M Mathiang

303 Kawai Mamuor Gup 25 M Mathiang

304 Mamuor Gup Deng 55 M Mathiang

305 Kuol Gup Deng 45 M Mathiang

306 Deng Abuoi Nyok 45 M Mathiang

307 Ayor Magook Alier 51 M Mathiang

308 Nyuop Akuei Jok 31 M Mathiang

309 Kuot Aluel Akuei 22 M Mathiang

310 Majok Akuei Nyok 48 M Mathiang

311 Apeu Nhomrom Dau 63 F Mathiang

312 Garang Deng Majak 75 M Mathiang

313 Kuec Juuk Kur 78 M Mathiang

314 Guet kuot Akuot 70 M Mathiang

315 Deng Jok Garang 30 M Mathiang

316 Ayak Deng Ngor 81 F Mathiang

317 Biol Kuec Juuk 10 F Mathiang

318 Akuot Mabior Deng 74 F Mathiang

319 Alier Akuei Kuot 70 M Mathiang

320 Ajak Kuol Anyieth 30 M Mathiang

321 Mamer Angok Akei 53 M Mathiang

322 Diing Kur Dot 75 F Mathiang

323 Guet Leek Nhomrom 59 F Mathiang

324 Achol Gai Arou 45 F Mathiang

325 Awei Riak Agoot 70 F Mathiang

 —

JALLE PAYAM

BOR COUNTY, JONGLEI STATE

Date: 24/1/2014

BELOW IS THE LIST OF WAR VICTIMS WHO WERE KILLED BY THE NUER WHITE ARMY DURING DECEMBER 18TH TO 31TH 2013 FROM ALLIAN COMMUNITY IN DETAILS OR VICTIMS OF RIAK MACHAR’S SECOND REBELLION.

S/NO NAME IN FULL SEX CHIEF Location REMARKS

1. Bol Juol gupngong M AyiiMabiorMayen Malakal

2. Akem Ayii Akech M “             “             “

3. Deng Ayuen Nyok M “             “             “

4. Achol Mayen Mareng F “             “             “

5. Amuor Deng Achiek F “             “             “

6. Adhieu Malou Wei F “             “             “

7. Tiit Amol Gut F “             “             “

8. Achuek Deng Arou M “             “             “

9. Jok Magot Jok M “             “            “

10. Maluak Akech Agou M “             “             “

11. Matiop Ayii Awur M “             “             “

12. Atong Ayii Jok F “             “             “

13. Jok Ayii Jok M “             “             “

14. Malek Deng Hok M “             “             “

15. Jok Ayii M “             “             “

16. Majok Thiak Alier M “             “             “

17. Akech Magot Garang F “             “             “

18. Reech Mayen Dor M “             “             “

19. Deng Adut Deng M “             “             “

20. Mabior Ayuen Ngong M “             “             “

21. Agou Akech Agou M “             “             “

22. Anyieth Kur Anyang M “             “             “

23. Thiak Alier Arou M “              “             “

24. Alier Arou Achak M “             “             “

25. Arou Alier Achak M “             “             “

26. Kuol Ayii Awur M “             “             “

27. Buol Dor Buol M “             “             “

28. Akech Agou Kot F “             “             “

29. Abuk Mabiei Deng F “             “             “

30. Lueth Deng Arou M “             “             “

31. Atem Manyuon Atem M “             “             “

32. Malir Manyuon Atem M “             “             “

Boma-Kuei–Payach Wut Apiu

33. Akech Ayom Akuot M

34. Reng Wuany Arou M

35. Akuch Lueth Nhial F

36. Buol Magok Matung M

37. Ajok Alop Apiu F

38. Manyok Jok Garang M

39. Mamer Amol Deng M

40. Yar Alier Deng M

41. Mathung Jok Ayom M

42. Amol Mading Amol M

43. Apiu Amol Deng F

44. Matiop Kuol Kuar M

45. Apat Malual Manyiel M

46. Apiu Malual Manyiel F

47. Manyang Malual Rok M

48. Nhial Akuot Ayom M

49. Madit Apiu Jok M

50. Arou Garang Ngok M

51. Garang Ngok Arou F

52. Kuany Yuang Kuany M

53. Yar Ajoh Kuany F

54. Pat Magok Apiu M

Buol Alier Thon

55. Panther Alier Anur Ayom M Bentiu

56. Wel Anyar Ayen Wel M

57. Chol Anyieth Dut M

58. Manyok Ayom Magon M

59. Ayom Magon Ayom

Chief Akuot Chol Akuot

60. Atem Ngor Atem M

61. Mayom Deng Magong M

62. Nyanabot Akech Amuom F

63. Deng Matiop Kur M

64. Dut Ngor Dut M

65. Kuo lNyok Lual M

66. Bol Deng lual M

67. MayomThungMayom M

68. Kur Deng Awur M

69. Dut Deng Dut M

70. Deng lueth Nul M

71. Deng Mayom Dut M

72. Nhial Anyieth Nhial M

73. Nyandeng Monyyong F

74. Abuol Awur Kur F

75. Kut Nhial Ajak M

76. Panom   Kut Akech M

77. Maluk Lual Dut M

78. Thuch Deng Nul M

79. Manyang Dut Lual M

Chief Kuai Ayuen

80. Maluak Mabior Reech M

81. Jol Manyok Kuor M

82. Acury Agent Ngong F

83. Buol Piel Bol M

84. Aruai Malei Puok F

85. Boni Dal F

86. KuaiAjak Awur M

87. Kalali Deng Arou M

88. Garang Jok Akuak M

89. Majur Ayuen Bol M

90. Achol Pei Deng F

Chief: Machiek Biar Deng

91. Deng Kok Achol M

92. Kuol Ayom Lual M

93. Adit Amol Kuot F

94. Ateny Kuot Kok F

95. But MajuchThuch M

96. Anyieth Akoi Atem M

97. Kuot Akok Lual M

98. Biar Lual Kuai M

99. Bol Yuot Chagai M

100. Thiong Agot Kuochrot M

101. Ret Amuor Adut M

102. Ayen Agou Gumbiir F

103. Lual Makuach Alual M

104. Nyanrach Nhial Anyang F

105. Anyieth Dut Ajak F

106. Arou   Alier Deng M

107. Anyieth Dhuor Yoi F

108. Awan   Akuek Lual M

109. Buol Deng Agamjok M

110. Buol Deng Kur M

111. Lual Akuoch Arok M

112. Anyieth Kulang Deng F

113. Anyieth Deng Malith M

114. Achok Deng Thuch F

115. Anyang Makol Kur M

116. Atong Mach Deng F

117. Lual Deng Kur M

118. Lual Kuai Lual M

Chief: Akuot Chol Akuot

119. Ayor Abol Riak F

120. Akech Akoi Malual F

121. Jol Awuou Deng M

122. Kuol   Ngor Amuom M

123. Chol Ajak Dut M

124. Marial Nhial Amuom M

125. Deng Amuom Deng M

126. Bol Amuom Deng M

127. Chol Goor Agany M

128. Agany Goor Agany M

129. Ayak Abiar Akol F

130. Nyanchiek Jok Arou F

131. Kut Chuir Kut M

132. Kuch Akech Nhial M

133. Aguek Nhial Lual M

134. Maluk Ajak Mabiai M

135. Chol Thon Achieu M

136. Akech   Maluk Lueth F

137. Madhier Nhial Anyieth M

138. Nhial Achieu Lual M

139. Kuch Kur Deng M

Chief: Alier Anyuon Deng

140. Deng Apui Manyiel M

141. Malith Mabior Deng M

142. Ajoh Akuak Dhuor F

143. Akuang Deng Kur F

144. Arok Apui Deng M

145. Athou Magar Makuei F

146. Adhieu Akuot Mayen F

147. Manyok Akuot Garang M

148. Apiu Mabior Deng F

149. Anyuon Deng Anyuon M

150. Apiu Manyiel Deng M

151. Majok Akoi Anyuon M

152. Yar Achiek Deng F

153. Mabior Malual Akuot M

154. Mabiei Malual Akuot M

155. Akuot Alier Anyuon M

156. Manyiel Akuot Apiu M

157. Anyuon Akuot Apiu M

158. Mum Abuoi Anyuon M

159. Achiek Maker Anyuon M

160. Agot Lueth Rop M

161. Bol Ajak Mabior M

162. Manyiel Apiu Manyiel M

163. Marol Aput Manyiel M

164. Adut   Majok Aput F

165. Deng Anyuon Deng M

166. Deng Akuot Ayuen M

167. Akuot Ayual Deng M

168. Anyieth   Moror Kuer F

169. Anyuon Akuot Mabiei M

170. Apiu Maluak Anyieth F

171. Achol Amaar Maluak F

172. Akech Anyuon Apiu F

173. Marial Akuot Apiu M

174. Ayom Deng Makuach M

175. Anyuon Majok Mayen M

176. Athou   Nhial Jok F

177. Anyang Bior Marial M

178. Anyuon Deng Akuot M

179. Marial Gon Akuot M

180. Gutbeny Bol Ajak M

181. Adut Awac Chol F

Executive Chief: Garang Ayuen

182. Buol Jok Mabiei M

183. Aguto Agor Atum M

184. Kur Mabior Kur M

185. Thiong Bior Jok M

186. Ajak Akuok Bior M

187. Ghai Maghar Anyieth M

188. Malual Buol Awan M

189. Magot Jok Deng M

190. Aluel Garang Chawuoch F

191. Deng BiarYol M

192. Thiong Anyak Biar M

193. Abuol Akuei Majuch F

194. Bol Kuot Guet M

195. Nyanlueth Adhuong F

196. Ayen Angok F

197. Awan Jool Buol F

198. Apiu Thiak M

199. Ngor Riak Lual M

200. Dut Thiak Dut M

Prepared by Juet Community

AKUAI-DENG BUMA,

__________________________________________________________________________

S/NO Name in full Rank Ages Sex Subsection

1. KuolGurechApiu Diploma 42 M Padong/Chamany

2. MatiopAbuk Civilian 50 M ,,,                       ,,,,

3. Thon Nhial Thon Civilian 129 M ,,,                       ,,,,

4. AgotMathiang Civilian 85 F ,,,                      ,,,,

5. MajokAnyiethNhial Civilian 55 M ,,,                       ,,,,

6. NyokCholAjak Civilian 130 M ,,,                       ,,,,

7. Machar Deng Kuot 2nd LT 40 M ,,,                       ,,,,

8. MahmadHusienMadit Director 63 M ,,,                      ,,,,

9. AchiekMaluk Mach Civilian 44 M ,,,                       ,,,,

10. AyenAjuuJok Civilian 78 F ,,,                       ,,,,

11. AyoolChauMuojok Civilian 75 F ,,,                       ,,,,

12. Awar Deng Akundur Civilian 46 F Pabeer

13. MalualMabiorDit ” 68 M ,,,                       ,,,,

14. NgorMalual Kun ” 47 M ,,,                       ,,,,

15. GaiDitMabior ” 73 M ,,,                       ,,,,

16. Deng NyokKuir ” 54 M ,,,                       ,,,,

17. AthiengAliyou ” 50 F ,,,                       ,,,,

18. AkorRiakKut ”                 ‘ 60 M ,,,                       ,,,,

19. MabiorAjakAlith ”                 ‘ 60 M ,,,                       ,,,,

20. AkuolNgardit ”                 ” 64 F ,,,                       ,,,,

21. AkuchYuangKuorwel Civilian 80 f ,,,                       ,,,,

22. MakethAdutBior Civilian 88 M ,,,                       ,,,,

23. ArouWuoiMayen Civilian 60 M Awenga

24. Mum Kuch Dot Major 62 M ,,,                      ,,,,

25. Thon MajokNyok Civilian 30 M ,,,                       ,,,,

26. BiarAjithBiar Civilian 36 M ,,,                       ,,,,

27. AluelChuir Anyang Civilian 70 F ,,,                       ,,,,

28. MalonyCholJok Civilian 78 M ,,,                       ,,,,

29. AbuolAyak Civilian 62 F ,,,                       ,,,,

30. CholBol Deng Civilian 12 F ,,,                       ,,,,

31. AngokMalekAwuok Civilian 75 M Pakei/Burju

32. Anyieth Deng Kur Civilian 45 M ,,,                       ,,,,

33. AbuoiLuethBior Civilian 62 M ,,,                       ,,,,

34. BiorAjohBior Civilian 28 M ,,,                       ,,,,

35. AngokKuolAngok BA of Degree 28 M ,,,                       ,,,,

36. AchiekKeechNyok Civilian 63 M ,,,                       ,,,,

37. NyankorAngok Civilian 78 F ,,,                       ,,,,

38. Kur Deng Kur Civilian 55 M ,,,                       ,,,,

39. KuolGurechBiar LT .COL. 47 M Bor Town

40. NyawurAbuoiNhial Civilian 47 F Malual-Agorbaar

KOLMEREK BOMA

S/N Name in full Sex Place of KIA Age Clan

1. Malek Angeth Angok M Bor Town 45 Kol..

2. Deng Anyieth Arou M Bor Town 53 Kol..

3. Mangar Deng Angok M Bor Town 35 Kol..

4. Bheer Ajuu Jok M Bor Town 53 Kol..

5. Maluk Ayuen Mayen M Bor Town 60 Kol..

6. Athung Jok Achiek F Bor Town 46 Kol..

7. Angeth Mabior Deng M Bor Town 38 Kol..

8. Jok Geu Nyingut M Bor Town 55 Kol..

9. Akeer Mabiei Ngang F Bor Town 70 Kol..

10. Malith Angok Malith M Bor Town 65 Kol..

11. Ayuen Khor Nyiel M Bor Town 38 Kol..

12. JemaYar Jok M Bor Town 25 Kol..

13. Achiek Monyychok Thon M Bor Town 40 Kol..

14. Chol Malok Jongthok M Bor Town 28 Kol..

15. Yar Anyieth Arou F Bor Town 60 Kol..

16. Nyanchiek Awan Gaar F Bor Town 50 Kol..

17. Nhial Ajok Deng M Bor Town 05 Kol..

18. Kuol Thon Jongthok M Bor Town 68 Kol..

19. Panchol Garang Majok M Bor Town 58 Kol..

20. Akuol Anyieth Nhial F Bor Town 67 Kol..

21. Chol Kuur Jok M Bor Town 67 Kol..

22. Thokluoi Kuany Ayol M Bor Town 70 Kol..

23. Abiar Ayuel Ajak F Bor Town 68 Kol..

24. Yom Reng Angeth F Bor Town 56 Kol..

25. Yar Juuk Mach F Bor Town 39 Kol..

AYOM GAL

S/N NAME IN FULL SEX

1. Jol Alier Dit M

2. Majok Bol Ayom M

3. Riak Bol Ayom M

4. Reech   Akuak Mayen -Sub-Chief M

5. Athiek   Ajhook Mathiang Sub-Chief M

6. Anyieth   Aguto Nhial M

7. Anyieth   Aman Anyang M

8. Leek Wal Reech M

9. Nyatiop Leek Wal F

10. Achok Khok F

11. Awel Janthok F

12. Majak Mayen M

13. Akur Diyo Gong F

14. Adau Lueth F

15. Reech   Nyatiop Leek M

16. Min Nyatiop Leek F

17. Nhial Ajhok Nhial M

18. Ateny   Deng Kuot M

19. Nhial Nyok Nhial M

20. Jok Deng Kuol M

21. Ghai Jokuch Thiong M

22. Makol Guong Makol M

23. Garang Deng Ayiei M

WUT-YACH

S/NO NAME IN FULL SEX

1 Michael Reng Mum M

2 Tiel Luk Athoch M

3 Ayuen Nhial Ajok M

4 Mayom Kuer Jok M

5 Ayom Kuer Ayom M

6 Malual Awur Garang M

7 Amour Thok-Jang F

8 Kelei Rok Reech M

9 Amer Anyijong M

10 Malith Athoch Jok M

11 Angeth Diing Alaak F

12 Ajok Nhial Garang M

PAGEU SUB CLAN

13 Garang   Deng Ayiel M

14 Athou Riak Magaa F

15 Ayuen Chol Deng Mayen M

16 Narech Mabior Ayom F

17 Chol Biar Deng M

18 Deng Magot Deng Ayiel M

19 Ayak Wuoi F

20 Ayuen Alith Nomrou M

21 Ngang Anyieth Ngang M

22 Kelei   Chol Biar M

23 Riak Ayuen Kuot M

24 Ayen Maketh Wai F

25 Garang Deng Chol M

26 Agau Ayiel Deng M

AWAN CLAN PEOPLE KILLED BY NUER (Killed in Bor Town)

S/NO NAME IN FULL SEX

1 Malith Lueth Aweer M

2 Achol Gai Arou F

3 Mach Garang Deng M

4 Ayuen Deng Mach M

5 Buol Agook Jil M

6 Riak Malong Riak M

7 Ayen Jok Chot F

8 Garang Nyok Arou M

JONGLEI STATE

KOL-NYANG PAYAM

Summary report of people killed by Riek Machar rebel forces in

Kol-nyang Payam on 18th December, 2013 – 5th February, 2014

The list by Bomas and Chiefs.

S/N NAME OF DECEASED SEX AGE BOMA CHIEF REMARKS

1 Mabior Mayen Garang M 48 Gak Aguto Makol

2 Thon Garang Nhial M 75 Gak Aguto Makol

3 Wut Aguto M 60 Gak Aguto Makol

4 Marial Ayol Goor M 47 Gak Aguto Makol

5 Achol Jool Alier F 79 Gak Aguto Makol

6 Guet Gai Ayuel F 80 Gak Aguto Makol

7 Joh Kur-bach Deng M 45 Gak Mabior Ater

8 Bol Lual Gong M 35 Gak Aguto Makol

9 Aguto Deng Chol M 60 Gak Aguto Makol

10 Deng Magok Deng M 70 Gak Mabior Ater

11 Areu Magot Areu M 55 Gak Nai Wal

12 Alier Nyuon Chol M 78 Gak Nai Wal

13 Ajok Jok Kur M 58 Gak Aguto Makal

14 Ayor Makol Bior F F Gak Nai Wal

15 Kur Ajuong Kur M 50 Gak Nai Wal

16 Ajith Jok Madit F 60 Gak Nai Wal

17 Amer Mading Madol F 30 Gak Maper Alier

18 Gai Abol Nhial M 40 Gak Maper Alier

19 Akoi Guarak Mach M 45 Gak Maper Alier

20 Garang Wel Garang M 96 Gak Aguto Makol

21 Panchol Deng Nhial M 60 Gak Maper Alier

22 Yom Achiek Yom M 40 Gak Maper Alier

23 Garang Chol Deng M 36 Gak Aguto Makol

24 Majok Jol Ngong M 40 Gak Garang Gai

25 Machar Dhaal Anyieth M 25 Gak Chol Alier

26 Kuol Mathiang Deng M 60 Gak Garang Gai

27 Tier Dut Jok M 70 Gak Chol Alier

28 Ariik Kuai Ariik M 17 Gak Chol Alier

29 Anai Joh Maluil M 90 Gak Maper Alier

30 Deng Alier Deng M 25 Gak Maper Alier

31 Garang Maluk Anyieth M 18 Gak Aguto Makol

32 Ajok Jok Chol F 70 Gak Chol Alier

33 Nyantet Jong-gook F 80 Gak Aguto Makol

34 Gai Kelei Gai M 55 Gak Aguto Makol

35 Ayom Mayen Deng Nyuat M 20 Gak Garang Gai

36 Juma Agot Ajak M 35 Gak Garang Gai

37 Atong Puka Mabit F 7 Gak Garang Gai

38 Garang Alier Garang M 37 Gak Aguto Makol

39 Akol Achol Akol M 30 Gak Mach Akol

40 Makoth Guem Adut M 75 Pariak Waat Nyieth

41 Achok Ajak Bior F 65 Pariak Alier Them

42 Mangok Guem Adut M 65 Pariak Waat Nyieth

43 Yom Ajak Aret M 40 Pariak Waat Nyieth

44 Small child of Yom M 01 Pariak Waat Nyieth

45 Lado-dit Akon M 60 Pariak Waat Nyieth

46 Lou Alier Machot M 30 Pariak Waat Nyieth

47 Aru Panchol Thiek M 30 Pariak Waat Nyieth

48 Diing Deng Aboch F 70 Pariak Waat Nyieth

49 Mayol Deng Majuch M 45 Pariak Waat Nyieth

50 Awan Wel Reech M 40 Pariak Alier Them

51 Nyankot Abolich Nhial F 50 Pariak Waat Nyieth

52 Ayong Adut Jok M 30 Pariak Waat Nyieth

53 Mawut Akech Chuer-wei M 38 Pariak Waat Nyieth

54 Nyirou Majuch Achok Nyirou M 85 Pariak Waat Nyieth

55 Mayol Yuot Tong M 48 Pariak Manguak Thuma

56 Mach Kam Mach M 28 Pariak Manguak Thuma

57 Madding Riak Deng M 85 Pariak Pandek Mach

58 Yar Wel Reech F 35 Pariak Alier Them

59 Nyidieng Chek/Leper F 44 Pariak Waat Nyieth

60 Garang Aluong Nyang M 33 Pariak Waat Nyieth

61 Garang Lueth Anyieth M 38 Chuei-keer Pandek Mach

62 Mading Mayom Garang M 44 Chuei-keer Pandek Mach

63 Panchol Deng Jok M 52 Chuei-keer Pandek Mach

64 Bathou Agau Bathou M 58 Chuei-keer Mach Kucha

65 Deng Goti Deu-tong M 56 Chuei-keer Pandek Mach

66 Yom Achiek Jok F 48 Chuei-keer Pandek Mach

67 Alei Akol Garang F 60 Chuei-keer Pandek Mach

68 Thieu Achiek Jok F 64 Chuei-keer Pandek Mach

69 Achol Ajal Kur F 73 Chuei-keer Mach Kucha

70 Akur Aguer-jiei Nai F 71 Chuei-keer Pandek Mach

71 Ater Yuot Awar-dit F 71 Chuei-keer Mach Kucha

72 Magot Mach Kuor-wel M 60 Chuei-keer Mach Kucha

73 Marial Akol Ajok M 55 Chuei-keer Marial Maluil

74 Mading Nyok Garang   M 55 Chuei-keer Marial Maluil

75 Reech Riem M 65 Chuei-keer Marial Maluil

76 Garang Dhieu Garang M 45 Chuei-keer Marial Maluil

77 Aluel Ajak Ayol F 79 Chuei-keer Marial Maluil

78 Aluel Bol Deng F 79 Chuei-keer Marial Maluil

79 Athor-bei Anyar Nyok M 70 Chuei-keer Aguto Chol

80 Mach Achuek Mach M 42 Chuei-keer Aguto Chol

81 Kur Kelei Ajuong M 33 Chuei-keer Aguto Chol

82 Thong-bor Kur Akau M 33 Chuei-keer Aguto Chol

83 Deng Mading Deng M Chuei-keer Garang Athiek

84 Riak Garang Ngong M 76 Chuei-keer Manyang Keny

85 Panchol Akol Aguto M 28 Chuei-keer Manyang Keny

86 Akuei Jok Magok M 58 Chuei-keer Manyang Keny

87 Panchol Kuol Ngueny M 28 Chuei-keer Manyang Keny

88 Achol Mathon Pach F 58 Chuei-keer Manyang Keny

89 Akech Mawut Jok M 30 Chuei-keer Manyang Keny

90 Aluel Bol Deng F 76 Chuei-keer Manyang Keny

91 Abuol Chieng-kou F 69 Chuei-keer Manyang Keny

92 Ayen Akuei F 60 Chuei-keer Manyang Keny

93 Awuoi Alier F 56 Chuei-keer Garang Athiek

94 Akol Bol Angok M 70 Chuei-keer Marial Maluil

95 Achok But Kuot F 30 Chuei-keer Marial Maluil

96 Ameer Kuol Chol F 78 Chuei-keer Mach Kucha

97 Awal Kang Kon F 45 Chuei-keer Mach Kucha

98 Majok Akol Aguek M 55 Chuei-keer Aguto Chol

99 Kuol Yai Chol M 70 Chuei-keer Makuach Arem

100 Ngueny Kuany Deu M 80 Chuei-keer Makuach Arem

101 Joh Deng Makol M 45 Kol-nyang Marial Alier

102 Bol Arou Barach M 55 Kol-nyang Her-jok

103 Gai Manyang Ngong M 53 Kol-nyang Her-jok

104 Akuei Jok Magok M 52 Kol-nyang Her-jok

105 Riak Dot Nhial M 40 Kol-nyang Madit Aret

106 Aluong Alier Kur M 67 Kol-nyang Nyok Alier

107 Ajak Mabil Ajak M 16 Kol-nyang Nyok Alier

108 Wut-lok Gai Nhial F 65 Kol-nyang Madit Aret

109 Abeny Mach Ayool F 80 Kol-nyang Deng Bol

110 Aman Joh F 85 Kol-nyang Deng Bol

111 Maker Thuma Alier M 50 Kol-nyang Her-jok Garang

112 Aluel Alier Garang M 70 Kol-nyang Her-jok Garang

113 Panther Liok Deng M 95 Kol-nyang Her-jok Garang

114 Ayor Aguek Deng M 70 Kol-nyang Mayom Malak

115 Akoi Garang Akoi M 65 Kol-nyang Her-jok Garang

116 Nyanchut Maleng Manyang F 40 Kol-nyang Guut Ajuong

117 Athiek Angeth Maper F 56 Kol-nyang Guut Ajuong

118 Ajah Maker Chuil F 40 Kol-nyang Her-jok Garang

119 Panther Mathiang Akau M 85 Kol-nyang Alier Alueng Gai

120 Bol Majok M 45 Kol-nyang Alier Alueng Gai

121 Mayom Dhol Alier M 80 Kol-nyang Nyok Alier

122 Agot Kon Agot M 60 Kol-nyang Mayom Malak

123 Arou Ajuong Kuol M 25 Kol-nyang Madit Aret Alier

124 Alier Deng Maluil Kuany M 40 Kol-nyang Madit Aret Alier

125 Mayen Liok Deng M 50 Kol-nyang Her-jok Garang

126 Kur Ngong Dot M 71 Kol-nyang Nyok Alier

127 Marial Athou Malith M 35 Kol-nyang Madit Aret Alier

128 Deng Tit Deng M 30 Kol-nyang Mayom Malak

129 Nyabol Anyang Bol F 40 Kol-nyang Mayom Malak

130 Akuany Garang F 50 Kol-nyang Mayom Malak

131 Mach Deng-koor Guut M 40 Kol-nyang Guut Ajuong

132 Ayen Yuen Lueth F 45 Kol-nyang Guut Ajuong

133 Athieng Aguto Nhial F 41 Kol-nyang Deng Bol

134 Gong Dot Gong M 45 Kol-nyang Madit Aret Alier

135 Chuti Ngueny Kuany F 35 Kol-nyang Madit Aret Alier

136 Ayiu Mach Ngong M 75 Kol-nyang Marial Alier

137 Panchol Athieu Bol M 80 Kol-nyang Mayom Malak

138 Majok Nyiel Nhial M 75 Kol-nyang Her-jok Garang

139 Ajak Mach Pach M 85 Kol-nyang Mayom Malak

140 Anyuon Malueth Aret M 40 Kol-nyang Her-jok Garang

141 Jok Akoi Alier-mapien M 35 Kol-nyang Madit Aret Alier

142 Ayor Anyieth Dut M 59 Kol-nyang Guut Ajuong

143 Kur Mony-roor Pach M 32 Kol-nyang Nyok Alier

144 Alier Kuol Aman M 32 Kol-nyang Madit Aret Alier

145 Nyantuong Mading Riak F 35 Kol-nyang Mayom Malak

146 Ayuen Malou Akol M 65 Kol-nyang Mayom Malak

147 Makech Mach Bol M 50 Kol-nyang Deng Bol

148 Anyieth Deng Ayuen F 45 Kol-nyang Mayom Malak

149 Achol Chuer-wei Anyieth F 45 Kol-nyang Mayom Malak

150 Nyandit Riak Garang F 60 Kol-nyang Nyok Alier

151 Mabior Koriom Leek M 70 Kol-nyang Guut Ajuong

152 Akuok Ajak Ajang F 50 Kol-nyang Marial Alier

153 Adol Aluong Aguek F 35 Kol-nyang Nyok Alier

154 Achol Magot Adhuol F 45 Kol-nyang Deng Bol

155 Nyaroor Gon Nguon F 65 Kol-nyang Deng Bol

156 Gok Maduer Thiech F 50 Kol-nyang Nyok Alier

157 Chier Achiek Madul M 60 Kol-nyang Her-jok Garang

158 Tholony Kuol Deng F 35 Kol-nyang Nyok Alier

159 Amer Deng Athou F 50 Kol-nyang Marial Alier

160 Lony Angok Jok M 60 Kol-nyang Marial Alier

161 Athiek Reng Alier Bior F 45 Kol-nyang Her-jok Garang

162 Alier Achol Alier M 70 Kol-nyang Guut Ajuong

163 Jumbo Yuot Yom M 60 Kol-nyang Marial Alier

164 Akur-dit Madit Jongkuch F 6 Kol-nyang Nyok Alier

165 Akim Madit Jongkuch M 4 Kol-nyang Nyok Alier

166 Abiei Makech Mach F 10 Kol-nyang Deng Bol

167 Bol Makech Mach M 8 Kol-nyang Deng Bol

168 Anyieth Makech Mach F 6 Kol-nyang Deng Bol

169 Makuei Makech Mach M 4 Kol-nyang Deng Bol

170 Ruben Agau Bol Garang M 7 Kol-nyang Deng Bol

171 Awuoi Adhuma Pach F 7 Kol-nyang Guut Ajuong

172 Akuol Adhuma Pach F 7 Kol-nyang Guut Ajuong

173 Ajah Adhuma Pach F 4 Kol-nyang Guut Ajuong

174 Riak Simon Deng Yau M 2 Kol-nyang Mayom Malak

175 Mayom Arou Ngang M 32 Kol-nyang Her-jok Garang

176 Agumut Chok Deng M 55 Kol-nyang Guut Ajuong

177 Bolich Barach Ajak M 55 Kol-nyang Marial Alier

178 Achol Mabil Nuer F 67 Kol-nyang Guut Ajuong

179 Lual-jok Ajak Lual-jok M 45 Kol-nyang Marial Alier

180 Keth Anuol Chol F 45 Kol-nyang Marial Alier

181 Guet Jok Anyang m 44 Kol-nyang Marial Alier

182 Arem Pach Dit M 53 Kol-nyang Nyok Alier

183 Jok Aguto Pach M 22 Kol-nyang Nyok Alier

184 Angau Pach Dit M 78 Kol-nyang Nyok Alier

185 Majok Awel Alier Garang M 60 Kol-nyang Her-jok Garang

186 Panther Majok Nyiel Nhial M 25 Kol-nyang Her-jok Garang

187 Athou Bior Anyieth F 32 Kol-nyang Deng Bol

188 Wal Mayol Pach Ahok M 25 Kol-nyang Marial Alier

189 Chol Mayol Pach Ahok M 28 Kol-nyang Marial Alier

190 Chuti Ngueny Kuany-deu M 75 Kol-nyang Madit Aret Alier

191 Garang Diing Garang M 28 Kol-nyang Her-jok Garang

S/NO. NAME IN FULL SEX AGE BOMA REMARK

1 Piok Ajak Kur m 55 Pajhok Pakom

2 Amer Garang Atem f 35 Pajhok Pakom

3 Mayen Aluong Mayen m 64 Police Pakom

4 Ajith Nook Anyang m 68 Police Pakom

5 Anyang Ajith Nook m 18 Police Pakom

6 Nyanman Jok Abuoi f 62 Police Pakom

7 Mabat Aguto Jool m 69 Apierwuong

8 Mawut Nyok Ding m 55 Apierwuong

9 Adongwei Kuol Deng f 45 Police Pakom

10 Deng Majok Kur m 19 Apierwuong

11 Ayen Kuol Kuai f 21 Apierwuong

12 Mading Jok Mayen m 70 Police Pakom

13 Dit Deng Gong m 70 Pajhok Pakom

14 Nyanthiec Awar Dit f 62 Police Pakom

15 Aman Maker Guut f 62 Police Pakom

16 Aluel Riak Keer f 65 Police Pakom

17 Leek Deng Chol m 38 Pajhok Pakom

18 Achiek Lueth Kulang m 61 Apierwuong

19 Maler Gai Kuai m 38 Police Pakom

20 Mawut Ayen Kuol m 55 Police Pakom

21 Ayen Jok Yuang f 61 Police Pakom

22 Garang Ayom Mach m 66 Pajhok Pakom

23 Appolo Pach Gar m 76 Leekrieth

24 Majok Akhau Leek m 62 Leekrieth

25 Machol Ngong Agok m 72 Leekrieth

26 Amuor Agoot Madol f 81 Leekrieth

27 Ayuen Jok Madol m 65 Leekrieth

28 Madol Kom Bior m 58 Leekrieth

29 Mayola Anyieth Akhau m 69 Leekrieth

30 Yar Anyieth Akhau f 71 Leekrieth

31 Apieu Biar Leek m 80 Leekrieth

32 Nyankor Pach Lukuac m 60 Leekrieth

33 Goop Ateny Kuereng m 56 Leekrieth

34 Nyok Bior Nyok m 15 Leekrieth

35 Piel Mayen Deng m 62 Leekrieth

36 Chol Nyok Ayook m 76 Leekrieth

37 Alier Maror Anyang m 54 Leekrieth

38 Nyuon Achien Pach m 71 Leekrieth

39 Bior Deng Yong m 63 Leekrieth

40 Amuor Deng Kuot f 71 Leekrieth

41 Ngong Chol Ajith m 6 Leekrieth

42 Yar Chol Ajith f 4 Leekrieth

43 Agok Machar Mayen m 66 Leekrieth

44 Manyok Dut Akuang m 73 Leekrieth

45 Mangar Leek Buol m 31 Leekrieth

46 Agot Leek Ateer f 70 Chuei-Magoon Chot

47 Nyanwut Achol Kon m 65 Chuei-Magoon Chot

48 Achok Nyueny Dot m 45 Chuei-Magoon Chot

49 Nyalueth Thiong Anyuat m 61 Chuei-Magoon Chot

50 Aluel Borong Anaai m 72 Chuei-Magoon Chot

51 Ajah Buol Manyang m 45 Chuei-Magoon Chot

52 Yar Awuol Deng m 62 Chuei-Magoon Chot

53 Bol Machol Mayen m 35 Chuei-Magoon Chot

54 Ayen Achiek Nhial f 55 Chuei-Magoon Chot

55 Ayuen Reng Mayom m 75 Chuei-Magoon Chot

56 Riak Reng Mayom m 62 Chuei-Magoon Chot

57 Alier Makol Bior m 65 Keer

58 Deng Angui Deng m 65 Chot

59 Makol Agou Makur m 80 Keer

60 Aleek Biar Mach f 71 Keer

61 Aliet Deng Akol f 62 Keer

62 Garang Deng Gar m 80 Keer

63 Achuerwei Deng Bior f 92 Keer

64 Keny Dekbai Riak m 37 Keer

65 Athieng Garang Alith f 80 Keer

66 Tholhok Yuang Nyieth m 87 Keer

67 Tiit Mabior Dekbai f 3 Chuei-Magoon Chot

68 Ayuen Kuol Kur m 38 Chuei-Magoon Chot

69 Ayuiu Mach Ngong m 75 Chuei-Magoon Chot

70 Akuol Kelei Ayol f 68 Chuei-Magoon Chot

71 Abiar Deng m 76 Chuei-Magoon Chot

72 Amoth Wuoi Agot m 72 Chuei-Magoon Chot

73 Erjok Machar Achuoth m 37 Chuei-Magoon Chot

74 Madol Lueth Mayen m 80 Chuei-Magoon Chot

75 Diing Deng Pakam f 37 Chuei-Magoon Chot

76 Mayen Madol Lueth m 2 Chuei-Magoon Chot

77 Nyanluak Alueng Ajuoi f 61 Chuei-Magoon Chot

78 Ayak Athiek Kur f 74 Chuei-Magoon Chot

79 Akuac Akuot Achuil f 81 Chuei-Magoon Chot

80 Mach Magon Awal m 50 Chuei-Magoon Chot

81 Achol Mach Lual f 80 Chuei-Magoon Chot

82 Awuoi Gai Nai f 80 Chuei-Magoon Chot

83 Abiei Malual Ayom f 87 Chuei-Magoon Chot

84 Ajah Yom Doot f 102 Chuei-Magoon Chot

85 Mach Gar Mach m 81 Chuei-Magoon Chot

86 Gar Kuek Gar m 30 Chuei-Magoon Chot

87 Awan Kuol Lual m 41 Chuei-Magoon Chot

88 Yar Ajok Geu f 50 Chuei-Magoon Chot

89 Nyankoor Leek Deng f 50 Chuei-Magoon Chot

90 Nyalueth Deng Bol m 78 Chuei-Magoon Chot

91 Nyabol Mach Wel m 52 Chuei-Magoon Chot

92 Ayuen Akhau Wel m 37 Chuei-Magoon Chot

93 Mamer Garang Tuung m 31 Chuei-Magoon Chot

94 Abiok Garang Deng f 83 Chuei-Magoon Chot

95 Achol Achiek Thok f 5 Chuei-Magoon Chot

96 Ngong Achiek Thok m 2 Chuei-Magoon Chot

97 Agok Kuol Deng f 40 Chuei-Magoon Chot

98 Chol Akol Bol m 3 Chuei-Magoon Chot

99 Akuek Deng Garang f 80 Chuei-Magoon Chot

100 Maluak Kang Jang m 35 Chuei-Magoon Chot

101 Jombo Apeech Ngong f 77 Chuei-Magoon Chot

102 Atong Diing Thok m 3 Chuei-Magoon Chot

103 Matuur Akech Chaboc m 35 Chuei-Magoon Chot

104 Achol Mach Chiek f 66 Chuei-Magoon Chot

105 Chol Garang Kur m 31 Chuei-Magoon Chot

106 Keth Guet f 68 Chuei-Magoon Chot

107 Akon Majok Luil f 50 Chuei-Magoon Chot

108 Angau Mach Ngong m 76 Chuei-Magoon Chot

109 Aliet Jual Anyang f 61 Chuei-Magoon Chot

110 Deng Nyok Anyieth m 28 Chuei-Magoon Chot

111 Nyabol Jok Deng f 53 Chuei-Magoon Chot

112 Mach Mayen Mayen m 2 Chuei-Magoon Chot

113 Jok Malek Deng m 40 Chuei-Magoon Chot

114 Abuui Mawut Abui m 43 Chuei-Magoon Chot

115 Abui Pur Abui m 51 Chuei-Magoon Chot

116 Gai Kelei Gai m 51 Chuei-Magoon Chot

117 Kuol Kuei Kur m 67 Chuei-Magoon Chot

118 Yar Gai Akuei f 82 Chuei-Magoon Chot

119 Deng Gaak Goch m 61 Chuei-Magoon Chot

120 Ngor Ayor Abui m 28 Chuei-Magoon Chot

121 Geu Yar Jok m 30 Chuei-Magoon Chot

122 Ayuen Achuei Gureech m 28 Chuei-Magoon Chot

123 Aguorjok Achiek Duot f 90 Chuei-Magoon Chot

124 Ding Ajith Nyok m 28 Mareng Apierweng

125 Mach Bol Ding m 60 Mareng Apierweng

126 Nyanchol Yuot Piel f 45 Mareng Apierweng

127 Akuut Pach Nai m 50 Mareng Apierweng

128 Akeer Riak Achien m 61 Mareng Apierweng

129 Aluel Leek Atuongjok m 45 Mareng Apierweng

130 Mach Lueth Mach m 50 Mareng Apierweng

131 Kuol Mathiang Deng m 51 Chuei-Magoon Chot

132 Mamer Garang Ayol m 35 Chuei-Magoon Chot

133 Mabiei Mayom Abuk m 32 Mareng Apierweng

134 Akech Makuei Ding m 35 Thianwei Boma

135 Bheer Kuol Anyieth m 40 Thianwei Boma

136 Agau Makol Ayath m 32 Thianwei Boma

137 Mach Madol Deng m 40 Thianwei Boma

138 Alier Ayuel Chengkou m 70 Thianwei Boma

139 Kelei Deng Ding m 80 Thianwei Boma

140 Kuec Tuung Lual m 70 Thianwei Boma

141 Kuei Nhial Lual m 90 Thianwei Boma

142 Achol Tong Kur m 82 Thianwei Boma

143 Akol Lukuac Bior f 90 Thianwei Boma

144 Ayong Deng Achuk f 87 Thianwei Boma

145 Yar Thiong Ayuel m 81 Thianwei Boma

146 Abuoi Jool Garang m 50 Thianwei Boma

147 Athieng Aguto Chol m 106 Thianwei Boma

148 Ajok Anyieth Achuoth m 56 Thianwei Boma

149 Abuol Garang Chol f 83 Thianwei Boma

150 Mayom Ngong Deng m 79 Thianwei Boma

151 Koor Jok Lieth f 86 Thianwei Boma

152 Athiek Anyier Akok m 79 Thianwei Boma

153 Chuti Yuol Aguto m 69 Thianwei Boma

154 Akueth Jok Ding m 80 Thianwei Boma

155 Adum Magaar f 71 Thianwei Boma

156 Ding Mangok Chol f 68 Thianwei Boma

157 Ngong Majok Ngong m 50 Thianwei Boma

158 Aluet Deng Garang f 95 Thianwei Boma

159 Maluk Mach Ding m 70 Thianwei Boma

160 Ajuong Ding Majuc m 34 Mareng Apierweng

161 Ayom Mayen Deng m 29 Mareng Apierweng

162 Ayuen Magot Bol m 46 Chuei-Magoon Chot

163 Lual Magot Bol m 38 Chuei-Magoon Chot

164 Achol Mach Achol m 60 Chuei-Magoon Chot

165 Lako Bol Mach m 38 Mareng Kucdok

166 Thon Mach Maluk m 41 Mareng Kucdok

167 Mabiel Kuei Mach m 50 Mareng Kucdok

168 Garang Mading Eguei m 30 Mareng Kucdok

169 Thon MalukMach m 30 Mareng Kucdok

170 Kuei Juac Kuonjok f 50 Mareng Kucdok

171 Guguei Majier Kuei m 26 Mareng Kucdok

172 Ayen Manyang Mach f 2 Mareng Kucdok

173 Garang Chuang Thiong m 50 Mareng Kucdok

174 Yom Ateng Dhelic f 60 Mareng Kucdok

175 Ding Lual m 90 Mareng Kucdok

176 Mach Long Mach m 90 Mareng Kucdok

177 Jambo Guec Mach f 50 Mareng Kucdok

178 Bior Arou f 88 Mareng Kucdok

179 Ateng Dhelic m 41 Mareng Kucdok

180 Makoi Wel Magot m 5 Mareng Kucdok

181 Ayen Mangar Ayuen f 40 Mareng Kucdok

182 Ayak Majok Geu f 2 Apierwuong

183 Ayoom Adiir Ayoom m 82 Chuei-Magoon Chot

184 Philip Achol Mach Achol m 50 Chuei-Magoon Chot

185 Mamer Garang Ayool m 30 Chuei-Magoon Chot

186 Mabiei Akol Deng m 40 Thianwei Boma

187 Thon Jok Nyuop m 30 Thianwei Boma

188 Mayen Amoth Nyuop m 28 Thianwei Boma

SUBJECT: BEING LIST OF PEOPLE WHO WERE KILLED BY RIAK MACHAR’S REBEL GROUP IN MAKUACH PAYAM FROM 18TH/DEC/2014 UPTO 19TH/JANUARY 2014 IN BOR COUNTY – JONGLEI STATE – BOR.

S/No Name in Full Sex Age Boma Payam

1. Majok Agok Ayaat M 52 yrs werkook makuac

2. Mathiang Guet Chuit M 60 yrs werkook makuac

3. Kuol Garang Leek M 35 yrs werkook makuac

4. Lueth Garang Leeth M 45 yrs werkook makuac

5. Awut Kuol Koryom M 50 yrs werkook makuac

6. Diing Arou Jur F 62 yrs werkook makuac

7. Hoka Aguek Hoka M 46 yrs werkook makuac

8. Garang Makuac Mathiang M 66 yrs werkook makuac

9. Achol Nyakarah Tong M 42 yrs werkook makuac

10. Dhaal Jok Mayen M 50 yrs werkook makuac

11. Athel Khou Nhial M 48 yrs werkook makuac

12. Madit Mac Jok M 62 yrs werkook makuac

13. Deng Makuac Anyang M 59 yrs werkook makuac

14. Abuk Chak Bior F 52 yrs werkook makuac

15. Ateny Bior Makol M 47 yrs werkook makuac

16. Mawut Dhuong Nhial M 52yrs werkook makuac

17. Madol Deng Ayom M 60yrs werkook makuac

18. Mayol Marok Nhiany M 48yrs werkook makuac

19. Kuol Ngong Aleeng M 52trs werkook makuac

20. Deng Kuol Deng M 39yrs werkook makuac

21. Bior Aguek Joh M 56yrs werkook makuac

22. Panchol Ariik Deng M 72yrs werkook makuac

23. Chol Deng Chol M 66yrs werkook makuac

24. Mabior Ngang Akon M 62yrs werkook makuac

25. Panchol Jakdit Bior M 58yrs werkook makuac

26. Makuol Arok Dau M 52yrs werkook makuac

27. Atem Aruu Atem M 48yrs werkook makuac

28. Ajith Thon Deng M 46yrs werkook makuac

29. Ayong Garang Deng M 52yrs werkook makuac

30. Abuol Garang Mac M 60yrs werkook makuac

31. Nyang Akol Nhial F 52yrs werkook makuac

32. Ajoh Garang Adhuong F 48yrs werkook makuac

33. Athou Jok Thok F 50yrs werkook makuac

34. Nyalueth Jok Ajak F 46yrs werkook makuac

35. Ayor Gor Moun F 60yrs werkook makuac

36. Abuot Ayen Anyang M 43yrs werkook makuac

37. Atony Japur F 39yrs werkook makuac

38. Mayak Bior Thiek M 50yrs werkook makuac

39. Maluk Reng Ayak M 65yrs werkook makuac

40. Wuoi Jok Koryom M 68yrs werkook makuac

41. Chier Jool Aduot M 55yrs werkook makuac

42. Akim Guet Kuol F 50yrs werkook makuac

43. Bior Ngong Anyang F 72yrs werkook makuac

44. Yar Gai Duot F 49yrs werkook makuac

45. Adau Kuol M 45yrs werkook makuac

46. Manyok Anyang Chol F 60yrs werkook makuac

47. Akuol Lual Dau M 52yrs werkook makuac

48. Anyang Jok Ayom M 60yrs werkook makuac

49. Gut Hoka Mathiang F 58yrs werkook makuac

50. Barach Deng Barach M 50yrs werkook makuac

51. Abuk Manyiel Chiman M 49yrs werkook makuac

52. Ajah Reng Angeth M 53yrs Mading makuac

53. Amach Niop Agok M 60yrs Mading makuac

54. Agol Majuch Agol M 30yrs Mading makuac

55. Nyandit Ajuot Ngang F 50yrs Mading makuac

56. Angau Kamot Tong M 60yrs Mading makuac

57. Machiek Majuch Nyok F 70yrs Mading makuac

58. Anok Achirin Marrial M 80yrs Mading makuac

59. Adol Agol Majuch F 36yrs Mading makuac

60. Panchol Malou Lueth M 70yrs Mading makuac

61. Abiar Tong Ajak M 90yrs Mading makuac

62. Lual Pach Anguet M 40yrs Mading makuac

63. Athiek Deng Marial F 50yrs Mading makuac

64. Machok Deng Marial M 50yrs Mading makuac

65. Non Angeth Mac M 60yrs Mading makuac

66. Makur Riak Agol M 70yrs Mading makuac

67. Deng Ayor Athiek F 18yrs Mading makuac

68. Buya Ngong Anyang F 50yrs Mading makuac

69. Apiu Ajak Anyang M 60yrs Mading makuac

70. Abathou Kur Jok M 80yrs Mading makuac

71. Ateny Nyanchok Majuch m 80yrs Mading makuac

72. Machar Anyieth Agau M 60yrs Mading makuac

73. Anyieth Yar Anyieth F 46yrs Mading makuac

74. Bol Akol Yom F 65yrs Mading makuac

75. Adhieu Nyieth Adhieu M 68yrs Mading makuac

76. Akuol Ngong Jil F 70yrs Mading makuac

77. Nyanthich Ngor Ngang M 18yrs Mading makuac

78. Akuany Achol Awan F 80yrs Mading makuac

79. Riak Achol Awan M 36yrs Mading makuac

80. Panchol Agol Majuch M 40yrs Mading makuac

81. Ngang Atem Mabior F 37yrs Mading makuac

82. Athiek Akau Mel M 50yrs Mading makuac

83. Choor Angeth Chaboch M 80yrs Mading makuac

84. Kuol Nyieth Angeth M 60yrs Mading makuac

85. Kuol Achiek Majuch M 70yrs Mading makuac

86. Chiek Thiek Agol M 63yrs Mading makuac

87. Nyanduck Makuac Aguek M 54yrs Mading makuac

88. Aman Duop Jok M 60yrs Mading makuac

89. Kuol Kudum Kur M 55yrs makuac makuac

90. Amer Biar Wel F 49yrs makuac makuac

91. Anger Riak Deng M 81yrs makuac makuac

92. Athou Amuor Khok F 90yrs makuac makuac

93. Agok Mabior Geu F 60yrs makuac makuac

94. Yar Deng Kuot F 97yrs makuac makuac

95. Aruar Piok Deng F 68yrs makuac makuac

96. Agot Deng Dhieu F 72yrs makuac makuac

97. Wal Kureng Akol M 80yrs makuac makuac

98. Akut Mayen Yar F 69yrs makuac makuac

99. Gai Machok Mading M 62yrs makuac makuac

100. Ateny Piok Thon M 57yrs makuac makuac

101. Yar Alier F 80yrs makuac makuac

102. Anyieth Guet Piok F 60yrs makuac makuac

103. Nyanlueth Ajok Lual F 82yrs makuac makuac

104. Anyijong Kucha Leek F 73yrs makuac makuac

105. Achiek Awuon Deng M 30yrs makuac makuac

106. Deng Awuol Kur M 57yrs makuac makuac

107. Kon Gai Ajok M 55yrs makuac makuac

108. Achiek Deng Biar M 35yrs makuac makuac

109. Achok Deng Anyang M 82yrs makuac makuac

110. Athiei Kuol Aluk M 10yrs makuac makuac

111. Achiek Deng Biar M 35yrs makuac makuac

112. Achok Akuok Bior F 75yrs makuac makuac

113. Nyiel Kud Aluk F 35yrs makuac makuac

114. Achiek Monyror Yuot M 65yrs makuac makuac

115. Bol Madol Kur F 43yrs makuac makuac

116. Nhial Jool Malual M 13yrs makuac makuac

117. Nyanyoum Deng Achuol F 86yrs makuac makuac

118. Adier Nhial Gak M 96yrs makuac makuac

119. Ajueil Garang Geu F 83yrs makuac makuac

120. Majok Joh Anyieth F 55yrs makuac makuac

121. Agot Majuch Biar F 82yrs makuac makuac

122. Ajah Alier Aman F 55yrs makuac makuac

123. Manyang Kuol Nyok M 30yrs makuac makuac

124. Akoi Kuol Agau M 38yrs makuac makuac

125. Mayol Ajak Chol M 48yrs makuac makuac

126. Adol Makum Chienkou M 29yrs makuac makuac

127. Achiek Deng Anyang M 52yrs makuac makuac

128. Apech Riak Gai M 60yrs makuac makuac

129. Chol Anyieth Kur M 46yrs makuac makuac

130. Anyang Jok Anyang M 52yrs makuac makuac

131. Amour Deng Anyang M 50yrs makuac makuac

132. Ateny Nek Rech M 62yrs makuac makuac

133. Mac Wai Mac F 58yrs makuac makuac

134. Mac Leet Luala M 42yrs makuac makuac

135. Guet Ajuoi Nai M 46yrs makuac makuac

136. Ayak Bolek Poch M 55yrs makuac makuac

137. Maluk Mach Bior F 50yrs makuac makuac

138. Maguet Anyieth Akol F 58yrs makuac makuac

139. Deng Riak Ajak M 72yrs K/luaidit makuac

140. Agot Malual Jok M 80yrs K/luaidit makuac

141. Mayen Duopo Riak M 61yrs K/luaidit makuac

142. Abuol Makuac Akur M 55yrs K/luaidit makuac

143. Aluel Ayuel Nyinger F 39yrs K/luaidit makuac

144. Bol Akau M 45yrs K/luaidit makuac

145. Ayen Kuot Ngong F 92yrs K/luaidit makuac

146. Abuol Kuol Kur M 55yrs K/luaidit makuac

147. Chol Kur Chol M 42yrs K/luaidit makuac

148. Wel Jool Aker M 50yrs K/luaidit makuac

149. Panchol Bheer Lual M 65yrs K/luaidit makuac

150. Ajak Leek Ajak M 66yrs K/luaidit makuac

151. Alier Mabior Bath M 32yrs K/luaidit makuac

152. Deng Apar Ngang M 52yrs K/luaidit makuac

153. Amuor Khok Chol F 48yrs K/luaidit makuac

154. Mac Angau Nyok M 28yrs makuac makuac

155. Bol Jok Ngong F 75yrs K/luaidit makuac

156. Anyieth Lual Abuor F 80yrs K/luaidit makuac

157. Ayen Kur Leet F 60yrs K/luaidit makuac

158. Akur Kon Buut F 08yrs K/luaidit makuac

159. Ayor Kona Ajak F 41yrs K/luaidit makuac

160. Jool Wel Alier M 85yrs K/luaidit makuac

161. Panchol Wel Alier M 45yrs K/luaidit makuac

162. Nyalat Mayom Deng F 10yrs K/Luadit Makuac

163. Anyieth Chot Alith M 82yrs K/Luadit Makuac

164. Awan Riak Abuong M 79yrs K/Luadit Makuac

165. Tit Gai Ajak M 75yrs K/Luadit Makuac

166. Chol Akuei Mabior M 78yrs K/Luadit Makuac

167. Talata Achiek Thiong F 07yrs K/Luadit Makuac

168. Ajak Manyuon Nhial M 65yrs K/Luadit Makuac

169. Majok Manguak Agot M 77yrs K/Luadit Makuac

170. Ateny Alar Awan F 75yrs K/Luadit Makuac

171. Biar Alier Kur M 65yrs K/Luadit Makuac

172. Kuol Riak Thiong M 72yrs K/Luadit Makuac

173. Kueth Alith Malith M 55yrs K/Luadit Makuac

174. Awuoi Jok Kur F 45yrss K/Luadit Makuac

175. Awum Kuer Mayom F 60yrs K/Luadit Makuac

176. Angeth Guerech Kuol F 58yrs K/Luadit Makuac

177. Awel Thiong Leek F 44yrs K/Luadit Makuac

178. Yar Kur Achien F 40yrs K/Luadit Makuac

179. Athou Chok Mac F 33yrs K/Luadit Makuac

180. Abuk Noon Agok F 37yrs K/Luadit Makuac

181. Awuoi Joh Akhok F 60yrs K/Luadit Makuac

182. Achiek Garang Jok F 30yrs K/Luadit Makuac

183. Athou Nyok Ajok F 45yrs K/Luadit Makuac

184. Yom Ajak Mac M 50yrs Makuac Makuac

185. Ajok Nhial Akau F 65yrs Makuac Makuac

186. Nyiel Ayiel F 60yrs Makuac Makuac

187. Achol Apech F 55yrs Makuac Makuac

188. Kuon Piel Akol M 60yrs Makuac Makuac

189. Akau Pach Akau M 67yrs Makuac Makuac

190. Abuol Aguek Awan F 33yrs Makuac Makuac

191. Aluel Khok Bol M 60yrs Makuac Makuac

192. Deng Nhial Deng M 50yrs Makuac Makuac

193. Anyang Arou Anyar M 75yrs Makuac Makuac

194. Aluel Jok Biar F 59yrs Makuac Makuac

195. Akor Deng Kuot F 59yrs Makuac Makuac

196. Yar Nyuop Leng F 52yrs Makuac Makuac

197. Achol Riak Wai F 09yrs Makuac Makuac

198. Ngor Aman Ajak M 106yrs K/luadit Makuac

199. Ngor Aluong Nhial M 32yrs K/luadit Makuac

200. Deng Kuol Deng M 29yrs K/luadit Makuac

201. Jok Nhial Jok M 69yrs K/luadit Makuac

202. Keth Jok Dhaal F 60yrs K/luadit Makuac

203. Jool Ajah Mayen M 49yrs K/luadit Makuac

204. Yar Deng Akol F 65yrs K/luadit Makuac

205. Majok Nyok Anyang M 75yrs K/luadit Makuac

206. Madol Makuc Achol M 28yrs Makuac Makuac

207. Nyanchiek Ajeriar Lado F 65yrs Makuac Makuac

208. Abiei Agot Akuei F 52yrs Makuac Makuac

209. Ayong Anyang Mac F 45yrs Makuac Makuac

210. Amour Apiel Aguto F 62yrs Makuac Makuac

211. Yom Chol Ajok F 50yrs Makuac Makuac

212. Chol Maluk Malual M 29yrs Makuac Makuac

213. Awuol Anyang Ajeth F 48yrs Makuac Makuac

214. Nyandit Manyok Mayen F 50yrs Makuac Makuac

215. Malueth Chol Alith F 80yrs Makuac Makuac

216. Ayuen Awan Kureng M 32yrs K/Lualdit Makuac

217. Malueth Aret Anyak M 75yrs makuac Makuac

218. Agau Manyok Mayen F 48yrs Makuac Makuac

219. Majuch Machiek Majuch M 80yrs Mading Makuac

220. Ajah Apar Ngang F 60yrs K/Luaditi Makuac

221. Charach Ngor Ngang M 80yrs Mading Makuac

222. Kuol Piok Alier M 61yrs Mading Makuac

223. Achuck Aloch Yout F 70yrs Mading Makuac

224. Choor Angeth Chaboch M 80yrs Mading Makuac

225. Kuol Nyieth Angeth M 70yrs Mading Makuac

KAPAAT BOMA MURDERD POPULATION DURING 18th. DEC.2013-24-JAN 2014

AYOOL DECESEAD PEOPLE

S/NO. Names in full Age Sex

1. Adut Mabior Malith 70yrs F

2. Maggot Deng Joh 60yrs M

3. Achiek Nyantiop Riak 10yrs M

4. Jok Ngong Jok 28yrs M

5. Riak Piel Joh 60yrs M

6. Alek   Dhieu machar 50yrs F

7. Machar lukuac 70yrs M

8. Ayen garang Apiu 70yrs F

9. Akuch lueth kur 60yrs F

10. Yar temweer Danyrial 60yrs F

11. Ayen kuch chiengkou 70yrs F

12. Agot jok Akol 70yrs F

13. Achok   Ghai barach 4yrs F

14. Bheer Arou Ghai 40yrs M

15. Kueth Akuch Adier 50yrs M

16. Chol Kucha Chiengkou 47yrs M

17. Anyieth Riak Kuei 60yrs F

KHANG DECEASED PEOPLE

S/NO. Names in full Age Sex

1 Achiek kon khang 60yrs M

2 Khang Jok khang 50yrs M

3 Majo Mayen khang 60yrs M

4 Thiongbor thiek Arou 27yrs M

5 Nyandiar Mallet A buor 37yrs M

6 Chol Angau Anyajong 45yrs F

7 Angau Anyijong Mayom 60yrs M

8 Nyankoor Arou Deng 60yrs M

9 Aluel Mangardit Gon 70yrs F

10 Nyankoor Arou Deng 45yrs F

11 Mawut Deng Dot 60yrs F

12 Majok Majak Akuei 55yrs M

13 Agaau Nyok Apiel 60yrs M

14 Deng Maker Kang Makuei 35yrs M

15 Yar Malith Dengathok 80yrs M

ACHUEI DEASED PEOPLE

S /NO. NAMES IN FULL AGE SEX

1. Nhial Ngong Deng 45yrs M

2. Nyolon Nai Maper 75yrs M

3. Payola Achiek Dot 65yrs M

4. Ayen Jok Adior 50yrs F

5. Ajieth Jok Adior 40yrs M

6. Ajieth Jooh Loch 41yrs F

7. Ayuen Maluol Jok 30yrs F

8. Nyanroor Mabior Tong 40yrs F

9. Anyieth Deng Jooh 30yrs F

10. Abuk Noon 32yrs F

11. Yar Manyok 30yrs F

12. Akoor Arou 35yrs F

13. Makuei Anyieth Aleer 40yrs M

14. Dekbai Liet Maper 60yrs M

15. Ghai Deng Kuorwel 50yrs M

16. Adol Alier Dhoor 86yrs M

17. Magot Ayen Anyang 45yrs M

18. Apeech Kuer Ngon 60yrs M

19. Nyantai Yuot Mach 70yrs F

20. Ayak Ayiei Angol 80yrs F

21. Adut Nhial Ajok 50yrs F

22. Panchol Anyieth Akau 60yrs M

23. Ajah Lual Ayiei 60yrs F

24. Maluak Garang Ghaai 32yrs M

25. Atai Jok Mach 80yrs F

26. Aciek Nyankor Kuol 40yrs M

27. Margot Ayen Anyang 60yrs M

28. Jiet Deng Kutwel 29yrs M

29. Lek Maluak Deng 07yrs M

30. Anyinyot Marur Abiar 60yrs F

Republic of South Sudan

Jonglei State, Bor County

List of the people who were killed by Riek Machar’s Rebel group in Makuac Payam

From 18th December 2013 – 19th January 2014

S/N Name in Full Sex Age Boma Payam County

1 Majok Agok Ayaat M 52 yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

2 Mathiang Guet Chuit M 60 yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

3 Kuol Garang Leek M 35 yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

4 Lueth Garang Leeth M 45 yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

5 Awut Kuol Koryom M 50 yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

6 Yar Anyieth Arou F 65 yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

7 Hoka Aguek Hoka M 46 yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

8 Garang Makuac Mathiang M 66 yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

9 Achol Nyakarah Tong M 42 yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

10 Dhaal Jok Mayen M 50 yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

11 Athel Khou Nhial M 48 yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

12 Madit Mac Jok M 62 yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

13 Deng Makuac Anyang M 59 yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

14 Abuk Chak Bior F 52 yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

15 Ateny Bior Makol M 47 yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

16 Mawut Dhuong Nhial M 52yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

17 Madol Deng Ayom M 60yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

18 Mayol Marok Nhiany M 48yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

19 Kuol Ngong Aleeng M 52trs Werkook Makuac Bor

20 Deng Kuol Deng M 39yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

21 Bior Aguek Joh M 56yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

22 Panchol Ariik Deng M 72yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

23 Chol Deng Chol M 66yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

24 Mabior Ngang Akon M 62yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

25 Panchol Jakdit Bior M 58yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

26 Makuol Arok Dau M 52yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

27 Atem Aruu Atem M 48yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

28 Ajith Thon Deng M 46yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

29 Ayong Garang Deng M 52yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

30 Abuol Garang Mac M 60yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

31 Nyang Akol Nhial F 52yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

32 Ajoh Garang Adhuong F 48yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

33 Athou Jok Thok F 50yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

34 Nyalueth Jok Ajak F 46yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

35 Ayor Gor Moun F 60yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

36 Abuot Ayen Anyang M 43yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

37 Atony Japur F 39yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

38 Mayak Bior Thiek M 50yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

39 Maluk Reng Ayak M 65yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

40 Wuoi Jok Koryom M 68yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

41 Chier Jool Aduot M 55yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

42 Akim Guet Kuol F 50yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

43 Bior Ngong Anyang F 72yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

44 Yar Gai Duot F 49yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

45 Adau Kuol M 45yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

46 Manyok Anyang Chol F 60yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

47 Akuol Lual Dau M 52yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

48 Anyang Jok Ayom M 60yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

49 Gut Hoka Mathiang F 58yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

50 Barach Deng Barach M 50yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

51 Abuk Manyiel Chiman M 49yrs Werkook Makuac Bor

52 Ajah Reng Angeth M 53yrs Mading Makuac Bor

53 Amach Niop Agok M 60yrs Mading Makuac Bor

54 Agol Majuch Agol M 30yrs Mading Makuac Bor

55 Nyandit Ajuot Ngang F 50yrs Mading Makuac Bor

56 Angau Kamot Tong M 60yrs Mading Makuac Bor

57 Machiek Majuch Nyok F 70yrs Mading Makuac Bor

58 Anok Achirin Marrial M 80yrs Mading Makuac Bor

59 Adol Agol Majuch F 36yrs Mading Makuac Bor

60 Panchol Malou Lueth M 70yrs Mading Makuac Bor

61 Abiar Tong Ajak M 90yrs Mading Makuac Bor

62 Lual Pach Anguet M 40yrs Mading Makuac Bor

63 Athiek Deng Marial F 50yrs Mading Makuac Bor

64 Machok Deng Marial M 50yrs Mading Makuac Bor

65 Non Angeth Mac M 60yrs Mading Makuac Bor

66 Makur Riak Agol M 70yrs Mading Makuac Bor

67 Deng Ayor Athiek F 18yrs Mading Makuac Bor

68 Buya Ngong Anyang F 50yrs Mading Makuac Bor

69 Apiu Ajak Anyang M 60yrs Mading Makuac Bor

70 Abathou Kur Jok M 80yrs Mading Makuac Bor

71 Ateny Nyanchok Majuch m 80yrs Mading Makuac Bor

72 Machar Anyieth Agau M 60yrs Mading Makuac Bor

73 Anyieth Yar Anyieth F 46yrs Mading Makuac Bor

74 Bol Akol Yom F 65yrs Mading Makuac Bor

75 Adhieu Nyieth Adhieu M 68yrs Mading Makuac Bor

76 Akuol Ngong Jil F 70yrs Mading Makuac Bor

77 Nyanthich Ngor Ngang M 18yrs Mading Makuac Bor

78 Akuany Achol Awan F 80yrs Mading Makuac Bor

79 Riak Achol Awan M 36yrs Mading Makuac Bor

80 Panchol Agol Majuch M 40yrs Mading Makuac Bor

81 Ngang Atem Mabior F 37yrs Mading Makuac Bor

82 Athiek Akau Mel M 50yrs Mading Makuac Bor

83 Choor Angeth Chaboch M 80yrs Mading Makuac Bor

84 Kuol Nyieth Angeth M 60yrs Mading Makuac Bor

85 Kuol Achiek Majuch M 70yrs Mading Makuac Bor

86 Chiek Thiek Agol M 63yrs Mading Makuac Bor

87 Nyanduck Makuac Aguek M 54yrs Mading Makuac Bor

88 Aman Duop Jok M 60yrs Mading Makuac Bor

89 Kuol Kudum Kur M 55yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

90 Amer Biar Wel F 49yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

91 Anger Riak Deng M 81yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

92 Athou Amuor Khok F 90yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

93 Agok Mabior Geu F 60yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

94 Yar Deng Kuot F 97yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

95 Aruar Piok Deng F 68yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

96 Agot Deng Dhieu F 72yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

97 Wal Kureng Akol M 80yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

98 Akut Mayen Yar F 69yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

99 Gai Machok Mading M 62yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

100 Ateny Piok Thon M 57yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

101 Yar Alier F 80yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

102 Anyieth Guet Piok F 60yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

103 Nyanlueth Ajok Lual F 82yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

104 Anyijong Kucha Leek F 73yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

105 Achiek Awuon Deng M 30yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

106 Deng Awuol Kur M 57yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

107 Kon Gai Ajok M 55yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

108 Achiek Deng Biar M 35yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

109 Achok Deng Anyang M 82yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

110 Athiei Kuol Aluk M 10yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

111 Achiek Deng Biar M 35yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

112 Achok Akuok Bior F 75yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

113 Nyiel Kud Aluk F 35yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

114 Achiek Monyror Yuot M 65yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

115 Bol Madol Kur F 43yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

116 Nhial Jool Malual M 13yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

117 Nyanyoum Deng Achuol F 86yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

118 Adier Nhial Gak M 96yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

119 Ajueil Garang Geu F 83yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

120 Majok Joh Anyieth F 55yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

121 Agot Majuch Biar F 82yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

122 Ajah Alier Aman F 55yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

123 Manyang Kuol Nyok M 30yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

124 Akoi Kuol Agau M 38yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

125 Mayol Ajak Chol M 48yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

126 Adol Makum Chienkou M 29yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

127 Achiek Deng Anyang M 52yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

128 Apech Riak Gai M 60yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

129 Chol Anyieth Kur M 46yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

130 Anyang Jok Anyang M 52yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

131 Amour Deng Anyang M 50yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

132 Ateny Nek Rech M 62yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

133 Mac Wai Mac F 58yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

134 Mac Leet Luala M 42yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

135 Guet Ajuoi Nai M 46yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

136 Ayak Bolek Poch M 55yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

137 Maluk Mach Bior F 50yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

138 Maguet Anyieth Akol F 58yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

139 Deng Riak Ajak M 72yrs K/luaidit Makuac Bor

140 Agot Malual Jok M 80yrs K/luaidit Makuac Bor

141 Mayen Duopo Riak M 61yrs K/luaidit Makuac Bor

142 Abuol Makuac Akur M 55yrs K/luaidit Makuac Bor

143 Aluel Ayuel Nyinger F 39yrs K/luaidit Makuac Bor

144 Bol Akau M 45yrs K/luaidit Makuac Bor

145 Ayen Kuot Ngong F 92yrs K/luaidit Makuac Bor

146 Abuol Kuol Kur M 55yrs K/luaidit Makuac Bor

147 Chol Kur Chol M 42yrs K/luaidit Makuac Bor

148 Wel Jool Aker M 50yrs K/luaidit Makuac Bor

149 Panchol Bheer Lual M 65yrs K/luaidit Makuac Bor

150 Ajak Leek Ajak M 66yrs K/luaidit Makuac Bor

151 Alier Mabior Bath M 32yrs K/luaidit Makuac Bor

152 Deng Apar Ngang M 52yrs K/luaidit Makuac Bor

153 Amuor Khok Chol F 48yrs K/luaidit Makuac Bor

154 Mac Angau Nyok M 28yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

155 Bol Jok Ngong F 75yrs K/luaidit Makuac Bor

156 Anyieth Lual Abuor F 80yrs K/luaidit Makuac Bor

157 Ayen Kur Leet F 60yrs K/luaidit Makuac Bor

158 Akur Kon Buut F 08yrs K/luaidit Makuac Bor

159 Ayor Kona Ajak F 41yrs K/luaidit Makuac Bor

160 Jool Wel Alier M 85yrs K/luaidit Makuac Bor

161 Panchol Wel Alier M 45yrs K/luaidit Makuac Bor

162 Nyalat Mayom Deng F 10yrs K/Luadit Makuac Bor

163 Anyieth Chot Alith M 82yrs K/Luadit Makuac Bor

164 Awan Riak Abuong M 79yrs K/Luadit Makuac Bor

165 Tit Gai Ajak M 75yrs K/Luadit Makuac Bor

166 Chol Akuei Mabior M 78yrs K/Luadit Makuac Bor

167 Talata Achiek Thiong F 07yrs K/Luadit Makuac Bor

168 Ajak Manyuon Nhial M 65yrs K/Luadit Makuac Bor

169 Majok Manguak Agot M 77yrs K/Luadit Makuac Bor

170 Ateny Alar Awan F 75yrs K/Luadit Makuac Bor

171 Biar Alier Kur M 65yrs K/Luadit Makuac Bor

172 Kuol Riak Thiong M 72yrs K/Luadit Makuac Bor

173 Kueth Alith Malith M 55yrs K/Luadit Makuac Bor

174 Awuoi Jok Kur F 45yrss K/Luadit Makuac Bor

175 Awum Kuer Mayom F 60yrs K/Luadit Makuac Bor

176 Angeth Guerech Kuol F 58yrs K/Luadit Makuac Bor

177 Awel Thiong Leek F 44yrs K/Luadit Makuac Bor

178 Yar Kur Achien F 40yrs K/Luadit Makuac Bor

179 Athou Chok Mac F 33yrs K/Luadit Makuac Bor

180 Abuk Noon Agok F 37yrs K/Luadit Makuac Bor

181 Awuoi Joh Akhok F 60yrs K/Luadit Makuac Bor

182 Achiek Garang Jok F 30yrs K/Luadit Makuac Bor

183 Athou Nyok Ajok F 45yrs K/Luadit Makuac Bor

184 Yom Ajak Mac M 50yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

185 Ajok Nhial Akau F 65yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

186 Nyiel Ayiel F 60yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

187 Achol Apech F 55yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

188 Kuon Piel Akol M 60yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

189 Akau Pach Akau M 67yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

190 Abuol Aguek Awan F 33yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

191 Aluel Khok Bol M 60yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

192 Deng Nhial Deng M 50yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

193 Anyang Arou Anyar M 75yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

194 Aluel Jok Biar F 59yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

195 Akor Deng Kuot F 59yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

196 Yar Nyuop Leng F 52yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

197 Achol Riak Wai F 09yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

198 Ngor Aman Ajak M 106yrs K/luadit Makuac Bor

199 Ngor Aluong Nhial M 32yrs K/luadit Makuac Bor

200 Deng Kuol Deng M 29yrs K/luadit Makuac Bor

201 Jok Nhial Jok M 69yrs K/luadit Makuac Bor

202 Keth Jok Dhaal F 60yrs K/luadit Makuac Bor

203 Jool Ajah Mayen M 49yrs K/luadit Makuac Bor

204 Yar Deng Akol F 65yrs K/luadit Makuac Bor

205 Majok Nyok Anyang M 75yrs K/luadit Makuac Bor

206 Madol Makuc Achol M 28yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

207 Nyanchiek Ajeriar Lado F 65yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

208 Abiei Agot Akuei F 52yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

209 Ayong Anyang Mac F 45yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

210 Amour Apiel Aguto F 62yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

211 Yom Chol Ajok F 50yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

212 Chol Maluk Malual M 29yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

213 Awuol Anyang Ajeth F 48yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

214 Nyandit Manyok Mayen F 50yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

215 Malueth Chol Alith F 80yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

216 Ayuen Awan Kureng M 32yrs K/Lualdit Makuac Bor

217 Malueth Aret Anyak M 75yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

218 Agau Manyok Mayen F 48yrs Makuac Makuac Bor

219 Majuch Machiek Majuch M 80yrs Mading Makuac Bor

220 Ajah Apar Ngang F 60yrs K/Luaditi Makuac Bor

221 Charach Ngor Ngang M 80yrs Mading Makuac Bor

222 Kuol Piok Alier M 61yrs Mading Makuac Bor

223 Achuck Aloch Yout F 70yrs Mading Makuac Bor

224 Choor Angeth Chaboch M 80yrs Mading Makuac Bor

225 Kuol Nyieth Angeth M 70yrs Mading Makuac Bor

226 Adut Mabior Malith F 70yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

227 Maggot Deng Joh M 60yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

228 Achiek Nyantiop Riak M 10yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

229 Jok Ngong Jok M 28yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

230 Riak Piel Joh M 60yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

231 Alek   Dhieu machar F 50yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

232 Machar lukuac M 70yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

233 Ayen garang Apiu F 70yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

234 Akuch lueth kur F 60yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

235 Yar temweer Danyrial F 60yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

236 Ayen kuch chiengkou F 70yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

237 Agot jok Akol F 70yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

238 Achok   Ghai barach F 4yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

239 Bheer Arou Ghai M 40yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

240 Kueth Akuch Adier M 50yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

241 Chol Kucha Chiengkou M 47yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

242 Anyieth Riak Kuei F 60yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

243 Achiek kon khang M 60yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

244 Khang Jok khang M 50yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

245 Majo Mayen khang M 60yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

246 Thiongbor thiek Arou M 27yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

247 Nyandiar Mallet A buor M 37yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

248 Chol Angau Anyajong F 45yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

249 Angau Anyijong Mayom M 60yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

250 Nyankoor Arou Deng M 60yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

251 Aluel Mangardit Gon F 70yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

252 Nyankoor Arou Deng F 45yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

253 Mawut Deng Dot F 60yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

254 Majok Majak Akuei M 55yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

255 Agaau Nyok Apiel M 60yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

256 Deng Maker Kang Makuei M 35yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

257 Yar Malith Dengathok M 80yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

258 Nhial Ngong Deng M 45yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

259 Nyolon Nai Maper M 75yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

260 Payola Achiek Dot M 65yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

261 Ayen Jok Adior F 50yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

262 Ajieth Jok Adior M 40yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

263 Ajieth Jooh Loch F 41yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

264 Ayuen Maluol Jok F 30yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

265 Nyanroor Mabior Tong F 40yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

266 Anyieth Deng Jooh F 30yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

267 Abuk Noon F 32yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

268 Yar Manyok F 30yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

269 Akoor Arou F 35yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

270 Makuei Anyieth Aleer M 40yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

271 Dekbai Liet Maper M 60yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

272 Ghai Deng Kuorwel M 50yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

273 Adol Alier Dhoor M 86yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

274 Magot Ayen Anyang M 45yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

275 Apeech Kuer Ngon M 60yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

276 Nyantai Yuot Mach F 70yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

277 Ayak Ayiei Angol F 80yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

278 Adut Nhial Ajok F 50yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

279 Panchol Anyieth Akau M 60yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

280 Ajah Lual Ayiei F 60yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

281 Maluak Garang Ghaai M 32yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

282 Atai Jok Mach F 80yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

283 Aciek Nyankor Kuol M 40yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

284 Margot Ayen Anyang M 60yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

285 Jiet Deng Kutwel M 29yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

286 Lek Maluak Deng M 07yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

287 Anyinyot Marur Abiar F 60yrs Kapat Makuac Bor

Total number of female 115 Below 18 years 12

Total number of male 172

From 60 to 79 years of age 190

From 80 to 99 years of age 31

Above 100 years of age 1

s/no Name in full Padiet payam Ages Sex Head chief Date

1- Thau Mar Hook 45 M Deng mabur Malual

2- Thon Deng Abiel 67 M

3- Maduk mathiang Bany 44 M

4- Mawut Maker Ater 47 M

5- Wuor Rial cHuol 24 M

6- Mabior thichot Deng 55 M

7- Maluk Hoth 60 M

8- Deng chol Deng 56 M

9- Wuor Monyong Akech 67 M

10- Kiir Bayak Deng 45 M

11- Kuol Ayiik Awuol 42 M

12- Riak JaNY dENG 54 M

13- Matong machok Deng 56 M

14- Manyiel Makor Pajok

15- Madit Galuak Kutin

16- Nyagach Deng Ajang 80 F

17- Thon Mabut Ayiei 74 M

18- Ruot Duoth Jok

19- Awan Reth Ayok

20- Mariak Biliu Majok

21- Pajok guolmchuol

22- Nyapar luak piok

23- Gach derwei weiu

24- Garkok jong Deng

25- Chol Biliu Ngut

26- Ayen Bayak Ayei 56 F

27- Nyachiek puluth Agany 34 F

28- Nyaliet piok kachuol 48 F

29- Akon Liep long 50 F

30- Par chol capoth 60 M

31- Lam Deng majok 78 M

32- Nyantut Ret kourwel 46 F

33- Them Thon Kok

34- Majok Both Jok

35- Nyagai Geu lony

36- Mathiech Abiel Dak

37- Wauker Mabil Thau

38- Piot Abukjok Majok

39- Wuor Deng Kachuol

40- Akuol Akuoch chuol

41- Majok Both Jok

42- Matong Dut Chol Dongchak payam AGES SEX HEAD CHIEF

43- Magai malual Riak Aruai Majok

44- Manyang Deng Deer

45- Makar Gatluak Malual

46- Nyanwan Ring Deng

47- Nyanakot Deng yuot

48- Majok Manuer Thaak

49- Nyanrach makor Riak

50- Mawuou chan kethi

51- Amach kuol Ayuel

52- Deng marol Deng

53- Galuak Deng kachuol

54- Amer Makuek Mawut

55- Athiei Gach Malek

56- Yar makuer Deng

57- Aluk Tong Deng

58- Duoth Riek Akalang

59- Athok Awuok

60- Bul Deng Ajang

61- Bol Madit Machok

62- Mabior Makuach Machok

63- Adhieu Dut Atem

64- Mabior Ayok Mabior

65- Majok Lam Chawich

66- Madau Awan Makor

67- Aguek Makuach Deng

68- Deng Malual Atem

69- Wer Awuol Deng

70- Ayen chatim Dau

71- Nyanrou Nak Thel

72- Mabany Machuei Mabany

73- Kachuol Tor Mun

74- Deng kuek Adhiach

75- Mayen kong Thook

76- Dau Manyok Thierdeng

77- Nyaluak Thikiit Kachuol

78- Nyakong Tiop Lueth

79- Riak Nak Riak

80- Magor Majak Majok

81- Mabet Madit Adieny

82- Mabror   Anyang Mabior Payuel payam

83- Marial kuol mabior

84- Galuak Ajuong Bol

85- Makuol Garang chok

86- Apajok Atem Lual

87- Mach Deng Garang

88- Deng Awuol Deng

89- Deng Garang

90- Makuei Abuk Deng

91- Mathiang Gach Achuil

92- Majok yor Doh

93- Ajak Galuak Yor

94- Ruot Awuur wut

95- Mawut Ruot awur

96- Maluk Ayuel kuai

97- Achol lual Deng

98- Manyiel Deng Garang

99- Maduk Manyok Deng

100- Deng Riak manyok

101- Athok Deng Lual

102- Yak chol Leek

103- Lual chan Deng

104- Manyok chan Kuir

105- Maker Deng tuet

106- Deng Chol Dau

107- Ajing Bol jing

108- Deng Ajing Maior

109- Goch Mach Goch

110- Kuot chol kuot

111- Anei Ajing mabior

112- Riak Aleer yath

113- Bol Dhuor Awuol

114- Yoor Deng Aleer

115- Duot Deng Duot

116- Yor Ayeul malual

117- Atem Athian Goch

118- Duot Deng Aleer

119- Nyanawan lual Ajok

120- Nyan luak Deng Thon

121- Leek jogak Deng

122- Laul lem yep

123- Malual leek Deng

124- Duot Jok Agany

125- Ruach gil Thon

126- Monykuer lul Deng

127- Garang Dau Deng

128- Akech Deu maker

129- Achot lul Guot

130- Achol Garwei Athian

131- Ayuel leek Deng

132- Nyaluich Thon Aguer

133- Ayen Nyok Arou

134- Garang Lual leek

135- Dau Galuak Reth

136- Mabior mayen Anei

137- Aleer Duot Awuol

138- Agot malual Dau

139- Athian Deng Ajok

140- Galuak Deng mayom

141- Anger Deng Majak

142- Adit Deng Majak

143- Leek Deng leek

144- kuol chol Awuol

145- Nyaretdit Lual Deng Ager payam AGES SEX CHIEF DATE

146- Lam Tiop Kok 70 M

147- Deng majok Aleer

148- Malual Bol Padiet

149- Alol Ajing Mabior

150- Bol monykuerdeng

151- Aler chan kout

152- Makuach Garang Akouc

153- Chol Atem chol

154- Galuak mire Deng

155- Makuach mire Deng

156- Deang reng mier

157- Deng Reng Derwei

158- Abuong aleer Abuong

159- Thon major Akech

160- wuor mwrial Giek

161- Manayng Ayuel Manyang

162- Ajah Majok Deng

163- Madit Bul Ayuel

164- Kon deng Aler

165- Aler mabil chan

166- Awuol dau awuol

167- Chool machot Riak

168- Abui lual mayen

169- Alang akot Dut

170- Nyankiir malual Deng

171- Chol Jurlei Achiek

172- Aler Makuei Them

173- Tiop majolk chengkuach

174- Aler Lam makuei

175- Aduk galuak makuei

176- Nyanlat galuak makuei

177- Deng mayom thon

178- Chol akoy Awan

179- Awuol lual Awuol

180- Majok Ruot Ajak

181- Kuol Thiong Awuol

182- Kon mach Goch

183- Mabior Aler Alol

184- Nyanwuor Aler Goch

185- Nyanring Aler Manyiel

186- Akol Biliu Mabior

187- Malual Riak Ding

188- Mager Akoi Anyang

189- Aduk Jok Abot

190- Aler Duop Angon

191- Dau Makuei Bol

192- Manyo Lok Ajak

193- Akuach Deng Ajak

194- Atem Dau Wai

195- Deng thon Awuol

196- Riak Manyuon Dau

197- Deng chol Ret

198- Tiop Galuak Guek

199- Pur Monyjang Panyang payam Head chief

200- Aleer kong kuek Machot Girkuach

201-

202-

203-

204-

205-

206-

207-

208-

209-

210-

211-

212-

213-

214-

The names of the other14 members in panyang payam will be brought

Wounded people in the fighting in Duk county

s/no Name in full payam Boma Chief Section Date:

1 Lual Deng Mayen payuel Rupdead Mapiou Deng Duot palual 1/3/2014

2 Mawut yuang Deng // Gadiang Thon Lul Bayak Lok //

3 Makat jok Ring Dongchak panajak Mawut Bol NYIEL 14/3/2014

4 Nyaak Jok Abiel padeit Dorok Kot Chany Angach //

5 Maker lul Deng Pagaak pajier Yai Rich //

6 Matiop lam nyok // // // // //

7 Khot Awuol Nhial padiet Ayueldit Chan manyang Angach //

8 Madual Marieu Lat // Dorok Kot // 15/3/2014

9 Marol Lom Awur Dongchak pakam Riak Mabior Pathe //

10 Pech Marieu Galuak Pagak Tindier Ngom Nyieth Pajook //

11 Maruon chok Nogr Dongchak pakam Riak mabior Deng pathel //

12 Diu Chany jok padiet Ayueldit Chan manyang Angach //

13 Mawut Riak chiin Dongchak pakam Riak Maboir Deng pathel //

14 Madhier Luk Yai Dongchak Amiel Machiek monychol Nyiel //

15 Galuak Kumdan Mar padiet Dorok Kot chany Angach 25/3/2014

16 Aleer mabil Majak Panyang pagaleng Douth Ayuel panbuoi //

17 Aleer chikuak Awer // // // // //

18 Mabui Tang Agaany padiet Buong jok Deng Dau k DUOR //

19 Machuei Majok Tor Dongchak Amiel Maciek Monychol Nyiel //

20 Lual lueth Luol Panyang Pagaleng Doth Ayuel panbuoi //

21 Moydum Dau kuany Padiet Bongjok Deng dau k Duor //

22 AkolDeng Akol padeit Papat Awuol Akuoch // //

23 Bol Thon puot Ager poktap Abot mayom pabot //

24 Chol Bepel Abacir padiet Dorok Kot chany Angach //

25 Aler lam chuol Ageer poktap Abot mayom payath //

26 Tiop Gai jok padiet Dorok Kot chany Angach //

27 Tong Tiop Diu // // // // /

28 Garang Aleu Nyok Payuel Gadiang Thon lul Bayak lok 13/1/2014

29 Mawut Aleu Nyok // // // // //

30 Thon luak Reth // // // // //

Name of the people killed during the crisis in Twic East County -JS

S/N Name in Full sex place Age

1 Kuany Deng Juach m Bor

2 Nyalueth Kuany Deng f “

3 Chol Dut Bul m “

4 Matiop Manyok Thuch m “

5 Atem Aruai Atem m “

6 Chol Aruai Atem m “

7 Bul Yiyith Agoth m “

8 Majak Palual Atem m “

9 Arok Thuch Yomayen m “

10 Deng Ngurot Juach M “

11 Gal Akuach Gal M “

12 Ayen Wel Mach F “

13 Thiong Ajang Deu M “

14 Deng Agoot Giet M “

15 Garang Bol Deng M “

16 Deng Atem Tong M “

17 Deng Arok Abit M “

18 Garang Jurkuach Deng M “

19 Chol Bol Deng M “

20 Achol Gai Bior F “

21 Abuoi Deng Ajok M “

22 Achuoth Deng Yong M Panyagor

23 Gak Chol Gak M Bor

24 Deng Kongor Awuol M “

25 Chol Garang Arik M “

26 Ajuur Atem F “

27 Nyuop Chol Gak M “

28 Akoi Gak Barach M “

29 Ajang Reech Ajang M “

30 Chol Arok Ajang M “

31 Majok Ayuen Deng M “

32 Aguer Deu Ayuen Yaak m Akobo

33 Gak Arok Alaak M Bor

34 Alaak Thuch Gak M Bor

35 Bior Garang Deu M Bentiu

36 Gak Alaak Duot M Bor

37 Jok Deng Jok M Bor

38 Alaak Gak Alaak M Bor

39 Garang Manyiel M Bor

40 Bior Ajang Gak M Bor

41 Deng Dut Deng M Bor

42 Bior Manyuon M Bor

43 Ajak Deng Ajak M Bor

44 Deng Garang Dual M Bor

45 Ayiik Deng Ayuur M Pan-pandiar

46 Dhieu Bol Awal M Madiing

47 Deng Thuch Duot M “

48 Atem Chol Atem M “

49 Deng Mach Deng m “

50 Achol Thuch Kongor F “

51 Apat Goch Chieng F “

52 Garang Padiet Deng F “

53 Achiththiech Garang Deng F “

54 Ayiik Deng Thuch M “

55 Garang Kuol Wach M “

56 Kiir Aguer Bul M “

57 Kuer Mayen Duot M “

58 Duot Mayen Duot M “

59 Mayen Garang Duol M “

60 Matiop Aleu Bol M “

61 Garang Awuok Atem M “

62 Aruai Garang Duot M Wernyol

63 Garang Machar Deng M “

64 Magong Leem Manyang M Wernyol

65 Mach Garang Mach M Madiing

66 Aguer Deng Monykuch M “

67 Aguer Atem Aguer M “

68 Dhieu Kuir Kuol M “

69 Akuol Akech Deng F “

70 Maker Nul Bior M Bor 50

71 Bol Angok Deng F ” 60

72 Malual Chol Ajok M ” 35

73 Maketh Deng Garang M ” 35

74 Garang Manyok Garang M ” 35

75 Barac Kuany Akoi M ” 34

76 Chol Mayom Akech M ” 45

77 Akoi Deng Manyiel M ” 60

78 Akoi Bior Barac M ” 50

79 Makuac giet Chut M ” 40

80 Maketh Dut Akoi M ” 50

81 Makuol Nul Bior M ” 45

82 Mayen Kuir Yuot M ” 48

83 Khot Aduor Akol M ” 36

84 Agany Deng Agany M ” 28

85 Duot Dut Thiong M ” 24

86 Dut Thiong Bul M ” 50

87 Dau Ador Akol M ” 50

88 Athieng Akoi Duot F ” 48

89 Aguer Yak Mabior M ” 38

90 Deng Patiou Atem M ” 46

91 Lual Manyok Deng M ” 50

92 lual Deng Lual M ” 55

93 Awut Deng Duot F ” 3

94 Dhieu Athian Ador M ” 60

95 Deng Arok Deng M ” 60

96 Akuol Mabior Deng F ” 70

97 Deng Achuoth Moijok M ” 35

98 Lual Mayen Lual M ” 35

99 Ajak Deng Thuch M ” 38

100 Chol Deng Mabior M ” 38

101 Lual Alaak Ajak M ” 45

102 Deng Arok Bior M ” 28

103 Angok Yak Ngor M ” 58

104 Ayak Bol Ayual F ” 26

105 Bul Mabior Deng M ” 71

106 Amou Mabior Deng F ” 60

107 Deng Chol Bul M ” 8

108 Dau Deng Achuil M ” 70

109 Adau Atem Thiong F ” 60

110 Mabior Reech Kuot M ” 37

111 Nyibol Abiar Manyang F ” 13

112 Akoi Bul Yaak M ” 40

113 Atem Akech Kuir M ” 40

114 Abiar Atem Barach F ” 50

115 Deng Dau Pech M ” 40

116 Lual Dau Lual M ” 36

117 Achol Juach Ateul F ” 40

118 Abraham Dhieu Mading M sudan sufari

119 Moses Makuol Mayom M Bor

120 Lazarus Panyang Dau M Bor

121 Garang Thuc Akok M Bor

122 Ajith Arok Ajak M Bor

123 Chol Toor Mamer M Malakal

124 Garang Toor Mamer M Bor

125 mabior Kuol Nyang M Pan-pandiar

126 Adau Achieng Chieng F Bor

127 Maketh Ayuel Malual M Bor

128 Diing Agok Arok M Bor

129 Alek Agok Arok F Bor

130 Bul Kuir Bul F Akobo

131 Garang Agok Yuen M Bor

132 Pech Atem Aleer M Pariak

133 Mabior Deng Akoi M Bor

134 Maguek Reech Kuir M Bor

135 Akoi Thon Akoi M Bor

136 Awer Awic Akuen M Bor

137 Yak Wal Tong M Bor

138 Adut Kuir F Bor

139 Dau Duot Guot M Bor

140 Barach Achuoth Mabior M “

141 Agok Riak Joh F Bor

142 Alek anhain F Bor

143 Thuc Ghak Guot M Bor

144 Garang Toor Guot M Bor

145 Deng Kiir Deng M Bor

146 Adhieu Bol Deng F Bor

147 Manyok Mading Majok M

148 Bol Ajuong Mawai M

149 Dit Kuir Ngor M

150 Abuoi Mading Deng M

151 Dut Atem Dut M

152 Dau Gak Arok M

153 Ayu Ajak Marial F

154 Mayen Thuch Mayen M

155 John Thiak Kuot M

156 Ayuel Diing Ayen M

157 Makuol Atem Amol M

158 Thiong Arok Thiong M

159 Jok Makol Athian M

160 Kuany Gak Yak M

161 Akuek Deng Machok F

162 Ayen Agem Kuol F

163 Dau Anyuon Atem M

164 Manyang Mawan Koryom M

165 Majak Bol Majak M

166 Mayen Manyok Akech M

167 Mamer Kuer Diing M

168 Majok Ajak Arok M

169 Awaak Makuei Jok M

170 Dut Abuoi Ayak M

171 Aguil Yool Dut M

172 Ayuen Mabior Akur M

173 Makuach Ding Arok M Akobo

174 Mawut Mabior Malual M Bor

175 Aguer Chol Ajak M Malakal

176 Deng Atem Biar M Bor

177 Ding Kon Biar M Pariak

178 Kuir Gak Kuir M Bor

179 Arok Atem Riak M Malakal

180 Ajang Garang Ajang M Pariak

181 Gai Chol Gak M Pariak

182 Aguer Mabil Ajok M Bor

183 Deng Jok Pawuoi M Bor

184 Ateny Mageny Bior M Juba

185 Atem Deng Kuir M Malakal

186 Juarwei Aruei Mabior M Bor

187 Aruei Mayen Ajang M Bor

188 Biar Dhieu Atem M Bor

189 Mamer Akech Atem M Bor

190 Deng Kuir Ajak M Pariak

191 Biar Kuoya Biar M Juba

192 Mayen Aguin Ajak M Juba

193 Geu Atem Manyang M Bor

194 Mawan Ding Lian M Bor

195 Juach Akim Deng M Bor

196 Adhieu Atem Magaar F Bor

197 Alakiir Lueng Bior F Bor

198 Yar Yaak Deng F Bor

199 Yar Garang Duot F Bor

200 Atem Kon Atem M Bor

201 Deng Nuer Ajang M Bor

202 Arok Ajang Arok M Bor

203 Angeth Mabior Deng F Bor

204 Nyawiny Thuc Miot F Bor

205 Nyaman Manyok Gak F Bor

206 Ajier Thon Akoi F Bor

207 Akuang Reech Ajang F Bor

208 Biar Yaak Biar M Bor

209 Malek Biar Malek M Bor

210 Arok Thuc Atem M Bor

211 Apajok Akoi Biar F Bor

212 Atem Ajang Atem M Pariak

213 Ngong Magiir Mabiai M Bor

214 Mayen Anyieth Kok M Bor

‘’In 2011, you go by bye, bye, now in 2013 you come by crying ‘’, Sudanese tell South Sudanese refugees

By David Aoloch Bion

South Sudanese:          Peace upon!  Can you open for us  the border?

Sudanese:                     what is it? Where are you going ?

South Sudan            :    I am going to take refuge in Sudan

Sudan                             Why do leave your country?

South Sudan                   Haven’t  you  heard what happen in my country?

Sudan                              Yes, i have not heard , what is it?

South Sudan                  War broke out  in my country among the liberators, traitors, wavers, bystanders and

Sympathizers

Sudan                   Kushthumkum!!!!!, you were claiming , we are the problem and in  2011 , you go by

bye, bye , bye , now in 2013  you are coming back by crying .  Come in, idiots !

South Sudanese                    can I buy the bread?

Sudanese                                  Go away gluttons!!! , always after food  . go and waits for UN food.

Street Kids Are Our People Too!

By Apioth Mayom Apioth

The number of homeless children in the South Sudanese capital, Juba, has more than doubled since 2009

–

On October 22, 2014, the New York Times ran an article titled “From a Rwandan Dump to the Halls of Harvard.” The story was about a young man named Justus Uwayesu, who was rescued at age 9 while living on the streets of Kigali; and through a principled composure, and high aptitude to learn with a little help along the way, he found himself in the most prestigious university in the world, Harvard, this past fall.

To extend over the story to the predicament of our very own street children in South Sudan, we would come to realize that the genocidal story of Rwanda wasn’t so much different to what South Sudanese went through for over half a century. First, the second Sudanese civil war left a deep scarred wound among South Sudanese, culminating in the thousands of street kids we saw before the current political malaise broke out in late December last year. And second, the December 15’s political crisis just added a salt to an already precarious painful wound by orphaning a new wave of street children.

South Sudan, in terms of size, is bigger than either of Kenya or Uganda; however by population-wise, its population stood at 8.5 million at the 2008 census, making it four times less populated than Uganda, and five times less numerically numerous than Kenya. In addition, South Sudan is endowed with a few mineral resources; with oil footing the majority of the bill. We have been extremely lucky to have been endowed with a country that is not heavily populated and that means less competition to knock elbows for resources. Fifty years from now, we might be tuning ourselves to a different ball-game.

Once the Peace Agreement is reached between the SPLA-IO and the SPLA-Juba, we are going to witness the same plundering of public funds all over again. We won’t have new chiefs in town; we will have the same Kiir Mayar, Riek Machar, Pagan Amum, and Majak Da Agoot beating the same old drums of saying to each other, “I will never stop building one mansion after another.” With the amount of money that gets embezzled through different cracks of government ministries every year, and how the not so large population of our country is, a small sum could be used to build street children’s shelters in all the state capitals of the country; at these shelters, a few paid workers could be employed to take care of these clientele kids. Building shelters for these kids sound like a better idea than allowing our government to bank-roll their living expenses while living under the custody of adopted foster parents; foster parenting would cast a big load on the government’s budgetary expenditures.

In addition, state capitals seem like good spots because they are always the business hubs of most states, and for that reason, they draw many people from different pockets of the states to their cores. Sometime last year, an article on Sudan Tribune came out reporting about a 14-year- old South Sudanese girl who used to get raped every night by police without giving her a penny for her services. Imagine, if that was your daughter, sister, niece, or another close relative, how would that make you feel? People who wouldn’t have a bad feeling about those brutal monstrosities are mainly the ones who committed those despicable crimes.

In sub-Saharan Africa, we are free to blame most of our societal ills on corruption, and our opinionated views are rightfully deserved. Corruption eats away at our much-needed resources of development like a beastly bottomless sloth. The reaches of corruption are deeply entrenched in the many sectors of our governments. And no matter how wretched the corruption is creating havoc to our developmental ambitions; we are not to blame for most of the societal ills that the corruption has thrust upon us, because the democratic institutions needed to properly run our governments haven’t flowered to maturity just yet; they are still in their infantile, nascent state. Apart from Mozambique, which was ruled by Portugal for some 477 years; Europeans rule in much of Africa didn’t last long for institutions of democracy to fully blossom to maturity like it did in Singapore and Hong Kong.

Corruption as we know will continue until the democratic institutions of accountability have matured. Humans are known to spoil themselves once they have gained something substantial. That is the reason behind why some of us go out on the weekends to have a few sips of beer; some of us call it the “head out” to relieve ourselves from the stress we accumulated during the course of the week, but in reality it is spoiling our dear selves. It is along the same lines that we see a lot of our public officials indulging in embezzlement of our funds because they find these resources easily accessible to them, and since we all have a weakness to spoil ourselves every once in a while, they sometimes go right ahead and take whatever they can while they are at it. So while many of us have been crying for a change of direction since the dawn of Independence, much of the blame should have been squarely targeted at weak governing institutions we hired from the colonial governments.

As long as there are no laws enacted to scare public officials from stuffing their treasury cabinets with public funds, we won’t have a day of rest. Strict laws indicating that public officials who have been found guilty of taking from the government’s treasure trove might be deprived of their offices; that misappropriated resources might be confiscated; and that any guilty party might be send to spend some time in an institution of confinement; all these laws might deter our politicians from participating in acts of self-indulgence. All public officials who serve any section of the citizenry must allow anticorruption agencies to scrutinize all their assets every year.

All in all, since the dawn of independence from the colonial regimes, the political philosophy of much of Africa has been guided by governments ruling their people through upright moral principles, since institutions of accountability have been slow to blossom to maturity. We, in South Sudan, can apply the same upright moral principles since we are the most infantile, nascent state of the continental Africa to have a second look at what we can do to alleviate the burden of impoverishments our street kids are going through.

By doing that, our government would be saying a one good big “thank you” to our martyrs and heroines who lost their lives in over half a century of struggle to find our footing in the world. Just like Justus Uwayesu of Rwanda, some of our street kids are probably scavenging over debris right now wondering whether they will find anything at all to sustain their miserable lives, and just like Justus Uwayesu, if they are given food provisions to nurse their hunger and a home to shelter themselves from the weather, one of them might make it to the residential halls of Harvard one day.

By giving these kids a chance to put their lives together, we are not only bettering their future prospects; we are also helping ourselves from turning some of our own into criminals who might one day come back and make our lives a living nightmare.

References:

Wines, Michael. (2014, October 22). From a Rwandan Dump to the Halls of Harvard. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/23/us/from-a-rwandan-dump-to-the-halls-of-harvard.html?_r=0.

Melbourne vs. Brisbane: Bor Dinka Historic Wrestling in Australia

Insure our cultures in Western countries or let them die!

By Kur Wel Kur

In the beginning of this month (December), young South Sudanese particularly Dinka who reside in Brisbane and Melbourne, Australia, initiated a wrestling match. A competition to take place on Boxing Day (26/12/2014) in Melbourne. The competitors submerged in practise and necessary preparations.  They exchange encouraging and demoralising words as the set-date looms.

In one of the preparations (trainings), the lead wrestler in Melbourne, accidentally dislocated his shoulder. However, this incident didn’t deter the young men to let go their desires of supporting and promoting their culture.  It didn’t either, inform our handful elders to advise the young men on the best things they must do to promote and help this community.  The wrestling occurred on 26/12/2014!

We must acknowledge that on this day (26/2014), the young wrestlers entertained spectators and the day vanished in minutes; an excellent day well-spent; however, one of the wrestlers sustained a horrible fracture on his arm. We spent decades in this country but our ignorance remains resistant to omnipresent millions of educational programs.  In everything we (South Sudanese) do, we wish for safety and good results but we don’t plan for them. And yet, wishes and lucks operate on low gears and on blind spots of successes in this country. In this country and in this century, everything is experimented and controlled by us in order to hit the bull’s eye (target)! Those whose brains still kneel down in front of lucks and wishes of safety and desired results must realise that this planet (earth) is brutal and wishes without experiments and plans don’t come to bear good fruits.

How I wish that our elders could educate our young people on bad sides of wrestling and encourage them to drop wrestling.  Young people must concentrate on other parts of our cultures. Parts such as: read and write our language (Dinka), avoid stupid habits such as families’ violence, crimes against women, their (young people) brutality to general population because of stupid habits such as alcoholism, and dropping out of schools. These are real issues in our second or third country.  To those who will be reading this article, the supporting evidences for the mentioned problems are in my- coming- soon -article, entitled: “why South Sudanese in diaspora must drop South Sudan’s politics”

Wrestling will cause unnecessary conflicts among young people! I would love a peaceful and entertaining wrestling but I can say with absolute, that our beautiful cultural activity will add to police database just as ‘Miss South Sudan beauty pageant’ has done so several times in Adelaide and Melbourne. I am sure about this because wrestling is boastful and physical demanding activity. Winners, most of times, look down on the losers and winners compose songs, which demean losers and exalt themselves (winners).

Merry Christmas Junubiin

With ready grounds such as Facebook, filthy words will flood wrestlers’ and their fans’ pages. The video clips will support all the rants.

The elders must make the Melbourne wrestling match the first and last one or advise the young to insure wrestling! Ignore the warning and reap consequences.

Yrs. Kur Wel Kur.

December 24th: The Battle for Malakal town

December 24 marks the darkest Day in malakal (1-2)

By Gatdiet Peter

One year on-South Sudan, the world’s newest nation has been engulfed by deadly man-made crisis after December 2013 Sudan people’s liberation movement (SPLM) convention turned violent and resulted into Juba miserable massacre seen as the grievous time in South Sudan history.

The violence was translated and concocted to fabricated military coup d’état (انقلاب عسكري الكاذبة ) which have sparked countrywide defections in the SPLA military ranks .The three governors of the mostly affected states by the ongoing conflict namely Jongeli , Unity and Upper Nile were in Juba to attend the then Sudan people’s liberation movement (SPLM) liberation council leadership meetings.

Mr.Simon Kun Puoch Mar, Governor of Upper Nile state returned back to Malakal on 18.12.2013 and addressed the state citizens and the public in speech which was seen as transgressed and haughty .Mr. governor had narrated a number of stories of juba incident where he jealously put all the blames on Dr. Riek Machar Teny and his supporters.

He recited the song that says ” Riek killed dinka-bor in 1991” and that he has repeated again this year; he went on denying any killing of nuer by security agents and special trained militia allied to presidency in Juba that had triggered anger among some military generals and nuer community in the Upper Nile state. Mr.Simon Kun had asured the public and applauded his loyalty to President Salva Kiir and promptedly downplayed any defection in the state.

Nuer elders approached Governor Simon Kun Puoch.

On 20.12.13 ,at least 50 Nuer elders and some government officials including Maj.Gen .Gathoth Gatkouth nicknamed ” Bipour ” ,formerly Upper Nlie State governor ‘s security advisor and Maj.Gen Saddam Chayuot Manyang had approached Governor Simon Kun to persuad him to join looming breakaway of some military generals who were not happy with leadership in Juba.The nuer elders advised , educated the incumbent governor to declare his defection from Juba ‘s regime who have committed war crimes and crimes against humanity to innocent civlians in three days , but nevertheless he had definitely rejected and warned the elders of their security concerned .

During the meeting convened between the governor and the elders, Mr.Kun Puoch and Gen. Gatkuoth reportedly had developed personal grudges and as result; governor Kun proudly exercised his gubernatorial powers and gave Gen. Gatkuoth an ultimatum to leave the state voluntarily in less than 24 hours or otherwise.

Immediately after the meeting, Gen. Gathoth and Gen. Saddam managed to escape and they made it to UNMISS log base to take refuge in for their life and possibly, Gen. Gathoth Gatkuoth (Bipuar) en route to Nasir county overnight and left Gen. Saddam in UNMISS compound.

Mr.Simon Kun and Gen.Gathoth both hails from ”Chie-Thiep” sub clan of Gajiok section of Jikany nuer, Nasir county while , Gen. Saddam comes from gajaak section of Jikany Nuer in Maiwut county.

On 21.12.203, a government vehicle ”four wheels Toyota pick-up” carrying seven Nuer government officials, was ambushed in Baliet county by Ngok Dinka and all fear dead because of their ethnicity, may Heavenly father rest their souls in eternal peace; this have also added a salt to the wound.

Malakal town, the capital of Upper Nile state.

Malakal is the capital of Upper Nile state was predominantly home to many tribes of different cultural diversity , and foreign nationals running their normal and routinely social activities pertaining trades , civil services in government , military services ,studies in schools and university (Upper Nile university-UNU) had expereinced terrible and horrible momments .
It is located along the eastern bank of River nile , approximately 290 miles away north of Juba , the capital city of Republic of south sudan.

I was in beautiful and lovely malakal town pursuing my dreamful future on general degree of veterinary medicine (Hons) at Upper Nile University. As heavy fighting erupted at presidential guards unit ( giada) , later spread to newsite military air forces as well as general army ‘s head quarters – bilpam in Juba ; I and my colleagues , students of Upper Nile University were shocked by unbelievable and disturbing news whilst we were revising and reviewing sheets and our other academic materials to kickoff the final examinations of 2nd semester on dec 18.2013 and on the other hand , the entire population in malakal were preparing for cheerful chrismass in the light of welcoming the birth of Jesus christ , the only begotten son of God and the subsequence occasions of new year.

The 2nd semester examinations did start exactly when the former vice chancellor of UNU Prof.Bol Chol insisted the continuation of university programs regardless of Juba fighting and he had assured the students of their safety in hostels and elsewhere in the town and as such ; the first tests underwent as normal commencing from 18-23 dec,2013.

Insecurity culminated malakal town after three days of intensive security meetings failed.

In the afternoon of 23.2013, traders in malakal big market (سوق الكبير) were told to locked down their shops and all shopping centres and disperse in the pretext of insecurity have reached it peak and culminated the town after three days of intensive security meetings failed. Because of unusual order ,it left the public with no choice , but only panicking, fearing and fleeing .On the same day in evening hours , UNU ‘s adminstration announced the closure of univesity through its dean of student affairs mr.Malony Keer quoting a short statement ” the university is closed until further notice ” and that is all as a result of insecurity in the area. we felt dizzy , bewildered and unhappy .But no choice only fleeing.

At around 9:00-10:00 pm , government officials were seen evacuating their families driving their V8 and pick-up vehicles in high speed retreating northward ,probably to UNMISS compound and beyond towards AKoka , maluet and Renk counties. civilians were worried on that night .
In the morning of 24 dec, 2013 at 05:45 Am people still sleeping on beds ,we heard fierce fighting erupted ; heavy gigling of artillery bombs and light machine gunshots likey heavy rains in the direction of military barrack at hai shawada between SPLA loyal to juba regime undercommand of Gen.Johnson Gony Beliw , commander of SPLA sector two and those of SPLA , police and other organized forces defectors led by more than 8 brigadier generals and number of conels believed to be allied to Dr.Riek Machar. the situation was transfigurated from normalcy to chaos and devastated in matter of minutes , people were fleeing , even dogs were running for their life , their tougues out … life is good.

The Military assault went on till evenning for control of malakal town until the SPLA defectors controlled the town after furious battles and overran the town.
The next morning ,25.12.2013 a day supposedly for Chrismass festival on the birth of Jesus christ , still we could hear bullets whizzing across the town ;no prayers , no network no hope for calm.we didn’t celebrate the joyous chrismass.Members of police and some youth were seen carried out uncontrolable looting in malakal big market .shops were broken and vandalized.

Malakal town recaptured by government troops

Then on 27 .12.2013 exactly at 10:00 Am, government troops launched a strong offensive against the SPLA and other organized forces defectors after they received reinforcement from first infantary division stationed in Renk , the border town with Sudan.The defectors tactically withdrawn and were seen retreating towards south of malakal ,and more likely to Doliep hill.Here , former state government’s official spokesperson and minister of information Mr.Phillip Jeben Wogual was heard speaking over south sudan radio in malakal on 28.12.2013, urging citizens to remain calm as the SPLA have defeated the enemy; he said . on that date, police vehicles also were seen caped with flying white flags showing peace and neutrality.

Following the capture of malakal by government forces , fews citizens returned to their homes , large number of people had congested at bus stations travelling to Renk county and possibly to sudan ,and dozen others remained in UNMISS cmpound . Students of Upper Nile university from Bahr el ghazal and Equatorian regions were evacuated to Juba through paloich airport. Little calm was sensed .But the magnitude of the situation was very volatile.Malakal teaching hospital was flooded with wounded soldiers and civilians caught by crossfire,external wards were created outside the building made with tents ;International committee for red commission( ICRC) staff tried their best in treating the injuries.

The conceit of co-existence was totally hurt , it became loose as my fellows shilluk people were grinding their teeth and grooming the ground, and despisingly blaming dinka and nuer tribes for all impediments and destructions inflicted of peoples of south sudan.

On 30.12.2013 , some SPLA soldiers of dinka ethnic group were accused of taking unlawful jurisdiction into their hands by raping ,targeting nuer youth and looting their properties around hai salam , hai tanmia ,and hai Tarowa outskirts of malakal town..these soldiers were reportedly jailed but later released after intervention of high profiles from military leadership in Juba and this was believed to be the reason behind the defection of Brig.Gen.Marko Liah Chany ,SPLA sector two former chief of military intelligence (MI) after he had narrowly survived an assasination attempt in Juba……….To be continue on Jan 14,2015.

The author, Mr. Gatdiet Peter, is a S. Sudanese and eyewitness of the events in Malakal City, reachable at gatdietpeter@yahoo.com or on twitter @gatdietpeter

Ethiopian PM backs ‘last resort’ South Sudan sanctions

Addis Ababa (AFP) – South Sudan’s leaders could face punitive sanctions from their neighbours as a “last resort” if peace talks fail to end their year-old civil war, Ethiopia’s prime minister said Monday.

The stop-start peace talks, brokered by the east African regional bloc IGAD and held in Addis Ababa, have resulted in several ceasefire deals — but each has been violated in a matter of hours.

The talks resumed last week but have again paused for Christmas, with mediators now laying the groundwork for a major regional summit on the conflict.

“If we fail to strike a deal during the coming summit, the IGAD leaders have been saying that there will be strong actions, including sanctions,” Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn told reporters.

“It is true that there is no clear agreement between the negotiating parties… but that doesn’t mean that things are falling apart,” he said, adding he was nevertheless “frustrated” by the lack of progress.

“In order to implement sanctions, we have to be sure that there is no other options, that this is a last resort. We have patience and we will continue to be patient for some time,” the prime minister said.

Fighting broke out in South Sudan, the world’s youngest nation, in December 2013 when President Salva Kiir accused his sacked deputy Riek Machar of attempting a coup.

The fighting in the capital Juba set off a cycle of retaliatory massacres across large swathes of the country, pushing it to the brink of famine.

Luka Biong Deng: “I was arrested, detained, deported from Yei…”

South Sudan: Who to arrest, detain, search and seize?

By Luka Biong Deng

I was arrested, detained, deported from Yei with my properties sought and seized not by police or national security service but by the Military Intelligence of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) on Sunday 14th December 2014, when I was conducting UK-funded research on strengthening institutions of accountability in South Sudan. After finishing the same research at the national level (council of states and national legislative assembly), Western Bahr el Ghazal State and Terekeka County in Central Equatoria State, I went to Yei as the last area of the research. After briefing the Deputy Mayor of Yei Municipality and informing him about the purpose of research, I was arrested at gunpoint, detained for more than five (5) hours with my properties sought and seized by SPLA Military Intelligence. I was accused of distributing money to mobilize Equatorian youth against the government.

I was later released when the Military Intelligence found no money with me for the alleged mobilization of Equatorian youth but some of my properties are still seized in their custody. Although this incident was an isolated event as the command of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) distanced itself from the event, it raises fundamental question of which institution in South Sudan is constitutionally mandated to arrest, detain, search and seize? This question is important as our parliament will soon discuss the National Security Bill, 2014 that was hurriedly passed but rightfully returned by President Salva Kiir to the Parliament to be reviewed in the light of serious concerns raised by the public about the Bill.

While one appreciates the right decision of President Salva not to assent to the Bill, the next phase of discussing this Bill should be subjected to a careful public scrutiny. The way the Bill was passed by the Parliament may need to be critically reviewed. The parliament has constitutionally obligation to make public to know about what happened so that such practice would be avoided in the future. The Parliament can either undertake its internal audit or to form an independent investigation committee to look into the way the Bill was passed.

When I was invited by South Sudan Human Rights Commission to be part of the panel in commemorating the Human Rights Day on 10th December 2014 under the theme “Human Rights Everyday”, I made it clear that the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan, 2011 defines the mandate of National Security Service in Article 159 (e) that states: “The National Security shall be professional and its mandate shall focus on information gathering, analysis and advice to the relevant authorities”.

The genesis of this constitutional provision of the mandate of the National Security Service goes back to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) as Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) insisted to discuss and to clearly define the mandate of National Security Service in the CPA. Specifically, the Power Sharing Protocol that was signed on 26th May 2004 stated in section 2.7.2.4 that National Security Service shall be “professional and its mandate shall be advisory and focused on information gathering and analysis”. The same provision about the mandate of National Security Service was included with the same wording in the Sudan Interim National Constitution, 2005. It is clear that the National Security Service is not constitutionally mandated to arrest, detain, search and seize.

Unlike the National Security Service, the Police Service’s mission is clearly defined in the South Sudan Transitional Constitution, 2011 in Article 155 (2) “(a) to prevent, combat and investigate crime, maintain law and public order, protect the people and their properties, and (b) uphold and enforce this Constitution and the law”. How such mission of the Police Service is to be discharged is detailed in the Southern Sudan Police Service Act and criminal procedure law that mandated, with due legal process, the Police Service to arrest, detain, search and seize.

In revising the South Sudan National Security Service (NSS) Bill, members of parliament may need to look carefully at the sections of the Bill that are related to powers of arrest, detention, search and seizure with the aim of either deleting or carefully reviewing them in the context of the provisions of the constitution and the due process of law. In particular Section 12 about the powers and functions of the NSS should be restricted to the constitutional provisions in Article 155 and as well provided for in sub-section 12 (h) of the Bill. The other sub-sections ((a) to (g)) of Section 12 of the Bill should be deleted.

Section 50 of the Bill is about the powers to arrest and it gives not only the officer of NSS but any member appointed by Minister of National Security or Director General of NSS the power to arrest without a warrant and to exercise all the powers of police service in carrying out the powers and functions of NSS. This is the most serious Section of the Bill as it contradicts the provisions of Article 155 of the Constitution as well as creating overlapping of functions with the Police Service.

This Section 50 of the Bill should be deleted and subsequently Section 51 of the Bill about the rights of a person under arrest, detention and confinement will be redundant and should also be deleted. The provisions of Section 51 of the Bill contravene with provisions of Bills of Right particularly Article 19 of the Constitution about fair trial.
Specifically, Article 19 (2) of the Constitution clearly states that “any person who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his or her arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him or her”. Also Article 19 (4) of the Constitution states that “a person arrested by the police as part of an investigation, may be held in detention, for a period not exceeding 24 hours and if not released on bond to be produced in court. Specifically, Section 51 (a) of the Bill states that “any person arrested or detained shall be informed about the charge or charges against him or her within 24 hours”. As such the Bill provides only for informing the arrested or detained person about the charges within 24 hours rather than informing him or her at the time of arrest of the reasons for his arrest as provided for by the constitution. The Bill is also silent about the period for holding a person in detention as the constitution makes it very clear that the period for detaining a person for investigation should not exceed 24 hours.
Other Sections of the Bill such as sections 18 and 52 regarding complaints against members of NSS and their immunity from criminal proceedings respectively may require serious revision so as to ensure that such complaints are adequately addressed and such immunity is not abused.

It is important that we should strengthen our institutions not by providing them with excessive functions and powers that may stifle their effectiveness and may intervene with other functions and powers of other institutions; a recipe for institutional conflict. With my personal experience in Yei, it is absolutely important that the role of Military Intelligence to be clearly defined so as not to overlap with the functions and powers of police and national security service. What I have observed in Yei is that the power to arrest, detain, search and seize is being exercised by police, military intelligence and national security. This has resulted in conflict between and among these institutions and has weakened the capacity of security apparatus to maintain law and order in the area.

Certainly, the National Security Service is an important institution in the light of increasing security threats facing our new nation. Internally, South Sudan faces serious challenges that threaten the very survival of our new nation. Serious economic crimes are being committed with impunity. The current crisis has equally shown the narrow national security interests and foreign policies that are pursued by most of our neighbouring countries to maximize their narrow national strategic interests in South Sudan. In fact South Sudan has become a battleground for regional and global interests. With increased fragility, South Sudan is becoming a breeding ground for international terrorism, particularly the threat of political Islam at our doorstep from Sudan. All these security challenges are compounded by our country being a landlocked country with bad neighbours, particularly Sudan that will continue to pose a real threat to the stability of South Sudan.

What our National Security Service needs is not more powers and functions to arrest, detain, search and seize but rather more capacity to strengthen its ability to gather information and to analyze such information and to disseminate such information for relevant institutions to take actions. If our National Security Service could be able to collect and analyze internal and external security threats to our new nation, the relevant institution will be in a better position to discharge their functions on an informed basis. Rather than arresting, detaining, searching and seizing properties, the National Security Service would supply its analyzed information upon which the Police Service could act on to arrest, detain, search and seize properties of any suspected person in accordance with the law.

By focusing and specializing in areas of relative comparative advantage, our institutions would be able to be more effective and more cooperative rather than competing with each other. Passing a National Security Service Bill that would strengthen it to perform its constitutional mandate is a necessity and all of us we should be ready to assist our National Security Service to become effective and a reliable source of intelligent information needed to put our country on the path of peace, prosperity and stability.

Luka Biong Deng is a Director at Centre for Peace and Development Studies, University of Juba. He is a Global Fellow at Peace Research Institute Oslo and Associate Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School. Deng can be reached lukabiongdeng@gmail.com, luka_kuol@hks.harvard.edu

Crisis Group Report: Jonglei – “We Have Always Been at War

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP – NEW REPORT

South Sudan: Jonglei – “We Have Always Been at War

South Sudan’s Jonglei state is emblematic of the regional, national and local challenges to peace and of the limitations of trying to resolve a conflict by engaging only two of the nearly two-dozen armed groups in the country.

Despite eleven months of peace talks mediated by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), South Sudan’s civil war threatens to intensify in the coming weeks. Most of the nearly two dozen armed groups in South Sudan are, at least nominally, allied with President Salva Kiir’s Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army (SPLA) or former Vice President Riek Machar’s SPLA-in-Opposition (SPLA-IO). Yet most of these groups are not battling for control of the central government and their casus belli is different from that of Kiir or Machar. Some groups are fighting over land and representation in state and local governments, while others are caught in cycles of revenge attacks that began with atrocities against members of their community. Crisis Group’s latest report, South Sudan: Jonglei – “We Have Always Been at War”, calls for IGAD to enhance its political presence in South Sudan, to better engage with armed groups and to ensure talks in Addis Ababa reflect the diversity of armed interests on the ground.

The report’s major findings and recommendations are:

• Jonglei state’s mix of violent ethnic militias, armed political opposition, intercommunal clashes and dysfunctional governance were part of the tinder that led to the outbreak of South Sudan’s civil war a year ago. Today, civilians are displaced and starving, and a return to war is all but guaranteed. While the government has the upper hand militarily, interminable rebellion and continuing regional interference point to a turbulent future.

• The trajectory of the war in Jonglei demonstrates the dangers of limiting IGAD’s peace process to only the government and Riek Machar’s SPLM/A-IO (Sudanese Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army-In Opposition). IGAD should expand its political presence in South Sudan to engage more directly with the various armed groups – including non-South Sudanese ones – and the communities that support them. Engaging these groups is critical to building support for a future peace agreement and to ensuring that Salva Kiir and Riek Machar cannot use these armed groups to undermine talks or an agreement.

• The multiplicity of armed groups and their independent nature suggest that far more effort should be dedicated to discussions about security arrangements that go beyond the government and the SPLA-IO.

• Much of the political work should be done in South Sudan, not Addis Ababa, and IGAD should carefully assess which conflicts require resolution at the national level and which should be addressed at the local level.

• Engagement with armed groups will lay the groundwork for the national political processes and transitional arrangements that are needed for a sustainable peace once a deal is reached in Addis Ababa.

“This war cannot be resolved by engaging only two of the nearly two-dozen armed groups in the country and ignoring those that have not yet entered into the fight”, says Casie Copeland, South Sudan Analyst. “IGAD should enhance its approach, which already includes regional and national tracks, with strengthened engagement with armed groups to move the peace process forward”.

“As the case of Jonglei illustrates, armed groups continuously assess their alliances, make and break them frequently, and will do the same with respect to the benefit or detriment they perceive from a peace agreement”, says Cedric Barnes, Horn of Africa Project Director. “Kiir and Machar have built their coalitions on these shifting sands and any deal between the two could fall apart if their constituent groups don’t see an advantage for themselves. This calls for more systematic engagement at the community level”.

Executive Summary | Full Report PDF

South Sudan: Merry Christmas and a Prosperous New Year

By Kur Wel Kur,

Dear my beloved country,

As I write this note the strawberry-coloured and woolly-white materials covered the streets and neighbours’ houses, symbolising Christmas, a celebration of enormous power of forgiveness and love of God to humanity. A Christians’ faith!

However, I acknowledge fully, these two colours (red and white) in my homeland in this particular time don’t mean the same thing as in the rest of the world. In my country, South Sudan, the red flag waggles side to side in the hands of blood-thirsty and trouble makers; who even with their Christians’ names cannot respect Christmas! With their ill-intentions, they attacked the trucks carrying civilians’ food supplies on Nimule-Juba highway.

Brig Lul Koang, the spokesperson of rebels, aired these remarks:

“The gallant SPLM/SPLA Forces under the command on General Martin Kenyi marked the day this morning by closing Salva Kiir Mayardit lifeline to the outside world linking him directly to his mentor President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda.”

Millions of people in the peaceful continents and countries spent their hard-earned tax payers’ money to fund for South Sudan’s peaceful resolutions to the one-year-old conflict because people in South Sudan are, ‘such friends that they would burn their arms for them’. Millions of South Sudanese in the country and in abroad poured the visible and invisible tears for the fallen loved ones and they shouted at the top of their lungs in prayers to God so that peace may come; however, the bandits ‘with stupid thinking who keep dropping their own handkerchiefs internationally and expect others to pick up for them’.

My country is dotted with dried bones, products of war; a war, which with no peace will claim other vibrant souls; souls full of earthly lives as I scribble this note will pay for desires of securing ‘respectable and wealthy’ seats in the government. South Sudanese can explain and diagnose the conflicts in South Sudan but we need God to come into our rescue as soon as in this month (December, 2014). So I am writing this card to wish South Sudan, a country of my birth, a Merry Christmas.

Dear my country, in the faces of tribal wars, of government officials’ corruption, of power greed, of a life of debauchery, of humans caused abject poverty, and of spreading lies, I am sending this CHRISTMAS CARD.

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People of my country, God chose each of us in a swarm of sperms (4.5 million) (excuse my language) and relayed to us a job of choosing our ways out of 10 million people in our country and in 7 billion people in the world today! So we could wiggle our ways in systems and become leaders who would end up killing their citizens; or we could choose to wallow in pools of citizens’ blood, enriching ourselves with bloods’ money; or would choose to be self-proclaimed writers who shout, pouring out divisive words on other side of canyons; or we would choose none!

I can name all professions or crimes in the world today or in the past, but that’s not the gist of the writings on this card.

As I look back in the history of Christians’ faith, the Grace and Love of The God we believe and worship, is so immense! In this time of the year, God saved humanity by sending the altruistic, wise leader and saviour, Jesus.

In the lifespan of our planet and in the existence of humans, God has continued to send the followers of our saviour, Jesus, to construct nations, our country included, and to instruct citizens to make the world/ nations better place(s). So South Sudan, my country, you will be constructed and instructed by Jesus in this year coming!

With these words, I wish you a Merry Christmas and a prosperous year; a year free of bloodshed!

Yrs. Kur Wel Kur.

Christmas Letter to President Salva Kiir Mayaardit

“People’s Peace”, not “Leaders’ Peace” is desperately needed General Salva Kiir Mayardit for the Christmas Season and New Year

By Deng Kur Deng

 

Dear President General Salva Kiir Mayadit,

I write to you today as both a supporter of your Presidency, but also, as a concerned citizen of South Sudan. You earned the authority to govern South Sudan because of your uninterrupted sacrifices for your people. You fought for us, and we are very grateful for your service. Your involvement in the Anyanya One and in the mighty SPLM/SPLA is the living evidence of why you deserve your post as the President of South Sudan. Many of us know that you have witnessed war after war in response to injustice from the government in the united Sudan. But as we speak, our country has been wrecked by war, and we do not know who it will benefit when in fact it is only killing our people. However, the South Sudanese concerns remain steadily concentrated on war, which is why I must ask you, General Salva Kiir Mayardit, are you not sick of the war? I will leave this question for you to answer, if you have chance to read this letter. Personally, I will not hesitate to express how I feel about war.

First, I have been a member of the SPLM/SPLA since I was a little boy, so I have been devastated by the war like everybody else. In all honesty, I was already sick of war twenty years ago. I am not the only person who is concerned; in fact, I know for sure that our people are indeed sick and tired of war. All I have ever known, like so many other South Sudanese children and adults alike, has been war after war. I am sick of it. As a person who served through it all, you bore the desperation of our people on your shoulders for peace. After our people fought hard for the independence, many of us thought it was the end of struggle. Unfortunately, now, it is very easy to get mobilized by the politicians/generals who fantasize about war, yet in doing so, we forgot to remind ourselves of what we fought for collectively as South Sudanese people.

Many of us know that you, President Salva, care about the welfare of the people of South Sudan, which is why you fought in both brutal civil wars. Those who have indirectly and directly sparked this current crisis are not interested in the welfare of the people but rather in the blood of the people. They rallied our people behind them, but in the end, they butchered these very people, without fear of any repercussions from the legal system. In fact, the system allowed them to do more damage. That is the true tragedy — that this damage was carried out by our very own people.

All of us in South Sudan seemed to have a common wish: to be safe, to protect ourselves, and to prosper. However, these wishes are just fanciful dreams for many South Sudanese people. Most of us are extremely concerned that children are no longer inspired to attend school amidst the violence in the country — a choice that puts our country’s future at risk. So I am compelled to ask you, General Salva Kiir Mayardit, to bring back Dr. Riek Machar in order to allow the country to stabilize. I understand that reinstating many of the generals is equivalent to inviting more killing, but Mr. President, we have no other choice if we want to avoid another civil war and stem the recent resurgence of violence in South Sudan. Machar’s return may also help address dysfunctional structures in our government, and shift our nation’s focus away from ethnic differences and onto economic growth, education, and health care — institutions that are constantly threatened by violence.

At present, our country is handling the current situation by acting as if people have not been hurt by the crisis, which, sadly, has become the norm in South Sudan. Political greed is not problematized by the average citizen, because fear is rooted so deeply in our people by the ill-informed politicians and military leaders. Given that it is still very hard to distinguish between the rebels and the people who support the government, our people are scared for their lives. This fear reflects the faulty logic employed by those who are currently manipulating people for their own interests.

At some point, when Dr. Riek decided to run for office, I became one of his supporters. However, like many others, I thought Dr. Riek would seek a fair election. When he decided, instead, to take a shortcut, he lost the support of many people who he had recently won over, solely because he took us back to war. He has restored domestic turmoil in our nation, and since many of us do not endorse violence whatsoever, we no longer can singularly support him. His actions have taken away any empowerment whatsoever that children may have developed over the last few peaceful years. The loss of hope among the South Sudanese youth is enough of a reason, in and of itself, to take a stand. It is your obligation as President to restore peace in the country.

Mr. President, this may not be the right time to talk about corruption, but many of your constituents are certain that greed had already infiltrated the political system before the war, and now, the results are before our very eyes. There is no trust between the people, the politicians, and the military leadership (namely the generals), so it is time to restore trust by starting to hold greedy politicians and generals responsible for their actions. If a leader breaks the law for selfish reasons and is, whether directly or indirectly, destabilizing the country, that leader must be handed a punishment that is fitting of the crime — be it anything from a formal reprimand to an execution, whatever is appropriate.

During our country’s first days, I dared to complain about these consistent pains that our people continuously endure, but in our less progressive society, I’m not sure anyone was listening. Even today, I feel like whining to a different person almost every day may not solve our problems in South Sudan, but YOU and many South Sudanese can. So many of your people still believe in you. However, we feel that you must be part of sincere change, and soon, in order to have a positive effect on the rising turmoil.

The people’s lack of trust in their leaders is a frightening signal, especially when many of those people are not supporting either side; regardless of who is in power, our people mistrust all authority figures. As the war drags on, this lack of confidence is becoming even more overwhelmingly ridiculous, given the scale of mass murders of innocent lives. You would think that as casualties only increase, more people would try to support the government’s response to violence, and yet that is not happening. I could be the next of many disenchanted South Sudanese to target to those so call politicians and generals who are known criminals and who bring grief and anguish to the people. But when we only talk about these select few criminals, especially those who regularly appear in the public spotlight, it’s as if we are blaming the majority (of those in power) for the criminal actions of a minority. It is just the odd nature of reality, but many leaders on the ground are ill-informed about the corruption of a few South Sudanese politicians and military personnel. We cannot completely understand a lot of what is going on right now, because the country only recently emerged from civil war, before and during which, many innocent people suffered under the Sudanese government. Now we are back at it, only now, even less-informed politicians and generals are trying to make useless bids for power by killing their own people. They believe that they gain power by outdueling their opponents, but the innocent citizens pay the price for this violence. Without adroit action, we cannot do much on the ground to correct many of the problems facing the country. With that in mind, we the people still feel numbed and confused by the strategies these generals and politicians are utilizing.

Those who are preaching peace are often doing the opposite. Many South Sudanese have only just realized these individuals calling for peace are using the same ideals and methods as those who are killing other South Sudanese people. In such a mess, there is no radiant future for the whole country, only for those who subscribe to the same political and culturally ideology. Politicians and other leaders are tearing down their rivals in gatherings that are intended to be platforms for peaceful discussions. Consequently, these private disagreements have provoked a public outcry, because the country has not reached, what many countries would call, “self-sufficiency” due to constant violence. When leaders preach the language of violence, it only does more damage to people. We remain very confused, torn between what we hear and what we see.

For that very reason, peace is absolutely critical for the revitalization of the country. And for that reason, your citizens are asking you to lead us by securing that peace. We are impressed by how you have thus far handled the crisis in the country, but there is more to be done. Security measures have widely changed in Juba since for number of months, as people reflect on the conditions in the streets, markets, and social areas. Citizens can see these improvements to security, and there is an overall good feeling about Juba. I want to personally extend a special thank you and to those in charge of security in the capital for making Juba a safer place.

However, the distribution of power remains a serious concern. The considerable, often unchecked, internal authority given to leaders is often the very reason why many of the generals are carrying out the worst attacks on their own civilians without any restraint. There is no other powerful body to hold them accountable, which makes the public vulnerable. We the people have delegated you to take ownership of the country’s responsibilities, so we must insist that you raise the bar and hold your deputies accountable. In fact, we are quite disturbed when you let people who speaks on behalf of voiceless suffers. For example, Deng Athuai’s voice embodied importance of the democracy in the country, so protect Deng Athuai. Charles Handy had once said, “Few will thank the leader when things go right, but many will blame the leader if things go wrong”, so many of us are blaming you for something you have little control over. We have stumbled, but we have not fall yet as a country. Life still has a meaning.

On our part, we the people of South Sudan knew that supporting the war from any side would be counterproductive and would eventually turn against us one way or another. Yet we are still filled with anguish for the same reason; we could not comfortably support the war even if we wanted to, because of its self-inflicted components. It is degrading that so many citizens are barred from participating in the development of the country, when we were the ones desperately hoping to change things for better. It has been very hard to ingratiate ourselves with people who are not up for change, but we are persistent with our cherished hopes. Even though war has drained much of the hope from abled bodies, our country desperately needs us — and we, in turn, desperately need you.

Our country is still unorganized, as war has scrambled everything that we fought for. War has wholeheartedly overshadowed the efforts made by the leaders we admire. Our doubts are many, especially since the services our country now offers are not well-aligned with the promises made by our leaders — promises introduced over the course of the civil war. In general, Mr. President, most of us are not asking for a highly precise governmental system at this early stage, when the political structure is not yet stable, but securing and maintaining peace is our ultimate desire. You are capable of recognizing what is unsuitable for South Sudanese people, and therefore you have a responsibility to mobilize people to take appropriate action against anything that threatens the well-being of the South Sudanese people. Mobilize us around PEACE. You may have signed a Cessation of Hostilities (CoH), but it has not materialized because people are not taking it seriously, which defeats the purpose entirely. My point is simple, Mr. President: Please sign a real peace — a PEACE for people, not PEACE for the leaders.

Sincerely,

This letter was written by Deng Kur Deng , he can be reached at: pananyangajak@gmail.com.

The Christmas Letter on the Quest for Peace in South Sudan

By Deng Lual DeNuun

The great blessing of mankind are within us and within our reach and the real blessings often appear to us in the shapes of pains, losses and disappointments, but let have patience and give peace a chance. While it is an unfortunate fact that people must secure peace after preparing for war, it’s now high time to stick to love, hate is too great burden to bear. Just like Martin Luther King said, “Like an unchecked cancer, hate corrodes the personality and eats away its vital unity. Hate destroys a man’s sense of values and his objectivity. It causes him or her to describe the beautiful as ugly and the ugly as beautiful, and confuse the true with the false and the false with the true”. The quest for peace doesn’t need petrodollar to purchase neither it nor believing in the strength that peace is achievable when a tribe expanded their ribs to fight the nation but through understanding. Not just peace but the one with justice for all.

The land with great abundance natural resources, land of the blacks, rich and blessed in diversity realized its dream and finally saluted their martyrs’ whose their expensive bloods cemented the foundation as coated in the pride of our national anthem of the Republic of South Sudan. Sadly, something that started like a political rift within the party turned out to victimized innocent children, women and all the villagers in their huts, cattle camps and farms and most entrepreneurs in big towns butchering numbers and forcing many to flee again to seek refuge either internal or external without their knowledge… what they were expecting to pay back in huge debts from their leaders ironically cleansed or deprived them of their hard earned living while the fruits is being harvested in big foreign cities by these very leaders causing havoc.

We are not the makers of history, we are made by history because this world came first, after hard gained struggle for liberty we returned to war within ourselves, the Killing of Nuers in Juba triggered the war and led to the subsequent genocidal atrocities committed in Bor twice in history and elsewhere, December 15^th will ever remain another D-Day in history of South Sudanese people. Just three days after Juba blast, December 18^th , That night I had forty wink completely innocent to think of big heart throbbing sounds of heavy artillery will befall me again after decades since the last one I had in Kapoeta back 1991, suddenly I was wrong, my friend Ojulu Ochalla whom I was working with and had that night together just at the west of the riverbank woke me up vigorously Deng, Deng wake up, fighting in Bor, then I woke up figuring what could my next hope be, then I said, God have mercy on your people.

This 2^nd rebellion in history (of the SPLM) spearheaded by the former Vice President, Dr. Riak Machar Teny Dhuorgon will ever go down, the man who is determine to robe Peter to pay Paul in the name of democracy….. Riek Machar who believes that he is more democratic than any other South Sudanese simply because he is the giant of blood of the South Sudanese people. You must know that nothing in all the world is more dangerous than sincere ignorance and conscientious stupidity, while I understand that wars, revolutions and battles are due simply and solely to the body and its desires. All wars are undertaken for the acquisition of wealth; and the reason why we have to acquire wealth is the body, because we are slaves to its service and I must stand tall and say “RIEK MACHAR IS TOO EXPENSIVE TO MAINTAIN”, South Sudanese must know this. You simply failed a simple test set to you by God, when it was almost to forgive and forget the memories and the scares of 1991 that were still vivid and the cleansing you did in Juba, no doubt that you have NO difference with the pig and the coconut tree, one of the trees that gives NO shading at all hence people don’t rest under it. Just after Juba 15^th, you went straight to Nasir and exhumed the archives of the 1991, same people murdered again, same towns set on fire, capturing or recapturing and the tactical withdrawal filled the air.

Dr. Riek Machar reinstatement to the SPLM on the ground to allow CPA be signed in unity of the Southern People became a privileged to the SPLM top leadership that they became too drunk like a cock when is drunk, he forgets about the hawk and I reiterate the quoting by the VP Wani that, when the big dogs are fighting over the bones, another intruding dog snatch the very bones they are fighting for. In real sense, why would these politicians/leaders claim for reforms in pretext to positions?,… too why would they demand reforms just after their reshuffled and last not the least, why would they claimed that someone has failed when they were the very ones serving in their capacities or hypocrisy in disguise?, these questions and many others makes the very civil population at the grassroots lingering and questioning their rebellion. It is vivid that Kiir government underperformed and continue to do so in maintenance to these greedy bullies, most of them if not all were involved embezzling the public money, some were Ministers and failed to link feeder roads to our remote villages, poor health system surrendered to Donor money and carried out by the government in the name of (NGOs), the ministry of Water and Electricity were nicknamed by the citizens as ministries of water tanks and generators respectively and eventually wants to believe them that they are good and their complain are just? No, the witness of a rat is another rat.

Eventually, Mr. President, the civil population is watching you, they know your government has completely failed to deliver but they remain firm in support for your legitimacy, all the politicians accepted that they have all failed, you been favoring them to loot the public fund now its high time to pay back to us, a decade is gone and nothing much has been realized, long-term frameworks have occupied the ministries, you have the rights to listen to us, a cobbler always wears the worst shoes. Both of you must accept peace as tool to prosperity. Merry Christmas and a happy new year.

The Author, Deng Lual DeNuun can be reached by mail denglual86@gmail.com

The Unrecorded Stories of Extraordinary Feminists Among the Dinka Community (Part 1)

THE AMAZING STORY OF ANEI DENG DE NGOOR

 

By Amer Mayen Dhieu, Brisbane, Australia

In most socio-historical headlines, we do find sensational stories of important people who have helped shaped social and cultural order of our time.

However, none of the recorded stories have deservingly showcased histories of our great women that are considered to be cultural icons such as Anei Deng de Ngoor, Apul-Magengdit, Commander Ageer Gum Akol, to mention but a few.

These extraordinary women, unlike some of our women in this generation, didn’t just show up and find a historic voice in a gender-conscious generation and time. Behind their fame and credits lurked great obstacles that were either cultural, political, social or economical.

Yet, these pioneers didn’t just prevailed at all odds arrayed against them but also excelled to be the most influential women whose determinations and courage and stories can be used as a model to inspire today women to pursue their dreams.

Unfortunately, many remarkable stories about South Sudanese women went down the history unrecorded. Hardly any of our books or newspapers has published the untold stories of this unprecedented group of women from different places in South Sudan.

No one has adequately recorded the amazing stories of our great women whose combined legacies are a testament to the feminist spirit among our people. Their pioneering, courageous works broke through the male-imposed gender chained that had, and continue to, deny our sisters and mothers their rightful and God-given roles in the society.

Though our people are yet to recognise the sensational contributions of these revolutionary women, there is still hope out there that our today opinion writers, book authors and historians are gathering stories that will be remembered and debated later by future generations.

Had we this group of gender-conscious writers in the past, I believe the extraordinary story of Anei Deng de Ngoor would have long been a guiding post for young South Sudanese feminists of today.

I was six years old when I heard about Madam Anei Deng de Ngoor from Twic East, Nyuak Payam, Ayual clan, Roordior section of Paan-Kueer. I can only remember her coming to my house to pay visit to my dad. Someday it could be a mere visit and someday it can be to discuss some administrative cases at a time when my dad was Nyuak’s chief.

Very often, Madam Anei visited our house but never sat near my mom. She always proceeded to dad’s room and would discuss, and discuss, till noontime with some other local chiefs from Twic East.

One afternoon I ask my mom: “Who is that woman and why does she always sit where men are?” Mom said her name is Anei Deng de Ngoor, a representative of certain section in Ayual. “She is not a woman, she is a man,” mom whispered.

I was lost for word. I didn’t completely understand what the heck she meant. Physically Madam Anei was a woman, she was wearing skirt and blouse, sometimes a dress. I stared into mom’s eyes looking for more information.

After few minutes of deafening silence, mom started again and said, “menthdi (my child), it is rumoured that Madam Anei didn’t have any brother in her family and for her father’s name to reign she decided not to get marry off but to marry a wife for herself instead.”

It was, however, today that I learnt that Madam Anei have brothers. She was married but for some reason her marriage didn’t work (or didn’t manage to have children) and therefore she had to come back to her family and started a brand new life with new thinking full of determination that ultimately helped her have wives and children of her own.

When Madam Anei returned to her parents, she decided to enter into business to earn some money and livestock so she can marry her own wives and have children of her own. She was also given a privileged place by her brothers to be one of them. That is, she was entitled to be given a cow from any of her sister or nieces’ marriage.

In business, Madam Anei succeeded remarkably and became one of the richest icons in her clan.

Right now she got five wives with a great number of children that called her daddy. Madam Anei’s brothers are the sperm donors, but Madam Anei herself is the real father. She carries out all the fatherly responsibilities and duties.

Madam Anei gave up her romance and sexual needs. She got no husband but wives that she barely kiss, hug or touch, yet she remains faithful to them and maintains her role as a father and husband to her wives and kids.

Madam Anei’s decision to have wives was not inspired by western culture of gay rights or lesbianism since at a time the Dinka people didn’t even know what that concept was. It was engendered by a pure selfless love and honour to her father’s name and herself. Without such sacrifices, Madam Anei’s name would have been extinct by now in her family lineage.

Rather than thinking too much about the biological side of the story, we should all be humbled and inspired by her selfless love to her father.

Nonetheless, the most important case in point is that, Madam Anei’s story, like other untold stories of women of her kind, is the first standout story among other extraordinary stories that would surely serve as inspiration for generation of women to come.

It does not only educate us about how to fix a broken glass but also how to look for other potentials when the old glass is completely broken.

Do we still think that our women are not great? Do we still think that they have not contributed and sacrificed so much in family and clan, and at the state and national levels? If you think that they are great, and have contributed their fair share in building our society, then give them their rights.

Because Madam Anei’s choice of life was duly supported and appreciated by the male members of her clan, she performed outstandingly well. Our women need that support and recognition to be vital members of our communities.

Bor Town: The City of Great Wrestlers

By Malith Alier, Juba

Traditional wrestling is a multilateral cultural event popular among cattle owning communities of South Sudan. It is the most popular event among the Dinka on the eastern and western banks of the Nile. The Dinka and Mundari in Jonglei, Lakes and Central Equatoria States practice it all the time.

Traditional wrestling is truly a multilateral event accompanied by dancing, singing as well as courtship among young people. It is the test through which young people assert their strength and fame that comes with it.

The up and coming potential wrestler(s) invite the well known existing wrestler(s) so that the contest decides who the next top wrestler is. If the existing wrestler still has some steam, he continues until next time.

In a period of one week I was in Bor, I saw more than five contests organised among several sub clans as preseason rehearsals. The coming dry season will see tens of contests organise going forward to 2015.

Wrestling among the promoting communities is a sport like no other. The modern sports like football and other games are just an addition to this traditional muscle sport.

Many wrestling sports activities were organised in Juba from 2011 and the attendance was phenomenal. The wrestling triangle of Jonglei, Lakes and CES showcased their wrestling talents to the whole nation before and after the Southern referendum of 2011.

A few names of wrestling greats are still in memory. Majok Jok, Ajang Garang, Deng Adol, Muor ci Kueng, Jada, Gore Mapak and many more still generate interest in wrestling.

Wrestling as a sport has many benefits. It is where people meet with friends. The wrestlers can also meet new friends and acquaintances.

What is very interesting with wrestling is that many songs are composed against opponents on the one hand and for self praise on the other.

The hit song for the year 2014 in light of Riek’s rebellion goes like this:

……………….( ran de abi dhuk ror ci Riek Machar) meaning another gentleman will go back to the bush like Riek Machar………….

Though Riek and forces have caused so much destruction they were forced out to the bush just like in 1991. The power of Riek forces cannot match that of the government just like the power of one wrestler against another is not the same.

Lead South Sudanese Musician (Gordon Koang Duoth) Commemorates the December 15th

Mekonen Tefere, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

In event organized by Gajiok Nuer Community in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Gordon Koang Duoth and Micheal Pal Rik raised their concern about the last year massacre in Juba through newly composed songs.

Gordon Koang who is a lead musician in South Sudan elaborated his heartfelt about the incident that happened last year in Juba.

The Chairman of Gajiok Community in Addis Ababa, Mr. Wiw Tung Wiw who organized the commemoration urged the whole Community of Jikany to remain united and appealed to any Jikany Community members to honor the lives of Nuer who perished in Juba. “Do not support the genocidal regime in Juba.” Wiw warned loudly.

Gordon Koang directed his concern to Gordon Buay Malek Chol and advised him not to interfere with musician. “I dismiss Gordon Buay’s statement which claim that God instructed me [Koang] to quit singing on the current crisis.” Koang warned Gordon Malek to refrain from his words and urged him to withdraw his propaganda as soon as possible. “It’s not good for my brother Gordon Buay to jealously act like this!! I’m a musician, should he choose to deal with me, that would be more dangerous for him.” Gordon Koang warned.

Gordon Koang appeals to IGAD and International Communities to address the root cause of the conflict and question why the truce take longer. Gordon Koang Duoth openly said that ‘Federalism’ is the best style of leadership to govern South Sudan. “I support Federalism and I need it”, Koang commented.

In separate interview, Simon Gatwech Met Koryom questioned the leadership that exists in Juba and inferentially underlined that the atrocities were committed by Juba regime from 16-19 December 2013 on innocents Nuer civilians. “Although things fall apart in Juba, now it’s time to find an amicable solution for this war.” Met Koryom narrated.

Meanwhile, Gajiok community has been mourning the death of more than 20,000 Nuer who had been killed in Juba. The commemoration started from 19-20 December 2014 in which Gordon Koang and Micheal Pal joined them.

Both [musicians] declared Salva Kiir as an illegitimate president and urged the International Community to closely monitor the crimes committed by him [Kiir] in order to get ready for International Criminal Court (ICC).

The Chairperson for South Sudan Nuer Youth Union in Ethiopia, Mr. Koat Gatkuoth Thoat welcomed the proposal by Gajiok community for appealing to [the] Nuer community around the World to remain united and for the root cause of the conflict to be addressed by IGAD. Koat commented in public gathering at the second day of commemoration in Addis Ababa.

“Although the community had been hurt, we need to keep the spirit of unity among ourselves.” Mr. Gatwech Ruach Bol, a South Sudanese Canadian added.

Furthermore, Gatwech Tut who studied Peace and Security Studies at Addis Ababa University was among the attendants. He urged the warring parties to drop their demands and work for peace.

Godon Koang Duoth said that if this war is to be used as a tool for self-benefit, two things are luckily to happen. These are:

The regional war and punishment from God – on those states who are responsible to calm the senseless war, but silence while kids, women and elderly people die every minutes in South Sudan. “We, as musicians need nobody to die. We neither need Riek Machar nor Salva Kiir to die, but we need Kiir to resign for peace to come”, the King of Musician Group represented by Gordon Koang finalized.

Both warring parties are progressing on the negotiation table in Addis Ababa in which their discussion trapped on the position of two ministries and control of the armies’ forces during the would-be Transitional Government of National Unity.

Finally, the Head of Security and Organizing Committees for the Commemoration Day, Gatwech Hoth Wal appreciated his friends who voluntarily work during the last two days and Gajiok community for commemorating the December 15 Nuer massacres. “You mad it! The days were calm, clear and safe”, Hoth Wal said.

The author can be reached on: mekonentefere@gmail.com

Tribalism is not Profitable to our Nation

The Spirit of Nationalism

One Nation, One People

By Daniel Machar Dhieu, Juba

I

I have a duty to share my thoughts on tribalism with those who look up to me for guidance in the spirit of One people, One Nation as our president initiated to us from the beginning of violence until now, for the benefit and stability of this nation and also tribe has nothing on development but as the main cause of the crisis. Furthermore, I salute all comrades who made it possible to defense this country from coup plotters of 15^th December 2013 despite of your tribe; you really make it and defeat those who did it.

To those who revolt against the government with the aims of dividing our nation into tribal state you are completely condemned by the die-heart of this nation. On other-word, the mentality of being loyal to one’s tribe than to one’s country or other social group is wrong. I am proud to be born and raised in South Sudan this is my homeland and I will make sure that I help my country in developmental insures. However, I am not proud of the fact that tribalism has found a fertile ground in our country. In other words, there is nothing wrong to belong to a tribe but we should not destruct our nation using our own people to disgrace our independence that is not our mandate as citizens of this country.

There is nothing wrong to practice as per the constitution of the Republic the cultural and traditional norms of that particular tribe. However, it is wrong to use one’s tribe negatively and retrogressively and this is where we are seen by our fellow compatriots as possessing monopoly of tribalism in South Sudan.

Let us face it. Tribalism is not profitable. It is a fact that, not everybody specializes in tribalism. The authentic tribalists are numerically few but very tactical. These are disgruntled members of our community found in Public Service, in Political Parties, in Villages and even in Church of GOD. They have a strong say and influence within their community. They have many supporters whom they mislead and sometimes they acted negatively toward nation building.

To them, tribalism is in their heart-point and it is their second religion. Most of them are highly educated and are able to mislead traditional authorities to act as they wish. They target traditional authorities because traditional authorities are the custodian of values and norms. They use the tribe as a vehicle and people as tools to achieve their desired individual goals.

The reasons for practicing tribalism is always centered around competition over limited natural resources such as land dispute, grazing area, competition over government position, competition over government services, competition over political positions and even competition over church positions. They refuse to solve conflicts peacefully instead they resort to tribal conflicts.

Tribal conflict is not in line with the constitution of the Republic of South Sudan or any country. Tribalism has the potential to disturb peace, political stability and derail socio-economic development because no one will want to work or invest in a conflict area.

It is unfortunate that instead of us investing our energy and time in eradicating poverty, hunger and diseases we are tribally sorting each other out as enemies of their owns. Our brain size is overloaded with tribal thoughts of how to destroy each other.

II

In actually sense tribalism has block our route to development and has totally make us build selfishness in the government. We see no good in each other. We see evil in each other. We mistrust each other. We mistreat each other. We misuse our position of trust. We misguide, misdirect and dilute the minds of the young people with tribal indoctrination. We make tribal mistakes but we do not learn from them. We misunderstand each other and yet we must build South Sudan together.

Tribalism invites misery. Our highly local leadership, including our able Regional countries such as east African countries and international communities such as United Nation (UN) and united State of America (USA) and other few genuine international agent Leaders are on record in warning us the people of South Sudan to refrain from tribalism instead we switch-off our ears and switch on tribalism network. I would wonder, if our president Salva Kiir and rebel chairperson Dr. Riek Machar are to meet in Ethiopia Capital, would they run from each other or would they embrace each other as people from the geographical origin of South Sudan? It is a question? And I need an answer, now.

Further, as a citizen of this nation and independence Journalist I have already observed that South Sudan a new state has a high number of registered both local and international Companies compared to other countries. Economically, it is employment creation which is good but security wise it is a security threat. Imagine a situation or should they remain on tribal war as by now, surely some of the owners of these Companies will use their guns and ammunitions for self-defense against other tribe especially there security companies that got registered to our government such as KK security agent and many more on list. The end result will be loss of life, revenge killings, untold suffering, displacement of people and the list is long. This is a serious national security threat and the state must think twice.

As a young person and Journalist of this nation, I want to humbly and respectfully appeal to my elders at the left side of my body and the right side of my body because my body is them and I am them to guide me and all young people of South Sudan towards a progressive platform of Anti-Tribalism Movement and say no, NO to tribalism and yes emphatically YES to unity and nationalism. It is possible.

I want every people to return back into history and copy the good / hard times when those who were in Anya-Anya 1 and Sudan People Liberation Movement/Army could seat together and plan about freedom of black people of South Sudan. This is our time and the future is ours. We need to change the minds of some of our elders who are highly intoxicated with tribalism.

The growing distance of animosity between president Salva and Dr. Riek Machar must be solved by themselves. As such I propose a Joint national Conference to talk about tribalism, its manifestation and how best we can expose hostile elements who brew tribalism within our community. The national conference resolutions could mount a more anti-tribal movement concrete programme of action for a better South Sudan and for a better future.

So let us organize the conference ourselves and leave our government to achieve its set priority areas of its demand. I remain open for new ideas or better alternatives from any progressive South Sudanese.

The writer is a student at South Sudan Christians University in Juba; you can reach him through machardhieu@gmail.com

SPLM: a tool for liberation vs. a forum for socio-economic development

The SPLM/A as a tool for liberation vs SPLM as a forum to initiate and implement development, and to seek justice from. The idealized world vs the realized world.

New UNMISS Human Rights Special Report: Rebels’ Attack on Bentiu, Unity State, 29 October 2014

UNMISS HRD – Rebel Attack on Bentiu October 2014

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About the report:

This report offers preliminary findings concerning allegations of gross abuses of human rights and serious violations of international humanitarian law committed by opposition forces when theyattacked Bentiu on 29 October 2014. It is based on investigations conducted by the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS).