Posts Tagged ‘Dr. John Garang’

What is Government in the View of Dr. John Garang? Dr. John Garang Talking to the SPLA Military Officers about Leadership and the Role of the Government in Readiness for the Post-CPA Era in the Republic of South Sudan

Transcripted by PaanLuel Wel, Juba, South Sudan

CPA

The Genius of Dr. John Garang: Speeches on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA); Paperback – November 26, 2015 by Dr. John Garang (Author), PaanLuel Wël (Editor); get a copy on Amazon USA or Amazon Australia

November 27, 2015 (SSB)  —  With the advent of peace, comrades, we have reached a new phase of our armed struggle, a new phase of transforming the guns and the bullets—that is military power—into political power, and using the political power to achieve socio-economic development rapidly. This is because there is no meaning of revolution—the revolution is meaningless, unless it makes our people happy, unless the masses of our people, as a result of our glorious revolution, become prosperous.

Socio-economic prosperity quantifiable with the degree to which people go ahead and advance in their individual and communal lives: they get food, they get shelter, they get clean drinking water, they get healthcare services, they get social amenities, they get economic infrastructure such as roads, they get jobs and so forth. Unless we provide these essential services to our people, unless the revolution provide these things to our people, then the people will prefer the government of the NIF that provide salt to the government of the SPLM that does not provide anything to its people.

This is simple arithmetic: if the SPLM cannot deliver anything and we just shout REVOLUTION! REVOLUTION!; and yet the cattle of the people are not vaccinated; their children are not vaccinated or sent to school; there is nothing to eat, there are no roads, there are no basic necessities of life—there is no cloth, no needle, not even a razor blade—when the barest minimum of essential things of life are not available, then the people will drive us into the sea, even though there is no sea here, they will find one. Mind you, we have no other choice.

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The Battle for the SPLM’s Chairmanship Heats Up!!

By PaanLuel Wël

Our former VP and current Deputy Chairperson of the ruling SPLM party, Dr. Riek Machar, has announced that he would “soon hold a press conference to address the nation on the party’s future and other pressing issues in the country.” Specifically, Dr. Machar is going to “unveil resolutions passed against the actions of the party chairperson Salva Kiir, also South Sudan’s president.”

Demo-cracy or Demo-crazy?

Demo-cracy or Demo-crazy?

In the layperson’s language, this is nothing short of reading the riot act to Salva Kiir Mayaardit–the chairperson of the SPLM party and the President of the republic of South Sudan.

Many questions are crying out for answers. Are the disgruntled members of the SPLM-Politburo, many of whom were recently fired from the cabinet, going to gang up behind Dr. Machar and “relieve” the Chairperson of his duties “in the interest of the party and for the sake of the nation”? How will the President, who have of late gone on decreeing spree unperturbed, react to such naked political challenge to his perceived “constitutional authority”?

Will President Kiir back down peacefully (as Dr. Machar did after his dismissal from the government) and take respite from his addictive decreeing habit? Will he ratchet up the political pressure and take on his political opponents?

What leverage do Kiir’s political competitors have over him? What else can the President do other than his recent actions–their dismissal from the cabinet and the dissolution of the SPLM-PB?

However, what most South Sudanese people are wondering over is the final lineup of the factions that would compete, first for the position of the SPLM chairmanship, and secondly, for the office of the President of the country. Some crude form of the factionalization within the SPLM appears to be crystallizing, albeit ambiguously.

First is what seem to be a public knowledge already–Kiir’s detractors in the person of Dr. Machar, Pagan and Nyandeng. While they have been relentless in their opposition to President Kiir for sometime now, the question is whether or not they would eventually succeed to put aside their internal differences (there are many internal contradictions, one of which is whether Pagan and Nyandeng would accept to serve under Dr. Machar given his past) and coalesce into a formidable political force.

That would be a matter of political survival for the duo though, for they could still re-unite with President Kiir just as we saw this week when the President made an unexpected political coup against Pagan & Nyandeng’s camp by (snatching and) appointing Nhial Deng as Pagan’s replacement–Juba’s chief negotiator with Khartoum over the outstanding issues. Dr. Machar’s political rapprochement with President Kiir, though not entirely improbable, is highly complicated by the fact that VP Wani Igga won’t be ready to give him a free ride this time round.

If Machar-Pagan-Nyandeng axis survive its tumultuous infancy and graduated into a fully fledged political force, who will they take on other than President Kiir? Most likely, it would be Kiir-Wani-Lam’s alliance. Yes, Dr. Lam Akol shouldn’t be counted out. Not yet! If you are in Juba, then you must have heard Mach-kuol tales of Lam being groomed as the next National Minister for Environment–replacing the recently dismissed Abdallah Deng Nhial.

All indications point toward that eventuality. Dr. Lam, a long time traitor, was received like a rock star, with all state security and amenities at his disposal, when he recently landed in Juba, after years of self-imposed exile in Khartoum.

After all, politics is the art of possibilities. With Pagan gone, President Kiir would be tempted (if not already convinced) to take in Dr. Lam, killing two birds with one stone in the process.

Firstly, Dr. Lam, who has the absolute loyalty of the Shilluk’s voters (look at the MPs, how many SPLM MPs are from the Shilluk kingdom?) will surely prop up Kiir’s numbers during the Presidential election. Secondly, with Lam in the cabinet, it would be hard for the critics to accuse Kiir of marginalizing the Chollo people.

Of course, many people from the Kiir-Wani’s camp would be aghast at the thought of them sharing political bed and platform with a character like Lam. That is true, except that the Machar-Pagan-Nyandeng’s camp won’t dare to question the credentials of Kiir-Wani-Lam’s camp while they have their own elephant in the room. It is therefore safe, politically, for Kiir to bring Lam on board without the slightest worry of being branded a Khartoumer for associating with Khartoumers. “Those people in the glass house should not be the first to throw the first stone”, Kiir would be telling anyone within ear-reach to emphasize his point.

With all things considered, it is Kiir-Wani-Lam camp vs Machar-Pagan-Nyandeng group that would possibly define political trend in the country. Who will carry the day in the contest for the SPLM chairmanship and for the highest office in the land–the presidency? Will it be the former or the latter group? Will it be two camps as posited above or will more factions spring up?
Will these political camps usher in the politics of personality and tribalism or of ideological struggle? What is Kiir’s vision for the country? What is Dr. Machar’s, Pagan’s, Nyandeng’s etc.? And the voters: should we sympathize with them or are they simply getting the government and the leaders they deserves, to paraphrase the Hon. Mansour Khalid? The jure is still out there! The voter will decide, or so consoles the myth!!
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PaanLuel Wël (paanluel2011@gmail.com) is the Managing Editor of PaanLuel Wël: South Sudanese Bloggers.
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Product Details
The Genius of Dr. John Garang: Letters and Radio Messages of the Late SPLM/A's Leader, Dr. John Garang de Mabioor (Volume 2) Paperback – November 27, 2013

The Genius of Dr. John Garang: Letters and Radio Messages of the Late SPLM/A’s Leader, Dr. John Garang de Mabioor (Volume 2) Paperback – November 27, 2013, ON AMAZON.COM

The Genius of Dr. John Garang: Letters and Radio Messages of the Late SPLM/A’s Leader, Dr. John Garang de Mabioor (Volume 2) Paperback – November 27, 2013, ON AMAZON.COM

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AN EXCERPT FROM THE BOOK

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CAPTAIN JOHN GARANG’S 1972 LETTER

TO DOMINIC AKECH MOHAMMED

Southern Sudan

February 5th, 1972 

Dear Dominic:

Thank you for the correspondence you dispatched to this end on January 25th, instantly. Very lucky, I go them today from Kampala through the lorry. It is lucky because I am leaving tomorrow morning for the interior, about 500 miles footwork from where we last met and I will not be back for over 7 months, maybe more.

Find here enclosed a copy of a letter I wrote to General Lagu and the negotiations committee (See Captain John Garang’s 1972 Letter to General Joseph Lagu of Anyanya One, January 24, 1972). I have handwritten it (it is 2:00 a.m) since I have packed my typewriter for tomorrow’s long journey. You may type it and if necessary you have my permission to use it BUT AFTER the negotiations ONLY so as not to prejudice the same. As you can see I am not in favor of these so-called negotiations nor do I have any illusions that much will come out of them. What is more, a settlement with the enemy at the present time is not in the best interests of the Southern Sudanese people, the Sudanese people and the African people for some of the reasons given in the attached seven page letter (refer to Captain John Garang’s 1972 Letter to General Joseph Lagu of Anyanya One, January 24, 1972).

Firstly, the “solution” will be no solution since the Arab military dictatorship of General Numeiry seeks to “solve” the problem within the spirit of Arab Nationalism and the context of a United Arab Sudan. Secondly, the Numeiry regime is illegitimate, a regime of blood, rhetoric, instability and theft, it is only a matter of months before the Numeiry clique is couped out of office by a similar scum of political prostitutes. To sign a “settlement” with such unstable barbarians is criminal and makes one a member of that gang though in a different outfit. Thirdly, the conditions for permanent revolution have not as yet been sufficiently created within our own motion.

The objective of liberation (of armed struggle) is firstly the riddance of oppression and exploitation and the simultaneous creation of conditions and structures for the permanent (continuous) release of our productive forces, which have been so historically damned, deformed, stunted and impeded by exploitation, oppression and humiliation. This last point is central as it focuses on the essence, the particularity of our movement.

About my role as Information Officer for the Anyanya, it is true that there has been such talk, but after I finished my infantry training last October, I made a concrete analysis of the situation and objective factors indicated that I could not make my total contribution in that capacity. You know what I mean. And if that be the case, it would be an intolerable situation. I joined the Movement with total commitment and dedication. I have sacrificed (I don’t consider it so) all the benefits paper dehumanizing education is supposed to confer on the dehumanized, decultured native holder, I am resolved to give the ultimate sacrifice, my life, for I am bound by nothing else but duty and commitment to Africa and the African people starting with the Southern Sudanese people, as a matter of course. African liberation can only primarily be effected through combat and everything else must be built around the combat, must enhance and give political character to combat. 

The Genius of Dr. John Garang: (Volume 1)

It would take me a book to go into analytical, historical and practical exposition of this line, but it is sufficient to say that this is why I turned down the “Information” work and chose active combat, and so tomorrow I go to the interior to (eventually soon) take over command of a full battalion. War is war, should anything terminate my usefulness (services) to the African people and revolution, it is incumbent upon you to continue with the struggle and/or to prepare the children and generations to come for the revolution. It is our duty.

I am indeed sorry about brother Vuzi Zulu that he comes at a time I have to leave. It would have been my duty and pleasure to cooperate with him since I presume we are engaged in the same revolution. (I would have also found that out). At any rate, pass my regards and explanation to him on his return. Some other time we shall meet.

Yes, I shot all the five colored films you gave me. After the training I went to Kampala but failed to develop them, as they don’t have facilities for developing Ecktochrome film in Kampala. When Allen Reed came he took them to Nairobi and they were developed and printed on slides. He then returned them and gave me a bill of 80/= (eighty Uganda shillings) which I promptly paid and I got all the slides. Two days later he came to me in Bumbo (twenty miles from Kampala) and begged me to borrow him some of the slides to teach his (Southern Sudanese) photography cadets who were there assembled in Kampala and that he would return them the following day.

He went and disappeared, till now I have not seen him—a complete breach of trust. Please convey the charge of theft to him from me, and collect those slides from him, I had actually told him that I was going to send them to you. The balance, I have left them locked up in Bumbo as I could not send them in time expecting Allen to return the borrowed ones and then send them in lump. This concurs with your other remarks.

Also please convey my sincere appreciation to FOPANO, ANAM, and OFPA for their endorsement “in principle” to cooperation with you and the Movement in our “efforts towards the liberation of Africa” and to Roy Inis and Core for the inclusion of “the Southern Sudanese Liberation Movement” in its support of African Liberation Movements.

Tell those citizens of Africa, snatched away from the great BLACK womb of our Mother, that time has come for their consciousness and ours on the mainland to merge (again) with one big black consciousness that will pull Mother Africa from the bloody teeth of the monster and usher in the total release of our productive forces long damned, deformed and impeded by centuries of oppression, exploitation and emasculating humiliation.

Greetings to all our students and brothers.

Brother Garang Mabior Atem

Southern Sudan, February 5th, 1972

Dr. John Garang Speaks: The Call for Good Governance in the Republic of South Sudan

What is the Government in the View of Dr. John Garang? Dr. John Garang Talking to the SPLA Military Officers About Leadership and the Role of the Government in Readiness for the Post-CPA Era

Transcribed and Edited by PaanLuel Wel

With the advent of peace, comrades, we have reached a new phase of our armed struggle, a new phase of transforming the guns and the bullets—that is military power—into political power, and using the political power to achieve socioeconomic development rapidly. This is because there is no meaning of revolution—the revolution is meaningless, unless it makes our people happy, unless the masses of our people, as a result of our glorious revolution, become prosperous. Socioeconomic prosperity quantifiable with the degree to which people go ahead and advance in their individual and communal lives: they get food, they get shelter, they get clean drinking water, they get healthcare services, they get social amenities, they get economic infrastructure such as roads, they get jobs and so forth. Unless we provide these essential services to our people, unless the revolution provide these things to our people, then the people will prefer the government of the NIF that provide salt to the government of the SPLM that does not provide anything for its people. This is simple arithmetic: if the SPLM cannot deliver anything and we just shout REVOLUTION, REVOLUTION; the cattle of the people are not vaccinated; their children are not vaccinated or sent to school; there is nothing to eat, there are no roads, there are no basic necessities of life—there is no cloth, no needle, not even a razor blade—when the barest minimum of essential things of life are not available, then the people will drive us into the sea, even though there is no sea here they will find one. Mind you, we have no other choice. The old Sudan has really been based on a fiction, on deception.

Hakuma—the government, is considered to be something that has a heap of resources, a heap of money, that it has the money; it has the resources. And then people want to take from the government; people want to loot these heaps of resources, these heaps of free money from the government. Comrades, there is a big contradiction here, you see, a government that has impoverished its citizens, a government where citizens are very poor to support themselves, to make a simple living, that kind of government cannot have anything, it cannot have heaps of resources, heaps of money, because where else, if not from the citizens, will the government get its resources, its money from? It is from the people, it is from production that a government obtains its resources from, because Hakuma—the government, in and of itself has nothing. What is the government by the way? What is it? Ye monydiit yinde—what kind of an old man is he? Where is he from? Remember that people that are poor have a poor government too and people that are weak have a weak government too. These are natural facts because where else will things fall from, which part of the sky? It is only when people are strong, then they will have a strong government, it is not the other way around; it is only when citizens of the country are rich, then they will have a rich government, it is not the other way around. Our concept of the government has misleadingly portrayed the government as a power thing with a lot of resources, and people want to benefit from it, to milk it. It should be the other way round, for it is the people who must be very productive in order to make their government a big thing with a lot of resources, to make their government strong. There is no any other way other than that.

This misplaced conception of the government is the major problem haunting many developing countries in Africa and in the world, because the administration, public administration, has become the biggest industry in many African countries, including the Sudan; it absorbs a very big portion of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In fact, the administration should only facilitate production, should provide a conducive atmosphere for economic production, should provide the optimal situation for production. So the New Sudan, beginning with the Movement now because there should be no passing between the Movement now and the New Sudan, for it is the Movement that merges into the New Sudan. There is no other time that we shall say we are now entering the New Sudan, that we have now arrived in the New Sudan, because it is the Movement that develop into a New Sudan, we are actually already in the New Sudan. Therefore, there is no other time coming for the arrival of the New Sudan, we are already there and in it. So the New Sudan, beginning with the Movement now, must be based on concrete production, on real economic production, we must produce things; otherwise we will have no future. Now, by saying that let’s us start with nothing and get a lot, and end up with a lot of resources. This can be done; it is doable comrades. Some of our places in the countryside are very productive: Koor-Chum is very productive, Maruah is very productive, the area between Raat and Pochalla is very productive—this is alluvial soil from the Boma plateau.

But in order to be economically productive and viable, in order for our economy to be based on concrete, real production, we must rid ourselves, our people, and our country of the aid dependency syndrome. Food aid from the UN has destroyed our work ethics; it has destroyed our people since from Itang and from all the refugees’ camps. We will organize our food production system, and anyone who wants to eat relief food, the UN humanitarian food, they should go and be refugees in Kenya or in Uganda or in any other country, but not here. And let the relief food be distributed to them there. Anyone who lives in agricultural areas, let them plant and grow their own food. Our civilians should grow their own food; they should practice and engage in agricultural activities, for it is the civilians themselves that will be feeding the soldiers protecting the country. Even the army that is not engaged in direct war, let them farm. Then we can confidently and proudly tell the relief peoples that ‘take away these dirty beans of yours and go away with it, we don’t need it anymore’. We are going to do this, because the only way you can have something is to be economically strong. And in that strength, from that power, we will create our own resources; nothing falls from the sky. When we liberate the country tomorrow, we got to work! We must work in order to get things. Nothing is going to come free. And we are going to dismiss these relief peoples because they are the ones destroying our country! They make people lazy. People say that relief food will come, why I should I bother to toil, and if the relief food doesn’t come my dear people, what will we eat? Therefore, we must depend on ourselves; we must learn to rely on our own resources, our own food, produce within the country, not dirty beans donated from outside. This is very important for our economic viability and political stability as a nation. It has to be done; it must be done because there is no other option, no other alternative. Do we want to be the worst copycat of the past and present Khartoum regimes? Then why did we allow ourselves to die in vain and our people to suffer for no reason? Where is the promise? Where is the vision? People will ask and you will be expected to provide the answers.

Lastly, we must tackle corruption in our society, not just within the corridors of power, within the government. You see, our people view the government, the role of the government, in a very strange, frightening way. The government is seen as an object to be looted. For example, when somebody become a minister, five years later the people will start saying, look at the son of so and so, he has been a minister for five (5) years and he has not even built himself a hut, he has no car, not even a suit. This is the root cause of corruption in our culture, in our country and in Africa. The same people that are ready to cast the first stone on you are the ones that will shout the loudest how the son or daughter of so and so has not even bought himself a suit, built herself a nice house or bought the latest car. As a leader you have to know where your priorities are and what your vision for the country is; otherwise, you would get distracted and end up plundering the country in the name of building yourself a hut, in the name of buying a suit or a new car model.

This is why we in the SPLM/A need to have, must have, a clear vision about the social, political and economic development strategies and priorities. We must accomplish this or else we would end up just like the various governments that have come and gone in Khartoum. We were not fighting them because they are Arab or Muslim or Northerners: it is because they were not delivering on anything that any citizen in any country in the world would rightfully expect from his or her government. If the SPLM/A-led government does not deliver on its promises, it will be doomed like various governments of the North. To govern is not a God-given right to be taken for granted; it is a social contract between the governed and the government of which each side, particularly the government, must abide by and fulfil its side of the bargain. Otherwise there would be Intifadha and you are thrown into the Sea, into the Nile.

By Gray Phombeah
BBC News website


John Garang was a government army officer sent to quell a mutiny of 500 southern troops who were resisting orders to be shipped north. It took him 22 years to come back.

John Garang

Garang fought for more than 20 years

Thus began the story of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, which fought one of Africa’s longest-running wars between the Christian and animist South and the Muslim, Arab-speaking North.

Instead of following his superiors’ orders, Mr Garang went on to encourage mutinies in other garrisons and set himself at the head of the rebellion against the Khartoum government.

 He was one of the few senior southerners who really believed in the concept of a united Sudan 
Peter Moszynski

Between 1983 and the peace agreement signed in January 2005, Sudan’s civil war took nearly two million lives and left millions more displaced.

The war officially ended and John Garang was appointed first vice-president – a position he held for only three weeks before he was killed in a helicopter crash.

Dodging bullets

With his beard, bulky physique, and jet-black skin of his Dinka ethnic group, he came across as one of the most complicated rebels on a continent that has seen every shade of self-proclaimed revolutionaries and liberators.

The rebel leader with a PhD in Agricultural Economics from the United States spent his early and middle life in the bush planning to blow up oil wells.

Despite his being at the centre of the Sudan conflict for so long, very little was known about Mr Garang the man.

John Garang

A military man who believed in a military solution for his country

He was, at best, described as a difficult man caught up in a complicated war.

“Becoming Vice President after 22 years leading a guerrilla army in the bush John Garang was an expert in survival: someone who knew how to bend with the wind yet maintain his political objectives, someone who knew how to seem all things to all men,” says Peter Moszynski, a Sudan specialist who covered the war for many years.

“Above all he was someone who understood the cardinal rule of political longevity: keep your friends close but your enemies closer…

“He was also one of the few senior southerners who really believed in the concept of a united Sudan and his passing will greatly strengthen the call for secession”

Gill Lusk – deputy editor of Africa Confidential and a Sudan specialist who interviewed the ex-guerrilla leader several times over the years – described Mr Garang as a proud man.

“He’s a man with charisma and his leadership qualities are quite obvious,” Ms Lusk told the BBC News website.

“He’s very much a professional military man, a man who believes he’s clever.

“He likes grand ideas, and has a great sense of humour – at least among his people.”

Blowing horns

John Garang was born in 1945 into the southern Dinka group famous for worshipping the sky, playing music on ram’s horns and their love of roast meat.

His family was Christian and he went on to study in the United States.

He studied at Grinnell College, Iowa, and later returned to the US for military training at Fort Benning, Georgia.

Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir

President Bashir came to an agreement with Garang

Mr Garang’s first taste of guerrilla warfare was at the start of the civil war with the southern-based Anya Anya movement in 1962.

Ten years later, the Khartoum government signed a deal with Anya Anya and the south became a self-governing region.

Mr Garang and others were absorbed in the government army and moved to Khartoum.

But five years after oil was discovered in southern Sudan in 1978, the civil war erupted again – this time involving the government forces and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, SPLM, and its military wing, the SPLA.

The ideological profile of SPLA was as shadowy as Mr Garang himself.

 John Garang did not tolerate dissent and anyone who disagreed with him was either imprisoned or killed 
Gill Lusk

He varied from Marxism to drawing support from Christian fundamentalists in the US.

There was always confusion on central issues such as whether the SPLA was fighting for independence for southern Sudan or merely more autonomy.

Friends and foes alike found the SPLA’s human rights record in southern Sudan and Mr Garang’s style of governance disturbing.

Murky world

“The SPLA has definitely changed quite a lot over the years for the better,” Gill Lusk said as the war ground to a close.

“But in the past it was guilty of committing serious human rights violations in southern parts of the country.

“John Garang did not tolerate dissent and anyone who disagreed with him or the leadership was either imprisoned or killed.”

Government prisoner

The SPLA was accused of human rights abuses

In the murky world of guerrilla warfare, John Garang survived attempts on his life from those within and outside his movement.

“He outfoxed everyone else by being cunning, by staying one step ahead,” says Peter Verney, editor of Sudan Update and Independent Information Services.

“You can tell by the type of security around him whenever he travels.”

But he was credited for keeping the movement together through turbulent times.

By 1986 the SPLA was estimated to have 12,500 armed men, organized into 12 battalions and equipped with small arms and a few mortars, according to Sudan specialists who monitored the war.

By 1989 the SPLA’s strength had reached 20,000 to 30,000 and rose to between 50,000 to 60,000 in 1991.

Statesman

Speaking before his death, Peter Verney said a new Garang had been emerging out of the ashes of Sudan’s bloody war.
“He was aloof before, very much to himself.”He has been consistent,” Mr Verney argued. “He has been carrying the hopes and aspirations of southern Sudanese – and he has known all along that they would ditch him if he didn’t deliver.”

“But we are seeing him now becoming more approachable, becoming a politician, even a statesman.

“There is a new sense of dignity and openness about him – or perhaps just PR.”

His premature death leaves an unfulfilled mission, and great uncertainty in the south.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2134220.stm

By Yasir Arman

Tomorrow the 30th of July, as we commemorate the memory of Dr. John Garang and celebrate his life and contribution as well, he would be one of the rare Sudanese who can be honored on the divide of both countries and by many Northern and Southern Sudanese and by Muslims and Christians.  He was and he is above the divide being ethnic or geographical, and he had crossed many areas on this great divide.  And as we all know, Dr. Garang was his vision, the vision of the “New Sudan”, a vision that was essential and in essence based on the commonality of the Sudanese historical and contemporary and what brings the Sudanese together in the past, present and future, the peaceful co-existence and the common wealth that respects diversity of all forms.
Today Dr. Garang is not around, but his vision never dies.  In actual fact, South Sudan and North Sudan they cannot do much without his vision.  They are both very diverse and the massive majority of the two countries are marginalized and only the vision of the New Sudan can deliver peace, food, democracy and stability.  Both countries cannot achieve progress without true recognition of their diversities in a true democratic state that respects human rights, the rule of law and accountability, builds a caring society that would address the issues of marginalization including women’s rights and taking “towns to people, not peoples to towns”, the famous jargon of Dr. Garang.  The two countries are in need of such a great vision. 
Dr. Garang was a true democratic Pan Africanist who believed in the unity of Africa from Cairo to Cape Town and as charity starts at home, he was for the unity of Sudan and he made the biggest attempt to preserve that unity on a new basis against all odds.  Now as we have two Sudans, the vision of Dr. Garang remains valid and needed by both countries, and it is also valid to re-unite Sudan, a unity between two independent viable countries and democratic states that share the same values.  The present situation full of challenges and liabilities that can be changed into assets requires a huge work and struggle by all democratic forces in the two countries.  Areas such as Blue Nile and South Kordofan can be and they should be a role model of economic and social integration between the two countries given the historical and social ties as well as the rest of the border states between the two countries. 
As we commemorate and celebrate the life of Dr. Garang by those who are from Northern Sudan, for us Dr. Garang is a true son of Northern Sudan as well as of South Sudan.  He is a point of the link between the two countries and a great hero of our lifetime, and in my humble opinion, he was the most important Sudanese personality in the last century, and it will take both Sudans fifty to one hundred years to bring a wonderful charismatic leaders such as him, full of sense of humor and intelligence, a real human being.  The good news is that his vision remains valid and never dies.  In fact, it is the only game in town for both Sudans.
Yasir Arman
 
July 29, 2012

Dr. John Garang and the New Sudan Vision (video)

Posted: April 30, 2012 by PaanLuel Wël Media Ltd. in History, Reports, Videos
Tags: ,

A speech by John Garang was created by Hisham Haj Omar.

John Garang was a true revolutionary and thinker, who passed away when he was needed the most. Through this speech we get a glimpse of his visons of the New Sudan. A vision of overcoming racisim and heading towards unity and growth. With this the late John Garang leaves us with an unfulfilled dream and a legacy that may one day see the light.

Dr. John Garang and the New Sudan Vision (Research Paper)

JOHN GARANG AND SUDANISM: A PECULIAR AND RESILIENT NATIONALISM

A SENIOR PROJECT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE HISTORY DEPARTMENT IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
BACHELOR OF ARTS OF HISTORY-CALIFORNIA POLYTECHNIC STATE UNIVERSITY, SAN LUIS OBISPO

BY MATTHEW J. DELANEY
SAN LUIS OBISPO, CALIFORNIA
JUNE 2010

http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context=histsp

DR. JOHN GARANG – KHARTOUM PRESS CONFERENCE BY TELEPHONE

Posted: April 13, 2012 by PaanLuel Wël Media Ltd. in History
Tags:

KHARTOUM PRESS CONFERENCE BY TELEPHONE

By Dr John Garang de Mabior: 17/11/1999

1. Greetings in the name of the New Sudan and our martyrs. I salute the heroic struggle of the Sudanese people. I salute our youth, students, workers, farmers, professionals, trade unionists, and NDA activists. These are the forces of the Intifadha that overthrew the Aboud dictatorship in October 1964 and brought down Numeiri in April 1985. I greet all the marginalized Sudanese everywhere in the countryside from Nimule to Halfa, from Genneina to Kassala, in the streets of our Capital and in camps for displaced people around the capital. Special greetings to our women, who are the “marginalized of the marginalized”. I greet you all in the name of the New Sudan. I wish you all a peaceful beginning of the New Millenium without Turabi and the NIF.

2. Our country has never witnessed peace and stability, as it has been at war within itself for 33 of its 43 years of independence. Sudan is a microcosm of Africa, characterized by religious, cultural and ethnic diversity. Yet all Khartoum governments have emphasized only two parameters of our reality, Arabism and Islamism, as the basis for the unity of the Sudan. In 1983 Numeiri decreed Sharia as the supreme law of the land, while in 1989 the NIF took over power in a military coup and declared their objective as establishment of an “Arab-Islamic state”. In May 1998 the NIF passed into law an Islamic constitution and the Sudan formally became a theocratic state.

3. This is the fundamental problem of the Sudan, the failure to manage our rich diversity, and instead to impose one religion, one culture and now one minority political party (the NIF) on a large and heterogeneous country. As a result the majority of the Sudanese people became marginalized. With the rise of the NIF to power, all Sudanese became marginalized, whether Arab or African, rich or poor, Muslim or Christian. The Rashaida, for example, are marginalized and have taken up arms against the NIF. Except for less than 5% of the population that are members of the NIF, I would say that more than 95% of the Sudanese people are marginalized.

4. The SPLM/SPLA was formed in 1983 to address the fundamental problem of the Sudan, to abolish the Old Sudan and establish a New Sudan; a new political dispensation; a Sudanese socio-political entity; a transformed Sudan in which all Sudanese are equal stack-holders regardless of their race, tribe, religion, or gender; a democratic Sudan where religion is constitutionally separated from the state; a Sudan in which governance is based on popular will, the rule of law and respect for universal human rights.

5. This means that there must be fundamental change that addresses the root causes of the Sudanese problem, for otherwise there can never be peace and stability in our country. In order to achieve fundamental change, the NIF must be removed. We will use a combination of all forms of struggle including the Intifadha, armed struggle, and negotiations leading to peaceful dismantling of the regime. The SPLM/SPLA advocates the convergence of the two principal forms of struggle, the armed struggle and Intifadha, as the most effective way of removing the NIF regime.6. Recently there has been talk about the NDA negotiating and reconciling with the NIF in a national conference. I would like to clarify SPLM/A position on this issue. The SPLM/A is committed to negotiations and peaceful resolution of the conflict. However, such negotiations must lead to the dismantling of the NIF regime. In South African the contribution of armed struggle was marginal. Apartheid was negotiated out of power. Hence, from the point of view of the SPLM/A, NDA negotiations with the NIF must lead to “peaceful dismantling of the NIF regime”. We cannot reconcile with the fascist NIF regime. The NIF regime cannot be reformed or improved, it must be removed.

7. Furthermore, the struggle of the people must not be compromised in the pretext of peaceful settlement. There must only be one peace initiative and this is IGAD. However, a modality must be worked out whereby other initiatives, such as the Egyptian-Libyan initiative could find expression in the IGAD process. The NDA is also an interested party in the Sudanese conflict, and their interest must find expression in IGAD.

8. In 1995 we rejuvenated the NDA and issued the Asmara Declaration. The Asmara Declaration is a minimum programme of the NDA to remove the NIF regime and transit to the New Sudan. The NDA is a suitable organizational form for achieving the objectives of the Sudanese people. The unity of NDA is therefore very important and it has become synonymous with the unity of Sudan. I urge all forces that advocate fundamental change to organize under the umbrella of the NDA, and transform it into a viable weapon of struggle against the NIF regime and for achieving the New Sudan.

9. Yesterday, Beshir talked of a foreign invasion and called for mobilization to counter this imaginary threat. There is no foreign invasion from America or from anywhere else. Moreover, the SPLM/SPLA would not support any invasion of our country. This lie is a clear indication of the crisis within the NIF. The NIF has failed. It is divided within itself. They are fighting against each other for power, not for the interest of the people. The Situation in the Sudan is ripe for fundamental change. The NIF must go and will go.

10. Another clear indicator of the crisis in the NIF is that Turabi sent me a letter recently. He asked me to make a dramatic move. What dramatic move can I make? It is Turabi that must make a dramatic move. I call on Turabi to relinquish power, to hand power back to the Sudanese people. The NIF has also talked of handing over confiscated property. I call on Beshir and Turabi to hand over the confiscated rights of the Sudanese people.

11.  Finally, I would like to assure all the Sudanese that the SPLM/A is fully committed to democracy, justice for all, and to the unity of our country on the basis of New Sudan. The struggle must and will continue until the NIF regime is removed and the New Sudan established. The struggle and revolution of the New Sudan is spearheaded by a coalition of the forces of the Intifadha in our cities and the marginalized peoples in the countryside. I want to assure them all that the NIF regime has reached a crisis point of no return. The NIF must and will be removed. This is the decisive historical moment for the forces of the Intifadha and the armed struggle to converge. And this time the victory of the Sudanese people will not be hijacked. The removal of the NIF regime must end in the birth of a united and strong New Sudan.  John Garang.

SECRET

FROM:  EBONY

TO      :  TIGER AND ALL THE FOLLOWING:

  1. All Members of the SPLM Leadership Council
  2. All SPLM Regional Secretaries
  3. All Commissioners of SPLM Secretariats
  4. The Chief Justice and all Members of the Court of Appeal
  5. All Deputy SPLM Regional Secretaries
  6. All members of the SPLA General Military Council (GMC)
  7. All SPLA Deputy Chiefs of Staff and GHQ Directors
  8. All Front Commanders and All Front Chiefs of Staff
  9. All Commanders and D/Commanders of other Organized Forces (Police, Prisons, Wildlife)

10.  All SPLM County Secretaries

11.  SRRC Executive Director, Deputy and the five Regional Directors

12.  All members of various SPLM Delegations to IGAD talks since 2002

ATTN: Attention of the Following Comrades who shall constitute the Meeting Organizing Committee

  1. Cdr. James Wani Igga (Political Affairs Commission)
  2. Cdr. Nhial Deng Nhial (Foreign Affairs Commission)
  3. Cdr. Deng Alor Kuol (Bahr El Ghazal Regional Authority)
  4. Cdr. Elijah Malok Aleng (SRRC)
  5. Cdr. James Kok Ruea (Peace and Reconciliation Commission)

INFO: ALL UNITS

04/11/2004

  1. Reference my 001/11/2004, dated 14/11/2004, to all units concerning rumours emanating mostly from Nairobi and elsewhere, and reference Message 013/11/2004, dated 19/11/2004, from the Deputy Chairman and COGS, Cdr. Salva Kiir Mayardit, concerning the same issue and in response to my above message and in which it is stated that the problem is not over.    The Chairman here expresses appreciation for the efforts of officers and various community leaders in Yei or who went to Yei to contain the situation. Cdr. Salva Kiir’s willingness to listen to these officers and community groups is also likewise appreciated.  The problem needs to be resolved urgently and in a wider meeting more than the SPLM Leadership Council, so that we enter the new era of peace united and strong to face the challenges of the coming peace period.
  1. Also Further to my 002/11/2004 concerning the Memorandum of Understanding entitled “Declaration on the Conclusion of IGAD Negotiations on Peace in the Sudan” signed by the SPLM/A and GOS on Friday, 19/11/2004, in front of the UN Security Council in Nairobi, and which I sent to all units for information.  This is a serious commitment by both the SPLM and GOS in front of the UN Security Council and we must fulfill this obligation to conclude and sign the Comprehensive Peace Agreement by 31/12/2004, and this needs to be discussed in a wider meeting.
  1. Also reference my 003/11/2004 concerning UN Security Council Resolution No. 1574 on Sudan passed unanimously by all 15 members of the Security Council, in which they demanded that the Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement must be completed and signed no later than 31/12/2004. As came in my message this is a serious demand by the UN Security Council that the Parties must conclude and sign the Peace Agreement no later than 31/12/2004.  This is another important development that the various structures of the Movement will need to review in a wider meeting.
  1. In view of the developments and their important and urgency, I am here in this message calling for a combined meeting of various structures of the SPLM/A involving all those addressed above.  The meeting shall have two main objectives as follows:

(a)   To address and resolve the problem in Para (1), above, so that the SPLM enters into the coming period of peace united and strong, and with its historical leadership intact, united and confident to face the many challenges of peace as we continue the struggle by other means (peaceful means)

(b)   To brief and consult on this last phase of the peace process and to give guidance to the SPLM negotiating team as we complete the IGAD negotiations. As you will recall at the beginning of the negotiations after signing of the Machakos Protocol and subsequent agreements, I called for several consultative meetings similar to the one I am calling now, which were held at various times in New Site and Rumbek. As the peace process comes to an end, and it must be ended by 31/12/2004, it is necessary to end as we started after signature of the Machakos Protocol with this major Consultative Conference.

  1.  The Technical Committees negotiating the Comprehensive Ceasefire and Implementation Modalities Annexes will sit from 26/11/2004 and members of these committees are required to be in Nairobi one day earlier.  The principals, Ali Osman Taha and I will arrive in Nairobi on December 5th to complete whatever issues the Technical Committees will be unable to resolve, and by December 20th the final Draft Agreement should be ready awaiting signature by 31/12/2004 at the latest.
  1. In view of the situation in Para. (1), above, and in view of the timetable for negotiations in Para. (5), the above combined meeting of our structures must be held urgently, and so it will take place from 28/11/2004 to 30/11/2004. The venue of the meeting will be Rumbek, and Bahr el Ghazal Regional authorities are here directed to prepare to host this conference in terms of accommodation, security, etc.
  1. In addition to efforts of the Regional authorities, the following SPLM structures are to mobilize resources for this event:  (a) Foreign Affairs Commission, (b) Peace and Reconciliation Commission and (c) SRRC.  These structures are to make the necessary coordination with Regional authorities and among themselves to make the meeting organizationally and substantively successful
  1. The meeting will be Organized and managed by the following SPLM structures: (a) Political Affairs Commission, (b) Regional Authorities, (b) Foreign Affairs Commission, (c) SRRC and (d) Peace and Reconciliation Commission, and any other members that may be co-opted and designated by the Organizing Committee, which shall be composed of the above five members and others co-opted.
  1. All the above mentioned categories of those who will attend the combined meeting are to be ready for airlift, and the pick-up points for air transport will be designated and coordinated by the above Organizing Committee. The return trips after the meeting will also be organized to the same pick-up points.

10.  The above is for your information and necessary action. Because of the importance of the meeting and despite the unavoidable short notice, all those designated are urged to try their best to reach the nearest pick-up point in time. Any questions concerning travel and other arrangements for the meeting are to be referred to the above Organizing Committee.

11.  Finally, I want to alert members of the NLC to be on standby for an emergency meeting of the NLC.  They are not part of the present meeting, but after we sign the final Comprehensive Peace Agreement an NLC meeting will be mandatory, because according to the Power Sharing Agreement of 26/5/2004, members of the NLC will ratify the Peace Agreement and will become members of the Interim National Assembly. Meanwhile members of the NLC are to send their names and any other relevant particulars to administration of the NLC so that membership of the NLC is updated, as there are members who have died or defected.

12.  The above is for your information and necessary action.

Message from Dr. John to Comrade Salva

Signed: Cdr/Dr John Garang de Mabior

SECRET

FROM:  EBONY

TO      :  TIGER AND ALL THE FOLLOWING:

13.  All Members of the SPLM Leadership Council

14.  All SPLM Regional Secretaries

15.  All Commissioners of SPLM Secretariats

16.  The Chief Justice and all Members of the Court of Appeal

17.  All Deputy SPLM Regional Secretaries

18.  All members of the SPLA General Military Council (GMC)

19.  All SPLA Deputy Chiefs of Staff and GHQ Directors

20.  All Front Commanders and All Front Chiefs of Staff

21.  All Commanders and D/Commanders of other Organized Forces (Police, Prisons, Wildlife)

22.  All SPLM County Secretaries

23.  SRRC Executive Director, Deputy and the five Regional Directors

24.  All members of various SPLM Delegations to IGAD talks since 2002

ATTN: Attention of the Following Comrades who shall constitute the Meeting Organizing Committee

  1. Cdr. James Wani Igga (Political Affairs Commission)
  2. Cdr. Nhial Deng Nhial (Foreign Affairs Commission)
  3. Cdr. Deng Alor Kuol (Bahr El Ghazal Regional Authority)
  4. Cdr. Elijah Malok Aleng (SRRC)

10.  Cdr. James Kok Ruea (Peace and Reconciliation Commission)

INFO: ALL UNITS

05/11/2004

  1. Further to my 004/11/2004, dated 23/11/2004, to all units concerning a combined meeting of various structures of the SPLM/A, involving all those addressed above and which is scheduled to take place from 28/11/2004 to 30/11/2004 in Rumbek. The pick-up points for the airlift of those to attend the meeting shall be as follows: –
  1. A.    Bahr el Ghazal
  1. All Aweil and All Gogrial Counties shall have one flight that will collect delegates from the following three pick-up points: (a) Malual-Kon, (b) Marial Baai, and (c) Akon.
  1. Twic, Abyei, Wau and All Tonj Counties shall have one flight that will collect delegates from the following two pick-up points:  (a) Turalei and (b) Tonj Town.
  1. All three Yirol Counties shall have one flight that will collect delegates from Yirol Town.
  1. Cueibet, Mvolo and All Rumbek Counties are near the venue of the meeting and will move there using local land transport.
  1. Equatoria
  1. 1.     All East Bank of Equatoria Counties shall have one flight that will collect delegates from the following two pick-up points: (a) Ikotos and (b) Kapoeta plus one flight for the C-in-C. 
  1. All Central Equatoria Counties shall have one flight that will collect delegates from Yei Town plus one flight for the COGS.
  1. All Western Equatoria Counties shall have one flight that will collect delegates from the following two pick-up points: (a) Yambio and (b) Tambura.
  2. C.   Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile
  1. All Nuba Mountains Counties shall have one flight that will collect delegates from the following two pick-up points: (a) Kauda and (b) Julud.
  1. All Southern Blue Nile Counties shall have one flight that will collect delegates from the following two pick-up points: (a) Kurmuk and (b) Bugaya
  1. D.    Upper Nile
  1. All Northern Upper Nile Counties shall have one flight that will collect delegates from the following three pick-up points: (a) Urienyo, (b) Liet and (c) Payuer.
  1. All Eastern Upper Nile Counties shall have one flight that will collect delegates from the following four pick-up points: (a) Pagak, (b) Mading, (c) Pochalla and (d) Boma.
  1. All Central Upper Nile Counties shall have one flight that will collect delegates from the following six pick-up points: (a) Padak, (b) Mabior, (c) Akobo, (d) Waat, (e) Fangak  and (f) Ayod.
  1. All Western Upper Nile Counties shall have one flight that will collect delegates from the following three pick-up points: (a) Leer, (b) Leel and (c) Pariang.
  1. E.     Nairobi.  All those in Nairobi will have one flight.
  1. T he flights will begin on 26/11/2004.  In the meantime those attending the meeting are to move to the pick-up point nearest or convenient to them. The date of the flight and any other details will be communicated to you by the meeting organizing committee.  Any questions are to be directed to the organizing committee – Ask Cdr. James Kok Ruea who will coordinate the flights.
  1. The above is for your information and necessary action.

SPLM/A STATEMENT AFTER 1999 SPLIT IN THE NIF

SPLM/SPLA POSISITION ON THE BESHIR COUP OF 12/12/1999

It has been five days since General Beshir dissolved his parliament and declared a state of emergency.  The SPLM/SPLA has closely monitored and studied the situation since then, and on the basis of a concrete analysis of the bizarre situation in Khartoum, and taking fully into account the suffering and interests of the Sudanese people and aware of our historic responsibility, the SPLM/SPLA makes the following statement.

The events of 12/12/1999 are an affirmation that the crisis in the ruling Congress Party have reached a point of no return, maturity and mark the beginning of the end and demise of the NIF and its regime. The SPLM/SPLA therefore welcomes these events as they put the struggle of the Sudanese people on a new and positive threshold.  In this regard, theSPLM/SPLA appeals to the Sudanese people to remain vigilant and to use this crisis within the NIF to effect fundamental and full change in our country.  The SPLM/SPLA asks the forces of the Intifadha in Khartoum and other cities to remain alert and on standby, and to be prepared to converge with the SPLA and NDA forces and with patriotic forces in the national army, so as to effect fundamental change and establish a transitional government of the New Sudan.

The struggle that erupted within the NIF on 12/12/99 is essentially a struggle for power between Hassen al-Turabi and Ali Osman Taha. What has happened so far is the tip of the ice burg.  The struggle within the NIF will deepen.  There is a stalemate, and as long as Hassen al-Turabi remains at large the stalemate and paralysis within the NIF and Government will continue. The situation obviously requires decisive resolution, in favour of Turabi, or in favour of Beshir, or in favour of the Sudanese people.

The situation in the Sudanese (Government) army will be critical in the resolution of the crisis in Khartoum.  There are at least three factions in the Sudanese army, these are:

(a)   There is a Beshir/Ali Osman faction, which stage the coup of 12/12/99 and which is now in control of the Government.

(b)  There is a Hassen al-Turabi faction, which is in control of the NIF National Congress party, and which may stage a counter coup against the Beshir/Ali Osman faction.

(c)   There is a non-NIF faction, by far the largest group within the Sudanese army.  This group may also stage a coup against the two NIF factions.  The appetite for a coup by this group has been wetted by the events of 12/12/99, as what was not possible before is now possible.

The SPLM/SPLA will closely monitor these three factions in the Sudanese (Government) army, and will act in the interests of the NDA, in the interest of the New Sudan, and in the interests of the Sudanese people.

By Agereb Leek Chol, Worcester, Massachusetts, USA

4/11/2012

“A society whose youth believe only in now is deceiving itself. It denies man’s basic and oldest characteristics, that he is a creation of memory, a bride into the future, a time blinder” Loren Eilsely.

I don’t even know where to begin because many things had happened in our community over these two names. We have debated these names in our gatherings, but we still couldn’t come up with a solution. We still don’t have a name that unites the Duk, “Twic East”, Gok, and Athoc. However, I have been contemplating to write this piece because maybe few individuals who can judge my argument from both sides rather than taking sides might find this piece useful. To irritate, Dr. John Garang de Mabior is known by his comrades as a patriot from Dinka Bor in the history of South Sudan. The question is did Dr. John Garang de Mabior secretly say to the so-called “Twic East” folks that they don’t belong to Dinka Bor? What is “Twic East” all over sudden? What is “East” in Dinka? All the counties from Cuei thon to Chuei-keer make up the Dinka Bor as per my understanding. This includes Duken, Litth, Ajuong, Pakeer, Gok, and Athoc. I hope no one is referring to “Twic Mayardit” from Dinka Bahr el Ghazal to make a reference. Some who know Ajuong’s clans believe “Twic” came from “atwiei” clan within Ajuong. The lingering question is when was this term coined anyway? Was this after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 or during the war? Don’t get me wrong, I come from both communities.

To begin with, I, the author, get pissed off, deceived, and frustrated about how our diaspora leaders from “Bor” or “Twic East” are handling development projects back home. I am not insinuating that they are bad leaders, but they are too blind to see how these names are affecting our communities in terms of development. Perhaps they noticed this, but they don’t have the guts to make this issue a part of their task.

I, the author, was brought up knowing that I am Dinka Bor from “Gok” region in Jonglei State. Within Gok, I have my own sub clan which I identify myself with. To go in depth, within ‘sub clan’ in Gok, I have a section that identifies me as well. As you can see, these categories paint the picture of Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) because this can be confusing when politics takes its role. In addition, I was told that ‘there isn’t any single people call “Bor” other than those groups mentioned above. This name came about because the ‘land’ Bor gets flooded every season by the Nile River. Perhaps we shouldn’t worry about the name because the GoSS has a plan to drain the Sudd Wetlands so the water can easily run straight to Egypt.

The question is should I, the author, identify myself with my ‘sub clan’ within Gok or should i identify myself with the general name, Bor, which unites the aforementioned groups? This seems to be the problem with our diaspora communities particularly my community. I won’t speak about the diaspora in East Africa, but I will mention the killing of one student in a tribal brawl in Nakuru, Kenya last year.  More importantly, I want to extend my late condolence to the families who lost their son because of this renaissance.

When we came aboard, our goals were to go to school, work, and help our people back home. We send money home regularly, but that’s not enough. Some of these dreams can be achieved by individuals, but bringing “cities to villages” as Dr. John Garang de Mabior said is not an easy task for one person or by a single clan. Perhaps the philanthropist, John Khok Alat is the only man who is capable of this since he already funded Makol-Cuei project. He inspired me to ask myself what the former President of the United States once said, “ask not what your country can do for you but what you can do for you country”. Khok Alat champions Kennedy’s figure of speech.

To generalize, we the so-called “Bor” or “Twic East” around the globe are divided simply because of the name Bor. I will limit my generalization to the United States and Australia because I live in both places.

In 2009, the Dinka “Bor” in America elected their President in Michigan State, of which I was one of the voters. His name is Abraham Deng Lueth. The acronym is Greater Bor Community-USA (http://www.gbc-usa.org). Some people from Australia and Canada came to cast their votes. There were disagreements, which let some people to leave the meeting because they didn’t like the “domination of Dinka Bor” name as an acronym. These individuals were half my age, and I was born sometimes in 1983 when Kerubino Kuanyin Bol surprised the Jalaba in Madingbor. Luckily enough, the meeting went on and we elected our leaders. There is no doubt that these leaders have been working day and night to help our communities here aboard or back home, but they are weak because we the community don’t have their full support because of this name. Some individuals might argue that they are doing well because they are raising funds. To offer my judgment, some of us just do it to be politically correct or to keep our constituents.

For example, I, the author, know someone who nominated himself to be a Bor leader, but in the low, he denies the name and claimed that he’s not from Bor. He first identifies himself with his ‘sub clan’ over Bor.  How absurd can this be! What progress do we expect from this individual? Is he a “political prostitute” or is he lost in the system.

The same year, I went to Australia and I was fortunate to meet my uncles, aunts, mothers, sisters, brothers, and friends during a Bor meeting. I felt like I was back in Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya. The meeting was well attended, but fights broke out over personal issues. However, what baffle me is what I later realized that the meeting didn’t include everyone except those from “Gok” and “Athoc”. I wasn’t sure if these two sections were the ‘legitimate’ “Bor”. Interestingly, the “Twic East” and Duken” were holding their meetings separately. I would assume their meeting pertain development in Jonglei State similar to the Bor Community.

My question is why are some people blindfolding the entire community to be part of “Bor” while in fact they don’t really embrace the name? Why are we raising funds in the name of “Bor” while in fact there are some people who want to serve their respective clans? How sustainable are these projects if we aren’t united to support them? Does anyone notice this trend or am I missing something?

Since “Bor” is denied by many people because it doesn’t represent them, we should go our separate ways in order to bring development in our villages. This doesn’t mean we hate each other, but to ease up these unresolved tensions in the meetings.  Whether the legitimate “Bor” meet together in Australia, the “Twic East” and the Duken individually, it doesn’t matter as long as they are planning to help people back home. The Greater Bor Community in the United States on the other hand, is even more confused like a child brought up in a village and relocated to a cattle camp for the first time. There are a lot of ambiguities because people don’t know who to support. This attitude is one of many reasons why people are reluctant to be part of development. How do we avoid this?

In my opinion, we should not raise funds in the name of “Greater Bor Community” here in the U.S because this name offends others who believe they are marginalized under this name. This thinking prevents them from helping our communities. We hope this thinking will cease since we are getting ‘higher education’, but it is not happening. Perhaps the wise Dinka man who said “a horse can finish University, and he will finish as a horse” was right. This is a direct translation. We shouldn’t forget that when the Murle raiders attack the Dinka in Jonglei State, they don’t say let’s go and raid “Bor”, “Twic East” and Duken for their children and cattle. In BOR POLITICALLY POOR POLITICIANS, Tearz Ayuen writes, “For how long will Bor people drink water straight from frog ponds? Even when the other South Sudanese middle-aged men are proudly developing pot-bellies as a result of Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Bor men still have flat stomachs. In case you spot a Bor male adult with a big belly in Bor town, he must be suffering from bilharzia or tapeworm that normally enlarges the belly. The dude still drinks dirty water!” Let’s keep Bor for political purpose, and let’s get down to business!

Recommendations:

  • Let’s abandon the so-called Greater Bor Community (GBC) for the sake of development. This name is destructing many people who want to help back home.
  • Form four major associations, which include “Gok, Athoc, Twic East, and Duk around the globe. These groups should raise their funds separately to avoid these conflicts.
  • The ‘legitimate Bor who happens to be Gok and Athoc should form one association since they don’t have a problem with the name.
  • Every year, each association should balance their check book with their partners, and report to other leaders from Cuei Thon to Cuei-keer. After these leaders balanced their check book, these communities can then sit down and prioritize two to three projects back home.
  • Renovate current schools, health clinics, and roads instead of starting new projects. We often failed to think about sustainability. How long are we going to raise funds individually?
  • Build a training center in Jonglei State like Don Bosco in kakuma, Kenya, so that our youth and wounded heroes could get skills instead of relying on Kenyans, Ugandans, and Ethiopians to do manual jobs.

As a member of this community, I deserve the right to criticize what’s happening in our community. Our leaders need to re-evaluate their rule of engagement given those aforementioned recommendations. I feel bad for those individuals who are trying to help, but they have no ‘plan B’ to sustain their projects. Let’s not be another World Bank and the IMF institutions. Until the Dinka “Bor”, “Twic East”, Duken, Gok, and Athoc in the U.S, Canada, Australia, and Europe unite and think of one project, what Tearz Ayuen narrated in his article will continue to hunt us years from now. Many of us left East Africa in early 2000 and we’ve been collecting money every year. What’s the result? How long can we send our people to neighboring countries for treatment and schooling?

This author is concern citizen. He can be reach at madingbor1983@gmail.com

—–
By PaanLuel Wel, Washington DC, USA
My Unsubstantiated View
Twic East has more to do with “Twic East” people opposition to “Kong’oor” name; a reaction or rather a rejection of the name “Kong’oor” which was previously used in place of today “Twic East.” It origin goes back to the acrimony, within Twic/Twi people (derogatory referred to as “Tuei” by Tears Ayuen), over the naming of the Dioceses in as far as whether the name, as then proposed, should be “Diocese Kong’oor” or should be changed to something else… something more inclusive of all sections that make up the “Twic” clans. The objection to the name “Kong’oor” stem from the fact that there is a clan within “Twic/Twi” that is specifically known by that name–Kong’oor. The other clans felt shortchanged and belittled for being referred to as “kong’oor” yet the name belong to one specific people. Eventually, to resolve that un-inclusiveness in the naming of the proposed “Diocese” it was decided that the name “Twic East” should be adopted–East in contrast to “Twic Mayaardit” of Bahr El Ghazal of which “Twic East” shared some linguistic aspects  and names, for instances, than they do with “Bor” of Athooc and Ghok of Jonglei.
Naming is very controversial. For example, Dukkeen, comprising Nyarweng and Hol, refused to be referred to as “Twic East” and they were given their own county and proposed diocese within the ECS. Lith was a termed used mostly by Pakeer to refer to the rest of Twic Clans except themselves–called it everybody north of Pakeer that include Ajoung, Awulian, Ayuaal, Dachueek, Kong’oor, Adhiook, and Abek. Later when Awulian, Ayuaal and Dachueek adopted the name “Nyuak” to refer to themselves, the name Lith become a default name for Kong’oor, Adhiook and Abek. Currently though, with Kong’oor by itself with the name Kong’oor Payam, Lith has become a group name for Wernyol Payam of Adhiook and Abek.
Of  course, that does not mean that there has never been a controversy over the name “Bor” when it is referred to all Dinkas of Jonglei. The question as to why the ECS diocese was not named “Bor North” as the county was then known is one indicator of an underlying disquiet. The author should have covered some historical background in terms of how much the SPLM/A–driven by need for easy categorization/groupings to ease administrative and logistic issues during the liberation era–contributed to the genesis of “Bor” as unifying name to all Dinkas of Jonglei. The author should have also looked into the time when Ajang Duoot (together with Machiek Deng of Bor South and Deng Malual of Dukkeen) was said to have been the paramount chief of all Dinkas of Jonglei; was Ajang Duot a paramount chief of one people referred to as”Bor” or of three separate people namely Bor, Twic and Dukkeen? If Ajang Duot was a paramount chief of “Bor” as in Bor being Twic, Dukkeen, Athooc and Ghok, then the hypothesis would be that that was the starting point when the name “Bor” became the universal names among the Dinkas of Jonglei. The author should also have posited what the local illiterate people back in the villages think of themselves: do old illiterate men and women from all these communities consider themselves as “Bor” or differently? The author should have also weighed whether or not the connotation in which the name “Bor” is used do rhyme to the same connotation to which the name “Kong’oor” was used to refer to all people of “Twic East”. And as mentioned above, the role played by the Diocese created by the ECS is another aspect that could have been explored by the author.
It is debatable whether the controversy over the name “Bor” is precluding social and economic development among the Dinkas of Jonglei. On the one end, more hands mean more effort, hence more things accomplished and more communal objectives attained. That is, if “Bor” were to unite under the name “Bor”, much can be achieved given more pooling of resources. On the other end, there is definitely no disagreement over the names Twic East, Athooc, Ghok and Duk-ku-Duk within those subgroups and yet they have got nothing to show for their unity under those names.
It is upon patriotic individuals–John Khok Lat, John Daau and Daniel Akech Thiong etc–who have done more to serve the community than those clanial groupings. While much could be attained with unity, it may not be guaranteed that unity translate into automatic development of “Bor” villages. As for the name, the rest of the Dinkas, plus all other South Sudanese will continue to refer to all Dinkas of Jonglei as “Dinka Bor” or “Bor Dinka.”
So while the debate may be raging within the “Greater Bor Community”—that is how I prefer to call them,—over whose and what names they should be collectively known, it would change little in terms of social harmony (there is no all-out war going on), political unity (they are all Dinka Bor outside the cocoon of their respective counties) and economic development (individual initiative, rather than communal handouts, will determine the pace and magnitude of economic development as exemplified by Khok Lat).
Dr. John Garang will remained a Dinka Bor to the rest of South Sudanese and the world no matter what local arrangement or disagreement the local groupings might have on their sleeves.
——-
By RaanLuel Wel (he is different from PaanLuel Wel please; he is an admirer of PaanLuel Wel, hence the closeness of the two names).

There are so many scenarios in the debate of Bor is this and Bor is that:

1. The origin: How the name came about to generalize Hol, Nyarweng, Tuic, Athooc, and Gok. If people know much about the history of origin, it would greatly help in solving the issue. It seems like the naming occurred in different time and generations. For example, time of Ajang Duot, Deng Malual, and Machiek Deng is totally different from Garang Mabior and Garang Anyieth’s time. Each group added a different level to the name. For instance, Garang Mabior-Garang Anyieth’s group coined up “the Cuei Thon to Cuei keer” or “Cuei Keer to Cuei Thon” phrase. Therefore, the challenge is up to the current generation to either abandon what has been already started or come up with alternative and universal name.

2. Bor Asili-Bor fake scenario: There are some people called themselves buor-asili and that isolates rest of the members. It is understandable that everything has an origin, but extremists from other part of the larger community feel excluded. The best example is “Twic-Bor” phrase. Some members from Tuic don’t want to be referred to “are you from Twic-Bor,” as opposed to Twic Mayardit. Therefore, all extremists from all sides made it hard to forge a unity and move on.

3. Bor South-Bor North scenario: There is always a question of why is it Bor South County and there is no Bor North County or Bor Central, in that matter? In this scenario, Duk-Duk has never considered itself as a part of Twic, Athooc, or Ghok. Twic, in other hand, wants to remain as Twic East County. Then Athooc-Ghok wants to own the name Bor County with no South attaches to it. Therefore, it has to be Bor County instead of Bor South Couty, since there is no Bor North, Bor West, Bor East, or Bor Central.

4. Garang Mabior’s credit scenario: Given the scenario #3 above, there is a question of who would take Garang’s credit, mainly good credit during the struggle of liberation. If what now called Bor South County becomes Bor County, then good credit will go with them and leave Tuic where Garang hailed from with no credit. Therefore, Bor South County has to be renamed Athooc-Ghok County and let go Bor name to everybody as unifying name, which is quite contradicting to other scenarios.

5. Other Sudanese communities’ scenario: There is an argument that other Sudanese communities know us Bor so why don’t we keep this universal name?! In this scenario too, there is an issue of other communities hate us or even kill us as Buor so why don’t we leave little things that separate us and be together?!

6. Stereotype and prejudice scenarios: This interesting scenario is very much based on the judgment that don’t ever call me Bor, because Buor are thieves and deceitful people who eat frog; don’t call me Tui, for Tuic are dumb and stupid people who know nothing; and that don’t connect me with Hol and Nyarweng, for they are very close to Nuer and people who jointed Nuer during 1991 massacre. Therefore, everybody is rejecting everybody based on stereotypes and prejudices.

All of the above factors, plus many others contribute to the debate of “Greater Bor Community” name in one way or the other. In my opinion, every side has to be accepted and given a special attention in any discussion. Some people take it personal and some people keep it cool. If members of the said community really want to debate the issue in question, they must discuss it openly and professionally. Otherwise, it gets out of hand easily.

——-

By Comrade Chol Kuch

I have tried very hard to stay away from this debate; however, I realize that this may be the single most existential threat to the citizens of Athooch and Gok (sometimes refereed as Boor or Bor), Twi East, and Duken (to stick to the term held dear by the respective sub-groups), whether they realize it, is another matter all together. It’s an existential threat because the hostile neighbors of these groups do not recognize their bickering differences and frustrate them equally. Politically, they are now fractured that each of them do not really matter anymore on the political arena and therefore, they are exposed to political abuse and resources distribution marginalization. Politics is a number game and hence the winner must side with large groups all the time. It is not a rocket science to see that their splinter is not in their long-term interest.

Having figured out how detrimental the lack of a proposed solution to this issue is, I would urge all our citizens from each subgroup to put forward a proposed solution, rather bandaging the problem. I know for a fact that each of these communities knows exactly the cost of their division, but they have allowed themselves to be caught up in their own hubris. I feel really bad for the common man among these groups for they are being taken for a ride by politicians on each side and also by the few who claim to be the community intellectuals. Both politicians and intellectuals who favor this splintering maybe be short-sighted and some are only interested in the short-run gains and should not be trusted.

The name issue is going to be a polarizing item for eternality, unless it is tackled at the highest level (our leadership in the government, council of elders, youth groups, mothers groups, and religious groups) knowing that each of this group ends up being the sacrificial lamb when things goes awry. I want to warn my brothers that the answer is not in the Diaspora; we can be participants, but we cannot provide the answer to this problem; people back home should.

Here is a simple novel idea: how about allowing both groups to remain as they wished to be call such as Bor, Twi East, and Duken. Then propose another unique name to unite all the groups. Let’s us all vote on the unique name that has roots in all. Now, that’s a challenge worth pursuing!

Gordon Buay: The Color of Ethnic Domination in South Sudan

Posted: March 18, 2012 by PaanLuel Wël Media Ltd. in History
Tags: ,

By Gordon Buay

Introduction:

When South Sudan became an independent state last July, many people had hoped that the newly independent country would be built on principles of ethnic equality, democracy, rule of law and federalism. There was a reason for people to be optimistic about the future of South Sudan. Those who had hoped that South Sudan would become a paradise of equality justified their argument on the belief that the people of South Sudan had bitterly struggled for equality in the old Sudan for over fifty years. Common-sense has it that people who struggled for ethnic equality for more than five decades would be able to manage ethnic diversity in a way other African countries failed to do. It is true that people who struggled against the imposition of Arabism and Islamism in the old Sudan could not end up having a government that would behave like successive Khartoum regimes that treated ethnic Africans in general as second-class citizens and the people of South Sudan in particular as third-class citizens.
When late Dr. John Garang told the people of South Sudan in 1994 that “an oppressor has no color”, a lot of South Sudanese thought that he was referring to black Sudanese who oppressed their own people. But with the advent of independence, so many people have begun to analyse what he was referring to and realized that anybody, whether a brother or a sister, could become an oppressor if s/he denies the citizens equality, democracy, rule of law and justice. Prior to independence, so many Southern Sudanese thought that an oppressor who denied people their rights was a Muslim man in Khartoum with a turban on his head. Little did the ordinary people know that a Dinka man with scarification on his forehead would become the new oppressor who may practise the worst kind of ethnic domination in the newly independent state. During the reign of successive regimes of old Sudan, ethnic domination was practised on the basis of religion and political ideology. South Sudanese were marginalized as a unit because the Northern elites wanted to assimilate them into Arab and Islamic culture. Within the north, there was some sort of power-sharing among the tribes of Shaygia, Jaaliyeen, Danagalla, etc. Political participation in the government was not dictated by one tribal affiliation but by whether one was a member of a sectarian party or Muslim brotherhood.
One could argue that despite the existence of so many tribes in the North, participation in the power structure of the state in Khartoum was not dictated by tribal origin but by ideological affiliation. The UMMA, DUP and Muslim Brotherhood have memberships across many tribes in the North including African tribes of Western and Eastern Sudan. It is well known that the UMMA party’s stronghold was Darfur prior to 1989 coup. The talk about racism within the Islamic Movement surfaced after the split of 1999 between Dr. Hassan Turabi and Field Marshal Omer Bashir. However, one can still see African northern Sudanese in the leadership structure of the National Congress Party. The same thing is true with Popular National Congress of Dr. Hassan Turabi which has Arab tribes as its members.
The issue of division of Islamic Movement along ethnic lines was accelerated by Hassan Turabi himself who wanted to use tribalism as a tool of political mobilization to bring down the regime of Omer Al-Bashir. The manufactured polarization of Islamic Movement along ethnic lines assisted Turabi to achieve his objective in Darfur because the Movements fighting Bashir’s government were formed on the basis that the Africans in the North were marginalized by the Arab regime which favored Arab tribes in Darfur. What was important to Turabi was not the issue of ethnic equality between the Africans and the Arabs in the Sudan. His main concern was the loss of control of state power. If equality among ethnic groups in the Sudan were to be his main concern, he wouldn’t have helped to dismantle the 1972 Addis Ababa accord which gave the South local autonomy by persuading President Nimeir to cancel the deal to impose Sharia.
 In attempting to compare Dinka domination of power in the South and the marginalization of South Sudanese in the North before independence, people need to differentiate land dispute between African and Arab tribes in Darfur which is an undeniable fact and the representation of African Muslims in the state institutions since the independence of Sudan in 1956. In comparison to South Sudanese, the African Muslims in the North were better represented in the government institutions because of their religion than South Sudanese. The African tribes of Nuba and Darfur dominated the Sudan army from 1956—1985. As late John Garang said, “the Arabs who were fighting South Sudanese in the first civil war were Nubas”.
The argument I am trying to put forth in this article is that political tribalism among Northern tribes is less destructive than what we are seeing in South Sudan. Islamism and Arabism were the pillars of political mobilization in the North prior to Darfur conflict in 2003 and participation in the political institutions in the North was based more on political affiliation than tribal origin that we are now witnessing in the post-independent South Sudan in which the Dinka elite based nation-building on ethnic domination.
Since the independence of South Sudan last July, we have been witnessing a very dangerous form of ethnic domination which would surely lead the South to become a failed state. Prior to July, 2011, Dinka elite controlling power began to practise ethnic discrimination and marginalization within the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) that was formed after the conclusion of the CPA on January 9, 2005. But so many people didn’t notice the gravity of the situation thinking that the practice would be addressed after the independence of the South. Many South Sudanese focused on the implementation of the CPA and the exercise of the right of self-determination and ignored the glaring practice of tribalism in each ministry of the GoSS.
When the ministries were set up in 2005, there were practices of tribal exclusions that made a lot of people to question the underlying policies and vision of Dinka elite. For instance, the Ministry of Legal Affairs and Constitutional Development which was under the guidance of Michael Makuei Lueth employed mostly Dinka Bor. Majority of employees of the Ministry were from Dinka tribe. The same thing to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development which was also dominated by Dinka tribe. Filling ministries with one’s tribe—a practice mostly demonstrated by Dinka ministers—continued up to now and many ministries in Juba are dominated either by one tribe or a clan depending on where the Ministers who set them up in 2005 came from. Majority of employees in the Ministry of Finance are from Dinka Bhar-el-Ghazal because Arthur Akuein Chol, who was the GoSS Minister of Finance and Economic Development in 2005, hailed from that region.
The purpose of this article is to educate members of the international community who are not well-versed in the affairs of South Sudan to understand the root causes of the on-going ethnic violence in the country. After the world was awakened by the ethnic violence which erupted on December, 23rd, 2011 in Jonglei state, so many people in the Western World, particularly in the United States, began to wonder about the state of affairs in the newly independent South Sudan. In order for the people to understand violence which has now engulfed the South, it is crucial for members of the international community to be educated about the ideology of Dinka domination being pursued by President Salva Kiir Mayardit.
Although it is true that violence in Jonglei State between Dinka and Nuer on the one hand and Murle tribe on the other is fuelled by cattle, political violence which involved fighting between Salva Kiir’s regime and the rebel Movements in Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity State was caused by Dinka domination of power in the South. It has become a practice among the less informed journalists to blame political violence in the South on the North by neglecting the politics of domination being pursued in Juba by Dinka elite. The same tactics of looking for a scapegoat in the north were used by so many African dictators in the past who blamed colonial powers for ethnic violence in the continent many years after Europeans left. The North may exploit a situation, but how did it come about in the first place?
It has also become a practice of some individuals in the media to dismiss the prevalent ethnic discrimination being practised by Salva Kiir’s regime saying that it is a normal practice among Africans to prefer their ethnic groups. People who dismiss the dangers of state-practised tribalism in South Sudan are confusing public realm and private realm tribalism. In South Sudan, consciousness of one’s tribal origin is a psycho-sociological reality that is largely universal in nature. However, as research noted, there is a distinction between public realm ethnicity which involves conflicts related to the determination of who gets what, when and how, and private realm ethnicity that may not invite state intervention. What is causing violence in South Sudan currently is a public realm ethnicity which denies non-Dinka public positions because of their ethnic backgrounds.
Public realm tribalism being practised by Salva Kiir’s regime is responsible for ministries to be filled by one tribe; it is also responsible for land grabbing in Juba, Numeli, Yei and etc. It is also responsible for the massacre of Shilluks in 2010 and the killing of ten Bari civilians in Juba this month. The on-going political violence in the South is a manifestation of negative aspect of tribalism as opposed to tribalism being practiced in the villages. It is the state-sponsored tribalism which we are more concerned about because ethnic domination at the level of state, as opposed to ethnic consciousness in Dinkaland, is divisive, and of parochial form that can lead to violence.
Experience from many African countries attested that the politics of ethnic domination being practised by Dinka elite plunged many nations into quagmires of bloodletting strife and instability. Before Yuweri Museveni took over power through revolution in 1986, tribalism in its extreme level reduced Uganda from one of Africa’s most promising countries to one of the poorest. In 1994 about a million Rwanda’s women, children, men, old and young died because they were butchered by their countrymen due to state-sponsored tribalism similar to what Salva Kiir is currently instituting in South Sudan. It is one thing for Salva Kiir to behave like a Dinka chief in the village who may not be concerned about ethnic equality in his administrative area. But it is another thing for a President of a country to favor who gets a government job, where to build a hospital or a bridge, whom to give justice to in a trial or whom to give scholarship to enrol in a foreign university. In South Sudan under Salva Kiir, the state administration, the political posts, the key ministries and central government commissions are compartmentalized along ethnic lines and ethnic discrimination and favoritism.
The Dinka domination of public institutions
After the independence of South Sudan, the regime of Salva Kiir did not deviate from practising state tribalism that he started in 2005. On August, 26, 2011, he formed the post-independent cabinet which was made up of 42% Dinka giving all the key posts to his Dinka Rek clan. He awarded his State, Warrap, ten Ministerial posts in addition to his post, the Chief of Security, Chief Justice of South Sudan Supreme Court and the Governor of the Bank of South Sudan. Although Greater Equatoria region has higher population than Greater Bhar-el-Ghazal according to 2008 National Census, the latter was awarded twenty ministerial posts in which ten of them went to Warrap state alone.
On March, 9, 2012, Lt. Gen. Salva Kiir appointed ambassadors and again awarded the lion’s share to his tribe, that is, Dinka appointed as ambassadors constituted 53% while all the other tribes in South Sudan combined were only 47%. The population of Dinka in South Sudan is about 25% and the non-Dinka are 75%. If fairness guided the appointment of ambassadors, Dinka tribe, which is a demographic minority when we compare their population to the rest of South Sudan ethnic groups, cannot have 53% of ambassadors. The decision to give 53% of ambassadorial posts to one tribe is based on the arithmetic of tribal domination which can also be noticed between the regions and within Dinka clans.
Among the Dinka clans, the Dinkas of Unity and Upper Nile states have been severely marginalized and are not represented at all in the ambassadorial positions. In comparison, the Dinka clans of Greater Upper Nile have fewer ambassadors than the Dinka clans of Greater Bhar-el-Ghazal. When one looks at percentage of ambassadors from region to region, the Greater Bhar-el-Ghazal’s share of ambassadors is 38.36% while the population of the region is only 2.71 million according to 2008 National Census. Warrap state, which is the home state of Salva Kiir, once again dominated the rest of Bhar-el-Ghazal states in the ambassadorial appointments and became the second state in the South with thirteen ambassadors despite the fact its population in the South is 11% (the states of Lakes, Northern Bhar-el-Ghazal and Western Bhar-el-Ghazal combined have only 17 ambassadors).
          The tables below show Dinka’s dominance in all appointments of President Salva Kiir. The appointments demonstrated that political posts in South Sudan are based on the ideology of Dinka domination, a practice which is worse than marginalization of South Sudanese in the old Sudan when one compares the ethnic marginalization in the old Sudan and Dinka domination of post-independent South Sudan. In the old Sudan, South Sudanese were a minority within the state dominated by Muslims. But in the post-independent South, Dinka, who are only about 25% of the population, controlled 55% of state power. In terms of demography, Dinkas’ domination of 75% of South Sudanese is like Afrikaans’ domination of black majority in South Africa.
 
THE COMPOSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
No
State/Tribe
Number of
Ministries
Minister
D/Minister
Total
The Ministers
1
Warrap
4
6
10
Cabinet Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Labour & Humanitarian Affairs
2
N. B. G
2
2
Commerce, Industry and Investment & Telecommunication
3
W. B. G
2
2
4
Health & Education
4
Lakes
2
2
4
Electricity and Dams & Irrigation
5
Unity
4
4
6
Jonglei
5
5
10
Defence, Justice, Parliamentary Affairs, Information & Roads and Bridges
7
Upper Nile
4
2
6
National Security, Higher Education, Petroleum & Wildlife
8
C. Equatoria
5
3
8
President’s Office, Transport, Environment, Gender & Animal Resources
9
W. Equatoria
3
1
4
Interior, Finance & Housing
10
E. Equatoria
2
2
4
Agriculture & Culture
TOTAL
29
27
56
1
Dinka
11
12
23 (42%)
2
Nuer
4
4
8 (14%)
3
Shilluk
2
1
3
4
Zande
2
1
3
4
Bari
2
1
3
TOTAL
21 (72%)
19 (70%)
40 (71%)
 
THE COMPOSITION OF AMBASSADORS BASED ON TRIBES AND STATES
The list of special Ambassadors above Grade (1) are:
S/N
Name
1-
Mr. Majok Guandon Thiep            –     Nuer                        Jonglei
2-
Dr. Chol Deng Alak                       –     Dinka                      Warrap
3-
Mr. Mohamed Hassan Bakeit       –                          Western Bahr el Ghazal
4-
Mr. Makelele Nyajok                     –  Mundari                  Central Equatoria
5-
Dr. Eluzai Mogga Yokwe              –      Bari                         Central Equatoria
6-
Dr. Akec Khoc Acieu                    –      Dinka                       Jonglei
7-
Mr. Sebit Abbe Alley                     –   Kakwa                     Central Equatoria
 2-    Presidential Decree No. 19/2012 for the appointment of Grade (1) Ambassadors in to the Diplomatic and consular service in the ministry of foreign Affairs and international Cooperation of the Republic of South Sudan. The Ambassadors are: –
S/N
Name
1-
Mr. Paul Macuei  Malok               –   Dinka                           Lakes
2-
Dr. Andrew Akon Akec Kuol       –   Dinka                           Warrap
3-
Mr. Kuol Alor Kuol                       –  Dinka                           Warrap
 3-    Presidential Decree No. 20/2012 for the appointment of Grade (2) Ambassadors into the Diplomatic and consular service in the ministry of foreign Affairs and international Cooperation of the Republic of South Sudan, 2012 AD.
 The Ambassadors are:
S/N
Name
1-
Mr. Anthony Louis Kon  –       Dinka                                      Warrap
2-
Mr. Ajing Adiang Mariik  –      Dinka                                      Warrap
3-
Mr. Alier Deng Rual         –     Dinka                                      Jonglei
4-
Mr. Akuei Bona Malwal    –     Dinka                                      Warrap
5-
Mr. Majak Philemon Majok –  Dinka                                       Lakes
6-
Mr. Baak Valentino Wol      –  Dinka                                      Warrap
7-
Mr. John Andruga Duku      –  Madi                                          EES
8-
Mr. Mariano Deng Ngor      –   Dinka                                     Warrap
9-
Dr. Francis George Nazario –  Acholi                                     EEC
10-
Mr. Joseph Moum Majak     –   Dinka                                     Warrap
11-
Mr. Parmena Makuet Mangar –  Dinka                                   Lakes
12-
Mr. Philip Jada Natana        –    Bari                                       CES
13-
Mr. Arop Deng Kuol             –    Dinka                                    Warrap
14-
Mr. Michael Majok Ayom     –    Dinka                                    Jonglei
15-
Gabriel Gai Riak                  –    Dinka                                    Jonglei
16-
Mr. Bol Wek Agoth               –   Dinka                                    Warrap
17-
Dr. John Gai Yoh                  – Nuer                               Upper Nile
18-
Dr. Daniel Peter Othol          – Chollo                             Upper Nile
19-
Mr. Ezekiel Lol Gathouth      – Nuer                                Upper Nile
20-
Mr. Samuel Luate Lominsuk –  Kuku                              CES
21-
Mr. Awad El Karim Ibrahim Ali – Non-Dinka                   State unknown
22-
Mr. Adam Saeed AbuBakr Kabawa –  Non-Dinka          State unknown
23-
Mr. Mustafa Lowoh Walla                                  Western Equatoria
24-
Mr. Aban Yor Yor                   –  Chollo                         Upper Nile
25-
Ms. Sittona Abdalla Osman   – Dinka                           Jonglei
26-
Mr. Pidor Tut Pul                    –  Nuer                            Upper Nile
27-
Mr. James Ernest Onge          –  Acholi                          EES
28-
Mr. Jwokthab Amum Ajak       –  Chollo                          Upper Nile
29-
Mr. Paul Malong Akaro            –   Dinka                         Northern BG
30-
Mr. Deng Deng Nhial               –   Dinka                           Warrap
31-
Mr. Lazaros Akoi Arou             –   Dinka                            Jonglei
32-
Mr. Ruben Marial Benjamin     –   Dinka                             Lakes
33-
Abdon Terkoc Matuet              –  Dinka                              Lakes
34-
Mr. James Pitia Morgan           – Kakwa                          Central Equatoria
35-
Mr. Dhanojak Obongo Othow   –  Anuak                             Jonglei
36-
Mr. Jokwen Yukwan Ayiik         –  Chollo                             Upper Nile
37-
Mr. Michael Nyang Jok             –   Dinka                            Jonglei
38-
Mr. Michael Mayiel Chuol          –   Nuer                             Unity
39-
Ms. Abuk Nikonora Manyok       –  Dinka                           Jonglei
40-
Ms. Nyandeng Joshua Dei Wal  –  Nuer                           Upper Nile
41-
Mr. Chol Mawut Unguec Ajonga  – Luo (Jurchol)               Northern BG
42-
Mr. Darius Garang Wol Mabior    –  Dinka                          Northern BG
43-
Mr. Joseph Ayok Ayok                 –  Dinka                          Northern BG
4-    Presidential Decree No. 21/2012 for the appointment of Grade (3) Ambassadors into the Diplomatic and Consular Services in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and international Cooperation of the Republic of South Sudan 2012 A.D.
S/N
Name
1-
Mr. Thiik Agoth Giir                        –  Dinka                     Warrap
2-
Mr. Nickson Deng Peter                –   Dinka                     Warrap
3-
Mr. Morris Batali Simon                 – Kakwa           Central Equatoria
4-
Ms. Mary Badoda Francis             –  Dinka                   Northern BG
5-
Mr. Hamilton Michael Lugor           –  Bari                        CES
6-
Mr. Akwoch Daniel Diing                –   Chollo                   Upper Nile
7-
Ms. Jago Arop Yor                         –   Chollo                    Upper Nile
8-
Mr. James Kur Muorwel                 –   Dinka                     Lakes
9-
Ms. Sarah Victor Bol                      –   Dinka                     Warrap
10-
Mr. William Wani Ruben                                          Central Equatoria
11-
Mr. Wol Mayar Ariec                      –  Dinka                     Warrap
12-
Mr. David Buom Choat                   –  Nuer                      Upper Nile
13-
Ms Agnes A.O Oswaha                    Lotuka                   E Equatoria
14-
Mr. Caesar Oliha Yanga                   Lotuka                  E Equatoria
15-
Mr. Garang Garang Diing                –  Dinka                  Northern BG
16-
Mr. Kau Nak Maper                         –   Dinka                  Lakes
17-
Mr. Ambrose Raphael Tamania       – Zande            Western Equatoria
18-
Mr. Kahmis Agar Wol                       –     Dinka                 Warrap
19-
Mr. Hassan Yousif Ngor                   –  Dinka                    Upper Nile
20-
Mr. John Simon Yor Kur                   –  Chollo                    Upper Nile
21-
Mr. Juma Dino Amoi                         – Lotuko          Eastern Equatoria
22-
Mr. Dominique Panthair Mading       –  Dinka                        Lakes
23-
Dr. Riek Puok Riek                           –  Nuer                       Upper Nile
24-
Mr. Martin Kahmis Tabia                   – Zande        Western Equatoria
25-
Mr. Raphael Nhial Kulang                 –  Dinka                        Lakes
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
Mr. Kureng Akuei Pac                           Dinka                  Jonglei
Mr. John Samuel Bwogo                      Chollo                   Upper Nile
Mr. Mayen Majak Malou                       Dinka                 Lakes
Mr. Abel Moses Majok                          Dinka                   Lakes
Mr. Gum Dominic Matiok                     Dinka                    Lakes
Mr. Santino Fardol Watod                   Luo (Jurchol)          W. BG
Mr. Christopher Leonardo Jada                                 Central Equatoria
Mr. Sebit Bullen Kamonde                                       Central Equatoria
Ms. Natalina Edward Mou                 Dinka                Warrap
Dr. Mawien Makol Ariik                      Dinka                 Warrap
Ms. Santina Sita Ndefu                                             Western Equatoria
Mr. Akec Chol Ahou                           Dinka                   Jonglei
PLUS the Ambassador appointed in October 2011 in Grade 1, Mr Mayen Dut (a Dinka from Warrap State).
Number of Ambassadors by Tribe:
Tribe
Grade 1
Grade 2
Grade 3
Total
Percent
Dinka
6
23
19
48
53
Non-Dinka
5
20
18
43
47
Total
11
43
37
91
100
 
CONSEQUENCES OF DINKA DOMINATION
Members of the international community who don’t know the academic backgrounds of ambassadors appointed may think that they are all qualified to represent South Sudan in foreign missions. Many people would be shocked when they discover that individuals who do not even have diplomas were appointed as ambassadors because of tribalism and loyalty to the ruling clique. In normal practice, an ambassador, indeed any diplomat in the Foreign Service, must at least have a Bachelor’s degree in order to represent the country abroad. However, in Salva Kiir’s regime, what is important is a tribal affiliation or loyalty to Dinka Rek’s regime.
For instance, Mr. John Andruga Duku appointed as Grade (2) ambassador did not even complete high school let alone having a diploma. He was appointed as GoSS Head Mission to Nairobi in 2006 because he was formerly a babysitter of Rebecca Nyandeng de Mabior (the wife of late John Garang). There are a couple of individuals from Warrap appointed like him as Grade (2) ambassadors without having diplomas or Bachelor’s degrees. There are also people who were disqualified to serve in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sudan on academic grounds in 2006 who are now appointed as Grade (2) ambassadors.
The tribal, clan and sectional favouritism in the ambassadorial appointments introduced a mess of inexplicable nonsense especially among South Sudanese who served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sudan prior to independence. There are qualified people like Mr. Kureng Akuei Pac, who has experience of twenty years in diplomatic service of Sudan but was appointed as Grade (3) ambassador while concubines of SPLM Secretary General who don’t even have academic qualifications, let alone diplomatic experience, were appointed in Grade (2). An example of injustice is the case of Ambassador John Simon Yor Kur who was a deputy ambassador of Sudan to Canada before independence but was appointed in Grade (3) while individuals who were secretaries of community affairs of GoSS Missions in Europe and Africa found themselves as Grade (2) ambassadors because they hailed from Greater Bhar-el-Ghazal. Another striking case is that of an IT officer, a non-diplomatic job, who was pole-vaulted to be top of the Grade (3) ambassadors. The only qualification he had is that he comes from the Gogrial Dinka in Warrap State.
The diplomatic community of South Sudan was also caught off guard by the deliberate exclusion of qualified ambassadors like John Ukech Lueth and Moses Akol Ajawin. It is reported that the Dinka Rek’s kitchen cabinet persuaded Salva Kiir to dismiss them technically because of their social relations with the leader of SPLM-DC, Dr. Lam Akol Ajawin. From the Shilluks appointed, the majority of them are either relatives or in-laws of SPLM Secretary General, Pagan Amum.
On the other hand, most Baris from Central Equatoria appointed are either related to Wani Igga (Speaker of parliament) in blood or loyal to him through political affiliation. People are no longer appointed on the basis of merits in the kingdom of Salva Kiir, and non-Dinkas have found themselves in an era where one has to compromise a lot, including morally, to be appointed to a civil service job. Because of demands of loyalty to dominant Dinka elite, some known non-Dinka personalities of Upper Nile were appointed to some prominent positions because they persuaded President Kiir that they have Dinka blood. Getting civil service jobs in the post-independent state of South Sudan has become so difficult for non-Dinkas unless one is either a loyalist of the ruling clique or has demonstrated blood ties with Dinka ethnic group.
The international community has to be aware that Dinka elite are not interested in ethnic equality but domination that would lead the South to become another Somalia. During the drafting of the Transitional Constitution in 2011, the hegemonic ambition of the Dinka elite in the SPLM Political Bureau was the major factor in blocking an effective power-sharing arrangement in South Sudan. The SPLM single-handedly dominated the constitutional drafting process and the procedures for establishing an elected government that would replace the transitional government in 2015. The SPLM was more interested to promote its project in reasserting the hegemony of the Dinka elite than adopting a Transitional Constitution which would ensure ethnic equality, and hence stability, in South Sudan.
The Dinka elite in the SPLM are not interested in ethnic equality but in the control of state power at the expense of democracy which cherishes majority rule because they have been benefiting significantly in getting a dominant political and economic position disproportionate to the share they should have been given in accordance with the ethnic entitlement principles of ethnic equality as it has been proclaimed by late John Garang. There is no justification whatsoever that an ethnic group which is about 25% of the population could control 55% of state power.
According to the SPLM’s principles of fair and equal representation of ethnic groups, the Dinka, who represent 25 percent of the South Sudan population, should have assumed a minority role, if the intention of Dinka elite of the SPLM was not to imitate the Afrikaans of South Africa.  But because the Dinka elite have been operating contrary to the rule of John Garang’s vision since 2005, the SPLM party is operating in South Sudan as an instrument of coercion and domination rather than equality and freedom. As a result, nation-building in South Sudan has been characterized by Dinkas’ economic monopoly, militaristic domination, and brutal suppression of the rights of South Sudan political parties which oppose the SPLM.
The political violence which engulfed Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity states cannot surprise people who are keen observers of South Sudan politics because since the formation of the Government of South Sudan in 2005, Dinka domination of state power has been the official policy of Salva Kiir Mayardit. But experience of old Sudan as well as other third world countries, does demonstrate that a continuation of brutal and forceful rule of a minority in a diverse country could lead to a chaotic scenario in which the majority may rise to take a desperate violent action to free themselves from the despotism of a minority group. One of the reasons that Peter A. Sule, former Minister of Rural Development, formed a rebel Movement one month after the independence of South Sudan was the rejection of ethnic equality and adoption of a transitional constitution with checks and balances.
The decision that Peter A. Sule had taken to form a rebel Movement last year to liberate the South was a clear indication that brutal tribal domination could not be imposed in post-independent South Sudan without bloodshed. We have seen in so many African countries that it is totally unfeasible and unsustainable for an elite from one ethnic group to assume a hegemonic position in a context where the consciousness of the people as well as of the ethnic communities is sufficiently mature to distinguish between what is appropriate and what is not. Military force and other deceptive strategies such as co-option of rival ethnic elites, and divide- and-rule tactics may work for some time, but such strategies cannot create a genuine framework that can nurture a workable political system in a sustainable way.
It would be practically impossible for Dinka elite to brutally dominate other ethnic groups in a country whose independence was achieved via a revolution. Dinka elite cannot institutionalize ethnic domination in post-independent South Sudan without facing a military uprising similar to 1983 formation of the SPLM/A. The current formation of various rebel movements in the country is a symptom of rejection of the ethnic domination being imposed from the top. As rebel leader, late Lt. Gen. George Athor Deng admitted in an interview in March 2011, “There is no equality between Dinkas and non-Dinkas in the government of South Sudan”. He further noted that most institutions of the government of South Sudan are built on tribal dominations and there is no equality and equity between various ethnic groups that would take place without regime change in Juba.
CONCLUSION
The politics of domination the Dinka elite pursue in South Sudan for the control of economic and political power is the main source of incessant conflicts among ethnic groups in the country. In other African countries, the proportion in which ethnic groups that produce the national wealth have access to political power or excluded from it may account for ethnic conflicts in the nation. For instance, the entire budget of Unity State in South Sudan, including two per cent oil share of the state, is a property of the Governor. Sometimes civil servants take one year without receiving their salaries because the Governor and President Salva Kiir diverted the money to their private accounts. The Governor of Unity State, Lt. Gen. Taban Deng, built a mansion in Akon, Warrap state, which is the hometown of the President, for a cost of five million dollars from the budget of Unity State to please President Salva Kiir while children in his own state die in hundreds a year because of treatable diseases. Experience in Nigeria has taught us that where the wealth producing ethnic groups feel cheated or marginalized in the country, the result always is war as it is now happening in Unity State.
In a country like South Sudan where the ruling elite favour their own kith and kin, competition for public jobs, admission into schools, distribution of state resources among others, constitute a source of conflict. In Nigeria, Sudan (before South Sudan independence) and Liberia, the ethnicization of state power led to civil wars. The international community could not be surprised to see South Sudan being engulfed in conflict six months after independence because Dinka domination of state power is creating internal explosions.
The side effect of ethnic domination in Africa is that civil wars resulting from ethnic tensions and conflicts usually plunge nations and countries into economic mess. For instance, ethnic violence in Nigeria’s Niger Delta area has partially paralyzed economic exploration of crude oil in that state. The ethnic tension between the ljaws, the Itshekiris, and the Urhobos has seriously affected the business of oil companies located in that area. In the process, economic setbacks are usually experienced. No sane person could argue that economic development will take place in Jonglei, Upper Nile, Unity and Warrap states which are infested with rebel Movements fighting to topple the corrupt regime in Juba. The cause of all conflict in South Sudan is not North Sudan as pathological Dinka elite would want the world to believe but the policy of ethnic domination which has become the manifesto of the ruling clique.
In closing, it is my considered opinion that the way to correct this malaise lies with the patriotic Dinka elites. They should speak out clearly and publicly against these malpractices which are being done in the name of their tribe. Otherwise, nobody will be blamed for generalizing all in the guilt by association.

And this, apparently, was done in the name of GOD? Unbelievable!

On the trail of Sudanese warrior

http://www.southsudanhub.com/media/65/On_the_trail_of_Sudanese_warrior/

I can’t help thinking about this timeless song of the SPLM/A:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FUKaUVXX3n0&feature=related

The good news, a befitting consolation to such an unimaginable and indescribable atrocities, is that THEY never succeeded to weaken the will nor the determination of the SPLM/A to realize their stated goal of liberation:

Republic of South Sudan Independence Day – 9th July 2011 – Yei, Central Equatoria

http://www.southsudanhub.com/media/184/Republic_of_South_Sudan_Independence_Day_-_9th_July_2011_-_Yei,_Central_Equatoria/

South Sudan Independence Day in Juba

http://www.southsudanhub.com/media/135/South_Sudanese_Celebrate_Independence/

The history of the war in (South) Sudan:

The Longest War – Sudan

http://www.southsudanhub.com/media/18/The_Longest_War_-_Sudan/

Crossroads Sudan: Sudan’s Tribal Division

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7NQQXB-v0TU

Crossroads Sudan – Profile: John Garang

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H1bL1Qir4AE&feature=relmfu

Al-Tarubi

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eMvoFSCW65k&feature=relmfu

Referendum:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eIZ4wygvt8w&feature=relmfu

Sudan’s tribal division
As the south votes on whether to secede, we take a closer look at the nation’s racial issues behind the divide.
Crossroads Sudan Last Modified: 21 Dec 2010 11:06 GMT
http://www.aljazeera.com/AJEPlayer/player-licensed-viral.swfSudan stands at a crossroads with the people of the south set to vote in January on whether to become an independent nation. This referendum is part of a 2005 peace deal which brought to an end a devastating 22-year civil war which left two million people dead and the same number homeless. Now, with the south likely to secede, Sudan’s borders and history may have to be rewritten.Al Jazeera looks at the racial issues behind the split, the impact of Sudan’s rich resources and the challenge of development ahead.

Profile: Omar Al-Bashir
http://www.aljazeera.com/AJEPlayer/player-licensed-viral.swf

Sudan, with 44 million people Africa largest nation, is rich in diversity and tradition but it is deeply divided along tribal lines.

It is on the verge of splitting in two with a potential for more fragmentation in the months and years ahead – a break up that could quickly deteriorate into another bloody conflict involving nations far beyond its borders.

After gaining independence in 1956, the nation has spent the best part of four decades fighting two civil wars. The most recent resulted in the death of two million people – and officially ended five years ago with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

In 2005, Sudan’s leaders agreed a peace deal which offered the people of south Sudan the right to choose whether to stay united, or go their own way.

Few were sure the vote would ever take place, let alone that the south would secede. But today more than four million southerners in the north, in the south and abroad have registered for a vote set to take place on January 9.

And all the signs show they will vote to break away.

Challenges ahead

If they do, an unstable region, cursed by conflict, short on infrastructure and in desperate need of development, will step into new ground.

The UN has illustrated the scale of the tasks ahead by publishing a list of what it called “Scary Statistics”.

Among the most startling are these:
• 92 per cent of women cannot read and write in the south
• One out of every seven children will die before they reach the age of five
• One out of every seven women who become pregnant can expect to die from problems related to their pregnancy

The largely black African, Christian and animist south has suffered decades of neglect by a predominantly Arab, Muslim North. It needs to work hard to build an independent nation.

The route the nation takes will be decided by the people of the south in the January referendum. How it treads the path will be decided by its two leaders, President Omar al-Bashir and Salva Kiir, the south’s president-in-waiting, and the man to lead the south on its route to secession.

Breaking away

Profile: Salva Kiir
http://www.aljazeera.com/AJEPlayer/player-licensed-viral.swf

These two men have a number of thorny issues to negotiate as the country moves forward. One of those is how to delineate the border. Its path still has to be decided.

Sudan is home to a number of nomadic tribes, many of whom cross the line of the proposed border to feed and water their cattle. The question of what they do and where they go has still to be looked at.

Many of the smaller tribes of southern Sudan are concerned about being dominated by the bigger tribes, they fear the hegemony of the Dinka tribe since Salva Kiir and most of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) leadership are Dinka.

Some tribes are known to be arming themselves, in some cases with the support of the armies of the North and the South.

It creates a series of flashpoints along the line of division, one of the most volatile of which may be Abyei. The state was supposed to get its own referendum to decide whether to become part of the North or the south. But that has failed to materialise and the fate of the region is now in the hands of the politicians.

With the CPA set to expire in July, north and south Sudan would have very little time to agree upon the practical issues of how to separate. If the issues are not solved by then, the two countries would face an uncertain future.

In this episode of Crossroads Sudan, Al Jazeera takes a closer look at the nation’s racial issues behind the divide. We went to find out why the status of Sudan is being watched with interest in Kenya, Egypt and Israel. Plus, the people of Sudan let us know what they really want for the future of their country.

Crossroads Sudan can be seen from Monday, December 20, at 1730GMT, with repeats at 2230GMT, and Tuesday at 0430GMT and 1030GMT.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) Between The Government of the Republic of the Sudan and The Sudan People Liberation Movement/Army.

http://www.aec-sudan.org/docs/cpa/cpa-en.pdf

January 9th, 2012: The 7th Anniversary of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of the Sudan (GoS) and the Rebel Movement of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A).

“I and those who joined me in the bush and fought for more than twenty years have brought to you CPA in a golden plate. Our mission is accomplished. It is now your turn, especially those who did not have a chance to experience bush’s life. When time comes to vote at referendum, it is your golden choice to determine your fate. Would you like to vote to be second class citizens in your own country? It is absolutely your choice.”—Dr. John Garang de Mabior, Rumbek, May 15, 2005, after the successful negotiation and signing of the CPA.

By PaanLuel Wël, Washington DC, USA.

January 9th, 2012 is a very important day in the history of the Republic of South Sudan. It marks the first commemoration of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) after the independence of South Sudan from (north) Sudan. It is also the seventh anniversary of the CPA since it was negotiated and signed on January 9th, 2005, in Naivasha Kenya. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of the Sudan (GoS) and the rebel movement of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) was a landmark event in the troubled history of the Republic of the Sudan that ended the war, guaranteed self-determination for South Sudanese people and successfully ushered in the independence of the current young Republic of South Sudan.

As such a milestone occasion as it is in the living memory of South Sudanese people, one would have expected a plethora of heightened political and cultural activities on January 9th, 2012 among the South Sudanese citizens to memorialize the first anniversary of the CPA in their own independent state, free from Khartoum sabotages and interferences. Yet, as Mading Ngor Akech of the New Sudan Vision—a resident of Canada but currently in Juba, South Sudan—observes on his Facebook page, the “first commemoration of the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in an independent South Sudan [was] ignored by [the] government, as only few hundreds showed up at Independence Square. Only a bunch of peace activists took it upon themselves to mark the occasion with no tribalism, violence, and other progressive chants…No official celebration, no government representation. I bet most have flown out of the country to enjoy ‘long weekend’ in neighboring countries…what, a new and interesting country!”

Of course, it may not be that baffling to figure it out why “only a bunch of peace activists took it upon themselves to mark the occasion” of the first anniversary of the CPA in an independent South Sudan. First, although the CPA ended the bloodshed and granted Southerners freedom from North Sudan, the grand promises and highly expected dividends of South Sudan’s independence—long lasting peace, political stability and sustainable economic development—are few and far between. Lack of long lasting peace and political stability in an independent South Sudan makes it appears as if the country is still practically in a civil war, contrary to the promise of the CPA. Economic development and the prospects of social prosperity are dismissal in spite of the oil money. Instead of resource blessing, there is an apparent foreboding sense of resource curse prevailing among the populace. Irrespective of their social and economic status, most South Sudanese seem to concur that the veterans of South Sudan’s war of independence have found a new cause in grand corruption.

Combined that with the inter-ethnic strife and the pervasive threat of military invasion from (north) Sudan and you would understand and appreciate the political disenchantment and economic disillusionment in South Sudan, barely six months into independence. Believably, those are the reasons why “only a bunch of peace activists took it upon themselves to mark the occasion” of the first anniversary of the CPA in an independent. Celebration is about happiness and appreciation of the event that engineered that particular happiness. While it is apparently clear that most South Sudanese will always be happy about and grateful to the CPA, it is a different matter, altogether, to expect them to pour onto the streets of Juba in glorious celebration when “only a bunch of” top leaders are reaping the fruits of South Sudan’s independence. And while those “chosen few” may not be celebrating in Juba, Mading Ngor might be right to believe that “most [leaders] have flown out of the country to enjoy ‘long weekend’ in neighboring countries.” It is “a new and [an] interesting country” indeed!!

Still, in spite of the existing political malaise, pitiable economic conditions and blossoming intertribal conflicts, political and economic instability in South Sudan, the first anniversary of the CPA in an independent South Sudan is too special in the fabric of our political revolution and in the political physic of the very identity we would want to construct for ourselves, present to the outside world as our national distinctive character and the one to bequeath to our children and children’s children.

So what is the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and of what significance is it to the long arduous political struggle of South Sudanese, to the eventual independence of South Sudan on July 9th, 2011 and to the socio-political edification of the national identity of the Republic of South Sudan?

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was a groundbreaking peace accord negotiated between, and signed by, the Government of the Republic of the Sudan (GoS) under President Omar El-Bashir and the Sudan rebel movement of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (the SPLM/A) under Dr. John Garang de Mabior. According to the Wikipedia site, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), also known as the Naivasha Agreement, “was a set of agreements culminating in January 2005 that were signed between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Government of Sudan.  The CPA was meant to end the Second Sudanese Civil War, develop democratic governance countrywide and share oil revenues. It further set a timetable by which Southern Sudan would have a referendum on its independence.”

The CPA was a mutual political commitment by the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) to a “negotiated settlement on the basis of a democratic system of governance which, on the one hand, recognizes the right of the people of Southern Sudan to Self-Determination and seeks to make unity attractive during the interim period, while at the same time is founded on the values of justice, democracy, good governance, respects for fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, mutual understanding and tolerance of diversity within the realities of the Sudan.”

The CPA was also a realization, among the SPLM/A-NCP’s top leadership, of the stalemate of the war at the frontlines and, subsequently, their desires to resolve “the Sudan conflict in a just and sustainable manner by addressing the root causes of the conflict and by establishing a framework for governance through which power and wealth shall be equitably shared and human rights guaranteed” within a new, better country acceptable to both parties, and all Sudanese people.

The successful negotiation and conclusion of the CPA was borne by the fact that the two negotiating parties of the NCP and the SPLM/A were: “(1) conscious that the conflict in the Sudan [was] the longest running conflict in Africa; that it has caused tragic loss of life, destroyed the infrastructure of the country, eroded its economic resources and caused suffering to the people of the Sudan; (2) mindful of the urgent need to bring peace and security to the people of the Sudan who have endured this conflict for far too long; (3) aware of the fact that peace, stability and development are aspirations shared by all people of the Sudan; [and] (4) recognizing that the present moment offers a window of opportunity to reach a just peace agreement to end the war [in the Sudan, once and forever].”

Conscious, mindful, aware and recognizing those aforesaid factors, the two negotiating parties of the NCP and the SPLM/A, in the Machakos Protocol, agreed that: “(1) the unity of the Sudan, based on the free wills of its people democratic governance, accountability, equality, respect, and justice for all citizens of the Sudan is and shall be the priority of the [two negotiating] parties and that it is possible to redress the grievances of the people of South Sudan and to meet their aspirations within such a framework; (2) the people of South Sudan have the right to control their affairs in their regions and participate equitably in the National government; (3) the people of South Sudan have the right to self-determination through a referendum to determine their future status; (4) religion, customs and traditions are a source of moral strength and inspiration for the Sudanese people; [and finally, among others, to cease fire and] (5) establish a democratic system of governance taking account of the cultural, ethnic, racial, religious and linguistic diversity and gender equality of the people of the Sudan.”

There were two main periods within the CPA: the Pre-Interim Period of six months pending the full implementation of the CPA and the formation of the first Government of National Unity in Khartoum and regional government in Juba, and the Interim Period of six years awaiting the conduct of the South Sudan referendum for self-determination to decide their future status. During the Pre-Interim Period of six months, “the institutions and mechanisms provided for in the Peace Agreement shall be established.” Then throughout the Interim Period of six years, “the institutions and mechanisms established during the Pre-Interim Period shall be operating in accordance with the arrangements and principles set out in the Peace Agreement.”

The end of the six years Interim Period would usher in the referendum on South Sudan self-determination in which “there shall be an internationally monitored referendum, organized jointly by the GoS and the SPLM/A, for the people of South Sudan to: confirm the unity of the Sudan by voting to adopt the system of government established under the Peace Agreement; or to vote for secession.” We all know what happened afterwards: South Sudanese voted with over 99.9% for secession.

Even though there had been numerous peace talks—and indeed peace agreements like the Khartoum and the Fashoda Peace Accords, of Dr. Riek Machar and Dr. Lam Akol respectively—between the Government of the Sudan and the SPLM/A, the real serious negotiation for the CPA commenced only in early 2002, in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attack masterminded by Osama Bin Laden, once a high-profiled guest of the Khartoum Government. In reality, the final peace process was long and uncertain, running from 2002 till January 2005. For example, the GoS and the SPLM/A “met in continuous negotiations between May 2002 and December 2004, in Karen, Machakos, Nairobi, Nakuru, Nanyuki and Naivasha, Kenya, under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace Process, and, in respect of the issues related to the conflict areas of Southern Kordorfan/Nuba Mountain and Blue Nile States and Abyei Area, under the auspices of the Government of the Republic of Kenya.”

Those long continuous negotiations between the two parties resulted in the following protocols—six chapters and two annexure—all of which constituted what we now referred to as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of the Sudan between the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan’s rebel movement of the SPLM/A:

(1) The Machakos Protocol (Chapter I) was signed in Machakos, Kenya on 20 July 2002. It set out the broad principles of government and governance within the Pre-Interim Period of six months and the Interim Period of six years. It was the Machakos Protocol that guaranteed the right to self-determination for the people of South Sudan besides offering the first priority to “making unity attractive” under a “democratic system of governance taking account of the cultural, ethnic, racial, religious and linguistic diversity and gender equality of the people of the Sudan.”

The clause about South Sudan self-determination enshrined in the Machakos Protocol—and currently the defining essence of the CPA—came about rather “accidental.” Neither the SPLM/A nor the NCP went into the Peace Talk with the zeal of making it the first priority. The SPLM/A first priority was the realization of New Sudan Vision, secular and inclusive country of all Sudanese, while the NCP were adamant about the retention of an Islamic state with more or less of an Arab identity. The incompatibility and the inevitable clash resulted in a nightmarish political stalemate for the negotiators.

Consequently, as a plan B to break the impasse, the clause on South Sudan’s self-determination was introduced—SPLM/A getting the right to conduct a referendum on South Sudan’s self-determination while the NCP obtained the privileges to keep and apply sharia law in all north Sudan except in Khartoum.

Therefore, the right to self-determination for South Sudan was arrived at as a political compromise between the SPLM/A and the NCP—the two parties who signed the CPA. In his article “South Sudan Referendum: First Thing First” Dr. Lam reports thus: “the self-determination in the CPA was an attempt to break the deadlock over the issue of separation of religion from the state and the relation between the religion and the state. So the CPA stipulated that Northerners shall have the right to apply Islamic Sharia in the North provided that Southerners shall have the right to self-determination” in the South.

Astoundingly, by the time the CPA negotiation started, a great number of South Sudanese apparently assumed that the SPLM/A and NCP went into the Peace Talk on the basis of self-determination stipulated in both the Khartoum and the Fashoda peace agreements. That was never the case because as Dr. Lam observed above, the only time the idea of self-determination was brought on the negotiating table was when the NCP refused to accept the basis of a Secular Sudan where religion would be separated from the state. Had the NCP agreed to a non-religious state, self-determination might not have been part of the deal.

(2) Power Sharing Protocol (Chapter II) was signed in Naivasha, Kenya on 26 May 2004. It delineated the sharing of power between Khartoum and Juba amongst the NCP, SPLM/A, South Sudanese and North Sudanese opposition parties. Consequently, in the national assembly in Khartoum, the NCP was to take 52%, SPLM/A 28%, other Northern Political Forces (14%) and other Southern Political Forces 6%. Meanwhile, in the regional government of Southern Sudan in Juba, the SPLM was to take 70%, NCP 15% and other Southern Political Forces 15%.

(3) Wealth Sharing Protocol (Chapter III) was signed in Naivasha, Kenya on 7 January 2004. It outlined the sharing of wealth between the NCP, the SPLM/A, and other oil-producing states of the Sudan. Under the management of the National Petroleum Commission, the South Sudan’s oil—which was the main national wealth to be shared—was shared equally (50-50) between the two parties: NCP was given 50%, SPLM/A 50% and the oil-producing states 2%. It was also under the Wealth Sharing Agreement that the Reconstruction and Development Funds—Southern Sudan Reconstruction and Development Funds (SSRDF), National Reconstruction and Development Funds (NRDF) and the Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTF)—were established to help in the reconstruction and development of the war-torn regions.

(4) The Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Abyei Area (Chapter IV) was signed in Naivasha, Kenya on 26 May 2004. It guarantee the sharing of power between the NCP, the SPLM/A, the Ngok Dinka and the Misseriya Arabs, in addition to a referendum for the Abyei residents to determine their future status of either remaining as part of Southern Kordofan, Sudan or joining Bhar el Ghazal, South Sudan.  The protocol defined Abyei as “the area of nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905” while permitting the Misseriya and other nomadic peoples to “retain their traditional rights to graze cattle and move across the territory of Abyei.” Meanwhile, the residents of Abyei would be citizens of both Southern Kordofan and Bhar el Ghazal states, with representation in both state assemblies, pending Abyei Referendum that was to happen concurrently with the South Sudan’s plebiscite.

(5) The Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Southern Kordorfan/Nuba Mountain and Blue Nile States (Chapter V) was signed in Naivasha, Kenya on 26 May 2004 enshrining human rights and fundamental freedoms, in addition to the protection and development of the diverse cultural heritage and local languages of the population. Most importantly, it called for the people of the Southern Kordorfan and Blue Nile States to be given the right to conduct Popular Consultation—“the democratic right and mechanism to ascertain the views of the people of the Southern Kordorfan/Nuba Mountain and Blue Nile States on the comprehensive agreement reached by the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement.” Administratively, the NCP was to take 55% of the state government while the SPLM/A-N takes 45%.

(6) The Agreement on Security Arrangements (Chapter VI) was signed in Naivasha, Kenya on 25 September 2003 affirming that, during the interim period; the two armies of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (the SPLA) were to remain separate and would be considered and treated equally. SPLA forces in Nuba Mountain and Southern Blue Nile, as well as the SAF forces in South Sudan, were to relocate to their respective borders of the 1/1/1956 with the exception of those forces operating under the Joint/Integrated Units (the JIU). The Joint/Integrated Units—which was composed of equal numbers of the SAF and the SPLA—was an experimental army to assess and establish a post referendum army of the Sudan, just in case South Sudan were to vote for unity.

(7) The Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities and Appendices (Annexure I) was signed in Naivasha, Kenya on 31 December 2004 with both parties agreeing to “(a) permanent ceasefire among all their forces with the broader objective of sustaining the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, promoting peace culture, reconciliation and confidence building, [and] (b) permanent cessation of hostilities between SAF and SPLA within 72 hours of the signature of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.” Redeployment, demobilization, disarmament, re-integration and reconciliation would then ensue based on different phases and the unique circumstances of the various designated assembly areas.

(8) The Implementation Modalities and Global Implementation Matrix and Appendices (Annexure II) was signed in Naivasha, Kenya on 31 December 2004 wherein the implementation modalities of all the protocols were outlined, explained and ascertained according to the letter and spirit of the CPA. The Implementation Modalities and Global Implementation Matrix and Appendices were to act as the “appropriate mechanisms for resolving any discrepancies that may arise during the implementation process.”

The CPA was jointly signed by Ali Osman Taha, first vice president of the Republic of the Sudan, on behalf of the government of the Republic of the Sudan, and Dr. John Garang de Mabior, chairman of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army, on behalf of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army. The Peace Accord was witnessed by the following people: President Mwai Kibaki of Kenya, President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Foreign Affairs Minister Ahmed Aboul of Egypt, Senator deputy FM Afredo Mantica of Italy, Special Envoy Fred Racke of the Royal Kingdom of Netherland, Minister Hilde Johnson of Royal Norwegian Government, Hilary Benn of the UK and Northern Ireland, Secretary of State Colin Powel of the USA, Chairman Alpha Oumar Konare of the AU, Charles Goerens of the EU, Secretary General Amre Moussa of the Arab League and Jan Pronk of the United Nations.

Is CPA fully implemented? Is it a success story? By and large, the CPA is way better than all the previous South Sudanese Accords signed or promised. Although the promised referendum on Abyei Area and Popular Consultations among the people of Southern Kordorfan/Nuba Mountain and Blue Nile States are yet to be materialized, the CPA dividends and successes are undeniable. Of all the numerous successes of the CPA, unlike the Addis Ababa Agreement, the successful conduct of the South Sudan’s referendum on self-determination and the proclamation of South Sudan’s independence are special, historic events unprecedented in the long painful history of South Sudan.

Of course, there were, and still are, serious challenges in the implementation of the CPA, not least the untimely death of Dr. John Garang, the political wrangling over the distribution of the ministerial posts in the GoNU, the acrimonious relationship between the SPLM/A and the NCP that once led to a temporary withdrawal of the SPLM/A from the national government, the suspicion over the census results and the heightened political anxiety towards the conduct of South Sudan plebiscite amid rebellions from war-lords probably back by the north. But in the end, we all know how it ended: freedom. While it may now emerge as if we had arrived home with an empty pot of water from the well, the fact of the matter is that we owned it and we can take it back to the well to collect more water or just remold and shape it to produce a better one.

In hindsight though, looking back to 2005, the CPA is but the culmination of all the previous peace accords attempted, negotiated, signed but dishonored, between South Sudanese and the Khartoum’s Government. The CPA is a fulfillment of the Koka Dam Accord, the Abuja I and II, the Juba Conference, the Torit, Bor and Akobo Mutinies and the Frankfurt Accord. It is the final realization and incarnation of the Addis Ababa Agreement of the 1972 and the fruition of South Sudan’s referendum. It is the embodiment of our sacrifices and the manifestation of our resolves.

That the CPA exemplifies all that there is within the realm of the history of South Sudanese struggle is the reason why it should be annually commemorated irrespective of the current socioeconomic and political realities in South Sudan. It is just good and befitting for and by its own self. It is the history of us, now and in the foreseeable future!

You can reach PaanLuel Wël at paanluel2011@gmail.com, Facebook Page, Twitter account OR at his blog: https://paanluelwel2011.wordpress.com/

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement.pdf The Comprehensive Peace Agreement.pdf
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The 7th Anniversary of the CPA Between the Government of the Sudan and the SPLM.pdf The 7th Anniversary of the CPA Between the Government of the Sudan and the SPLM.pdf
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By PaanLuel Wel, Washington DC, USA

Synopsis of Elhaq Paul’s Contention

In his September 28, 2011 article SPLM and mass media: Promoting history on falsity published by South Sudan News Agency, Mr Elhaq Paul undertook to disassociate Dr. John Garang and the SPLM/A leadership from any claim to the attainment of self-determination in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the successful secession of South Sudan from the North.

Mr. Elhaq Paul argues that Dr. John Garang was not a separatist and therefore cannot be the founding father and the hero of the independence of South Sudan. Thus, Elhaq Paul maintains, any attempt by the SPLM/A leadership in Juba or his wife Madam Nyandeng, through public media, to project him as an ardent separatist, the great champion of South Sudan liberation struggle, the hero of South Sudan independence and the founding father of the new nation is a falsehood that would have been rejected by Dr. Garang himself. According to Elhaq Paul’s thinking, Dr. John Garang was an “avowed unionist” who had nothing to do with separation or the present image being concocted on his behalf. Mr. Elhaq Paul concludes that all those actions being done by President Kiir’s government amount to state promotion of Dinka superiority under Dinkocracy—Dinka hegemony.

In an attempt to support his claims, Elhaq Paul quoted from John Garang Speaks”a book purportedly written by or about Dr. John Garang in which he had allegedly stated his main objections to South Sudan separation from the north in preference to one United New Sudan. To buttress his indictment of Dr. John Garang, Mr. Elhaq Paul cited the oft-time quoted statement of Dr. John Garang that ‘our first bullets were fired against the separatists.” And these first victims of the SPLM/A are supposed to be Samuel Gai Tut and Akuot Atem Mayen. Both gentlemen were killed, according to Mr. Elhaq Paul’s assertion, because of their secessionist beliefs.

In what appears to conjure up a grotesque picture of an Old Testament prophet, Mr. Elhaq Paul give the impression of someone on an urgent divined mission to warn, inform and redeem South Sudanese from being misled into entertaining and accepting fabricated and distorted history being written by one community—the Dinka—purposely to enshrine their ethnic superiority of Dinkocracy. For those who have been exposed to his writings for a while, this is the overarching theme you can adduce whenever you study his work: resistance to and redemption from Dinkocracy.

In a nutshell, Mr. Elhaq Paul thesis is that Dr. John Garang is not the father and champion of South Sudan’s independence because (1) South Sudanese, through the ballot box, liberated themselves from the Arabs, and (2) Dr. John Garang was a murderous unionist who killed, imprisoned or/and threatened separatists—Akuot Atem, Gai Tut, Dr. Riek Machar, Dr. Lam Akol etc—who liberated South Sudan from the Arabs. For that reason, in his judgment, these separatists—dead or lucky to be alive—should be the true champions and founding fathers of South Sudan independence and not Dr. John Garang, Kerubino Kuanyin, William Nyuon, Arok Thon, Joseph Oduho, Majier Ghai, President Kiir, Pagan Amum, Wani Igga etc.

Response to Mr. Elhaq Paul’s Core Argument

As anyone can grasp from the plethora of counter-arguments and counter-claims already made against his article, there are a lot of objections that one can muster against Mr. Elhaq Paul’s fundamental disputation. The first of course is about whether or not Dr. John Garang, the former leader of the SPLM/A, was a separatist or a unionist. This has to be well established because, in Mr. Paul’s argument, Dr. John Garang can never be the real hero of South Sudan’s independence or the founding father of the nation insofar as he is not a separatist. The assumption here is that only separatists liberated South Sudan. And since only liberators should be bestowed the honor of being the national heroes/heroines and founding fathers/mothers of the republic, a person like Dr. John Garang, Mr. Elhaq Paul affirms, cannot qualify for that accolade: they must be excluded at best or maligned at worst.

Mr. Elhaq proceeds to counsel South Sudanese to take Dr. John Garang by his own words which are, allegedly, revealing of his unionistic bearing. But which are his words? That (1) “Our first bullets were fired against the separatists”—in the 1980s which places him among the unionists—or that (2) “I and those who joined me in the bush and fought for more than twenty years, have brought to you CPA in a golden plate. Our mission is accomplished. It is now your turn, especially those who did not have a chance to experience bush life. When time comes to vote at referendum, it is your golden choice to determine your fate. Would you like to vote to be second class citizens in your own country? It is absolutely your choice”—Rumbek, May 15, 2005, which put Dr. John Garang on top of the separatists’ list? On which basis must anyone pick proclamation (1) in total disregard to declaration (2) or choose statement (2) without putting into consideration affirmation (1)?

Indeed, as Brian Adeba points out in his reaction to Elhaq Paul’s article, the main problem with Elhaq Paul’s argument is that his “article failed to account for Garang’s flexible stances on self determination and the evolution of these stances over a [long] period of time.” In other words, the Dr. John Garang that Mr. Elhaq Paul seems to be sacrificing may be the one of the 1980’s while he would be contented, it is apparent from his pronouncements, to dine on the table, and worship under the feet, of Dr. John Garang of May 2005. But since it is the same man leading a party battered, and in the process shaped, by different circumstances over a long period of time, which Dr. John Garang should South Sudanese take on his words and on which words precisely?

Judging by what I read from other South Sudanese commentators, combined with my own personal analysis of Dr. John Garang’s political evolution, Dr. John Garang, plus Dr. Riek and Dr. Lam too etc as I will explained below, might be compare to Simon Peter—that biblical disciple to Jesus of Nazareth, the first century Jewish teacher of morality believe by some people to be a god. Simon Peter was first the leading apostle of Christ; then he stumbled and retreated when he denied Jesus at the hour of reckoning, only later to emerge as the first successor to Jesus Christ. Similarly, Dr. John Garang, as an Anyanya One freedom fighter, could be considered to have started out as a separatist (how else could he have joined a separatist movement of Anyanya One if he was not a party to their ideology). This is where Dr. John Garang’s letter to Gen. Joseph Lagu comes in as a certification of this stance though that letter does not triumph the fact that Dr. John Garang was a member of Anyanya One, a separatist Movement. His mere present and full participation in Anyanya One Movement is more of a solid proof than any written letter: action speaks louder than words.

Nonetheless, by the time the SPLM/A was founded in Ethiopia, Dr. John Garang seemed to have renounced separatism and adopted New United Sudan as a vision for the Party, either as a strategy as some people argue or as his core absolute belief as others presume. The Garang of Ethiopia—1980s—is the one boasting of having shot the first bullets at the separatists. That statement itself though, subject to critical analysis, is mistaken unless we want to believe that May 16, 1983—when Kerubino Kunayin Bol in Bor and William Nyuon Bany in Ayod started the revolution by shooting the first bullets at Arab officers and soldiers—was not the date the Revolution began. The fighting did rage on for days in Bor town and William Nyuon murdered almost an entire squad of Arab soldiers till the well was filled to the brim. Were those Arabs separatists? Of course not and so Dr. John Garang’s statement might be tempting at face value but it is erroneous per se. The first bullet was shot at the Arabs in Bor town! Whatever that Dr. John Garang was talking about might have been his propaganda war—one that erupted over power struggle—against Akuot-Gai’s group to boost the morale among his troops.

And while it is veritably true that Samuel Gai Tut died at the hand of the SPLM/A, it is not the case that Akuot Atem was killed by the SPLM/A as Mr. Elhaq Paul appears to be professing. In reality, he was murdered in cold blood by Abdalla Chuol, his minister of defense and commander-in-chief, either because of internal disagreement amongst themselves over proposed collaboration with the Arabs or because Abdalla Chuol wanted to avenge Gai Tut whom he believed to have been killed, and publicly humiliated, by the Dinkas (read Kerubino Kunayin). From what has been written about the death of Gai Tut, the Adura Camp of SPLM/A were enraged by two main factors: (1) the interception and killing of SPLM/A new unsuspecting recruits coming from Bhar el Ghazel and Abyei by the Bukteng camp of Akuot Atem and Gai Tut and (2) the killing of 24 senior SPLM/A officers, among them Francis Ngor who was only next to Dr. Garang in seniority. The officers and Ngor were killed when Akuot and Gai Tut camp attacked and overran SPLM/A headquarters of Adura camp in Ethiopia. The SPLM/A soldiers, led by Kerubino Kuanyin, went on the revenge spree, tricked/pre-empted (there are two version to his death) Gai Tut into/before peace talk and fatally wounded him in the ambush. Then, unfortunately, he was humiliated (his dead-decomposing body was whipped by Kuanyin Bol). The public humiliation, it is deemed, might have led Nuer soldiers under Abdalla Chuol to kill Akuot Atem, a Dinka, as a revenge for Gai Tut’s killing and public humiliation by what they (the Gai-Chuol’s soldiers) considered as a rerun of Dinka-Nuer’s old tribal rivalry.

Indubitably, Akuot Atem and Gai Tut, being former members of Anyanya One, were strong advocates for South Sudan independence. What is disputable though is the claim that their public stance on separation, of which they were not the exception as most Anyanya One leaders would attest—uncle Joseph Oduho, for example—was the main cause of contention between them, and the Garang-led group of Adura camp. Be informed that by this time in the Movement, as it was later the case with the Nasir group, both Akuot-Gai group and Garang-Kuanyin-Nyuon-Kiir group considered themselves as SPLM/A. It was not about the name or the objectives or the manifesto of the party, but rather who should be the leader of the Movement. That does not mean that the call for self-determination was discarded; rather it was not the main issue because both Adura and Bukteng camps were conscious of the non-viability of forming a separatist movement in Ethiopia. It was a non-starter for the Ethiopian Dergue regime, the only lifeline for the revolution in those days.

As Dr. Majak argues in his response to Mr. Elhaq Paul’s article, Both Akuot and Gai Tut were there when the manifesto was drafted and signed and they never objected or chose to leave the party. In fact, Akuot was temporarily appointed (force himself upon the group) as the chairperson, and he appointed his longtime friend, Gai Tut, as his deputy and the head of the army, with Dr. John Garang as the chief of staff. As for the prefer ideology of the new rebel group, it was forced upon the group by their host—the Ethiopian government through General Masfin and President Mengistu who were fighting a separatist rebellion and would not have entertained hosting a separatist movement. The mere business of writing the first statement of the movement attest to this fact because it had to be drafted, rewritten and revised many times in order to make it acceptable to the Ethiopian government. That arduous process of writing, redrafting and revising the Manifesto to satisfy Ethiopian’s stern demand was overseen by none other than Akuot Atem as the self-appointed Chairperson and Samuel Gai Tut as his deputy and commander of the armed forces.

Akuot Atem and Gai Tut never objected to the proposal—or rather order—from the Mengistu government about the nature and direction of the movement. They were contented so long as they were leading the new Movement. Trouble started only when Kerubino Kuanyin and William Nyuon arrived in Ethiopia—accompanied by larger army than that of Akuot and Gai Tut. Both Kerubino and William Nyuon (they were late because Kerubino was still recuperating from the wound he had sustained in Bortown while William Nyuon was reportedly amassing wealth and money on the way to Ethiopia) were horrified to discover that they were being led by Akuot and Gai Tut. Added to this internal leadership wrangling was the external pressure from the Ethiopian government which was openly demanding Dr. John Garang to be the leader of the new rebel. (Interestingly, the Ethiopian are said to have been advised by Dr. Lam and others to settle on Dr. Garang as the leader) Outsmarted by Dr. Garang alliance with the Ethiopian government and outnumbered in army to army numbers and strength because of the arrival of William Nyuon with larger army, Akuot Atem and Gai Tut stormed out of the Adura camp and moved to Bukteng Village which was inside Sudan. It was from Bukteng camp that they started sabotaging the SPLM/A by intercepting and murdering new recruits joining the Movement from around the country.

While we may never know the real truth as to whether Dr. John Garang was just a separatist by heart and a unionist by strategy as some people do rationalize, there is no doubt that the event of 1990s did compel him to revisit and to revise his ideology. First, the demised of the Soviet Union led to the sudden fall of the Dergue Regime in Ethiopia which deprived the SPLM/A of their sanctuary and ready supply of arms and material supports. Then came the August 28, 1991 Nasir coup led by Dr. Lam and Dr. Riek Machar, cutting SPLM/A forces in half; hence, reducing their numerical and military strengths as well as demoralizing them. The resurgence of emboldened Jallaba under the new leadership of an Islamist party of NIF headed by Bashir and Hassan El Turabi took advantage of the mayhem within the SPLM/A that was first initiated by the fall of Mengistu’s government and then worsened by the Nasir coup plotters.

The subsequent humiliating defeats that SPLM/A suffered at the hand of a rejuvenated Arabs Mujadeens in the earlier 1990s, might have been enough to tilt the balance of discussion within the SPLM/A ranks about the questions of separation. After all, there was no more Ethiopian government to be appeased. As the SPLM/A was teetering on the verge of defeat, the 1994 SPLM/A Convention in Chukudum decided to adopt self-determination as an option in addition to the New Sudan Vision. The Dr. Garang that was reborn by circumstances or who, as some people have argued, re-assumed his true colors during 1994 Chukudum Convention is the same one talking in Rumbek, May 2005, lecturing about the choice between being a second class citizens in the old Sudan or opting to be a first class citizen in your own country. It is reminiscence of the one we initially found in the bushes of Anyanya One war.

Given that kind of declarations from Dr. John Garang of Rumbek, 2005, what do you think he would have voted for if he was there to cast his vote on referendum day? To Mr. Elhaq Paul, Dr. John Garang would have voted for unity because he was, in his word, an “avowed unionist.” But as Brian Adeba noted, the shortcomings of that argument is that it deliberately or inadvertently overlook the “evolution of these stances over a period of time.” Dr. John Garang, unquestionably supported the killing of Gai Tut, just as Gai Tut did wish the same to him, and I think he was also exultant to learn about the death of Akuot at the hand of his own soldiers. But this was justified because Akuot and Gai Tut intercepted and killed innocent recruits who left their beloved families and cattle to join the movement to fight for their rights. Whoever whose conscience is dark enough to murder such kind of selfless individuals, according to the rule of the jungle (the SPLM/A was a rebel movement, not a liberal democratic party in Western Europe) must be brought to justice and that is exactly what the SPLM/A did. It is not, and will never be, immoral to kill a killer. It was just a matter of who kill who first between the two warring camps. That Akuot Atem and Gai Tut were unlucky to get kill in a competitive war could not possibly be a logical ground to turn their death into martyrdom.

Another aspect that I would like to address here is the insinuation in Mr. Elhaq Paul argument that SPLM/A killed or imprisoned some leaders just because of their ethnicity. Mr. Elhaq Paul mentioned the imprisonment of freedom fighters whose identities (read ethnicities) or ideas (read separatism) were not entertained by the movement leaders. However, historical accounts point to the fact that most leaders detained by the SPLM/A under Dr. Garang were arrested, chiefly, due to power struggle, not ideological differences and not ethnicity either because among them were Dinkas i.e Akuot Mayen (Dinka Bor), Arok Thon (Dinka Bor), Majier Gai (Dinka Bor), Kuanyin Bol (Dinka Bahr el Ghazel) among others. In fact, it was only after the elimination of these leaders by the SPLM/A under Dr. Garang that Dr. Lam and Dr. Machar emerged to fill the vacuum, a position that they later use to instigate the coup. Even the SPLM-Nasir had many Dinkas among them, the detainees for instance, who were freed by William Nyuon. Interestingly, among the freed detainees—the so called progressive officers like Alfred Lado, Chol Deng Alaak, Wantok Ammon, Dhol Acuil, etc—were arrested by William Nyuon, Arok Thon and Kerubino in their internal struggle against Dr. Garang and Salva Kiir.

To articulate that ethnicity was given strong consideration is to overlook the conspicuous fact that most of the power struggle and tragedies within the SPLM/A were, at first, mostly between Dinkas. Akuot Atem, who sided with Gai Tut, was not only a Dinka like Dr. John Garang but they were both from Dinka Bor. And even within Dinka Bor, they came from the same Twic East, or what was formerly referred to as Kongor. To talk of ethnicity there is not only outlandish but it is just pure ignorance. While Akuot and Gai Tut, a Dinka and Nuer, were in one camp, Dr. John Garang, Kerubino kuanyin and William Nyuon etc were on the other camp, a mixture of different tribes. The internal power struggle among the SPLM/A leaders affected and victimized people of all tribes and regions. It started with Garang vs Akuot in the 1980s and ended with Garang vs Salva Kiir in Rumbek, 2004. And if revelations from Wikileak are to be believed and taken seriousness, then power Ping-Pong is still going on since President Kiir is suspicious of Madam Nyandeng whom he believe to be planning a coup to ouster him from power (a hallmark of gender equality when men genuinely feel threatened by women?).

The second contestation of power was between the less educated (Kuanyin Bol and William Nyuon) on the one hand and the progressive group (Dr. John Garang and Salva Kiir) on the other hand. Arok Thon Arok was pitting the two groups against each other in the hope of reaping from the self-destructive fallout of the two groups (Arok was enraged for having been placed under Salva Kiir, his junior officer in the Sudanese intelligence, in the SPLM/A ranking. He also used to consider himself too smart and too qualified to be under any of those guys). It has to be recalled that by this time, Dr. Lam and Dr. Machar were junior officers with no voice. If tribalism was the determining factor, then (1) the Dinkas—Dr. John Garang, Salva Kiir and Kuanyin Bol would have ganged up against William Nyuon, the sole Nuer among the high ranking officers, or (2) Kuanyin Bol and Salva Kiir, being not only from Bahr el Ghazel but from the same Twic of Gogrial, would have joined hand against either Dr. John Garang and Arok Thon, who were not only from Dinka Bor but from the same Twic East. Moreover, Arok Thon was Garang’s maternal uncle since Garang’s mother is from Kongor where Arok hailed from. But that was never the case, Dr. Garang teamed up with Salva Kiir instead while Arok Thon despised them all, including William Nyuon and Kerubino Kuanyin. Arok’s arrogance and defiance and Kuanyin’s rebelliousness and belligerence, not their ethnicity, later led to their eventual arrests and detention.

What I am trying to say is that pure power struggle over leadership, and possibly a little dosage of dictatorship from Dr. John Garang, was the sole reason for all the squabbling, detentions and the unfortunate killings. It had little to do with either ideology or ethnicity because the alliances were never delineated along tribal groupings; and nor did the SPLM/A ever attacked a party formed by secessionists that was fighting the Arabs on the frontlines. The separatists, that ever were, chose to ally themselves with the Arabs where they became a mere tool used to fight the SPLM/A. Take for example the case of the remnants of Gai-Akuot groups under Abdalla Chuol, who relocated to the outskirt of Malakal near the Arabs. The question become, how do you purport to fight for the separation of South Sudan when you are in bed with the enemy? Must SPLM/A cease to exist before they could have commenced fighting the real enemy?

But then again, if it is the case that Dr. John Garang was first a separatist, then a Unionist and then again reverted back to separatism; somebody may wonder: don’t the Nasir coup makers have a valid point when they claim that they re-introduced the call for self-determination into the debate and hence compelled SPLM/A to adopt it? My response is that it is true. It is true because without the 1991 Nasir coup, the SPLM/A might have toppled the central government with Dr. Garang as the president. It is hard to see and argue how SPLM/A could have reversed gear from there to embrace separation. And even if the SPLM/A would have not succeeded in an outright military victory; they would have still been strong enough, without the coup, to force the Khartoum government to negotiate on their terms. Both scenarios point to one fact: the SPLM/A under Dr. John Garang was a real force to reckon with in the pre-coup days in Sudanese political arena and it was not prepared to settle on the moon when it believed itself to have sufficient fuel to reach the star.

In the post-coup day, however, the SPLM/A was weakened internally, having been violently uprooted from it bases in Ethiopia and heavily pounded and hotly pursued by the resurging Arabs invigorated by the coup. Therefore, the coup makers, deliberately or inadvertently (I believe this) killed the SPLM/A’s goal of ever dislodging the Khartoum government from power. Face with little room to maneuver around, The SPLM/A under Dr. John Garang, switched or rather expanded their objectives of the war and adopted self-determination as one of their objectives in the 1994 Chukudum Convention. And even though Dr. Lam and Dr. Machar publicly adopted the call for self-determination as the centerpiece of their missions, there is little of it that had appeared from their writings before the coup. The writings of Dr. Lam, who did almost all the writings, were mostly about Dr. Garang’s alleged dictatorship—what he termed as one-man show—lack of democracy, dysfunctional party institutions and human rights abuses. The same accusations were later labeled against both Dr. Lam and Dr. Machar when they themselves became party leaders.

But the trouble of claiming absolute ownership of the demand for South Sudan self-determination by the Nasir coup makers is the glaring disparity between their public declarations and public actions. Like the Anyanya Two of Akuot Atem, Gai Tut and Abdalla Chuol, they were separatists by proclamations and collaborators by deeds. As if by fate, neither the Anyanya Two Movement nor the SPLM/A-Nasir fought the real enemy—the Arabs. In the words of Dr. Majak D’Agoot, South Sudan’s self-determination and the present-day independence was not won on “empty proclamations, sloganeering, or even through nonviolent means—read Khartoum and Fashoda Peace Accord of 1997” but rather “through a protracted struggle that took many lives and eventually weakened the resolve of the most determined and even fanatic opponent that Khartoum was.” Both the Anyanya Two and SPLM/A-Nasir collapsed and disintegrated. Had SPLM/A been defeated by the NIF/NCP during the dark trying days of the 1990s, Mr. Elhaq Paul would not have been talking today about whether or not Dr. John is the founding father of the nation because that nation wouldn’t have existed. The Nasir camp has nothing—but their collaborations with the Arabs—to show for their public adoption of the call for self-determination.

Therefore, while Dr. Lam and Dr. Machar might be right (the idea was already there) to talk about the re-introduction of the demand for South Sudan self-determination into the debate, they should show South Sudanese what they did to realize their dreams. The coup did changed the SPLM/A not because of what they were saying about the separation of South Sudan but because the coup divided and weakened the SPLM rendering the goal of deposing the Khartoum government impossible. And so the SPLM/A had to settle for the moon rather than longing for a star whose reach was evidently beyond their military and political capacity.

Even after the 1994 Chukudum resolution, the SPLM/A was not yet officially done with the New Sudan Vision. For example, the SPLM/A went to the peace talk (the CPA) with the agenda of a “New Sudan which would be multi-racial, multi-religious, multi-cultural,” and secular but the NCP’s adamant insistence on retaining an Islamic law in the country change the course of the peace talks. Self determination clause was arrived at as a political compromise: the NCP getting to keep Sharia law in all Northern Sudan except in Khartoum and the SPLM/A got the option to secede under the self-determination clause. That is why it is incorrect for some people to argue that the signing of Khartoum Peace Agreement had made South Sudan’s self-determination a foregone conclusion. If it was the case, then the reverse would have been true: SPLM/A tabling and insistence on self-determination for South Sudan forcing the NCP to trade it for an Islamic north. But we know that was not what actually happened; it was the other way round.

When self-determination clause was being worked out, the Khartoum and the Fashoda peace accords provided the framework for the clause. Of course, that does not mean that the “the right of self-determination of the people of South Sudan to determine their future status through a referendum” came from Khartoum and Fashoda peace accords; it was arrived at as a political compromise between the SPLM/A and the NCP—the two parties who signed the CPA. In his article “South Sudan Referendum: First Thing First” Dr. Lam reports thus: “the self-determination in the CPA was an attempt to break the deadlock over the issue of separation of religion from the state and the relation between the religion and the state. So the CPA stipulated that Northerners shall have the right to apply Islamic Sharia in the North provided that Southerners shall have the right to self-determination” in the South. So it was not because Anyanya Two or the Nasir group had championed it, but because of the political deadlock over the preservation and application of Sharia law!

While Dr. Lam was not actually making this argument to show the origin of self-determination as a compromise between the two negotiating parties, it does however show the fluidity of the demand for and the attaining of the right to self-determination by South Sudanese. (Let me clarify here that Dr. Lam was advancing the argument that Northerners have the full right to apply sharia law in the North because it was stipulated in the CPA and so for the SPLM/A to deny them that right during the GoNU period was to call for the renegotiation of the CPA). As commonly known by most South Sudanese, the first time it was demanded or made was in the 1947 Juba Conference by the likes of Uncle Both Diw. The 1960s also saw the re-emergence of the call for self-determination and that continued till the days of both Anyanya One and Two and then the Nasir group. It is as old as South Sudanese struggle itself.

Astoundingly, by the time the CPA negotiation started, many people apparently assumed that the SPLM/A and NCP went into the Peace Talk on the basis of self-determination stipulated in both the Khartoum and the Fashoda peace agreements. That was never the case because as Dr. Lam observed above, the only time the idea of self-determination was brought on the negotiating table was when the NCP refuses to accept the basis of a Secular Sudan where religion would be separated from the state. Had the NCP agreed to a non-religious state, self-determination might not have been part of the deal. Unless there was a clear connection between NCP’s refusal to abandon an Islamic-Sharia state and the 1991 Nasir coup, there is no direct relationship between the inclusions of the self-determination clause and Dr. Lam’s claim of being the father of South Sudan self-determination. Oddly, it may sound funny but the NCP may actually be the real father because it was only due to their dogmatic insistence to part way with Sharia law that the SPLM/A settled for a self-determination which was not their first priority though it was part of their adopted official agenda.

Alternatively, the Anyanya Two may lay a better claim to the call for self-determination more than the Nasir guys. After all, there was hardly any difference between the two camps. They both fought the SPLM/A, allied themselves with the Arabs and both espoused South Sudan separation. Although Anyanya Two was a hired-to-kill machine by the Arabs, they never abandoned their call for South Sudan separation till 1991 when the coup occurred. So what does re-introduction of self-determination into South Sudan official debate mean if it has been there all along? If Dr. Machar and Dr. Lam were still part of the SPLM/A, then it would be meaningful to talk of re-introduction. But since they were no longer members of the SPLM/A, they neither re-introduced the idea into the party nor into South Sudan national’s debate because it was already there through the call made by, and Arabs’ promises to, Anyanya Two Movement.

As a matter of fact, I do not agree with those who champion the idea that Dr. John Garang was a separatist from the beginning but decided to “employ the Machiavellian intelligence—-to achieve the independence of South Sudan” or that he was, to rephrase it differently, a unionist by day and a separatist by night. The notion that the SPLM/A under Dr. John Garang employed “the Machiavellian intelligence—-to achieve the independence of South Sudan” is appalling because it could, among other things, suggest that the SPLM/A under Dr. John Garang intentionally misled, used and dumped people of Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and other northern states. That would be a cantankerous claim to make about Dr. John Garang and the vision he gave up his life for. It would be as insulting as Mr. Elhaq Paul’s allegation. He pursued the New Sudan Vision because he had believed in it attainment as it was within reach before the demised of Mengistu regime and the 1991 coup. He later adopted separation when the chances of removing a regime “too deformed to be reformed” from power become hardly feasible.

Simply, he changed and adapted and rebranded the vision based on the prevailing political and military circumstances. Dr. John Garang underwent various ideological and strategic metamorphoses through which he responded and adjusted his vision to achieve the best he could given the realities of the situation he was confronted with to realized the goal of liberation. Thus there are two main reasons why he revised his stance: (1) the military weakening of the SPLM/A by the 1991 coup, not the hollow proclamations of those who were with the Arabs; and (2) the adamant persistence of the NCP to retain a religious state during the CPA negotiation. History will testify that those are the main factors that change the course of SPLM/A ideology. Of course, other South Sudanese have their own version of events and claims to truth, but unless those claims combined and reconciled words and actions, they are baseless and hubristic.

To say that Dr. John Garang was indeed influenced, negatively, by the actions of the Nasir coup may sound as if I am conceding a point to the supporters of Dr. Lam and Dr. Machar. Quite to the contrary, the changes I am talking about happened across the political divides. For example, Dr. Majak mentioned the fact that Dr. Machar and his colleagues in London had formed another unionist party—Sudan Congress Front?—in October 1983. This party, that never saw the light of the day, was co-chaired by Dr. Riek Machar and Benjamin Bol Akook. People like Dr. Chol Dau, Dr. Marial Benjamin, Dr. Thomas Gordon, Justice Mabil Anyieth, Justice John Luk, John Roach, among others, were confirmed members.

When Dr. Machar went to Libya to solicit for military support, he was told by Muamar Ghadhafi, who was already supply arms to the SPLM/A, to join the SPLM/A since they was no difference between the two. Not only had Dr. Machar, the champion of the Nasir coup, formed a unionist party, he went ahead and willingly joined SPLM/A which was a unionist party instead of Anyanya Two, the separatist. The same logic applies to Dr. Lam Akol: not only did he officially recommend Dr. John Garang, a unionist against the separatists of Akuot and Gai Tut, to the Ethiopian government, he also freely participated in the founding of, and later officially joined, the SPLM/A, the unionist party. Both Dr. Lam and Dr. Machar, if truly they had never been unionists like Dr. John Garang, would have comfortably joined Anyanya Two whose official policy was separation. Simply put, they just changed their ideologies depending on the circumstances as much and often as Dr. John Garang did change his. This is equally applicable to Akuot Atem and Gai Tut of Anyanya Two because they would have remained in the SPLM/A had they been offered those positions they demanded.

That is the kind of ideological transmutation I believe Dr. John Garang did undergo through. It is meaningless and unrealistic to place him under one category as being a unionist or a separatist. He was everything that could have worked for him to achieve the goal of liberation, which, in the heydays of the SPLM/A, was the liberation of the whole Sudan, while, in the darkest days of the SPLM/A, became the separation of South Sudan. By everything I am not thinking of the so called “Peace from within” which was, and still remain, a gentleman term—a psychological euphemism—for surrendering oneself to the Arabs in a gentleman agreement with nothing to guarantee its implementation. It was just signed on paper to save faces while the two parties are/were cognizance of the fact that the document will have no bearings whatsoever on realities. That was the fate that doomed both the Khartoum and the Fashoda Peace Agreements. The CPA, because it was backed up and protected by the SPLA, was able to see the light of the day—and now millennia to come.

While “Dr. John Garang is unquestionably the father of South Sudan, the champion of its independence and its greatest hero” the fact of the matter is that Kuanyin Bol, William Nyuon, Arok Thon, Joseph Oduho, Justice Martin Majier, Dr. Lam Akol, Dr. Riek Machar, Nyacigak Nyaciluk etc were among the founding members of the SPLM/A and they will always be remembered for their sacrifices. Moreover, Dr. Machar, as the first vice president of the republic of South Sudan, and Dr. Lam, as the first official opposition leader of an independent South Sudan, would be remembered among the founding fathers of the republic of South Sudan.

And this need to extent the horizon of national recognition, as Dr. Okuk rightly argues, is the reason why we are having this debate. It is not that Dr. Lam and Dr. Machar want to introduce a law barring Dr. John Garang from being considered as the leading founding father and the champion of South Sudan independence; the debate gyrates around the call to have more than one person recognizes as the champion of South Sudan independence. It is about the need to have other people recognize too for their contributions to the liberation of South Sudan. I do suppose that Dr. Lam and Dr. Machar’s reason for glorifying the 1991 coup which ushered in division, misery, death and had almost led to the extinction of the Movement, could be because of the way they are labelled as traitors and collaborators. If only people let bygones be bygones, I surmise that this debate about “founding fathers/mothers” would die a natural death in the next few years to come.

Conclusion

Amidst all the tribulations South Sudan is undergoing today, there are so many opportunities for those who wanna be considered founding fathers/mothers or heroes/heroines or the champion of so and so. Let’s have the founding father of long lasting peace and sustainable development and the mother of national integration, harmony, and mutual co-existences in South Sudan. Let’s have the hero of political stability and the heroines of democracy and the rule of law. Let’s have the champion of anti-illiteracy, anti-corruptions, anti-tribalism and anti-tribal conflicts campaign in South Sudan. There are as many opportunities in South Sudan to be great as there are many willing hearts and minds, ready to pay the cost and reap the benefits. Who is heeding the call?

PaanLuel Wel can be reached at paanluel2011 or through his blog, twitter or facebook page.

Was Dr. John Garang a Unionist or a Separatist.pdf

(1)   SPLM and mass media: Promoting history on falsity

By Elhag Paul

Sudan Tribune: September 28, 2011 — The late John Garang De Mabior would have certainly objected to being projected as a separatist by his widow Rebecca Nyandeng, close relatives, the Dinka community and the SPLM in their never ending quest to use his formidable life story to promote him as the person who brought the independence to South Sudan and by implication Dinka superiority.

Recently, having personally attended the shameful and shambolic celebration of independence of the republic of South Sudan on 9 July 2011 in Juba, it was asphyxiating to witness the promotion of Garang as the father of the nation and the hero of independence of South Sudan. Large electronically refined coloured adverts on giant billboards around Juba’s main streets showing pictures of Garang walking into freedom with masses of followers. This story is a fabricated lie and had Garang been alive, he certainly would have objected to it.

Garang was very honest with his political beliefs. He made it absolutely clear in various fora and writings that he was an avowed unionist and this gained him respect in North Sudan, Arab world, Africa and the west.

Garang in his book, titled ‘John Garang Speaks’ published in London in 1987 by KPI on pages 253 and 254 writes that:

“Our believe in the Sudanese Unity and territorial integrity is axiomatic, that is, it is principled position. In our Manifesto published 31 July 1983 we said in very unequivocal terms, and I quote, It must be reiterated that the principle objective of the SPLM/SPLA is not separation for the South. The South is an integral and inseparable part of the Sudan. Africa has been fragmented sufficiently enough by colonialism and neo-colonialism and its further fragmentation can only be in the interest of her enemies. The separatist attitude that has developed in the South since 1955 has caught the imagination of the backward areas in Northern Sudan. Separatists Movements have already emerged with guerrillas fighting in Western and Eastern Sudan. If left unchecked these separatist Movements in the South, East, West coupled with stubborn determination of repressive minority clique regime in Khartoum to hang onto power at all costs will lead to the total disintegration of the Sudan. The imminent, latent and impending disintegration and fragmentation of the Sudan is what the SPLM/A aims to stop by developing and implementing a consistent democratic solution to both the nationality and religious questions within the context of a United New Sudan. This was in 1983. Our position remains the same.”

There you are. This is from the horse’s mouth. To refuse to believe it is to make a fool of oneself.

Unity has always been the official policy of SPLM/A. It did not remain in the files as a redundant or dormant policy but it was operationised and put into practice with devastating consequences on the separatists. Garang did not hesitate to kill any separatist who make his case.

Among the prominent separatists who paid dearly with their lives were Samuel Gai Tut and Akot Atem. The atmosphere in SPLM/A controlled areas  at the time was akin to that of the communists during Nimeiri’s era in the Sudan. The words associated with secession were considered treasonable and the consequences were dire for anyone who dared to invoke them.

At the apex of Garang’s power towards the end of 1980s and beginning 1990 he had become so arrogant to the extent that he freely rubs salt on the wounds of the separatists at every occasion the subject came up. He haughtily proclaimed that ‘our first bullets were fired against the separatists.’  Anybody doubting should research the barbaric murder of Samuel Gai Tut and Akot Atem.

Peter Nyaba in his book, titled ‘The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan: An Insider’s View’ published by Fountain Publishers in 1997 in Kampala, Uganda on page 45 writes that after Kerubino’s forces ambushed and murdered Gai Tut, he (Kerubino) refused ‘the burial of the remains of Mr Samuel Gai Tut and to have his corpse given eighty lashes daily until it decomposed.’ From this act alone, one can imagine the raw emotions of hatred towards the separatists.

What kind of people are these who engage in such a wanton brutality to the extent that they could not respect the dead? These dead brave South Sudanese spoke and died for separation. Paradoxically, today, the very people who killed them are enjoying the fruits of these separatists’ foresight. So far, the SPLM has not shown any remorse or decency to say sorry for their heinous acts and their divisive policy of ‘New Sudan’. What a shame on SPLM/A.

In the House of Commons in UK, the then secretary for International Development Claire Short used to dismiss us the South Sudanese pressing for support of secession. Her argument was that she had no misgiving about South Sudanese aspiration to secede. Her own visits to the refugee camps in Kenya, Uganda, Congo and the liberated areas in the Sudan proved to her beyond doubt that the overwhelming majority of South Sudanese wished to secede. However, what confused her was that also the majority of South Sudanese supported SPLM/A and its objective of united Sudan. Garang and SPLM, she asserted, were adamant about unity and so it was up to us the South Sudanese to speak with one voice of what we wanted. Because SPLM/A represented the majority of South Sudanese she would promote unity of the Sudan. With this, the separatists melted away like ‘Halawa Goton’. Or should I say with tails in between legs. Such was the hullabaloo SPLM/A created.

With the above, Garang has abundantly made his case loud and clear. What baffles people like me is the mendacity of Garang’s family and the SPLM to assert forcefully that Garang is the father and champion of South Sudan’s independence. How could this be when Garang put his policy of unionism in practice by killing separatists? The fact is that the separatist victims of Garang’s policy are well known and well documented. These should be the true champions of South Sudan independence and not Garang. To be fair to Garang, he was a revolutionary who worked hard to transform the Sudan. He fought tooth and nail to realise his objective but unfortunately this has not materialised. May be the SPLM/A North in the Sudan will succeed to implement the project of ‘New Sudan’ in that country. But it must be emphasised: Garang was not a separatist. He was a unionist to his core.

SPLM/A knows that to promote the lie that Garang is the hero of South Sudan’s independence, it has to use all means available to it regardless of the cost. Hence, it is now engaged in deploying the arsenals of mass media in the form of advertisement, SSTV and the radio service to bludgeon South Sudan psychologically. By bombarding the South Sudanese masses on a daily basis with the lie, it will not be before long when the young generation and the South Sudanese masses succumb to the story of the masters resulting into ecstatic triumph of the rulers in establishing themselves as the elites of South Sudanese society.

This is on one front of the media war. On the other, the heavy use of advertisement to promote Garang as the champion of South Sudan independence although it is costing GOSS a fortune is not for nothing, it has a strategic meaning. The purpose of advertisement is to create fantasy and illusions in the mind of the watchers to promote craving for the product – in this case, the story of the ‘hero’ of South Sudan’s liberation. As this kind of product is not for purchase pecuniarly, it is specifically designed to influence thoughts and the mind to cultivate a hyperreal history of the struggle. The consumer (you, me and others) if not critical minded and well informed inevitably end up by believing what is shown on these giant billboards as the truth and reality. Once this is achieved, history is distorted and re-written in favour of the agents beautifully portrayed in the adverts.

To buttress this fabricated story, SPLM has blended Kiir in. During the independence celebration an interesting poster was displayed around Juba. This poster presenting sergeant Kiir in long white Jallabia sitting amongst a group of senior SPLA officers in military uniform wearing red epaulets. The writing on the poster congratulated sergeant Kiir for liberating the country. Like those posters of Garang, it not only buttresses the fabricated story but elevates the social status of these actors.

In this particular poster, Kiir’s dress indirectly appears to be designed to present him as a benign, intelligent, and caring leader protected by the might of SPLA. Here is one man the country cannot afford to lose. Therefore, he must be protected like the queen ant. Looking at this poster subliminally draws one attention to the well circulated picture of Jesus in Jallabia carrying a lamb and followed by sheep. Now Kiir is being presented as the caring saviour and shepherd. While in reality, this is the man who was Garang’s Rottweiler for 22 years. He supervised the despatch of hundreds of innocent people to death. Kiir was responsible for the suffocating poorly aerated prison containers.

Do you remember the story of John Nambu who was imprisoned in a container until he turned yellow before his death due to lack of aeration? Nambu’s crime was only because he hailed from the wrong ethnicity and wanted to join the SPLM. This was only one horrible way of violating human rights in SPLM/A. The other was the imprisonment of freedom fighters whose identities or ideas were not entertained by the movement leaders in 10 meters deep holes where the unfortunate prisoners occasionally were visited by all sorts of deadly snakes and creatures. During the rainy season prisoners got drowned in these prison holes. The master supervisor of these horrendous joints was none other than Kiir himself. Please note that most of these victims were separatists.

This benign supposedly caring leader has now been in power for six years and what has he done for the people of South Sudan. Nothing at all, apart from presiding over orgies of looting and massive corruption. His lack of due diligence in running and protecting the country is breathtaking. Yet SPLM is squandering massive resources on media to promote him and re-write our history. Come to us here in Juba and visit any office, you will not miss seeing Garang and Kiir looking at you from hanging photographs strategically positioned.

The work of Jean Baudrillard (1929 – 2007), the French philosopher and sociologist on the influence of mass media techniques and especially of images on human beings shows that the use of images create its own reality divorced from original facts or truth of what is being represented. It paints its own reality constructed by values and stories attached to the images displayed. This is politics at its most psychologically dangerous, because it is not only the blatant promotion of crude tribalism, but it is also the sowing of seeds of discord for future conflict.

SPLM as an instrument of the masters of South Sudan is using massive resource of the country to promote a big lie with implication for history and future generations.

The question to ask is: why is the SPLM deploying expensive mass media techniques to promote a fabricated story of one section of our community to distort our history? Whose interest as a minister of information is Mr Barnaba Marial serving? Is it serving South Sudan or a specific tribe? I leave the answers to you to work it out for yourself. Why is the true story of the South Sudan not being promoted since 1983? Why is there no reference to Oliver Albino’s and other books on the Anya-Nya movement? Why is there no mention to Aggrey Jaden hard work on separation of the south? Why this obsessive promotion of our fresh distorted history which when truly unpacked contains horror stories?

To understand the magnitude of the brutality, inhuman policies and heinous acts of SPLM/A against humanity, it is absolutely necessary to read the work of Garang, Peter Nyaba, Lam Akol, and reports prepared by Human Rights bodies such as Africa Watch, Amnesty International and so on. There is no justification for that kind of behaviour meted out to the South Sudanese people other than from wanton criminals. Hence, the necessity to pursue the establishment of Justice and Reconciliation Commission, as in the case of Rwanda and South Africa to bring Kiir and his cohorts to account. Bringing these people to account might help us even to understand better Kiir’s current presiding over the orgies of looting of public resources and corruption by his group. For South Sudan to develop healthily, this deep internal mental injury on its psyche must be addressed and urgently. Glossing over it with mass media tricks is a surest way of returning to mistakes done by the rulers of the Sudan at the time of its independence in 1956.

The self-determination which the South Sudanese had been fighting for since 1947 was forced on SPLM/A by circumstances beyond its control. It first entered into the vocabulary of SPLM/A following the 1991 failed Nasir coup led by Reik Machar, Lam Akol and John Koang. These three, opportunistically calculated that since SPLM/A lost its support base following the overthrow of the Mengistu Dirge regime in Ethiopia the time was ripe to get rid of Garang. As we all know, they failed and they continued to pursue their objective of ousting Garang through alliance with NCP. But the benefit to South Sudan of their unpopular act was to force SPLM/A to accept the principle of self-determination, especially after the talks in Abuja in early 1990s.

This was further advanced in the Khartoum agreement of 1997 with the same group. However, paradoxically this time NCP blundered and included the principle of self-determination into the constitution of the Sudan. When the peace talk under IGAD was first started in early 2000s, self-determination was not on the agenda. SPLM and Rev. John Danforth, the American envoy to the talks were content with the idea of solving the problem of the Sudan within a framework of a united country based on the  project of ‘New Sudan’ which would be multi-racial, multi-religious, multi-cultural etc. It was only when the Diaspora in Europe and North America rose up forcefully and brought pressure to bear on the talks that the principle of self-determination was then included on the agenda. The first protocol on self-determination was won because NCP was cornered by the fact that self-determination was already catered for in the constitution of the Sudan. The rest was history and we had our CPA of 2005.

The provision of the referendum in the CPA allowed each and everyone of us to decide for ourselves what we wanted. We individually (through the power of our votes) chose separation and thus liberated ourselves from the Arabs. It has nothing to do with Garang liberating us to qualify him as the father of the nation. This must be made clear to avoid distortion of our history and construction of a false history. The true separatists are those Garang fired his first bullets of unionism at such as Samuel Gai Tut and Akot Atem.

In light of the above, the minister of Information should desist from promoting one section of our society as being solely responsible for the liberation of South Sudan with Garang as its founding father based on falsity. For this does not bode well for the future.

Elhag Paul lives in South Sudan. He can be reached at elhagpaul@aol.com
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(2) Lwal Baguoot

Dear all:

I’m sharing with you the following article published today by the New Sudan  Vision newspaper. It rebuts a scathing and misleading article written by Mr. Elhag Paul not long ago, in which he knowingly or unknowing misled the public that self-determination and secession of South Sudan were altogether foreign and alien objectives and ideas to Dr. John Garang De Mabior prior to the infamous defection of some SPLA/M senior commanders.

Central to Mr. Elhag Paul’s argument is that the 1991 disastrous defection, led by Dr. Lam Akol Ajawin and the company, forced Dr. Garang De Mabior to accept and embrace self-determination as a new basis for waging war against the Khartoum rogue regime. Evidently in contrary to Mr. Elhag’s misinformation, Dr. John Garang De Mabior, on January 24, 1972, wrote a powerful and cautionary letter to the Anyanya Movement leadership articulating and outlining his vision for a peaceful resolution of “Sudan fundamental problems” either through Southern Sudan separation or United New Sudan.

Dr. Garang intelligently and cleverly articulated how both options could lead to achieving a permanent peace in Sudan if the parties involved were genuinely committed to reaching PEACE. One can also see in this letter that the seeds for the CPA were planted way before the signing of the 1972 Addis Ababa Accord.

Lwal Baguoot
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(3) Dr. John Garang, the SPLM and the question of unity: A rebuttal to Mr. Elhag Paul (In response to Elhaq Paul’s artcile above)

Written by Deng A. Dekuek (Perth, Australia)
Saturday, 08 October 2011 02:01
The New Sudan Vision: In the course of human affairs it is a rarity to come across obtuse slanderous remarks from a seemingly learned man of reason. I unequivocally, have no problems whatsoever with a person or people expressing their opinion, however what is outrageous, absurd and warrants universal condemnation is distortion and manufacturing of facts to malign a particular person and or community or communities. Even worse universally, speaking ill of the dead is an abhorrent and a tasteless culture, which is unfortunately condoned, encouraged and has taken root in South Sudan.In a distasteful disregard for cultural etiquettes, journalistic professionalism and standards, The Sudan Tribune on the 29th of September 2011 published an opinion piece, which was, blatantly aimed at assassinating the character of the late Dr. John Garang. In a rumbling monologue of vengeful, distorted and sugarcoated facts and unsubstantiated allegations, Mr. Elhag Paul accused the late Dr. Garang, his widow Madam Nyandeng, his family, his people the Dinka, the People’s Movement, the SPLM and by that extension a significant proportion of South Sudanese of being hypocritical. Mr. Paul’s long allegations can be summarised as follows:“Dr. Garang does not deserve to be called the father of South Sudan nation, because he always was an advocate for a united Sudan. I know this because he said so in ‘John Garang Speakers’. Madame Nyandeng, his family, his people, the SPLM/A and anyone who claims otherwise and mentions him as a hero and champion of South Sudanese independence is a liar because Dr. Garang always advocated for a democratic united secular Sudan. I know this because he wrote about it. He was dead set on unity because he killed all those who advocated for separation like Mr. Samuel Gai Tut and Mr. Akot Atem Mayen because they were separatist. I know this because Dr. Peter Adwok Nyaba wrote about it. Living in Sudan as a communist during Nimeiri’s terror was better than living in the liberated areas because Claire Short spoke about it in the British Parliament.”He further insinuated that the President of the Republic, a Lieutenant General and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army whom he reduced to a rank of a “Sergeant Kiir” was a murderous dog at the disposal of the late Dr. Garang – “Garang’s Rottweiler.” He went on to question national fidelity of Dr. Benjamin the Minister of Information and hinted that he was serving his tribe and not the nation. Such utter disrespect for the office (I am not saying the individuals but the office) of the President is astonishing. Having said that, I would like to point out and correct some historical fabrications, misconceptions and outright lies in Mr. Paul’s article. I am not going to write in defence of the President or the Honourable Minister but in that of the defenseless Dr. Garang and the People’s Movement, the SPLM.It appears that Mr. Paul either has selective amnesia or does not want to acknowledge the fact that Dr. Garang was not a village idiot but a cunning political and military tactician who was a master of political games, trickery and theatre. I am wondering whether Mr. Paul knows or has considered the possibility that perhaps Dr. Garang was employing Machiavellian intelligence in his unwavering advocacy of a democratic united secular Sudan to achieve unknown agenda, which has eventuated and has become apparent to some who do not think and see things in plain black and white.Mr. Paul’s revisionism and negation of history is disturbing. Distorting the writings of the esteemed Dr. Peter Adwok Nyaba is alarming. I do not dispute the facts following the death of Mr. Samuel Gai Tut but I find it preposterous and completely reject in its entirety the insinuation that his death was personally sanctioned by Dr. Garang or SPLM/A because he was an advocate for South Sudan separation. This is a manufactured perception of raved faculties. It was and still is a common knowledge among the rank and file of the People’s Army that in the early days of the People’s Movement in 80s, Anyanya 2, of Commander Gordon Koang Chuol, Mr. Tut and Mr. Mayen was hostile to SPLA/M and that its leadership had ignored repeated warnings from SPLA/M to cease attacks on their recruits. It is highly probable and highly likely that as a consequent Mr. Samuel was killed in one of these confrontations with the SPLA as a result of SPLA feeling its warnings were not being heeded.Following Mr. Tut’s death nobody knows why Commander Kerubino Kuanyin Bol did what he did notwithstanding the fact that he was a maverick with occasionally deranged tendencies. Whether it was to punish Mr. Tut or whether it was a form of psychological warfare to demoralise Anyanya 2, nobody can answer that except Commander Kerubino but to present mere speculations, fantasies and distortions as facts is unscrupulous. This has been the fundamental foundation of Mr. Paul’s argument that those Southerners who were killed were meted the fate of death because they were separatist or that they were imprisoned because they advocated such ideas.In addition, a sensationalist claim that living in the Sudan as a communist during Nimeiri’s tyranny was of an equal measure to living in the liberated areas is a personal insult to any of the people who lived in Nasir, Kapoeta, Boma and other liberated areas. Although I was a young boy, I never heard then or know of anyone among all those who were executed by firing squads, anyone and I repeat anyone who was executed for being an exponent of an independent Southern Sudan.

Perhaps the most telling and remarkable were the slanderous claims that self-determination was an alien concept to Dr. Garang and the SPLM until 1991 when Nasir plotters forced it upon them. This clearly shows that the author is lacking in capacity and his superficial and crammed understanding of South Sudan’s history is illusionary. Thirty years before the landmark Declaration of Principles of 1994, there existed a political party called the Southern Front, which was formed inside Sudan after what was known as the October Revolution of 1964 that toppled military rule of Abud. Late Uncle Clement Umboro led it and the objective of that southern party was SELF DETERMINTION while SANU, the other southern party was aiming at FEDERAL SYSTEM in Sudan, led by late William Deng Nhial and late Joseph Oduho. Southerners in the Round Table Conference of March 1965 presented those two positions, and referendum for Southerners for self-determination was proposed in that Conference. Hence self-determination was never a new notion to Dr. Garang or the SPLM/A to be said to have been invented by Nasir splitters. This is a historical crime to distort facts known to all.

The 1991 failed opportunists, chief among them Dr. Lam Akol who hasn’t learned from history, can attest that the 24th of March 1986 Koka Dam Declaration signed by then Lt. Col Kerubino Kuanyin Bol were a culmination of negotiations spanning 1985 to 1986 where SPLA/M was represented by Commander Kerubino and Commander Arok Thon Arok. At the conference self-determination was discussed and this desire for self-determination was clearly demonstrated in the context of Article 2(d) which called for the “adoption of the 1956 Constitution as amended in 1964 with incorporation of ‘Regional Government’ and all other such matters on which a consensus opinion of all the political forces shall be reached.” In addition the Koka Dam Declaration aimed to (a) repeal September 1983 sharia laws and (b) dissolve the government, and called for new general elections and formation of a coalition government that would include SPLM/A. However, these agreed points were never taken up because Sadiq al-Mahdi took power and was never keen on resolving the war.

Mr. Paul also shamelessly contradicts himself by partially correctly stating that self-determination was discussed at the Abuja 1 and 2 Peace Negotiations but then goes on to say that it was off the agenda in early 2000s until the people in diaspora put pressure on SPLM and the NCP. What a laughable joke! Abuja 1 and 2 Peace Negotiations, which  Elijah Malok Aleng and the late Dr. Justin Yac Arop and late Commander William Nyuon Bany were the SPLM representatives certainly discussed self-determination however, it was not forced upon the People’s Movement as insinuated. It was rather because the Southerners felt a need to present a united front and they had nothing in common except to see a free Southern Sudan. Mind you there was still heavy fighting between the SPLM and the Nasir plotters and the NIF at that time. Also the idea that self-determination was off the agenda in early 2000s is a blatant lie. SPLM/A and NIF had already committed themselves to the “Declaration of Principles” on the 20th of July 1994 where the most significant point was Article 2. It said:

“the right of self-determination of the people of south Sudan to determine their future status through a referendum must be affirmed.”

 

Dr. Garang is unquestionably the father of South Sudan, the champion of its independence and its greatest hero. His vision and the fundamental pillars of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) were formulated way back before the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement was concluded on the 27th of March 1972. Dr. Garang wrote a remarkable letter to General Joseph Lagu on the 24th of January 1972. The letter is presented here in its entirety to dispel any doubts that I am quoting favorable parts to my argument:

Click here to read Dr. John Garang letter

This letter is a proof beyond reasonable doubt that Dr. Garang was an advocate of Southern Sudanese autonomy in whatever form and outlines the critical structures of C.P.A which are (a) separate armies (b) self-government during the interim period (c) referendum for Southerners.

Reflecting on Mr. Paul’s article there are few things that indicate the following:

  1. Writer’s lack of in-depth knowledge of the History of South Sudan which he claims to be defending but is consciously and maliciously distorting.

2.                  The author thought that by cleverly disguising his anti-SPLM rhetoric and tribalist animosity towards the Dinka he would be taken as a serious intellectual.

3.                  The author is lacking in critical thinking because of his simplistic interpretation of Dr. Garang and SPLM’s political ideology.

If any lessons are to be drawn from this, they would be that Sudan Tribune’s editorial and journalistic standards have descended lower into
the gutters to allow the publication of an article that insults and calls the President of the Republic, a Rottweiler (that is a breed of a butcher’s dog).

It is clear that Mr. Paul needs to read more since he does not understand various tactics including the Machiavellian intelligence employed by Dr.Garang and SPLM/A to achieve the independence of South Sudan. Just because Dr. Garang, SPLM/A or any Southerner advocated for a democratic united secular Sudan does not mean that their minds were set in a perpetual immobile granitic slab and deaf to the manifest calls for separation.

The notion that because Dr. Garang called for a democratic united secular Sudan disqualifies him from his rightful place in our nation is insulting. The man deserves his dignified place as the father of our nation and deserves much more than the respect we are showing his legacy for he went above and beyond the call of duty for his people, the South Sudanese.

Deng Dekuek is a South Sudanese Geologist and can be reached at dengdekuek@gmail.com

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Dekuek: Shooting down his SPLM/A clients.(In Response to Deng Dekuek)

BY: AlHag Paul, SOUTH SUDAN

OCT. 16/2011, SSN; This is a response to an article posted on New Sudan Vision website on 8th October 2011 and South Sudan Nation website on 12th October 2011 by Mr Deng A. Dekuek titled: ‘Dr John Garang, the SPLM and the question of unity: A rebuttal to Mr Elhag Paul.’

I came across the said article by chance while browsing through New Sudan Vision website and it became of interest to me for obvious reasons articulated in my article under the heading, ‘SPLM and mass media: promoting history on falsity.’ Published recently in South Sudan Nation, Sudan Tribune and South Sudan News Agency websites.  I welcome Mr Dekuek’s rebuttal of my article and wish to say that I am more than happy to engage Dekuek on the issues raised.

The intimidatory tone of Dekuek’s rebuttal is all the more telling especially his withering attack on the websites that published my article.  One would expect that intellectuals would be the last people to pander to censorship but that is not the case here.

Dekuek essentially takes issue with me on a number of points.  These are: 1) blatant assassination of Dr Garang’s name.  2) disrespect for the office of the president and the office of the minister for information.  3) negating the history of South Sudan.  4) comparing Nimeiri’s treatment of communist to SPLM’s treatment of separatists.  5) that Koka Dam agreement discussed self determination.  6) Contradicting self on the issue of self determination.  In addition, Dekuek presents a letter supposedly written by Dr Garang in support of his argument.  Let us now look at these issues point by point.

Dekuek argues that “In a distasteful disregard for cultural etiquettes, journalistic professionalism and standards, The Sudan Tribune on 29th of September 2011 published an opinion, which was blatantly aimed at assassinating the character of the late Dr John Garang.  In a rumbling monologue of vengeful, distorted and sugar-coated facts and unsubstantiated allegations, Mr Elhag Paul accused the late Dr Garang, his widow Madam Nyandeng, his family, his people the Dinka, the people’s movement, the SPLM and by extension a significant proportion of South Sudanese of being hypocritical.”

Garang’s real beliefs: With this comment Dekuek is trying to muddy the waters in order to confuse people.  Given this, it is important to separate issues for better understanding and clarification.  First of all, I did not assassinate the character of late Dr John Garang.  If anything, my article set out clearly to present what the late himself expressed about his beliefs and personal views about the conflict in the Sudan.  I quoted directly from the book: ‘John Garang Speaks’ edited by Mansour Khalid in order to avoid the kind of accusation Dekuek is now throwing at me. 

Secondly, I believe that it is unethical for the family of late Dr Garang, and the SPLM to use his formidable life story to distort the history of South Sudan.  For the distortion to work, it necessitates that Dr Garang is branded as a separatist.  It is this false branding that is unacceptable because it has huge implication for South Sudan history and the various strata in the society.  Without branding Dr Garang as a separatist, SPLM would not be able to indoctrinate the people of South Sudan and elevate certain sections of the society as elites.  Dr Garang was an exceptionally intelligent, clear minded, far sighted, articulate and highly ambitious person.  These are characteristic that can not be taken away from him and muddying these with lies will not do him justice. 

Disregarding Dr Garang’s documented own words about himself and assigning something (secession) that he hated to be associated with him is at best intellectual dishonesty and at worst intellectual vandalism.  Dekuek and company should not discredit Dr Garang’s great mind and intellectual integrity to diminish my argument about Dr Garang’s unambiguous stand for a united Sudan.  They should not negate the possibility that Dr Garang truly could have ruled the Sudan had he not tragically met his death. 

What I find more dishonourable is for Dekuek and company to accuse Dr Garang of being a liar.  Dr Garang documented his views and beliefs in his books and spoke publicly in numerous fora about his unionist position. Is Dekuek trying to say Dr Garang’s books, speeches and presentation are a bunch of lies?  In light of what has been said, who is assassinating Dr Garang’s character? 

Nothing wrong for sergeant as president: Dekuek further argues that the article abused the offices of the president and that of the minister of information by being disrespectful to president Kiir and Dr Benjamin.  My reference to the president as a sergeant is based on the fact that the president is a ranker and he held that esteemed post.  In the army being a sergeant commands much respect.  There is nothing wrong with a sergeant being a president.  There are numerous examples in the world.  Liberia, for instance was once ruled by a sergeant Samuel Doe and he was respected by the professional well trained Liberian army generals.   My questioning of Dr Benjamin’s involvement with mass media and falsification of South Sudan history is my right as a citizen. 

The government in South Sudan should treat all sections of the society equally.  It is not right that state tool like the ministry of information is used to promote one section of the society to the detriment of the others.  Given this, is Dekuek comfortable with the falsification of the history of South Sudan?  If he is, then this reveals his personal interest in promoting Dinkocracy. Thus his supposed defence of Dr Garang and the president is nothing but a smoke screen for promotion of his interest.  If he is not, then he can be excused for his ignorance on this matter.

Dekuek continues, that “Mr Paul’s revisionism and negation of history is disturbing.  Distorting the writings of esteemed Dr Peter Adwok Nyaba is alarming…………….   Following Mr Tut’s death nobody knows why Commander Kerubino Kuanyin Bol did what he did notwithstanding the fact that he was a maverick with occasional deranged tendencies.”  As stated above, I quoted directly from Dr Nyaba’s book and this as far as I was concerned could not constitute distortion.  It is interesting that Dekuek himself acknowledges that he does not dispute the quoted facts but yet goes to call them distortion.  This is very strange.  It begs the question as to whether Dekuek really understands the meaning of the word ‘distortion’ or whether he is captivated by this word and would like to use it to show off his intellectual prowess.  It would be helpful if Dekuek could clarify where the distortion was in regards to the quote I took from Dr Nyaba’s book. 

As a voluntary self appointed advocate of SPLM, Dekuek surprisingly scores points against his own client.  His report of Kerubino’s mental state is something that should never happen in any normal organisation.  Deranged people pose danger to themselves and the public.  Knowing this, Dekuek should have questioned the rational of allowing Kerubino to run havoc in the SPLM for such a long time and not to try to excuse him in his rebuttal of my article.  What is more shocking is that Dr Garang was present when the body of late Gai Tut was being desecrated by Kerubino.  Dr Garang did nothing but to rash to BBC to announce that Gai Tut was accorded full military burial.  Dr Nyaba for unknown reasons did not report the presence of Dr Garang during the nauseating lashing of Mr Gai Tut’s body in his book. 

However, Dr Lam in his book, titled ‘SPLM/SPLA: Inside an African Revolution’ published by Khartoum University Press in Khartoum in 2001 on pages 202 – 203 indicates that although Gai Tut very much wanted reconciliation, Dr Garang appeared uninterested and this eventually led to attack and counter attack where “Samuel Gai Tut himself was killed during the fighting.  This was on March 30, 1984.  His body was not discovered until two days later.  On receiving the news, Dr John Garang and Kerubino Kuanyin Bol flew by a helicopter to Adura where Kerubino lashed the decomposing body of Gai Tut fifty strokes while Garang looked on in appreciation.  The body by then was beyond recognition were it not for the characteristic finger of Gai Tut.  Soon after, Garang wrote to the London office of the SPLA that Samuel Gai Tut was buried ‘with full military honours’!”  Just imagine this level of gruesome brutality. 

Dekuek is right to highlight the deranged mind of the leaders of SPLM.  He only failed to see the inhuman part of it. No wonder his client SPLM/A turned out to be what it is now.  If Dekuek on the basis of humanity only can not condemn the inhuman acts of SPLM leaders and its management by deranged people, how can he be taken seriously?  Can he clarify why he finds it difficult to condemn both Kerubino and Dr Garang for such inhuman act?  Where are Dekuek’s duties here as a good citizen towards other South Sudanese regardless of their tribe, race, sex etc?  To be a good citizen demands that one protects the rights and freedom of others.  For in doing this one indirectly protects their own as well.  So, in South Sudan, the citizens need to treat each other with respect to allow a healthy society to develop. Further to this, is Dekuek’s attempt to rebut my article by distortion intended to create confusion to mask the gains that the Dinka people stand to benefit from their use of mass media? Where is the credibility of Dekuek’s argument here?  In fighting to maintain the lie, Dekuek is shooting down his own clients.  Whereas in stating the truth everybody (South Sudanese) stands to benefit.

Dekuek states that “in addition, a sensationalist claim that living in the Sudan as a communist during Nimeiri’s tyranny was of an equal measure to living in the liberated areas is a personal insult to any of the people who lived in Nasir, Kapoeta, Boma and other liberated areas.  Although I was a young boy, I never heard then or know of anyone among all those who were executed by firing squad, anyone and I repeat who was executed for being an exponent of an independent South Sudan.”  At least Dekuek is being honest here.  He acknowledges the fact that his understanding of events in the liberated areas was limited due to his age. 

Soundless defence of Garang: According to Dekuek he did not hear or learn of any executions of separatists.  His measure for evidence is grounded on hearing and learning from others as he was young.  But how could hear-say be evidence.  What method did he apply to distil the truth from the stories he heard and learnt? The fact that he did not hear does not mean that separatist were not being murdered.  Did Dekuek know that Martin Majer, Martin Kejivoru and others were murdered in cold blood towards the end of 1990s around Morobo after long period of incarceration without trial?  Now, would it be right for him to deny this because he never heard? 

Dekuek can not hide behind being young in order to snipe at people he disagrees with.  Either he knows or he doesn’t.  If he doesn’t, he either puts up or shuts up.  Having committed himself to defend “the defenceless Garang and the People’s Movement, the SPLM”, Dekuek needs to read more widely before taking up such a difficult assignment.  Dekuek’s clients have an interesting complex history of 28 years which requires mature minded advocates.  Rumbling with hear-say without documented evidence and refusing to accept what his clients have documented does not look like sound defence.

Dekuek invokes the Koka Dam talks as his evidence that self determination was discussed and adopted.  This is a red herring.  The outcome of Koka Dam agreement is clear as blue skies.  It aimed at achieving a united Sudan.  Steve Wondu and Ann Lesch in their book, titled ‘The Battle for Peace in Sudan: An Analysis of the Abuja Conferences 1992 – 1993’ published by University Press of America, Maryland in 2000 on page 9 states that, “The Koka Dam declaration called for the creation of a New Sudan free from racism, tribalism and sectarianism; a system that would eliminate the causes of discrimination and regional economic disparities.  The national constitutional conference to define the New Sudan would address the basic problems of Sudan and not the problems of the South alone.  The government must repeal the Islamic decrees and restore the secular constitution that was in place at the time of independence.  In addition the government must lift the state of emergency and abrogate military pacts with foreign countries (Egypt and Libya) that infringe on the sovereignty of the Sudan.  After that, both sides would declare and enforce ceasefire.”  These are the hard facts about Koka Dam.  It beggars believe that Dekuek deliberately goes out to twist facts in order to portray his client the SPLM as a separatist movement.

Dekuek writes, “Mr Paul also shamelessly contradicts himself by partially correctly stating that self-determination was discussed at the Abuja 1 and 2 Peace Negotiations but then goes on to say that it was off the agenda in early 2000s until the people in diaspora put pressure on SPLM and the NCP.  What a laughable joke!”  Dekuek’s inability to understand my article reveals his limited knowledge of contemporary history of South Sudan.  The fact remains that self-determination was tabled, discussed and accepted in Abuja in early 1990s.  Also the fact remains that the talks in Machakos in early 2000s initially did not have self-determination on the agenda.  Dekuek should consult with his client the SPLM for more information on this reality.  What seems as contradiction to Dekuek is the usual game of SPLM of vacillating between two things.  Although SPLM accepted self determination in Abuja, it was not a priority policy for the movement.  The unity of Sudan always took top priority with self determination coming at the bottom as a last resort.  Hence when the talks started in Machakos self determination was not on the agenda, SPLM was content and happy to have the problems of the Sudan solved based on the concept of New Sudan.  So there is no joke in what I wrote.  I am dead serious in what I write.

Dekuek has produced a letter purportedly written by Dr John Garang on 24th January 1972 to support his arguments.  First of all, the address on top left hand of the letter is highly suspect.  The wording state, “Khartoum – Anyanya. Negotiation: Guideline”.   As far as South Sudan was concerned the peace talks were held in Addis Ababa and Anyanya did not have an office in Khartoum,  So, what is all this about?  Secondly, the letter itself has no signature, name, title or/and position of the writer?  How authentic then is this letter?  Dekuek also failed to reference the letter clearly to show where he obtained it from and who had custody of it?  Careful scrutiny of this letter raises a lot of issues around its authenticity.  Mr Brian Adeba unfortunately failed to notice this questionable discrepancy.  He hurriedly waded in to support Dekuek pre-maturely saying: “Thanks for forwarding this note here.  It certainly offers a perspective about John Garang’s (and the SPLM’s) vision for a separate and independent Sudan……………. Elhag Paul’s article failed to account for Garang’s flexible stances on self determination and the evolution of these stances over a period of time.”   Until the questions posed about this letter are answered, this document remains high suspicious.   Dekuek’s knowledge of Addis Ababa agreement is so wanting.  He erroneously claims that Addis Ababa agreement was signed on 27th March 1972.  How he got this date is something that I do not understand but it says a lot about him and his ability to research.

Even if this document were to be authentic, it does not mean in any way that Dr Garang was a separatist, because from 1972 to 1983 there is nothing documented that tells the world about his life story.  The only time Dr Garang’s view of the world became known was when he released his speech on 3rd March 1983.  In this speech he clearly declares his unionist credentials and it is this that led to him later saying ‘our first bullets were fired at the separatists’.  As SPLM/A was formed in 1983 and from the word go it was a unionist movement, it is difficult to see the connection that Dekuek is trying to make in order to portray it as a separatist movement by referring to 1972.

Now it has become extremely important to address the issue raised by Adeba above regarding Garang’s flexible stance.  Adeba seems to imply that Dr Garang began to change his political position “a month prior to the coup, the SPLM had already asked the Nigerian mediator to include self determination in the agenda of the talks”.  It is true that SPLM/A had already written to the Nigerian and Sudanese governments on the issue of self determination.  Steve Wondu and Ann Lesch in their book, titled ‘The Battle for Peace in Sudan: An Analysis of Abuja Conferences 1992 – 1993’ published by University Press of America, Maryland in 2000 on page 22 confirms this point.  They state that “the independence option was therefore included in the still-united SPLM’s proposal for the Abuja agenda that was submitted to Nigerian and Sudanese government on 29th July 1991.” 

On taking this as his evidence for Garang’s flexible stance, Adeba has erred simply because he failed to consider fully the context in which SPLM/A was forced to adopt the new position.  By early 1991, Dr Garang and the SPLM/A were already aware of the developments about the impending coup.  Combat Intelligence, the feared security organ of SPLM/A which reported directly to Dr Garang detected the conspiracy by Dr Riek, Dr Akol and Koang to overthrow Dr Garang at its earliest stages.  It kept monitoring, observing and collecting detailed information on the trio.  As early as June 1991, Dr Garang was already in possession of considerable intelligence at his disposal about the intentions of the trio with their objectives.  At about this same time internally in the Sudan, South Sudanese had begun to call for secession because of the policies of the new NIF regime. 

Douglas H. Johnson in his book, titled ‘The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars’ published by Fountain Publishers in Kampala, Uganda in 2003 on page 174 writes: “The NIF government’s halt to substantive constitutional discussions in 1989 and its open pursuit of Islamist agenda revived talk of separation among many southern Sudanese living in the government-held areas.  The SPLA was already preparing a new position on self determination in 1991 when the Nasir declaration finally brought the issue of southern Sudanese independence to the fore, not just for debate among southern Sudanese but between southern and northern Sudanese.  At first the SPLA’s response seemed equivocal, in that it proposed a number of alternatives plans to self determination, including confederation within a united Sudan and an association of sovereign states.” 

So in the government controlled areas and within SPLM/A the pressure was already building up in favour of secession.  Externally, the main supporter of SPLM/A, Ethiopia started to fall apart from the advancing Ethiopian rebels.  Holistically, the intelligence pointed to one direction only and that was – a change that can be supported by the masses of the south Sudan.  That only position at the time was secession.  Hence, Dr Garang, intelligent and suave as he was tactically seized the opportunity and conceded a little to adopt self determination as an option of last resort while maintaining the policy of unity.  In doing this, Dr Garang had hoped to spoil the plans of the trio and also to firmly keep the support of South Sudanese.   He succeeded.

After the trio announced their coup in August 1991, the pressure increased on SPLM/A and it issued a public statement to confirm their new position with unity as the top priority and self determination as the option of last resort.  Arop Madut Arop in his book titled ‘Sudan’s Painful Road to Peace’ published by BookSurge, LLC.  ISBN: 1-4196-1153-4.  www.boksurge.com on pages 276 – 278 drawing from Lesch (1998) points out that the SPLA Polico-Military High Command met in Torit in September 1991 and among other recommendations it “proposed four options the movement would present to the peace conference scheduled to convene in Abuja, the Nigerian capital city.  The four options were:

1.  The maintenance of the SPLA demand for a united secular democratic state.

2.  Confederation between the north and the south

3.  Association of sovereign states

4.  During the referendum the people of the marginalised regions shall choose between unity and secession.

The last option was the most significant departure from the first one because it was the first time that the SPLM/SPLA in its eight year of armed struggle was able to give signal that the South Sudan could possibly secede if the government of the Sudan maintained its centralised and unitary Arab-Islamic state in the country.”

In political manoeuvres and the psychology of negotiations, adversaries often try to outwit their opponents by presenting or offering the opponent unpalatable propositions they knowingly are aware would be rejected to achieve their aims. In proposing self determination in July 1991, Dr Garang might have wanted to frighten the NIF with the possibility of breakup of the country so that they abandon Islamic policies for him to achieve secular democratic Sudan.  Dr Garang was aware that if the NIF rejected his proposal, he would find himself in a limbo and so he left a leeway for himself to retreat with his policy of unity intact by insisting that unity was the top priority.  So when the NIF rejected his bluff, he back off and continued to pursue the policy of united Sudan.  Amin Hamid Zeinelabdin of University of Khartoum suggested else where that the position taken by SPLM in July 1991 on self determination could have been a strategic political bluff to pressure the NIF to accept secularism.

Deducing from the above, the letter written to the Nigerians in 1991 that Adeba refers to is a product of concerted pressure internally and externally on the SPLM/A leaving it with no option.  The choice at the time was either it changed and adapted or it imploded and atrophied.  Dr Garang wisely chose the former.  Now change under such circumstance can not be referred to as ‘flexible stance’.  Dr Garang did not have many options to choose from to allow him any ‘flexible stance.’  He was forced by a very hostile atmosphere.  It is just like a hurricane coming your way.  You either evacuated or you remained and got hit and swept away.  The highest organ of the movement responded swiftly and appropriately to the fast changing political terrain by adopting self determination to save itself from demise.  Hence, it was forced to accept self determination.

Reducing Garang to a liar: Although Dr Garang and SPLM/A accepted self determination, it consistently remained as an option of last resort.  Officially, unity was the top priority and this is why when the Machakos talks started self determination was off the agenda.  Yes, Garang saw self determination as a possible solution, but it was not in his believe or preference.  It was not his political choice.  Given this record how could “Garang’s flexible stance” be justified.  Reading and arguing Garang into a separatist in the face of naked evidence is unhelpful for him as it denies him what he proudly stood for and fought for with blood.  Garang bought the position of unity with blood and this was not a joke.   Again it is not right that indirectly a leader of such formidable stature should be reduced to a liar by his own supporters rejecting his own documented words in order to mould him into what they want. 

Some South Sudanese should by now recognise that Dr Garang’s political position as a separatist is indefensible.  No matter how some people philosophise over the issue, the evidence will not go away.   The more they do it the more they disrespect Dr Garang as a formidable thinker.  Dr Garang toyed with the idea of self-determination only to maintain unity of Sudan under his ideology of the New Sudan as the first option.  Dr Garang was not only consistent in pursuing unity, but shed blood to advance it.  So, evidence to baptise Dr Garang posthumously as a separatist is thin and unfair. Thus promoting him as father of the nation can not stick because he is not.  Dr Garang could not be a father of a nation that he did not want to see born.  Therefore, please stop ascribing to Dr Garang what he did not believe in.

Having said this, it is important to note that self determination was a constant demand of South Sudanese prior to independence of the Sudan in 1956 and up to 1983 when Dr Garang zapped it with his speech of 3rd March followed by violence.  So the period in contest relates only from 1983 to 2005.  The only other South Sudanese who openly and sincerely stood for unity is Garang’s name sake: Mr Joseph Garang who was executed by Nimeiri in 1971 following the failed communist coup. 

Resting this case, it is unfortunate that Dekuek in his attempt to rebut the evidence has gone down the slippery slope clutching straws in defence of his clients.

Elhag Paul at elhagpaul@aol.com

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(4) Brian Adeba

Dear Lwal,

Thanks for forwarding this note here. It certainly offers a perspective about John Garang’s (and the SPLM’s) vision for a separate and independent South Sudan. Most significantly, Garang’s letter shows that he wasn’t opposed to the idea of self-determination. And as a matter of fact, Elhag Paul’s article failed to account for Garang’s flexible stances on self-determination and the evolution of these stances over a period of time.

In essence, as the records show (and as some of us have argued previously), the Nasir coup plotters CAN’T claim sole ownership of “introducing the self-determination agenda” in the early ’90s (This is not to say that they did not play a significant role). This is a fact. (A month prior to the coup, the SPLM had already asked the Nigerian mediator to include self-determination in the agenda of the talks). As well, the argument that Garang was totally opposed to self-determination is spurious.

Brian

twitter.com/kalamashaka

“Chance favours the prepared mind”

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(5) Dr. Majak D’Agoot (in response to Alhaq Paul)

Dear Brian & Lwal

It is hard for critics to make a convincing case that Dr. John Garang was an ardent unionist as they try in vain to misrepresent history… The life of Garang – the freedom fighter – since his mundane engagement with the South Sudanese National Liberation Struggle is choke-full of examples of deep-seated belief in South Sudanese nationalism and quest for independence…

The letter just published here in this forum (thanks to late Dr. Akec Mohammed who kept the copy for years even after Garang lost the originals) is one of the few testimonies of his legacy… His only deviation, however,  from his predecessors/contemporaries – for example Uncle Joseph Oduho, the late William Deng, Gen. Lagu, Col. Samuel Gai, my own uncle – the late Akuot Atem, Gordon Murtat, Bona Malwal, Abel Alier, Luigi Odwok, Dr. Riek Machar, Dr. Lam Akol, etc. – was that he introduced the most powerful tools of modern politics into the game.

He applied a superb game theory anchored in supreme principles of political and military strategy… He wasn’t, however, engaged in an abstract game that our children master on their computer screens these days but in an absolute shooting war overshadowed by complex geo-strategic and geopolitical environments… Dr. Garang understood very well the adage (attributed to Sun Tzu) that “War is a master of great concern to a people/country, a province of life and death, the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be carefully studied.”  Despite of these boundless challenges, Dr. Garang had a gift of boiling hard problems in political calculus down to simple and manageable proportions in addition to his unmatched will-power… For those of us who were closely associated with him during the war, we simply clang to him because he was patriotic, consistent, and focused… He was perhaps complex and hard to pin down in certain occasions but that was understandable… For those of us that he trusted absolutely and fought the war together with him, we knew what he wanted; which was, in fact, in perfect fit with what we also wanted…

Self-determination as is always debated on this forum was not to be won on empty proclamations, sloganeering, or even through nonviolent means. Rather, it was to be won through a protracted struggle that took many lives and eventually weakened the resolve of the most determined and even fanatic opponent that Khartoum was…

The chronicles of self-determination teaches us that our Chiefs called for it in the Juba Conference of 1947 in their own expressions before the advent of the political science’s parlance into our political vocabulary. At the Malakal’s Southern Front Convention of February 1965, part of Southern elites assembled under this political rubric (SF), such as Hilary Lugali, Bona Malwal, Abel Alier, Gordon Abyei, Clement Mboro, Luigi Adwok, etc., called for self-determination and pursued it through the Round Table Conference… Historically, it derived largely from the early call for self-determination in the 1940s by the Northern elites from the Condominia..

Dr. Riek Machar and Dr. Lam Akol have, however, stayed in the SPLM for almost a decade before the split… Akuot Atem and Samuel Gai even took part in the formation of the SPLM in July 1983 and including the drafting of the first Manifesto which we used till September 1984 and which talked about the Problem of the Sudan… It was reviewed and reprinted in Libya after the First Split in 1984 to suit the new realities… Therefore, what ripped Southerners apart in the two bloody splits (1983 and 1991) that we have seen during the Second War was power struggle and not differences in the objectives of the struggle…

You know my views on this topic as contained in my unpublished piece: “Defying Mao’s Archetype: Analysis of the Sluggishness of the Periphery-originated Insurgencies in the Sudan” which I shared with you last year…

At broad brush, Dr. Garang acquired his bearings right through a well-thought-out, diagnostic net assessment of the complex situation in which South Sudanese fought the two protracted liberation wars… He analysed trends and asymmetries in relative strengths and weaknesses of the South as opposed to its adversary(ies)…He also considered broader factors ( instruments of power) such as demographics, economy, allies, military capabilities, strategic culture, disruptive phenomena (uncertainty), which may affect the balance of power in the long-term…

My submission (or rather contention), as yours my friend, is to discourage these misrepresentations and misalignments of history which are crafted to fit egocentric discourse that is out-of-path with historical facts… Furthermore, I also concur with you that Dr. John Garang’s contribution shouldn’t be linked to any particular ethnicity, region or creed… John Garang was an archenemy of sectarianism and would turn manifold in his grave if he were to know that this was what the South Sudan is determined to to become after his death..

Kindest regards

Dr. Majak D’Agoot

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(6) Dr. Isaac Gang (in response to Dr. Majak D’Agoot)

Hello all,

I really enjoyed reading the rejoinder from one of my role models, Dr. Majak D’ Agoot because it was full of logical arguments despite eventually falling in the same trap as those he was trying to correct. I made it a point to stay away from these type of discussions not because they are not important in shaping the direction of our nascent nation but due the fact that the way we approach them threatens the very existence of the same.

While I generally agree with Brian Adeba that the architects of 1991 cannot be fully credited with the introduction of self-determination into the national consciousness, for national heroes such as Samuel Gai Tut, Hilary Lugali, Joseph Lagu, Akuot Atem, Both Dieu, Luigi Adwok, Biliw Reath Kok, William Deng Nhial, to mention a few, are on the record calling for self-determination (as correctly recalled by Dr. Agoot), dismissing the contribution of Dr. Riek Machar and those who stood with him, such as Dr. Lam Akol, Arok Thon Arok, Joseph Uduho and others, is nothing short of misrepresentation of history.

While my fellow comrade, Dr. Agoot, is correct in asserting that Dr. John Garang was a very shrewd liberator, whose strategic calculations were often concealed from the average man’s plain comprehension as circumstances dictated, thinking that this intricate ideology should have been a common knowledge is simply asking for too much from our SPLM/SPLA masses. While I personally belief, based on critical analysis of the historical events, That Dr. John was a unionist by day and a separatist by night, I don’t expect everyone to conduct the same analysis in order to come to the same conclusion as my comrade, Dr. Agoot, appears to expect from the average South Sudanese since most people sleep at night. This phenomenon, in my opinion, explains what Dr. Agoot described as discrepancies between the time the the manifesto was drafted and the time those who expressed dissatisfaction with the direction of the movement both in 1983 and 1991 make it known.

What a balanced Historian would concluded when analyzing these historical events is that the few analytical thinkers within the SPLM/A leadership wanted, at some points, Dr. John to be a separatist by day, especially when circumstances were conducive, so that the average man in the SPLM/A will know what the heck is going on. When I was a Jesh el Amer in group 3 at Tharpam in Itang, my colleagues and I were just happy to get up early in the morning to attend the parade and sing songs, but I am sure we would eventually want to know what is going on in a plain language since it was a struggle for us putting a complete sentence together leave alone analyze anything.

The point I am trying to make here is that the events of 1991 opened the eyes of the average South Sudanese given the plain language of the objective. This forced the late Dr. John Garang to be a separatist by day as he called the first SPLM Convention in Chukudum in 1994 making the self-determination a twin objective of the movement. Dr. Agoot knows this very well.

Furthermore, a Jalaba would rather die of thirst rather than drinking from a glass with a ‘self-determination’ written on it before 1997. After 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement (KPA), this was a forgone conclusion as the precedent was set in that document recognizing the right of self-determination by the people of South Sudan. These are just some of the reasons why it is important for anyone trying to right the wrong to do so without misrepresenting the history, however bitter it maybe.

So just like I believe that those who put Dr. John only in the box of unionist are distorting history either intentionally or otherwise, those like Dr. Agoot, who refute and correct them by dismissing the events of 1983 and 1991 as mere ‘power struggle’ not deserving of any credit for the achievement of self-determination, are also guilty of the same crime.

The lesson here is to get our history right.

Dr. Isaac Gang

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(7) Dr. Majak D’Agoot (in response to Dr. Isaac Gang)

Dear Dr. Kang,

Millions of congratulations on your recent academic achievement. The acquisition of critical skills by individual citizens coupled with nationwide human capital accumulation have a centrality as well as far-reaching consequence on leapfrogging socioeconomic recovery in a post-conflict environment such as the case of South Sudan. Again, accept my congratulations on a persuasive but impressive critique on my ‘on-the-ground account’ on the thesis and antithesis of the South Sudanese Self-Determination.

This anger-free approach that we adopted, provides a pathfinder to navigate through the labyrinth of distortions of history that have been largely responsible for the ‘Dilemma of a Southern Intellectual’ to quote the less celebrated son of South Sudan – the late Joseph Garang. These ill-conceived and incoherent accounts appalled our conflict-injured psyche; even generating more intricate lines of traps that are difficult to undo. Put another way, for us to crack the nut of historical mystery that has always shrouded our accounts, we need this kind of sobriety to find answers to plethora questions that are yet to be dissected..

Comparing my rejoinder to the one you posted on this forum, I admit that we have both made a case that epitomises the side of argument that is fundamentally progressive. My contention on the splits of the SPLM by describing them as being power-driven, has provided, in my view, a cure to misrepresentation rather than a mere palliative or  exercibating   the phenomenon.

I strongly argued that denying Dr. Garang the glory of our hard-won independence that he led; and that he didn’t even live to take a pie, is unpatriotic, shameful, and completely out of synch with the realities that you and I had lived in the bush. For we know that it is a virtue and value for an enlightened mind to be intellectually astute and altruistic but not simply degenerate into entertaining a make-believe that “a glorious history is often a story of the living to the injustice of the dead”.

While the SPLM/A and its bush leadership (Dr. Riek Machar and Dr. Lam Akol included) and populations in the rebel-controlled South absorbed the bulk of the costs, other South Sudanese in Khartoum-held towns and Diaspora variedly shared in footing the bill of freedom. Hence, we should equally accept the grades that history has assigned to us during this arduous and daunting historical experience – the war. If Dr. John Garang has stood out of the pack as an outstanding contributor to our freedom, it doesn’t assume away the fact that others too, have made their great and modest contributions…

Indisputably, the call for Self-Determination, as I said, attributes its genesis in South Sudanese political lexicon to the call for the same right by the Northerners from the Condominia in the 1940s. Uncle Both Diew and his colleagues made their first robust call mirrored on Northern demands from the Condominia but building on a solid foundation of the 1947 Juba Conference that carried this aspiration. So, in terms of articulating it, no party has even done better than the elite-based Southern Front (SF) in mid-1960s.. The question is not really about who said it first, last, less, or more than others. Rather, it is about who really fought for it and delivered it in the final analysis…

It is because of this reality of lethality of Khartoum and the fear of becoming pawns in the geopolitics of the Cold War, that our leaders on both sides of the divide (Akuot-Gai politicians’ Alliance Versus Garang-Kerubino-Nyuon Militarists’ Axis in 1983; Riek – Lam Nasir Alliance Versus Garang-Salva Torit Alliance in 1991) chose this vagueness and obscurity of objective. But this vagueness in what was abandoned to Garang to become his discourse and legacy, drew to the SPLM a large number of combatants from the peripheral North, who during the Anyanya War, were in support of the riparian Arab clientele State..

This strategic correctness is responsible, to greater degree, for the tremendous groundswell of opposition to the regime in Khartoum and which has helped us reaching the referendum during the interim period and may help in shaping the undemarcated border between the Sudan and the South Sudan.  

These splits, I contend, were therefore driven by power struggle among the political and military elites of South Sudan.. If this proposition is considered farfetched or admonished by some people, let somebody out there provide a failsafe hypothesis on:

A) Why did Akuot-Gai Alliance took part in the founding of the SPLM and even participated in outlining its objectives, principles, as well as its political and military structures ( The Executive Committee, The Central Committee, The Military High Command; not The Politico-Military High Command that the Militarists constituted out of the two organs after falling out with Akuot-Gai Alliance and subsequently with Joseph Oduho and Justice Martin Majier); and not proclaiming secessionism right away? Why did their call for secession become more pronounced after losing the support of the Ethiopians who lent their full support to the Militarists ostensibly on belief that they would deliver well on the geopolitical/geostrategic duels of the Cold War?

B) Why did Dr. Lam Akol and Edward Lino recommended Dr. Garang – the unionist – to the Ethiopian Ambassador in Khartoum few weeks after the Bor Mutiny as the most promising candidate among other prospective leaders (Dr. Lam and Edward have talked publicly about this meeting)? Why did Dr. Lam followed four years later to join a ‘Unionist Organisation”? Why did Dr. Machar join the SPLM/A in 1984 when it was already founded on unionist principles? Do most of our Forum members know that Dr. Machar, Dr. Benjamin Bol Akook, Dr. Chol Dau, Dr. Marial Benjamin, Dr. Thomas Gordon, Justice Mabil Anyieth, Justice John Luk, among others, had set up another unionist movement with Dr. Machar and Dr. Akook as cochairmen and even visited Libya on that political ticket in October 1983? Why did Dr. Machar stayed in a unionist organisation that the SPLM/A was for seven years before splitting in 1991?

Returning to diagnostics of the 1991 split, I dismiss the justification of it on grounds of the call for Self-Determination based on the aforementioned points. However, I reluctantly espouse the justification of the coup on grounds of democracy and human rights even though the Nasir experience did not walk the talk on these principles and values.

But in the interest of fairness and objectivity, by 1991, most SPLA officers had already been alarmed by Dr. Garang’s tendency to centralised authority to the detriment of initiative and autonomous action which are both highly required in a Guerrilla organisation. Accusations of autocratic leadership and abuse of human rights were already a talk in the streets/roads of Itang (our then Refugee Capital), our bases inside Ethiopia and liberated areas as good portion of our leaders languished in jail.. When Kerubino challenged Garang in 1987, he premised his justification on account of lack of structures (not democracy and human rights of course)..

Whether or not the split has induced change and democratic reforms in the movement, I submit that it is true. But look at the bigger ballgame: the end of the Call War, the fall of the Mangistu Derg regime, politics of NIF radical Islam, etc as other key variables that have also delivered even the most robust influence on Dr. Garang to make reforms… Additionally, the call for Self-Determination by Nasir Group coincided with the wind of change that blew across the former Soviet Union and the then Eastern Bloc and the Eritrean victory.

This was the era when a call for secession was not any longer a taboo but a celebrated orthodoxy.. As an intellectual, you may be persuaded to accept a proposition that this call was opportunistic given its timing. I would also make a contestation if this claim was genuine why did this call was not made prior to the end of the Cold War; say, in 1988, 1989, or 1990, for instance…

Was this not power struggle sugarcoated in these slogans? If there is another most powerful argument out there than this modest one, I would rest my case; or we should avoid deluding ourselves.

Kindest regards

Dr. Majak

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(8) Dr. James Okuk (a rejoinder to Dr. Majak’s)
Folks,

The below post from Dr. Majak  D’ Agoot is more interesting as it confirms my assertion earlier that we should write credible history of founding fathers of South Sudan in an inclusive and sincere manner, and without tendency of creating a personality cult for any one particular person or tribe.”

The strong point Dr. Agoot put forward in his latest post is that evolution and change took place within the SPLM/A leaders. These comrades might have appeared unionists institutionally at the start due to geo-political politicking of the time. That is, Dr. John Garang formed a unionist SPLM/A in 1980s together with those of Mr. Salva Kiir, Dr. Riek Machar, Dr. Lam Akol and others. There was no objection raised against SPLM/A unionistic Manifesto by then prior to founding, joining or being in it (SPLM/A).

But later after 1990s, objection popped up as some of these leaders changed to become separatists by proposing institutionalization of the right to self-determination for Southern Sudanese, and with a consequence of secession as opposed to unity of the Sudan. As the demand of the situation became greater, Dr. John Garang changed too and accepted the new move towards self-determination. In 2005 Dr. Garang went as far as telling Southerners to choose between being Second Class Citizen in the Sudan or First Class Citizen in their own South Sudan Republic.

Surely, this suggestive rhetoric shows that Dr. John Garang became a changed man for an independent South Sudan. The same rhetoric was adopted and given more weight by Mr. Salva Kiir, Mr. Pagan Amum and other Southerners later (after the untimely death of Dr. Garang), especially during the campaign for the referendum for self-determination.

Thus, it may be concluded that if being unionist is a political sin in South Sudan, all SPLM/A and other leaders have sinned. No one among them could be clean to take the first separatist stone and throw it at another leader. Also if change makes sense in political dynamism, all of these leaders should be given credit of having shifted from unionists to separatists, even at the last second of eleven hour.

Having established this understanding of political dynamism in Southern Sudanese politics of liberation, then it could become comfortable to draw the criteria of naming the significant founding fathers of the Republic of South Sudan without biases or prejudices.

Sincerely,

Dr. James Okuk

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(9) Dr. James Okuk (a follow up)

Folks,

This is a very interesting exchange of ideas. It is the right path of sifting and finding the real truth from myths. It is the correct way of search for putting records straight (i.e writing credible history of the founding fathers of of South Sudan) to be taught to next generations.

But the core question remains: who is (are) really the founding father(s) of South Sudan Republic?

AlHag Paul refuted the common claims that it is Dr. John Garang who is the founding father of South Sudan. Nonetheless, he did not advance beyond this refutation to tell us exactly who is (are) really the founding father(s) of the new republic by names. Perhaps he found it difficult to pin this down with a simple answer.

Brian Adebe, Dr. Majak D’ Agoot, Dr. Isaac K. Geng and others have only reacted to AlHag’s critique by refuting his denial that Dr. John Garang is not the founding father of South Sudan. Nevertheless, they did not come out directly to say who (by names) should really be crown with historical honor of founding father(s) of the Republic of South Sudan. Maybe their current positions in the SPLM/A makes it sensitive for them to go specific.

I would have given a competent answer if I were not a student in this field of compiling objective literature of history of the the Republic of South Sudan. This novitiate situation tempts me to lean to the side of AlHag Paul.

I see a separatist as a separatist whether at night time or day time; likewise a unionist. The time (day or night) of practice doesn’t matter to me; the practice itself matters.

If Dr. John Garang was both a separatist and a unionist irrespective of time difference, then this dualism puts me into a serious dilemma of specific identification or ‘sectionalization’. Hence, it makes it very sophisticated for me to pin him down as a founding father of South Sudan Republic conveniently, far away from propagandist or sympathetic tendency.

But a hard fact remains; SPLM/A Chairman Dr. John Garang negotiated or perhaps accepted the right of self-determination in the CPA to get institutionalized in the Republic of the Sudan  (as it was done with Khartoum and Fashoda Peace Agreements), and with a consequence of possible secession for independence of South Sudan.

Dr. Garang ensured that this right was guaranteed internationally by the UN, IGAD, friends of IGAD and other forces. Also he ensured that this right was guaranteed nationally by the SPLA as an independent military force ready to recommence the war in case of violation.

The same situation was accepted by President Omer Al-Bashir and Vice-President Ali Osman Taha until it reached down to the people of Southern Sudan in order to put it into real practice of individual votes (i.e., referendum).

In other word, if the SPLM/A Chairman Dr. Garang and the Sudan President Al-Bashir did not institutionalize the right of self-determination and guaranteed its practice, it wouldn’t have been possible for the people of South Sudan to separate from the Sudan peacefully in a democratic manner. Also, if the people of South Sudan did not go out massively to practice the right of their self-determination in the renowned referendum, there wouldn’t have been a republic called South Sudan in the World map as we have it today. 

That is, the decision for the separation of South Sudan was complimentary (i.e., it was not one-way traffic or one-man show).  Thus, AlHag Paul was partially right that it was the people of South Sudan who who decided to separate and declare their independent state. They are the heroes and founding fathers/mothers of South Sudan. However, this could have not been possible without political will from leaders of the Republic of the Sudan (Southern Sudan included by then).

Can we say here too that Mr. Salva Kiir and other living leaders of South Sudan who ensured ( i.e., political will) that the referendum for self-determination took place as agreed in the CPA, are the founding fathers of the new republic? Partly I can say yes, but with no prejudice to those who cleared the road before them in struggle for separation and independence of South Sudan, whether by military or democracy force.

In a nutshell, we should write credible history of founding fathers of South Sudan in an inclusive and sincere manner, and without tendency of creating a personality cult for any one particular person or tribe.

History should be written fairly that South Sudan has many founding fathers and not one founding father. But we should find a proper criterion of doing this so that we don’t flood our history with so many insignificant founding fathers. The core criteria here should be the political contribution of the selected founding fathers and with a clear road-map; not mere military courage or majoritarian tribal backing.

Sincerely,

Dr. James Okuk

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(10) By Peter Gatkuoth (in response to the debate)

Dear brothers and sisters,

I came late to realize that the topic is about the vision of the movement. I would respond to you as quickly to give you more medicine and to help you understand what the vision mean. The New Sudan Vision is a life history and it is subject to personal interpretation. It is a Vision rooted in a philosophical design and only few among us know what it really meant.

Although you may not agree with it, it is just a matter of how you interpret it and use it as a daily history to be preached. Yes, I know most of us are not aware of what the Vision aimed at or leaned towards but some people who criticize Dr. John Garang that he is a unionist do not even remember that John Garang was a young frontier of A/A one. If there is anything brought to light by the group of A/A, John Garang would have credit in the part of the phase one of the struggles.

The worse things that caught the man with mental capacity was how to frame the Vision into one with more arrays within it. As I said above that the vision is subject to interpretation is because how you understand it may thus be the way you preach it but the reality is there. It would take thousands of pages to link you with the fact but hatred has gotten rooms in the life of individuals and therefore, they fail to hear the voice of reasoning of how the vision is about…..

First, John Garang himself was a very separatist-minded person, and I am here to preach why but having the mental capability to deceive and bring the Arab alliance inclusive would never be a job of someone with that short mental ability. Dr. Garang preached the separation in his own ways by using the alliance of Southerners and Northerners to fight for the cause of our way to separation.

In the Nuer culture, there was a story of man who was so hungry and need to eat but he cannot find anything to eat. Few hours later, he found a bunch of many young men who killed an ox for certain celebration. He looked at their eyes and concluded that they will not give him the meat he wants to survive quickly. Instead, the guy involves himself in the process of preparing and putting meat together while the young men were chanting.

After few minutes, he was asked “what do you want?” The guy responded that he wanted the whole body of the cow. They young men reacted and said, “just give him one leg of the cow”……you know how big is the part of the leg.The man smiled and said, “okay I will take it, and I am sorry.” The groups laughed and just told him to eat and take that part of the cow later when he decided to leave.

This is the same scenario to the vision. The vision of the SPLM/A by Dr. Garang is something he does not wanted to disclose to all members of the SPLM/A. When some commanders asked him as to what the vision meant, he always asked them that when you reach where you think worth more for you, stop right there and I will continue alone.

It is like when people asked Jesus, he always answered them with questions and few are the one to capture the tone of the reasoning and interpret it appropriately.

Take care and expect me to come back or I will try to put something together for readers if I manage to have few hours free later today.

Peter Reat Gatkuoth

Costa Rica, Central America 

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(11) By Bol Deng (in appreciation of Dr. Majak and Dr. Ganng Arguments)

Dear All,

Now that Dr. Majak D’Agoot and Dr. Isaac Gang have engaged in this epistemologically, high-pitched intellectual debate on the politics of unity and secession as well as the call for self-determination; in addition to factual accounts by Mr. Deng Atem de Garang and Isaiah Abraham on Sudantribune and Newsudanvision, I strongly believe that the key thesis of Mr. Elhag Paul and his apologists has been shattered and put to rest, once and for all.

The second issue of who is the father or are the fathers of the nation is trivial and marginal. I suspect that could be the reason why Dr. Agoot and Dr. Gang focused more on the theme of self-determination, unity and separation and brushed this aside completely. Obviously, it is not Dr. Garang, neither his family nor his socalled tribe/clan who made the decision of being called so. In the interest of fairness, it is the powers that be who proclaimed him as the national hero and father of the nation. What I know, the Committee for the Celebrations of South Sudan Independence were chaired by Dr. Machar. The people who made official statements during the celebrations were President Kiir and Speaker Igga.

If any decision of or any statement ‘deifying Dr. Garang’ were taken or made, Mr. Alhag and those debating this like Dr. Okuk should ask the powers that be why so. This makes me wonder on why some people on this forum were perplexed on why President Salva, VP Dr. Machar, or Speaker Igga were not the ones proclaimed as fathers of the nation, or among other fathers of the nation. Perhaps they made a deliberate decision to leave it to you and the posterity to judge them when their bones are long interred. Then, how could the dead person build a personality cult as Dr. Okuk claims? I thought what amounts to creating a personality cult is what he is exactly doing by promoting Dr. Lam Akol as a hero in a broad daylight forgery.

Again, this same argument renders the theology and philosophical innuendos of my admirable Professor, Dr. Alfred Lokuji absolutely redundant. As a theologian myself, there was one Virgin Birth that I know and that is of our Lord Jesus Christ. Other births- including our independence are pure natural processes; often, involving political and social intercourse. But like other sacred human activity, are blessed by the Holy Spirit. The blessings that Sarah and Abraham received to have Isaac; or Elizabeth and Zachariah received to have John the Baptism, could be more analogously correct and theologically relevant. South Sudan did not just drop down from the Heaven on the eve of the independence. Rather, it was delivered through a rough intercourse with adverse factors such as war and after stressful years of infertility and stigma.

On intellectual bias, Professor Lokujji is aware, I believe, that viewpoints are not belief-proof. Even in his own academic writings – probably including his doctoral thesis (if read critically) – he must have subtly included a few of his hunches, beliefs or bias. I’ve experienced this dilemma in writing my two short theses for Master’s of Theology and Master’s of Business Administration where I sneaked in a few biased positions about my religion, my country and the struggle of its people. My supervisors noted them but they were not fatally subjective. So, to a certain degree, objectivity is relative.

As for how the nurses run the nursery these days, this is none of Dr. Garang’s business as it concerns the living. His mission is accomplished and the rest is left to you and me to fix. In a nutshell, I thought Professor Lokuji could have simply posted a new article on his views on the future of the country than just putting everything together in one lest we digress.

God bless

Bol Deng
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(12) Dr. James Okuk (in response to Bol Deng) 
Dear Bol Deng,

1. The question of the “Founding Father(s)” of South Sudan is neither trivial nor marginal as you may think. In fact, it is the most important one now as we try to write history of the new republic. That is why it is drawing interest and reactions from Southerners. Of course, this question could be sensitive to Dr. Majak D’ Agoot and Dr. Isaac K. Geng due to the positions they are holding now on SPLM ticket. This might be the reason of their tactic of avoidance.

2. Where I disagree with ElHage Paul is when he denies that Dr. John Garang should not be crown with the honour of “Founding Father” of South Sudan. For me, his argument did not consider the aspect of political dynamism in the politics of South Sudan liberation. He failed to notice that Dr. Garang become a changed man later towards separation of South Sudan.

3. Also where I disagree with you is when you try by any means (especially fallacy of appeal to SPLM and RSS authority) to betray the African spirit of solidarity and inclusivity. You seem to endorse the anti-thesis of ElHag Paul that the statue of Dr. Garang should be the only one erected in Juba and other parts of South Sudan. In other word, Dr. Garang has been chosen as the only “Founding Father” of the Republic of South Sudan by crowning him hero of the heroes during the declaration of our independence. Hence, he should remain being so alone as far as the government of the day and the living SPLM leaders are comfortable with this scene.

4. But for me, this is exclusivity and unfair action to history. Yes, Dr. Garang is a “Founding Father” but not him alone. We are proud to have his statue in Juba and other places in South Sudan as well as his head on all specimens of our currency. Nonetheless, this should not be the terminal. We need to go further and crown other “Founding Fathers and Mothers” in accordance with sincere criteria of selection and naming. It will make me more prouder to see statues of other “Founding Fathers and Mothers” of South Sudan being erected side by side with that of Dr. John Garang.

Sincerely,

Dr. James Okuk

Was Dr. John Garang a Unionist or a Separatist.pdf Was Dr. John Garang a Unionist or a Separatist.pdf
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Bor MPs cautiously laud Riek apology about 1991 massacre, ask him to extend it to the grassroots
Written by Mading Ngor, The New Sudan Vision (NSV), newsudanvision.com
Thursday, 11 August 2011 11:53
bormps

Hon. Malek Alier, MP for Anyidi, Kolnyang, Bor South (left) and Hon. Deng Dau, MP for Twic East, on Wednesday waded into Dr. Riek Machar’s apology to the Dinka Bor community on Sunday for crimes committed in 1991 under Nasir Faction

( Juba  NSV) – Two Dinka Bor MPs from the National Assembly on Wednesday waded into Dr. Riek Machar’s Sunday apology to members of the Bor community for the gruesome killing of thousands of its citizens by the Nasir Faction’ forces in 1991, then commanded by Dr. Riek Machar Teny.

In the same year, the community also saw its property looted and livelihood put into disrepair by the faction.
At a gathering held at the home of the late Dr. John Garang to commemorate the sixth anniversary of his death on Sunday, Dr. Riek Machar, South Sudan’s Vice President stunned those who attended, when he unexpectedly owned up to the heinous crimes of the Nasir Faction in 1991. The apology came nearly twenty years after the massacre.
On August 28, 1991, Riek Machar and his comrades declared a coup against the late leader of the SPLM/SPLA, Dr. John Garang, called ‘Nasir Declaration.’
On Sunday, Dr. Riek explained the aim of his movement, which was initially supported by many southerners from different tribes, was to restore democracy and human rights in the mainstream SPLM, whose late leader was allegedly autocratic. However, the Nasir Movement went on to commit human rights abuses, culminating in the ‘Bor Massacre.’
The Sunday occasion was organized by Garang’s widow, Madam Rebecca Nyandeng, and supported by the committee, which was charged with organizing Martyrs Day, The New Sudan Vision has learned.
Madam Nyandeng invited MPs, government officials, the Speaker of South Sudan parliament, religious leaders, the President, the Vice President, and members of the public. The event was announced at Emannuel Jieng church in  Juba , and through SSTV.
President Kiir did not attend the prayers, but the Vice President, Dr. Riek was one of the invited dignitaries who turned up.
“The family [of the late Dr. John] took the opportunity to remember Dr. John in a bigger way because the vision and the legacy of what he fought for is now achieved,” Hon. Deng Dau Malek, MP for  Twic   East   County , explained to The New Sudan Vision on Wednesday.
Hon. Deng, who also spoke at the event in his capacity as representative for Twic East, where the late Garang hailed from, said most of the speeches at the occasion, bordered on memory of South Sudan’s fallen heroes and heroines, in light of last month’s historic achievement of independence for South Sudan, and what awaited its future.
Apology for 1991 massacre
‘“Dr Riek, when he stood, and talked about the painful event of 1991,”’ narrated Hon. Deng, ‘“His statements were that whatever that happened in 1991 should not be associated to other people, namely people like Dr. Lam who was his deputy, and person like Gordon Kong, who was also member of the Political High Command during that time.”’
The lawmaker went on further:   ‘“He said I should take squarely the responsibility of the events of 1991. And he said the people that have suffered were people of the Greater Bor, and the entire Jonglei.
‘“He took that day to express his apology to the people who are affected by the events of 1991”’, he concluded.
When he was narrating the events of 1991, Dr. Riek broke down and wept, to the point where he nearly collapsed, several witnesses confirmed to The New Sudan Vision.
The Vice President was then joined by his wife, Dr. Anjelina Teny, who was also reportedly in tears. The dramatic scene provoked a moment of raw emotions, where some of the victims started wailing in memory of their loved ones who had died in the massacre or its aftermath, while others were bewildered by the apology, The New Sudan Vision understood from various accounts from witnesses.
In response to the apology, Caretaker Gov. of the Central Bank of  South Sudan , Elijah Malok, as elder in the Bor community and immediate relative of the late Dr. John Garang, took the microphone. He was said to have expressed his bitter feelings about 1991, before concluding that he would personally forgive Riek, but that he would refer the case to the larger Bor community for deliberation on the next step.
Madam Nyandeng, on the other hand, spoke the last words. She blamed Riek for setting the South backward with his 1991 move, when SPLM/SPLA was on the verge of victory at the time. She reasoned the  Republic  of  South Sudan  would have been achieved a decade earlier were it not because of the defection, The New Sudan Vision was told.
On her own behalf and that of her children, the Former First Lady said she forgave Riek Machar for his crimes.
On Monday, the Dinka Bor community called an emergency meeting, also held at late Dr. Garang’s home, and attended by representatives of the Bor community, intellectuals, citizens, and politicians to agree on how to handle the issue.
Although those who attended said no consensus emerged from the meeting, the predominant ideas can be broken up to about three, according to Hon. Malek Alier, MP for Const. 15, Anyidi, Kolnyang, Bor South:
  • (1) those who are asking for Dr. Riek to apologize to the grassroots in Bor and other S. Sudanese communities
  • (2) those who are willing to forgive Dr. Riek but without any political strings attached
  • (3) and those who are saying Dr. Riek’s apology will fall short if it comes from him alone and not from fellow perpetrators.
In the meeting, a committee made up of Bor representatives to follow up on how genuine was Dr. Riek’s confession, was formed. Its members are waiting to meet with the Vice President to sought whether he stood by his apology, and to agree on how to best proceed with the issue.
‘Truth and Reconciliation’
For Hon. Deng, Dr. Riek’s apology on Sunday was a welcome development.  “As members of parliament, we say this is a good gesture for general reconciliation, and this is what we call Truth and Reconciliation. People must talk about the bitter things that had happened,” he told The New Sudan Vision, in an interview.
On the timing of Dr. Riek’s apology, he said it “could be political” but also “reality” because reconciliation will be nonexistent if the people of Bor do not express their feelings about the horrific memory of the massacre.
He carried on: “People of Bor have been uprooted by 1991. And we are saying we cannot do it alone here in  Juba because Greater Bor people, who are affected, are at the grassroots. It may not be understood by people who are at home in the villages.
“We encourage Dr. Riek to extend this gesture to the people who are really affected, and we’re talking about people who are in the rural areas,” he added.
Ready to forgive…
Hon. Malek held similar sentiments with his counterpart. “Generally, people are ready to forgive but they think that, this thing should be said in another bigger gathering, where people who have been affected or victimized, who have lost many [relatives], should be heard first,” he told The New Sudan Vision on Wednesday.
“It should not be done at the political level. It has to be extended to the grassroots, so that those who are bitter, those who have lost their dear people, they have to air out themselves, and if that forgiveness comes out from them, then all are going to be healed,” he said.
Dr. Riek’s belated apology has triggered all kinds of speculations about his intentions. Others wondered whether his apology was meant to solicit Dinka Bor support in his leadership ambitions.
“This apology should not be misunderstood, as if we have something we’re cooking,” said Hon. Deng, when The New Sudan Vision asked him about the political implications of any resultant forgiveness from the community.
“It’s from him, and he knows why he has said this at this time,” he said.
“As a people of Bor, we’re firm behind the leadership of the SPLM, led by comrade Salva Kiir Mayardit. And so whatever reconciliation that is done, is done within the context of the existing structures,” he concluded.
What’s more, Hon. Malek stressed the importance of having a uniform apology from the perpetrators.
“What we want to know, is that, is this idea, the idea of Riek Machar alone, or the idea shared by those with whom he was doing this together. Riek alone, even if he’s forgiven and others are still maintaining that bitterness, it will not help. So I want this thing to be extended and we hear from others who were with Riek Machar, whether they are ready, what Riek has said, is what they have, then it would be good for us,” he told The New Sudan Vision.
“We’re convinced that [the apology] is a good initiative, it’s really a national initiative, because we want Southerners to forget all the bitterness. We want Southerners to forget the past. We want to begin anew so that we build our
nation,” he added.
Machar move on the 1991 Bor Tragedy is patriotic
By Isaiah Abraham

Sudan Tribune: August 11, 2011 — The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) broke up in August 1991 until 2002, when the two sides came together again. The break up at that time was so devastating and nearly put the liberation struggle to its knees. There were problems everywhere: on the military and political fronts. The ugly part of it all is the tribal dirty seeds it has sown among our people. It was a split that never to be talked about openly unless one is prepared to soak all kinds of salvos from those against and for it.

The split by our people at that time, just not to waste your precious time, was unnecessary fratricide and horror we must now leave behind as we look forward to rebuild our nation. A healing is badly needed, the very pain caused by the aftermaths of the 1991 split. No amount of reparation could assuage that pain of destruction in that land, but admission of the miscalculation or mistake does. A bright chapter was opened to important section of our society. It took one man initiative to burry the matter (hatchet).

That is why this man called Machar has gone to bed with the Southern Public. The man is here to stay whether you hate or like him. He has everything it takes to stay there, irrespective of what haters want done or not done against him. This is a beauty of people with big hearts. May this gifted man continue to offer directions to his people, Oh! May the vision of this great man be firm and unshakable, Oh!

But some people will rebuff the big man offer on the ground that it was ‘justice delayed and therefore should be denied’- that it came late. They also argue that the big man should have gone to Bor or Panyagor to express it under no pressure (recall how elders in the party started the argument. The other concern is that the Vice President made an apology after the man they have tried to wrest power has gone (dead).

The author however thought that time doesn’t affect the truth so long as it was done in good faith. Going to Bor/Panyagor or Duk again isn’t a deal; since the big man has gathered courage to do what a civilized person does, there is no elephant to make out of it to press him to the wall. Between him and father (Dr. Garang) and as politicians and learned ones, they had cleared their differences then and forever.

Radicalists within their camps in this regards shouldn’t make mountains again out of mound hills; they got to shut up, and allow our people this opportunity for healing. Machar has started it, others must follow.

Let’s look briefly at the so-called apology at Garang’s home in Juba on that cold Sunday the 7th, its importance to everyone and the leader (Machar) in question. We shall do it in few notes however. Our beloved Vice President chose the home of our hero (Dr. Garang) to make amend, something so symbolic and historic not done by any dead of living Southerners. What has killed our people and still will do them more harm is pride and arrogance. Time to forge ahead together is right here. It starts with you

Mama Rebecca de Mabior was just on a thanks giving service/occasion, and from nowhere politicians from there (Bor) scratched the matter and the big man didn’t disappoint. It was an emotional moment for everybody, something a coward and evil minded people won’t do. He stated what we usually say here that the rebellion was exploited by others, and wasn’t the policy of the break away faction; that is unmistakable truth. He took the blame as a leader, and he did it very emphatically and sincerely. We must be proud of this talent at the top!

Second, the elegiac will remind others who killed political prisoners in Ashwa or whatever near Pageri in Nimule County and Chukudum in 1993/1994 that what they did there to finish up politicians, officers and innocent people because of their political orientation or tribe was ingloriously a wrong. Whether the directives were given from ‘above’ or not, the loss of lives of our politicians, officers there remains unforgivable unless the authors of that wanton deaths of Southerners come out publicly and say ‘we are sorry’. Example is set by the Vice President how about them?

Take it right, this line above doesn’t allude to insinuation of group or one person, rather it is an expression of pain about what was done stupidly that must be let go out of our chests. Shamely though the officers who were engaged in disappearance are still being promoted, and are move from one plumb job to another. People know them and history will not be kind to such individuals in our society. Time has come for us to show maturity to the damage we did to ourselves.

Third, is that the said apology by the Vice President has put to rest (as far as Bor Community is concerned) a matter that has always divide our people; say Bor vs Nuer. The Big man (Machar) and by extension the larger Nuer community were targeted by Bor community for what had happened then in 1991. Yeah, brothers and sisters from Bor were on the receiving end of that rebellion and no right minded person could deny the destruction it has caused these people. But the by gone should be by gone, especially now that the big man has come out and say ‘he is sorry’. That is leadership, not because he personally ordered the macabre, no! Let no one again go over this matter again; it is close and is done. Congratulation to the big man for that job well done!

Forth just to wrap up, the entire Southern public shouldn’t take such moves with guile, wily reception or for that matter for granted. What this great son of South Sudan (Dr. Machar) did to Bor people in Juba (not necessary in Bor Town) on Sunday should be emulated by other leaders whose political path trails blood of innocent people in our land. Gen. George Athor Deng and Gen. Gordon Koang Chol should now renounce violence and say to Southerners ‘we are sorry’. By doing so, they are healed and allow others to heal too (Proverbs 28:13 and James 5:16). God bless Dr. Riek Machar Teny Dhorgun!

Isaiah Abraham writes from Juba. He ca be reached at Isaiah_abraham@yahoo.co.uk

Return In Peace (R.I.P) Dr. John Garang de Mabioor
Return In Peace (R.I.P) Dr. John Garang de Mabioor —By PaanLuel Wël (July 30, 2014)
Price: $27.66
Ships from and sold by Amazon.com
——————————-

Biography of the Late Dr. John Garang de-Mabior

June 23, 1945 – July 30, 2005

Founding President

The late Dr. John Garang De Mabior Atem is a founder of the Sudan People Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Sudan Liberation Army (SPLA) and eventually became the President of the Government of the Southern Sudan after he signed one of Africa longest war with Khartoum based government. John Garang lost his life of the plane crush as he was coming from Uganda to his base in Southern Sudan; barely after two weeks in the office.

Dr. Garang was born John Garang to Mabior Atem and his wife Gak Malwal Kuol on June 23, 1945 at Buk village, Nyuak Payam (Twich East County), Bor area in Jonglei State. He was the sixth of the family’s ten children comprising seven boys and three girls. Dr. John was a disciplined but inquisitive child who grew respecting his parents and the community. His parents were strict Christians hence the discipline with which they brought up their children.

Young John began his education at Tonj and Buseri primary and intermediate schools. Upon completing primary education, he joined Rumbek Secondary School. However, his stay there was short-lived. He was expelled after taking part in a strike. He went to Tanzania where he joined Magamba Secondary School from where he completed his studies having passed with flying colours. Thereafter, he joined the University of Dar es Salaam where he was a classmate to President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda. John also received a scholarship to Grinnel College in the USA where he was awarded BA in Economics. Due to his quest for knowledge, he pursued further studies in the USA and was awarded a PhD in Economics by Iowa State University in 1981. His love for his country and the dream of its development was epitomed in his doctoral thesis was entitled: Aspects for Development in Southern Sudan.

Dr. John was first recruited into the liberation army when he was 17 during the Anyanya I revolt but he dropped out after a short stint to go back to school. It is reported that the commanders saw his intellectual prowess and urged him to complete his education first. No wonder he rejoined Anyanya I army soon after he came back to Sudan in 1971. His military organization skills was recognized fast and he was soon dispatched for a company commanders’ course in the American Military Academy where he graduated in the top three positions. He remained in the army until he left the country for his doctoral studies. He returned in 1982 and rose to the level of Colonel and was based at Khartoum as a military planner. On May 16, 1983, a group of army officers based at Bor mutinied. Dr. Garang was sent by the Nimeiri’s government to quell the mutiny. Converse to the government’s expectations, Dr. Garang joined that mutiny than fight his own people. Due to his leadership qualities he became the leader of this group and set up a command base on the Sudan-Ethiopia border. This is how SPLM/A was born.


Dr John Garang’s grave in Juba.

Dr. Garang married Rebecca Nyandeng on December 19, 1976. They were blessed with seven children of whom one died in infancy. The surviving children are Mabior, Chuol, Gak, Akwal, Nyankuir and Atong.

Dr. John was a well travelled person and a Pan-African for that matter. For instance, he lived in Kibera in Kenya’s capital in the early 1960s. He even taught at Gatung’ang’a secondary school in Nyeri between 1965 and 1966; just before he flew to Iowa on a scholarship.


A towering statue of Dr John Garang at the SPLA Headquarters [Photo by Joseph Garang Deng]

This article was updated on Jul 13, 2011
Further Resources on Dr John Garang

Books:

Shimanyula, J.B. (2005). John Garang and the SPLA. Nairobi: Jomo Kenyatta Foundation

http://www.goss-online.org/magnoliaPublic/en/president/FormerPresedent.html

 A Brief Biography of the Late Dr. John Garang De Mabior

The late Dr. John Garang de Mabior was born on June 23, 1945 (with five brothers and two sisters) to parents Mabior Atem Aruei (of Aulian Tribe) and Gak Malual Kuol (of Kongoor Tribe) in Buk Village, Nyuak Payam, Tuic East County of Jong’lei State. The late Dr. John Garang was a very dynamic human being who wore many hats and accomplished many great feats. His biography can be written in volumes, however for the purposes of this manual, the focus shall be on his education.

           The late Dr. John (as he was fondly known) started his education in Tonj Primary School in 1952, after being taken there by his uncle Athethei Aruei, who had to plead with his family to release him. This was a time in the history when most tribal societies in Southern Sudan had negative attitudes towards education. The parents of Dr. John where of the view that the numerical strength of families in the village where important than education of their children; however, his uncle pleaded with the family until they relented. Athethei Aruei had travelled widely in Sudan, and had been exposed to urban life, hence predicted to his family of a time in the future when education would become central to the survival of families in the village. It could therefore be said had it not been the visionary (family) leadership of Uncle Athethei, the history of the Sudan would have been much different.

                  In 1956, Dr. John graduated from primary and enrolled in Buseri Intermediate School in Wau. In 1960 he was accepted in Rumbek Senior Secondary School, from where he was recruited (with many of his colleagues) into the Anyanya I Rebel Army. The leaders of Anyanya, particularly the late hero Deng Nhial, suggested that the young John Garang should go and continue his studies as the revolution would soon need educated young men. This took the young John to East Africa, where he visited and stayed in Uganda, and also taught in a high school in Nyeri, Kenya. From Kenya, he went to Tanzania where he first lived in Bushoto Refugee Camp, before going to the University of Dar es salaam where he became an assistant to Professor Walter Rodney.

                      The University of Dar-e salam is also where he met with current President Yoweri Museveni, and together formed a student organization called the University Students African Revolutionary Front (USARF). Through the help of missionary organizations, the late Dr. John was able to sit for and pass an international examination that awarded him a scholarship to Grinnell College in Iowa, USA. After completing his Bachelors of Arts Degree, he was offered a scholarship to University of California at Buckley; however, he chose to go back to Tanzania where he studied East African Agricultural Economics. In 1968 he rejoined the Anyanya Army fighting for the Independence of Southern Sudan.  In 1972 when the Addis Ababa Agreement was signed between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Anyanya, Dr. Johnhad attained the rank of Captain the Sudanese army and he was sent to Fort Benning in Georgia, USA, where he received a Masters in Military Science.

           He returned to Sudan and in 1976 married his beautiful wife, Mama Rebecca Nyandeng. Thereafter, Dr. John together with his wife, returned to America where he completed his PhD in Agricultural Economics from Iowa State University. He then returned to Sudan and worked briefly as the Deputy Director of Production at the General Head Quarters of the Sudan Armed Forces. He also taught at the University of Khartoum, Faculty of Agriculture. In 1983 when the Addis Ababa Agreement was violated and Sharia Law was decreed, the whole country was thrown in to turmoil.

            It was in the midst of this chaos that the late Dr. John emerged as a leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), which then created the current Sudan Liberation Movement (SPLM).The Dr. John Garang International School is thus among the pioneer custodians of this legacy and is committed to training young Scholars that shall follow on the heels of this great man.

     DR.JOHN GARANG INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL (to be referred to as institution) DR.JOHN GARANG INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL is an institution founded in remembrance of the late DR. JOHN GARANG DEMABIOR.

http://www.drjohngaranginternationalschool.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=36&Itemid=37

Biography of the Late Dr. John Garang de-Mabior
June 23, 1945 – July 30, 2005


Date of Birth: June 23, 1945 (One of the 7 (Seven) siblings {5 brothers and 2 sisters} and Dr. Garang was the child # 6.

Place of Birth: Ajakgiet (Wagkulei Village) Jongley.

Parents of Dr. John Garang:
– Father: Mabior Atem Aroy
– Mother: Gag Maluwal Kwal: (From Knogor)

Education:
– 1952 Tonj Primary School.
– 1956 Buseri Intermediate School (Wau).
– 1960 Rumbek Senior Secondary School (Did not complete)
– 1962 Left for Uganda then Tanzania and sat for overseas
examination, after that he was granted a scholarship at Grinnell College in Iowa (USA) where he received a B. A. in economics in 1968. He was well known there for his bookishness. John Garang was offered another scholarship to pursue graduate studies at University of California at Barkley but chose to return to Tanzania and studied “East African Agricultural Economics” in Dar El-Salaam University were he met the current president of Uganda (Yoweri Kaguta Museveni) and became close friends.

– 1968 / 1969 Joined the Anya Nya One rebel movement which was led by General Joseph Lagu Yanga.

– 1972 After the Addis Ababa agreement, John Garang was absorbed in the Sudanese Army as a junior officer (Rank of Captain).

– 1973 John Garang went back to Tanzania and then to USA where he pursued his studies at the Iowa State University and received a master’s degree in Agricultural Economics.

– 1976 John Garang was married to his lovely wife Madam Rebecca Nyandeng in Juba, Sudan, but traditionally the marriage arrangements were done in their village.

– 1978 John Garang and his wife Madam Rebbeca Nyandeng came to the United States and John Garang continued with further studies and received a Ph. D. in economics in 1980 at Iowa State University, Iowa.

– 1980 Dr. John Garang went to Sudan and was a lecturer at the University of Khartoum, Faculty of Agriculture in “Shambat” (Khartoum), by then was also a colonel in the Sudanese Armed Forces.

– 1983 Dr. John Garang was sent by field marshal president Jafaar Mohammed Nimeri to crash a mutiny in Bor (His Home Town) of 500 southern Sudanese government soldiers known as Anya Nya Two, but he decided to join his colleagues (Samuel Gai Tut, William Nyuon and Keribino Kuanyin Bol) and then the name Anya Nya Two was changed to Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) “Political Wing” and Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) “Military Wing” and that was in May 16, 1983 in Bilpaam. Dr. John Garang was welcomed and selected to lead the movement and became it’s chairman of SPLM and commander in chief of SPLA.- May 16, 1983 to January 8, 2005 Dr. John Garang waged a successful war against the Islamic Government of Sudan for almost 22 Years.- January 9, 2005 SPLM/A, And National Congress Party permanently signed Comprehensive Peace Agreement ending 21 years of war.

– July 9, 2005 Dr. John Garang was sworn in as the First southerner to hold the position of the first Vice President of the Republic of Sudan and at the same time the President of the government of southern Sudan (Dr. John Garang was appointed to these two positions by president Omer Hassan Ahmed El-Beshir according to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement “CPA”).

– July 30, 2005 Dr. John Garang passed away in a helicopter crash at the mountains ranch of Imatong in a place called Himan south of Lotukei in “Eastern Equaoria”.
Late Dr. Garang is survived with six children (2 Boys and 4 Girls).

Southern Sudan and indeed the whole of Sudan have lost its beloved son, Dr John Garang De Mabior.

Early Life

John Garang de Mabior (June 23, 1945 – July 30, 2005).

A member of the Dinka ethnic group, Garang was born into a poor family in Wanglei village in Bor, Sudan, in the upper Nile region of Sudan (currently Jonglei State). An orphan by the age of ten, he had his fees for school paid by a relative, going to schools in Wau and then Rumbek. In 1962 he joined the first Sudanese civil war, but because he was so young, the leaders encouraged him and others his age to seek an education. Because of the ongoing fighting, Garang was forced to attend his secondary education  in  Tanzania. After winning a scholarship, he went on to earn a B.A.  in  economics in 1969 from Grinnell College in Iowa, USA. He was known there for his bookishness. He was offered another scholarship to pursue graduate studies at the University of California, Berkeley. But chose to return to Tanzania and study East African agricultural economics as a Thomas J. Watson Fellow at the University of Dar es Salaam (UDSM). At UDSM, he was a member of the University Students’ African Revolutionary Front. However, Garang soon decided to return to Sudan and join the rebels. There is much erroneous reporting that Garang met and befriended Yoweri Museveni, future president ofUganda, at this time; while both Garang and Museveni were students at UDSM in the 1960s, they did not attend at the same time.

The civil war ended with the Addis Ababa agreement of 1972 and Garang, like many rebels, was absorbed into the Sudanese military. For eleven years, he was a career soldier and rose from the rank of captain to colonel after taking the Infantry Officers Advanced Course at Fort Benning, Georgia. During this period he took four years academic leave and received a master’s degree in agricultural economics and aPh.D. in economics at Iowa State University, after writing a thesis on the agricultural development of Southern Sudan. By 1983, Col. Garang was serving as senior instructor in the military academy in Wadi Sayedna 21 km from the centre of ( Omdurman )where he instructed the cadets for more than 4 years and later he nominated to serve in the military researchs department in the Army HQ in Khartoum.

Rebel Leader

In 1983, Garang went to Bor ostensibly to mediate with about 500 southern government soldiers in battalion 105 who were resisting being rotated to posts in the north. However, Garang was already part of a conspiracy among some officers in the Southern Command arranging for the defection of battalion 105 to the anti-government rebels. When the government attacked Bor in May and the battalion pulled out, Garang went by an alternate route to join them in the rebel stronghold in Ethiopia. By the end of July, Garang had brought over 3000 rebel soldiers under his control through the newly-created Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M), which was opposed to military rule and Islamic dominance of the country, and encouraged other army garrisons to mutiny against the Islamic Law imposed on the country by the government. This action marked the commonly agreed upon beginning of the Second Sudanese Civil War, which resulted in one and half million deaths over twenty years of conflict. Although Garang was Christian and most of southern Sudan is non-Muslim (mostly animist), he did not initially focus on the religious aspects of the war.

The SPLA gained the backing of Libya, Uganda and Ethiopia. Garang and his army controlled a large part of the southern regions of the country, named New Sudan. He claimed his troops’ courage comes from “the conviction that we are fighting a just cause. That is something North Sudan and its people don’t have.” Critics suggested financial motivations to his rebellion, noting that much of Sudan’s oil wealth lies in the south of the country.

Garang refused to participate in the 1985 interim government or 1986 elections, remaining a rebel leader. However, the SPLA and government signed a peace agreement on 9 January 2005 in Nairobi, Kenya. On 9 July 2005, he was sworn in as vice-president, the second most powerful person in the country, following a ceremony in which he and President Omar al-Bashir signed a power-sharing constitution. He also became the administrative head of a southern Sudan with limited autonomy for the six years before a scheduled referendum of possible secession. No Christian or southerner had ever held such a high government post. Commenting after the ceremony, Garang stated, “I congratulate the Sudanese people, this is not my peace or the peace of al-Bashir, it is the peace of the Sudanese people.”

As a leader, John Garangs’ democratic credentials were often questioned. For example, according to Gill Lusk “John Garang did not tolerate dissent and anyone who disagreed with him was either imprisoned or killed”. Under his leadership, the SPLA was accused of human rights abuses.

The ideological profile of SPLA was as shadowy as Mr Garang himself. He varied from Marxism to drawingsupport from Christian fundamentalists in the US.

The United States State Department argued that Garang’s presence in the government would have helped solve the Darfur conflict in western Sudan, but others consider these claims “excessively optimistic”

Death

In late July 2005, Garang died after the Ugandan presidential Mi-172 helicopter he was flying in crashed. He had been returning from a meeting in Rwakitura with long-time ally President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda. He did not tell the Sudanese government that he was going to this meeting and so did not take the presidential plane. To this day nobody knows with whom Garang had met. Sudanese state television initially reported that Garang’s craft had landed safely, but Abdel Basset Sabdarat, the country’s Information Minister, went on TV hours later to deny the report. Actually, it was Yasir Arman, the SPLA/M spokesman who told the government that Garang plane had landed safely. His intention was to save time for internal arrangements in SPLA before Garang’s death was known. Garang’s plane crashed on a Friday and so remained missing for the following Saturday. During this time the government believed he was in Southern Sudan.

Soon afterwards, a statement released by the office of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir confirmed that a Ugandan presidential helicopter crashed into “a mountain range in southern Sudan because of poor visibility and this resulted in the death of Dr. John Garang DeMabior, six of his colleagues and seven Ugandan crew members.” His body was flown to New Site, a southern Sudanese settlement near the scene of the crash, where former rebel fighters and civilian supporters gathered to pay their respects to Garang. Garang’s funeral took place on August 3 in Juba. His widow Rebecca Nyandeng de Mabior  promised to continue his work stating “In our culture we say, if you kill the lion, you see what the lioness will do.”

Both the Sudanese government and the head of the SPLA blamed the weather for the accident. There are, however, doubts as to the truth of this, especially amongst the rank-and-file of the SPLA. Yoweri Museveni, the Ugandan president, claims that the possibility of “external factors” having played a role could not be eliminated.

Considered instrumental in ending the Civil War, the effect of Garang’s death upon the peace deal is uncertain. The government declared three days of national mourning, which did not stop large scale rioting in Khartoum which killed at least 24 as youths from southern Sudan attacked northern Sudanese and clashed with security forces. After three days of violence, the death toll had risen to 84. Unrest was also reported in other parts of the country. Leading members of the SPLM, including Garang’s successor Salva Kiir Mayardit, stated that the peace process would continue. Analysts suggested that the death could result in anything from a new democratic openness in the SPLA, which some have criticized for being overly dominated by Garang, to an outbreak of open warfare between the various southern factions that Garang had brought together.

Source

Garang, John 1987 John Garang Speaks. M. Khalid, ed. London: Kegan Paul International.

Wikipedia (2005). “John Garang”  Wikipedia, the online encyclopedia.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Garang

Accessed September 15, 2010.

The First Vice President of the Republic of Sudan and the President of South Sudan was on official visit to Uganda during the period 29th – 30th July 2005 when the helicopter he was traveling in crashed near New Kush on his return last Saturday.

John Garang de Mabior (June 23, 1945 – July 30, 2005).  By the time of his birth, his parents were looking for shelter…. Dr. Mabior. Born in Wagkulei, Bor, Sudan. One of 7 siblings. Attended Tonj Primary School, 1952. Buseri Intermediate School, 1956. Rumbek Senior Secondary School, 1960. In 1962, went to Uganda then Tanzania. Took overseas examinations and granted a scholarship at Crinnel College in Iowa, USA. Receved a B.A in Economics, 1968. Granted another scholarship for graduate studies at University of California but chose to return to Tanzania. Continued studying Economics. Met current Uganda President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni. Became close friends with Yoweri Kaguta Museveni. Went to South Sudan. Joined Anya Nya One rebel movement, 1968-1969. Became Junior Officer (Captain), 1972. Returned to Tanzania, 1973, and then to the US. Economics in Iowa State University. Received a master’s degree in Agricultural Economics. Went back to Juba, Sudan. Got Married to Rebecca Nyandeng, 1976. Went to the US. Continued studies at Iowa State University. Recieved Ph. D. in Economics, 1980. Returned to Sudan, Khartoum. Worked as a Lecturer at the University of Khartoum. Dr. John Garang was then sent to Bor by Presiden Jafaar Nimeri to crash a mutiny of 500 Southern Sudanese known as Anya Nya Two. When in Bor, he decided to join the 500 Southerners. Shortly after, the name was changed from Anya Nya Two, to Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) “Plitical Wing” and Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) “Military Wing,” 1983. Again, shortly after, Dr. John Garang was selected to lead the movement. He was the Chairman of SPLM and the Commander in Chief of SPLA, 1983. SPLM/A, with the leadership of Dr. Mabior, brought about the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 – after a two-decade civil war. After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Dr. Mabior was sworn in as the First Vice President of Sudan. He was also the President of South Sudan. Six months into his Presidency. Dr. Mabior meets with his long-time ally Yoweri, the Presidend of Uganda. After the meeting, the President’s Mi-172 helicopter attempts to take Dr. Mabior back. The helicopter is reported missing. The helicopter is reported to have landed safely. Then again the helicopter is reported missing. Dr. John Garang de Mabior’s death is announced. Chaos! ….By the time of his death, he was the President.

PAN-AFRICAN POSTCARD

Killing of John Garang: Who did it?

Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem

2007-06-28,

“When my husband died, I did not come out openly and say he was killed because I knew the consequences. At the back of my mind, I knew my husband had been assassinated”

Those were the chilling words of Mrs. Rebecca Garang, the widow of the late Liberation fighter, Dr (Col) John Garang de Mabior, leader of the SPLA/M who was killed on July 30 2005 in a helicopter crash on the borders of Uganda, Kenya and Sudan. The helicopter he was traveling in belonged to President Yoweri Museveni, Dr Garang’s closest ally and comrade.

I was one of many people who refused to accept the immediate conclusion then that it was an accident. Not because we missed Garang too much and found it impossible to let go which we did but because the explanation was too obvious.

If anyone wanted to kill Garang (and there were many forces) there was no better cover for an almost perfect crime than for him to be traveling unofficially in the helicopter of his closest ally. Since Khartoum did not officially know that he was leaving the capital anyone of the many vested interests who felt threatened by Garang’s messianic entry into Khartoum early in July that trip provided your best opportunity.

Mrs. Garang has now thrown open widely what many had been suspecting. All the inquiries so far have ‘concluded’ that it is pilot error, bad weather, and other technical conclusions but the dearth was political.

So who could have done it?

My first suspect was and remains the extremist wing of the government and Northern hegemonists in the security and intelligence of the country. Their heart must have shook and their desperation further heightened by the tumultuous welcome from all Sudanese commitment to creating a New Sudan when he arrived in Khartoum to be sworn in July 9 2005. They must have seen their world collapsing before their eyes. A Black prophet arising from the South must seem like end of the world for them. Garang was not the first Black Sudanese to have been made Vice President. Khartoum has had a succession of Black poodles willing to be tools of misrule against their people and the whole of Sudan. But in John Garang, a formidable personality who had distinguished himself both militarily and politically the hegemonists shook at what would happen to their rule were Garang to have the opportunity to reshape the country because Garang could be no one’s errand boy. For Sudanese democrats he was a bridge of hope with the potential of turning the country into a genuinely democratic environment where Sudanese might, in the Martin Luther King hope , ‘ be judged not by the color of their skin but by the content of their character ‘ . The enemies of hope had to act and act quickly before goodness broke out in a country that has been in conflict for most of its post independence (1956) existence.

Khartoum is not the only suspect in Garang’s death. Chief amongst other suspects could be extremist wing of Southern Nationalists whose agenda was to secede from Sudan and may have great fears that Dr John’s commitment to creating a New Sudan uniting the North and the South was a betrayal. Plausible but not probable. They needed Garang and backed him in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which gave them the option of full independence by referendum in the course of the 6 year term of the agreement.

Mrs. Garang is herself a believer in Southern Sudan Independence, and between her and her husband they agree to disagree on this issue therefore it is highly unlikely that Southern nationalists killed Dr John.

Mrs. Garang made her public disclosure at an award ceremony by the Jaramogi Oginga Odinga Foundation (JOOF) in Nairobi, Kenya. The late John Garang had been honored with a posthumous Uhuru Award for his contribution to the liberation struggles of Africa. Prof. Dani Wadada Nabudere was the guest speaker on the theme of CONFLICT AS A CATALYST FOR CHANGE.

It was not just about her husband’s death that Mrs. Garang spoke. Her speech also touched on a number of sensitive issues across Africa. One of them is how we treat. Partners of our heroes. Often they are not seen as persons in their own right. They may have been married to heroes but some of them have a place in the struggle in their own rights. Mrs. Garang spoke from the heart but not as a grieving widow rather as a combatant. She disclosed the embarrassing fact that that award by the JOOF was the first time that Dr John was being honored by an African organization. What doe this tells us about the way in which we treat our heroes and heroines. Garang was the recipient of many awards from all kinds of people in Europe ands North America but his first ward from Africa is posthumous and even then from an Independent foundation. Is this yet another case of a prophet having honor but not in his village or not in his life time?

* Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem is the deputy director of the UN Millennium Campaign in Africa, based in Nairobi, Kenya. He writes this article in his personal capacity as a concerned pan-Africanist.

Tribute to Garang death: http://www.videosurf.com/video/tribute-to-dr-john-garang-de-mabior-9610909?vlt=

http://www.videosurf.com/video/tribute-to-dr-john-garang-de-mabior-9610909?vlt=

http://www.videosurf.com/video/dr-john-garang-new-sudan-speech-part-1-4-120450816?vlt=

SPLM/A Leadership Biography

The line of succession was already detemined by each individual’s senior in the POLITICO- MILITARY HIGH COMMAND. Below is the list according to their seniority
1. Cdr Dr John Garang,
2. Cdr Kerubino Kuanyin Bol
3. Cdr Wlliam Nyuon Bany
4. Cdr Salva Kiir Mayardit
5. Cdr Arok Thon Arok
6 Cdr Nyacigak Nyaculuk
7. Cdr John Kualng
8. Cdr Dr Reik Machar Teny
9. Cdr Dr Lam Akol Ajawin
10 Cdr Yusif Kwa Mekki
11. Cdr James Wani Igga
12.Cdr Daniel Awet Akot
13. Cdr Kuol Manyang Juk
14. Cdr Martin Manyiel Ayuel
15. Cdr Lual Diing Wol
16. Cdr Gelario M

Salva Kiir Mayardit 

 

First Vice President of the Sudan

President of South Sudan

“SPLM/A will remain united and strive to faithfully implement the comprehensive peace agreement.”Yoweri Kaguta Museveni.

President of Uganda. 

Long-time ally and friend

“Possibility of external factors having played a role could not be eliminated.” President Muserveni on the death of Dr. Mabior.

Peter Moszynski, a Sudan specialist who covered the war for many years. 25 years’ experience in Sudan.

 August 3, 2005

“Becoming Vice President after 22 years, leading a guerrilla army in the bushes, John Garang was an expert in survival: someone who knew how to bend with the wind yet maintain his political objectives, someone who knew how to seem all things to all men.”

George W Bush 

President of the United States of America

White House

August 1, 2005

 “I was deeply saddened to learn of the death of Sudanese First Vice President Dr. John Garang de Mabior. He was a visionary leader and peacemaker who helped bring about the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which is a beacon of hope for all Sudanese.”

Rebeca de Mabior

The widow of Dr. John Garang de Mabior.

Currently one of the advisors of the President of SS.

 

   “Wh

o killed my 

husband?”

 

 

 

 

 

 

Hope Page Picture

The First Vice President of the Republic of Sudan and the President of South Sudan was on official visit to Uganda during the period 29th – 30th July 2005 when the helicopter he was traveling in crashed near New Kush on his return last Saturday.

Dr. Mabior’s Death

Garang’s death was a blow to the people of Sudan and to those in northern Uganda who would have benefited from his promised clamp down on the murderous Lord’s Resistance Army that terrorized the region.

I have to wonder whether or not Garang’s death an accident? He somehow survived a 21-year civil war but, when peace came, died in an aircraft mishap? I’m suspicious. And, so are others.

Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni for the first time has publicly stated that the “accident” may not be what it seems. “Some people say accident, it may be an accident, it may be something else,” he told Garang mourners.

But I assure you that if the investigation finds that it was a result of foul play, the perpetrators will pay,” Museveni was quoted as saying in another report. He said SPLA, Ugandan, US, Russian and Kenyan investigators visited the crash site, inspected the bodies and recovered the black box. He said former army commander Maj. Gen. James Kazini oversees the Ugandan team.

Museveni also announced the formation of a panel of three experts to probe the accident that claimed Garang’s life. “We have also approached a certain foreign government to rule out any form of sabotage or terrorism,” he said.

Ironically, although Museveni was reportedly a long-time friend and ally of Garang, some suggest that negligence on his part and other Ugandan official contributed to Garang’s tragic demise. Ugandan parliamentarian Aggrey Awori told reporter William Eagle that the Ugandan government does not seem to have followed proper procedures with regard to the doomed flight.

They took off after hours, definitely. According to CAA regulations, no rotor aircraft, [like a] helicopter, can take off after 5 pm for any destination lasting more than one hour,”he explained. And Awori said Museveni should have advised his Garang to stay in Kampala, or to cut short their mid-afternoon meeting so Mr. Garang could arrive home before nightfall.

Museveni also shut down a popular FM radio station after it aired a program discussing theories about the crash, including some that blamed the Ugandan government.

Sudan authority Eric Reeves in an interview with Adnkronos International (AKI) stated there may be more to the story than meets the eye. “There’s a clear possibility that sabotage was involved,” Reeves said, noting how the SPLA wants a full investigation on Saturday’s crash before making any announcement on the allegations.

UPI reported that a senior ai\de to Garang is requesting an investigation.

Deng Alor, a senior member of Garang`s rebel movement, the Sudan People`s Liberation Army/Movement, refused to say if the plane crash was accidental or the result of a sabotage.

“We do not rule out any possibility, and that is why we are asking for an investigation,” Alor told UPI in a telephone interview from southern Sudan.

CNS News notes the potential link and subsequent speculation regarding the LRA:

Although no reports have suggested foul play in the crash, speculation will likely arise in the days ahead that a notorious Ugandan rebel group, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), may have shot down the helicopter.

Operating from bases in southern Sudan — allegedly with past support from Khartoum — the LRA has for some 18 years been fighting to overthrow the Ugandan government. It is notorious for vicious tactics including the abduction of thousands of children forced to become soldiers or concubines for rebels.

A joint commission between the northern Sudanese government and Garang’s Sudan People  Liberation Movement (SPLM) was formed to investigate the causes of the crash and officials have said they welcome any input from the U.N. or other international experts. Considering that northern Sudan has a terrible track record full of human rights violations and would certainly welcome the demise of the SPLM, it is incumbent upon those overseeing the peace process to provide “input” and, even better, accountability.

In addition, there are also powerful international forces vying for influence in this oil rich country of Sudan.

While there exists speculation tied to the vested interest of certain governments and groups to silence Garang the reality is that no evidence has been reported to the outside world that would substantiate any claim of foul play. As I mentioned, I’m suspicious but only because of the unusual timing of the crash, the inherent corruption of the Sudanese government and the numerous individuals and groups who had motivation to assasinate Garang.

Eric Reeve Writes,

The NIF will continue to sustain genocide by attrition in Darfur, even as it welcomes the destabilizing possibilities presented by the death of John Garang. The new leader of the SPLM, Salva Kiir Mayardit, will face severe testing, with all too many possible venues in the south and in Khartoum for such trial. As the authoritative “Africa Confidential” observes in its August 5, 2005 edition:

“The [NIF] regime may not have caused the crash [that killed Garang] but could not have wished for more. It will redouble its efforts to deepen Southern divisions, convinced that Garang’s successors won’t withstand its mixture of military attack, disinformation, and financial inducements.” (“Africa Confidential,” Vol 46, No 16, August 5, 2005).

There were also signs, prior to Garang’s death, that the National Congress Party [the ruling faction of the National Islamic Front] was seeking to undercut implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement through its uses of the militias (the South Sudan Defense Forces), bribery, and through the tactics of divide and rule. [ICG, July 25, 2005]

Biography of the Late Dr. John Garang de-Mabior
June 23, 1945 – July 30, 2005



Date of Birth: June 23, 1945 (One of the 7 (Seven) siblings {5 brothers and 2 sisters} and Dr. Garang was the child # 6.

Place of Birth: Ajakgiet (Wagkulei Village) Jongley.

Parents of Dr. John Garang:
– Father: Mabior Atem Aroy
– Mother: Gag Maluwal Kwal: (From Knogor)

Education:
– 1952 Tonj Primary School.
– 1956 Buseri Intermediate School (Wau).
– 1960 Rumbek Senior Secondary School (Did not complete)
– 1962 Left for Uganda then Tanzania and sat for overseas
examination, after that he was granted a scholarship at Grinnell College in Iowa (USA) where he received a B. A. in economics in 1968. He was well known there for his bookishness. John Garang was offered another scholarship to pursue graduate studies at University of California at Barkley but chose to return to Tanzania and studied “East African Agricultural Economics” in Dar El-Salaam University were he met the current president of Uganda (Yoweri Kaguta Museveni) and became close friends.

– 1968 / 1969 Joined the Anya Nya One rebel movement which was led by General Joseph Lagu Yanga.

– 1972 After the Addis Ababa agreement, John Garang was absorbed in the Sudanese Army as a junior officer (Rank of Captain).

– 1973 John Garang went back to Tanzania and then to USA where he pursued his studies at the Iowa State University and received a master’s degree in Agricultural Economics.

– 1976 John Garang was married to his lovely wife Madam Rebecca Nyandeng in Juba, Sudan, but traditionally the marriage arrangements were done in their village.

– 1978 John Garang and his wife Madam Rebbeca Nyandeng came to the United States and John Garang continued with further studies and received a Ph. D. in economics in 1980 at Iowa State University, Iowa.

– 1980 Dr. John Garang went to Sudan and was a lecturer at the University of Khartoum, Faculty of Agriculture in “Shambat” (Khartoum), by then was also a colonel in the Sudanese Armed Forces.

– 1983 Dr. John Garang was sent by field marshal president Jafaar Mohammed Nimeri to crash a mutiny in Bor (His Home Town) of 500 southern Sudanese government soldiers known as Anya Nya Two, but he decided to join his colleagues (Samuel Gai Tut, William Nyuon and Keribino Kuanyin Bol) and then the name Anya Nya Two was changed to Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) “Political Wing” and Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) “Military Wing” and that was in May 16, 1983 in Bilpaam. Dr. John Garang was welcomed and selected to lead the movement and became it’s chairman of SPLM and commander in chief of SPLA.

– May 16, 1983 to January 8, 2005 Dr. John Garang waged a successful war against the Islamic Government of Sudan for almost 22 Years.

– January 9, 2005 SPLM/A, And National Congress Party permanently signed Comprehensive Peace Agreement ending 21 years of war.

– July 9, 2005 Dr. John Garang was sworn in as the First southerner to hold the position of the first Vice President of the Republic of Sudan and at the same time the President of the government of southern Sudan (Dr. John Garang was appointed to these two positions by president Omer Hassan Ahmed El-Beshir according to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement “CPA”).

– July 30, 2005 Dr. John Garang passed away in a helicopter crash at the mountains ranch of Imatong in a place called Himan south of Lotukei in “Eastern Equaoria”.
Late Dr. Garang is survived with six children (2 Boys and 4 Girls).

Southern Sudan and indeed the whole of Sudan have lost its beloved son, Dr John Garang De Mabior. The First Vice President of the Republic of Sudan and the President of South Sudan was on official visit to Uganda during the period 29th – 30th July 2005 when the helicopter he was traveling in crashed near New Kush on his return last Saturday.

SPLM/A Leadership Biography

The line of succession was already detemined by each individual’s senior in the POLITICO- MILITARY HIGH COMMAND. Below is the list according to their seniority
1. Cdr Dr John Garang,
2. Cdr Kerubino Kuanyin Bol
3. Cdr Wlliam Nyuon Bany
4. Cdr Salva Kiir Mayardit
5. Cdr Arok Thon Arok
6 Cdr Nyacigak Nyaculuk
7. Cdr John Kualng
8. Cdr Dr Reik Machar Teny
9. Cdr Dr Lam Akol Ajawin
10 Cdr Yusif Kwa Mekki
11. Cdr James Wani Igga
12.Cdr Daniel Awet Akot
13. Cdr Kuol Manyang Juk
14. Cdr Martin Manyiel Ayuel
15. Cdr Lual Diing Wol
16. Cdr Gelario M

http://www.gurtong.org/GarangTribute/Biographyof_LateDr.JohnGarangde-Mabior.asp

John Garang de Mabior

Leader and Founder of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army

By , About.com Guide

Colonel John Garang de Mabior was a Sudanese rebel leader, founder of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) which fought a 22 year civil war against the northern dominated, Islamist Sudanese Government. Was made vice president of Sudan on the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, shortly before his death.

Date of birth: 23 June 1945, Wangkulei, Anglo-Egyptian Sudan
Date of death: 30 July 2005, southern Sudan.

John Garang was born into the Dinka ethnic group, educated in Tanzania and graduated from Grinnell College in Iowa in 1969. He returned to The Sudan and joined the Sudanese army, but left the following year for the south and joined the Anya Nya, a rebel group fighting for the rights of the Christian and animist south, in a country which was dominated by the Islamist north. The rebellion, which was sparked by the decision made by the colonial British to join the two parts of Sudan when independence was granted in 1956, became a full blown civil war in the early 1960s.

1972 Addis Ababa Agreement
In 1972 the Sudanese president, Jaafar Muhammad an-Numeiry, and Joseph Lagu, leader of the Anya Nya, signed the Addis Ababa Agreement which gave autonomy to the south. Rebel fighters, including John Garang, were absorbed into the Sudanese army.

Garang was promoted to Colonel and sent to Fort Benning, Georgia, USA, for training. He also received a doctorate in agricultural economics from Iowa State University in 1981. On his return to The Sudan he was made deputy director of military research and an infantry battalion commander.

Second Sudanese Civil War
By the early 1980s the Sudanese government was becoming increasingly Islamist (introduction of Sharia law throughout Sudan, an imposition of black slavery by northern Arabs, and Arabic being made the official language of instruction), and when Garang was sent south to quell a new uprising by the Anya Nya, he instead swapped sides and formed the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and their military wing the SPLA.

2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement
In 2002 Garang began peace talks with Sudanese president Omar al-Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir, which culminated in the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on 9 January 2005. As part of the agreement Garang was made vice president of Sudan. However, only a few months later, on 30 July, a helicopter carrying Garang back from talks with the president of Uganda crashed in the mountains near the border. Although both Al-Bashir’s government and Salva Kiir Mayardit, the new leader of the SPLM, blamed the crash on poor visibility, doubts remain about the crash.

http://africanhistory.about.com/od/biography/a/John-Garang-De-Mabior.htm

Birth of A New Nation

Monday, 11 July 2011 00:00 Editorial Team
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Before the birth of Africa’s 54th newest nation on July 9, 2011, the man who, for over two decades, is credited for unleashing a rebellion for an independent state for Southern Sudan, Dr. John Garang  in one of his interviews with BBC’s Robin White upon being inflicted a massive crushing blow which claimed huge deaths on his SPLA in a battle, and when asked  following such loss of lives, to call  it a day and devise a new method outside the military posture, the late SPLA’s strongman proudly and robustly told Robin White that his  men (rebels) are like fish under the water, no matter how many you kill, they can never finish from under the water.

Finding the expression to become the backbone of the embodiment of the world’s 193rd country on July 9, 2011, and although he was killed in a tragic helicopter crash in 2005 upon signing a ceasefire with his archrival;  and like Paul Coffee (the first free negro who did not realize his dreams as a result of death),  he died  before his plan was realized; yet he remains the shining and indelible imprint at the heart, body, mind and soul of the new country-In short, he stands as the most dominant gene in the DNA structure of the new Southern Sudan nation.

Like any nation on earth that has fought for independence, for the new country, it equally took blood, sweat, tears and deaths to arrive at this point of freedom, independence and self-rule. They too know the bitter and the essence of independence which is all about land; and how did it come about…through bloodshed.

As Malcolm X once said that the essence of independence is land- the landlords vs. the landless, and how did it come about…through bloodshed. The Independence of July 4, 1776 was all about land, and how did it come about, through bloodshed as well as others which stormed Africa and Asia as well as some parts of the world during the terrifying colonial golden era.

Reports simmering from Southern Sudan reflect the presence of over 10,000 people including high profile dignitaries and heads of state who are bracing the freshness of the birth of a new nation with joy and happiness punctuated by mind captivating political and nationalistic speeches with the new  National Anthem thundering all over the place, the struggle of the SLPA and its quest for an independent homeland has become a living dream with the bones of Dr. Garang and other patriots gladly and gallantly turning in their respective graves.

On this auspicious occasion, we hesitate not to caution the revolutionary people of Southern Sudan that the price of independence, freedom and self-rule was not achieved on a silver platter nor was it obtained by sudden flight, and as such, should remain mindful and keep on the red alert to ensure that that vices that ruin the cardinal fabrics of a promising nation do not infest their wisdom, knowledge and sense of belonging to reduce their hard earned and newest sensation to the level of becoming a failed state due to greed, selfishness and autocratic tendencies.

We make it no secret about the daunting problem and task ahead in building the capacity of a trained, professional and vibrant civil servants and in order to make progress in that direction; all those at the helm of authority must embrace and welcome with open arms and hearts those brothers and sisters in the Diaspora who are well schooled in the various crafts and trade in nation building including those who mean well for the genuine growth and development for the new nation.

Treacherous tactics, chicanery and maneuvers designed to frustrate their efforts must be immediately thwarted in the supreme interest and spirit of greater, better and prosperous Southern Sudan that will proudly serve as a beacon of hope and dignity on the continent. A route to that end is the total discouragement and if possible the abolition of a one party state, entertainment of a class system or elitism to dominate and influence the politico-socio-economic and cultural spheres of the society.

Let not the honeymoon of independence continues perpetually; the line must be drawn so that Christmas will only be Christmas and business is business and avoid combining both time after time.  We reiterate our caution, be open-minded and receptive to the accommodation of those in the Diaspora including the experienced professionals and technocrats in order to build the solid foundation of the new nation.

Strive, and make it a must, to end and discourage unsavory practices in both government and business. At this juncture we pause to allow carrying on your celebration of the beauty of independence coupled with its attending kudos. We say bravo and hats off to you all dear brothers and sisters, as we hail the birth of a new nation.

H.E. GEN SALVA KIIR MAYARDIT, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC ADDRESS TO THE FIRST JOINT SITTING OF THE NATIONAL LEGISLATURE AND TO THE NATION
 
JUBA 8TH AUGUST, 2011
 
 
Your Excellency, Dr. Riek Machar Teny, Vice President of the Republic,
 
Rt. Hon. James Wani Igga, Speaker of the Joint National Legislature and the National Assembly of the Republic,
 
Rt. Hon. Joseph Bol Chan, Deputy Speaker of the Joint Sitting and Speaker of the Council of States of the Republic,
 
Honourable Deputy Speakers of both Houses,
The Honourable Chief Justice of the Republic,
Excellencies, Members of the Executive Caretaker Cabinet,
Honourable Members of this Joint august House,
Religious Leaders,
 
Representatives from all branches of government and states of the Republic,
 
Distinguished Members of the Diplomatic Community,
 
Ladies and Gentlemen,
This day is yet another momentous occasion for our nation.  The convening of this First Joint Sitting of our two houses: the Council of States and the National Assembly is a historical episode in our life time.  These two houses constitute the National Legislature, which is the supreme authority in the land.  The interests of the people are fully represented in this noble institution.  Thus, allow me the opportunity to congratulate you and welcome you to the first sitting of this august house.
Before I proceed ahead to share with you what I consider to be the pertinent issues of this epoch, please let us rise up and pay tribute to all those who perished in order for this nation to be born. Foremost amongst these heroes and heroines is our great leader and hero, Dr. John Garang De Mabior, whose fond memories are still vivid in our minds (Minutes of silence).
Thank you very much!
 
 
Rt. Honourable Speaker,
Honourable members of this august House,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
On July 9th, 2011, we ended a long period of misfortunes by the formal declaration of our independence.  We have been occupied, colonized, marginalized and denied our dignity and humanity.  This sitting clearly demonstrates the result of our long struggle and the beginning of a new journey for peace, democracy and prosperity. The independence we celebrated a few weeks ago is a great achievement for our people.  I am grateful to have witnessed the birth of our nation and to you all comrades, congratulations for being pioneer citizens of this new nation!  We are indeed a lucky lot because history has favoured us to be alive to witness this great moment of emancipation.  Let us recreate ourselves, let us find new ways, new thinking and be ready to learn in order to adequately meet new challenges.  We should not take anything for granted. Instead every challenge should be considered an opening for greater opportunities and triumphs.  I urge all of you to seize the opportunities and accept the challenges of the future.
The freedom we have just achieved endows us with power and mandate.  In return we must manage what is given to us with utmost care and responsibility.  Moreover, as a sovereign body representing the sovereign will of the people of the Republic of South Sudan (RSS), it is incumbent upon this august House to manage the affairs of this land in order to deliver on what we promised to our people.  While debating matters of national interest, it is important that we put the well being of our people and nation first.  Our people have waited patiently for so long.  It is time we act and we do so without delay.  Therefore, the two houses must complement each other rather than compete against one another.  This is expected of you in the conduct of business and this is critical for nation-building.
As a people who have navigated from far it may not be easy to forget the pains of the past.  Our hearts are still heavy with the anguish of history.  That notwithstanding we must be brave and wise enough to resist revisiting the past and we must embrace the future.  We will not forget the past but the sacrifices of our martyrs will keep us consoled to be worthy of freedom and concentrate all our energies on nation-building.  If we deviated away from the core objectives of our liberation struggle, the sacrifices made by many will be for nothing.  We were able to achieve our objectives because of the sacrifices of our martyrs and the long suffering of our people.  The rewards of our heroes and heroines lie in our future and in the realization of our vision.  And it is also in this future and in the realization of this vision that we can fulfill the pledges we have made to our people.
Rt. Honourable Speaker,
Honourable members of this august House,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Our dreams and hopes can only be met through hard work so that they can become a reality.  A democratic and stable South Sudanwill contribute to regional and international peace and prosperity. Remember, our independence also has its burdens and we must be ready to face them headlong.  As I have pointed out in my past appeals, the worst experiences of the past and those of other nations must be considered in order for us as a new nation not to repeat them.  We should not defend ourselves by using the failures of others as a threshold.  Let us build our country by striving towards what others have achieved successfully.
As we move forward, the most serious challenge and responsibility we face is what we can deliver for future generations?  What would be the best way to honour our heroes and heroines?  I said it during Martyrs Day and I will repeat it here that there is nothing material to offer worth the sacrifices of our martyrs.  What is worth the ultimate sacrifice they made is for us to build this nation.  Nation-building requires cohesion, hard work, honesty and altruism.  While I will continue to urge you to work harder, I am already at work.  My next government will do the best it can to enhance the welfare of its citizens.  Building a nation is not an easy enterprise.  It takes time and in most cases those who build hardly reap the fruits of their own labour.  Thus, let us keep in mind that we are here to serve our people and not to enrich ourselves.  It is our duty to ensure that future generations must not experience the sufferings we have endured.  In other words, let us end the promises and deliver the basic services to our people. Misfortunes of the past should end with us and let us set a brighter future for our people.
 
Rt. Honurable Speaker,
Honourable members of this august House,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Together with the honourable members of this august Assembly, we must now focus on delivery of basic services to meet the great expectations of our people.  This is only possible if we have a government whose first, second and final priorities are public interest, public interest, public interest!  Let me make it clear once again that those individuals who are not willing and ready to make the sacrifices necessary to help our people will not be part of this government.  Most important, the people of South Sudan will not sit ideally and allow corruption and abuses of public resources to continue unabated.  You will agree with me that the people ofSouth Sudan have not only suffered for far too long but they have also waited for basic services for too long.  They cannot wait much longer.  It is time for delivery and it is also time to put the public interest as the number one priority.
I take this opportunity to announce to this august Assembly that I will appoint the new Government of the Republic of South Sudan this week and according to constitutional requirement I am sending the list of the new cabinet to you for approval.  The Ministers that are selected will have to work very hard and be disciplined.  The new Government will work towards the ambitious goals set in our National Development Plan, and I will set them to task.
Firstly, for South Sudan as a new nation to develop, we need education.  No country has ever achieved development without educating its population.  It remains a major challenge that only a minority of our children in South Sudan have access to education.When it comes to girl’s education, it is even worse.  All children in our independent country must have the opportunity to go to school.  To do this there is a need to scale up education enrolment quickly all over the country.  Together with our development partners we can achieve this.  We will also encourage our communities to help build schools.  To demonstrate our seriousness, within the first 100 days of the new government 30 new primary schools and four new secondary schools will be under construction.  Together with our development partners, we will also launch a Teachers Training Development Programaiming at training 7000 teachers in the next three to five years.  We are also going to build higher education institutions in the coming years.  We cannot afford to lose our next generation leaders because of the absence of higher education institutions.
Secondly, the lack of good health care system in South Sudan has made our nation the most difficult place to live, especially for children and senior citizens.  Many people still die because of preventable diseases.  Let us be honest, you and I, and indeed our family members can afford to go out of the country to get treatment.  But this is not the case for the millions of our people. And it is not because of war, rather because of the absence of health services.  It is time to change that by providing basic health services for all our people in the villages, Bomas, Payams and Counties.  Through community health programmes we can distribute anti-malarial bed nets to more people and save the lives of our children and their mothers.  And we will start now.
Similarly, within the first 100 days of the government and together with development partners, we will make sure that 600,000 children are vaccinated against deadly diseases, including measles,particularly in the four states of Unity, Northern Bahr El Ghazal, Warrap and Upper Nile.  And the good news is that 30 community midwives will finalize their training and be ready to be deployed to the rural areas.  I also intend, with the support of this august House, to construct 100 small health care centers within the first year of this Administration.
Thirdly, South Sudan cannot develop without infrastructure.  Our country is vast, and our communications are limited.  Only through the use of roads and rivers can communities connect, agricultural production takes off, businesses flourish, the economy grows, and services are delivered. Infrastructure is at the heart of our development plan.  Together with our development partners, we will invest in roads and bridges, and in river transport.  But also here, we need our people to give a hand.  They can help rehabilitate and construct feeder-roads.  With the focus of this august Assembly, together, we can make it happen.
Within the first 100 days of the new government two roads and two airstrips will be opened in Unity and Warrap states.  The repairs of Juba Bridge and the construction of a new bridge on theNile donated by the Government of Japan will get underway.  The rehabilitation of four roads will be in process, three in EasternEquatoria State, Warrap and the Pagak-Mathiang road in Upper Nile.
Fourthly, no country can develop without abiding with basic principles of justice and rule of law.  South Sudanese have been at the receiving end of aggression, injustices, arbitrary detention and absence of law and order during decades of war.  Now similar incidences have occurred among our own police and security institutions.  As I said on Martyrs’ Day, this has to end. Criminality should cease or else those who perpetrate suffering to others will be subjected to the strong arm of the law.  It is time to put our own house in order.  We need to strengthen law and order, both within our own institutions and among citizens.
Within the first 100 days of our new government, 50 new police stations located throughout the country, will be opened. Two prisons will also be completed.  Again together with our development partners the Government will do more.
Fifthly, no country can ensure peace and security and protect its citizens without a modern and professional Army.  As a new and independent country, we will complete the transformation of the SPLA into a national army.  For this to happen successfully, the Government must put in place programs that would provide new opportunities for former SPLA soldiers.
 Within the first 100 days, we will launch our new programme for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR). We will provide tailored programmes to give them a new start.
These are just but few caveats for the beginning.  We have got more daunting tasks in front of us – development, development and development!  And development does not only come with the donors or with oil money.  As I said earlier it requires hard work and discipline.  For example, the Republic of South Sudan should never depend on imports of food or handouts.  We are endowed with fertile land.  I said it and I will repeat it now; we must till the land to produce food.  This is a moral responsibility for citizens – work, work, work and work!  I want to reiterate again, a prosperous nation is not made up of indolent citizens, because laziness is useless.   As pioneer members of this joint august Parliament, I call upon you all to help mobilize our communities to service in order to help develop our nation.  We can only achieve our ambitious development goals if all of us dedicate ourselves to develop our country and pull together with unity of purpose.
On Independence Day I made it clear that from now onward we do not have any excuses or scapegoats.  It is our responsibility to protect our land, our resources and ourselves and to develop our country.  Moreover, the goat is dead therefore there is no one to blame!
 
Rt. Honourable Speaker,
Honourable members of this joint august sitting,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
For South Sudan to succeed, we need to abide with the principles of transparency and accountability.  Only then can we build a strong foundation for our new nation.  Another word for corruption is stealing and it is called ‘stealing’ because money which should have gone to build our country is stolen by selfish persons.  Those who engage in corruption are undermining our country and the sovereignty of the Republic of South Sudan.  To borrow from our liberation laws, join me in defining corrupt persons as the enemies of the people.  We must therefore fight corruption with dedication, rigour and commitment. And that is why, on Independence Day, I pledged to the people, the nation and the heads of state and government present that I would do all that I could to remove this cancer.
Most important, let me put a human face on what corruption does to our people and country.  With the amount of funds stolen over the past six years and half; we could have saved thousands of our citizens from unnecessary deaths and suffering, building more than a dozen of schools and hospitals, and feed many of our citizens.
At this juncture, allow me to take permission from this august Assembly to outline key priority expectations of your business in the first 100 days.  This requires us to change the way we have been doing things and become more disciplined.  For example, timekeeping has been one of the worst vices of the old Sudan.  This honourable legislative body has loads of work to deliver to this nation, critical amongst which is legislation itself.  We must pass crucial laws to cement our sovereignty and independence.   There is need to work even extra harder in order to expedite the process of legislation and achieve the following:
 
One, in the first 100 days I will make sure that the new Government of the Republic of South Sudan passes 5 essential laws to establish full transparency and accountability in the management of our financial resources, natural resources and oil. Thus, we will send to Parliament a Public Financial Management and Accountability Act, a Procurement Act, an Internal Audit Act, a Petroleum Act for regulating the management of oil resources, and an Oil Revenue Management Law for sustainable and transparent management of the oil income.
Several of these laws are already prepared, and all of them will hold international standards.  This is an essential part of putting our new Republic on a solid foundation cemented by the blood of our martyrs.  I call upon you, the National Legislature of the newRepublic of South Sudan, to process and pass these laws without delay.  We need them to take effect as soon as possible.
Two, implementation of these Acts is essential.  Within the first 100 days, the Republic of South Sudan will develop an implementation plan to put these policies into practice.  This includes rules of procedures for our public service and large-scale training of staff. Here, we will have to ask for external assistance and support.  We need to be ready to implement expeditiously as soon as Parliament passes these laws.
In the first 100 days, the Audit Chamber and the Anti Corruption Commission will also be strengthened.  We will have audits underway in three of the most significant spending government ministries and agencies.  We will take action on their findings and as I have pointed out before there will be no loopholes for people who are addicted to mishandling public resources.  There will be no sacred cows this time round.  Moreover the Anti-Corruption Commission has already been granted the right to independent investigations but the institution itself also requires restructuring. I will urge the Commission to make use of this right within the first 100 days.  The Commission and its members will have my full support as President of the Republic.
Three, implementation always starts at home with us as political leaders.  In all South Sudanese communities stealing is seen as deeply shameful!  We all know what happens in our cultures and communities, particularly, if one is caught stealing?  The community will start composing songs against you, and the whole family will be disgraced. Your children will have difficulties getting married respectably, and you cannot even become a chief or be in any position of authority.
I always wonder what has happened to these core values of our communities.  It seems that people have forgotten them.  This has to change and with determination it will change.  We must set new standards to be eligible for public office.  When the government is appointed I will make these standards clear to the public, and I will expect every Minister and civil servant to abide by these standards. The Republic of South Sudan will expect nothing less from those who serve our newly independent country.
With these actions, I hope we will have taken the first critical steps to put our new country on a solid footing.  Remember no government performs well without checks and balances.  The primary role of Parliament is, therefore, essential in this process. I request you, our Parliamentarians and our international partners, to assist us and to hold us responsible in the implementation process of these pledges. I will report back to you on all these deliverables when our first 100 days have passed.  I promise you that this time, we will deliver.
Rt. Honourable Speaker,
Honourable Members of this Joint Assembly,
Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen,
I shall be remiss if I do not say something about the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), particularly about the issues that are still outstanding.  I would like to reassure all that Abyei is not a forgotten cause because we will remain actively seized of the matter until a final resolution is found.  We are all aware that the United Nations Security Council has authorized the deployment of the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) in order to ensure resettlement of the people of Abyei back in their homes.  I trust that a final solution will be found that will reflect the true will of the people of Abyei.  I am equally committed to ensuring peace and security along our common borders and the spirit of good neighbourliness is one of the guiding principles of our foreign policy.  The massive attendance of the world during our independence celebrations is testimony that we are a friendly people.  We will continue to engage with all our neighbours, particularly with the leadership in the Republic of the Sudan to build strong relations because we share a long border.
Finally, I would like to repeat what I said during the declaration of independence.  Let us continue to celebrate our hard won freedom but we must always be sober to wake up the following day and work.  I reiterate my appeal to this august House that this new nation is yours and let us commit ourselves to build it with optimism.  Hard work is a virtue and in just a matter of time, we will prosper.  There is nothing impossible and as it is said: ‘If there is a will there is a way’.  The role of government is to provide a conducive atmosphere while citizens must join hands and work. We will issue comprehensive priorities for the next five to ten years as soon as the new cabinet is constituted.
Let me say this again we cannot prosper as a nation without the unity and harmony of our people.  We must accept our diversity and use our difficult past experiences to grow.  We must work harder and harder so that in five years change must be apparent. Government will ensure that there is no hindrance or obstacle and people should go about doing their businesses in safety and without any kind of fear.
 
As for you the honourable members of this joint august House, legislation is your first order of business and I wish you all well in this national duty.  I am always available and my office is there to attend to urgent national needs and emergencies.
Let us start to work right away.
 
Thank you all and may God bless South Sudan!

Address to the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and Other Armed Groups (OAGs) Dialogue Conference

By: Dr. John Garang De Mabior, Chairman and C-in-C SPLM/A

28th – 30th, June 2005, Nairobi, Kenya

I. Opening Remarks:

Fellow compatriots, before we proceed with our deliberations, let us
remember to pay tribute and salute the memory and honour of all our
martyrs, who have fallen in the struggle for Sudanese dignity before independence, during the Anyanya Movement and in the war that has just ended, for it is because of their ultimate sacrifices that it was possible to reach the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that we signed on January 9th and which has made it possible for us to have this continued dialogue among ourselves today. We pay this tribute to the memory of those who have fallen because it is important to remember that they did not lose their lives in vain. The legacy and spirit of their struggle and sacrifices should always guide us and all generations to come toward creating and building a better and ever
better southern Sudan and Sudan as a whole, whatever the results of the referendum on self-determination will be at the end of the six year Interim Period.

Fellow participants, this meeting is a continuation of the previous
South-South dialogue conference held in Mbagathi in April this year between the SPLM and other political groups in Southern Sudan, and in which 24 different signatories appended their signatures to a solemn “Covenant of the People of Southern Sudan”. The issues addressed during that dialogue included: unity of the people of Southern Sudan, implementation of the CPA, reconciliation and forgiveness, good governance in Southern Sudan, democracy, institutional change and the reconstruction of post conflict Southern Sudan among others. This meeting is a result of a special recommendation made by the conference in Mbagathi that the SPLA and OAGs must also dialogue. That is also why I have left all other engagements to come and address the meeting in person. I have been away for 24 days
visiting Egypt twice, the USA, Netherlands, UK and Eritrea from where I arrived here yesterday to attend this Dialogue conference. In Cairo I
invested some two weeks of my time in North-North dialogue to ensure that the NDA become part of the peace process, and as a result of these efforts, the NDA have participated in the NCRC and will participate in the coming GONU after July 9th. This OAG dialogue conference is part of South-South dialogue and very important for Southern Sudan and I am glad I was able to come to be with you today. I am aware that there are elements within the present NCP government that did not want the OAGs to come to this dialogue
conference as also happened in April for the South-South dialogue
conference, but I am happy that you were finally able to come, and I thank and congratulate you for this.

II. The aims and objectives of the Dialogue:

Fellow compatriots, the CPA has opened a new phase in our struggle for justice, equality, freedom and democracy. The CPA has indeed addressed the fundamental problems of the Sudan and particularly the historical grievances of Southern Sudan and other marginalized areas by providing an equitable and fair framework for power sharing, wealth sharing and security arrangements.
In fact it has led to the restructuring and devolution of power in the Sudan where we now have two systems in one country. In Southern Sudan, we will now have greater say in the running of our own affairs without any undue interference. This demands that we dialogue among ourselves to resolve our differences so that we redirect our energies as a united people towards a peaceful, prosperous and tolerant society. Therefore, our objective in this dialogue is to heal the wounds of the past, remove mistrust, build confidence and restore fraternity and mutual respect among us. This is of utmost importance if the legitimate aspirations of our people are to materialize. Our participation here and my personal participation and waiting for five days should remove any doubts about our commitment to this dialogue, and our faith in the enormous benefits that will accrue to our communities as a consequence of our collective will and resolve to make a difference as we go away from here united and cohesive. I want to underline here that this is not a negotiation; it is a dialogue among brothers to heal wounds and to put our house in order. Before I came here, I spent two weeks in Cairo helping to heal wounds among Northerners, and so my coming and waiting is in the spirit of my commitment to unite all Sudanese, and Southern Sudanese in particular. The ultimate objective of this dialogue is for us to clear misunderstandings and engage in the process of building consensus for peace, to rally around the CPA, and reconciliation among the people of Southern Sudan. The new situation in the Sudan requires that Southern Sudanese rediscover their common destiny and reconnect with it. At this juncture, allow me to outline my presentation by discussing the following issues.

III. Vision and Objectives of the Movement:

The vision of the SPLM/SPLA has always been to achieve justice, equality, reedom and democracy for all Sudanese within the context of a new Sudanese political dispensation, which we have called the New Sudan, a new Sudan inwhich all are free and equal citizens irrespective of whether they are of Arab or African background, whether they are Muslim or Christian, men or women. When we first expounded this vision in 1983 it appeared strange to both Southerners and Northerners alike. Some Southerners got stuck with solving what is called “the problem of Southern Sudan” – “Mashkalat al-Junub” and the traditional rulers of Khartoum encouraged them.
[Demonstrate the futility of this approach, some one standing on me, who is the problem?]. Indeed ruling Northerners prefer to deal with those who say they want to solve “Mashkalat al-Junub” and are frightened by those who say they want to solve “the problem of Sudan”, and why do you think this is the case? Because the traditional rulers of Khartoum know that those who talk about “Mashkalat al-Junub” and an independent Southern Sudan, do not have a methodology for achieving that objective. On the other hand the rulers of Khartoum are frightened by those who talk about solving “the problem of Sudan”, such as the vision of the New Sudan, because we question the very basis and legitimacy of the Old Sudanese state and we aim at its complete restructuring. The vision of New Sudan is correct and has a methodology for change and is popular as it addresses all the problems of Sudan. Today, in 2005, after 22 years of struggle and consistency, the vision of New Sudan has engulfed the whole Sudan, from South to the far North, from East to West and in Khartoum, the national Capital as well as in Central Sudan. The vision of New Sudan holds the keys to the future of the country. The CPA articulates the vision of New Sudan in a “two systems one country” Model during the six years of the Interim Period during which we shall put in place the basic foundation and parameters of the New Sudan.
The second key objective of the Movement is Self-determination for
Southern Sudan, Abyei and other marginalized areas, where it has taken the form of the right of popular consultation for the Nuba and Fung peoples.
The CPA provides that the referendum on the right of self-determination will be conducted at the end of the sixth year of the Interim Period, that is, between 9th July 2010 and 9th January 2011, in which Southerners will choose between: (a) continuation of unity, or (b) an independent Southern Sudan. Also the right of popular consultation for the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile will be by the fourth year of the Interim Period, where the peoples of these Two Areas will give their views and verdict through their state parliaments concerning the Agreement for the Two Areas as contained in the CPA. Finally, the Ngok Dinka of Abyei will hold a separate referendum on the same day with Southerners to choose between: (a) continuing to remain administratively in the North, or (b) returning to Southern Sudan.

In addition to these two primary objectives, New Sudan and the right of self-determination, the vision and program of the SPLM in the coming period will emphasize the following: –

Restructuring the power apparatus of the Sudan and creating a new
political dispensation.
Promotion of reconciliation, peace and harmony among all our people in
the South. North, West, East and Centre.
Transformation of the SPLM into a full-fledged political Movement in
peace time and in the environment of competitive politics, so that the SPLM truly becomes a robust political organization around which our people can rally to defend the gains of the struggle, to complete the march to New Sudan and to ensure the true and free exercise of the right of self-determination.
Transformation of the SPLA into a conventional modern standing army that will defend the gains of Southern Sudanese, the marginalized and all the Sudanese people.
Reconstruction of the country, particularly Southern Sudan and other
war-affected areas, using our resources, and emphasizing private sector
development, rural development, provision of social services and
restoration of hope and dignity to all our people after decades of war and immense suffering.
Promotion of civil society activities, development of Southern Sudanese entrepreneurs and the free movement of people, goods and services.
Establishment of an inclusive system of governance where all our peoples and communities are fairly represented.
Fighting corruption, tribalism, nepotism, discrimination of all kinds in
the context of the new political dispensation both in the GONU and GOSS and at the State and local government levels as well as in the society in general, and thereby provide a new model of governance and development for Africa and the world.
Promotion of human rights and the rule of law.
Promotion and development of our indigenous languages and cultures and the protection of the environment and our natural and historical heritage.
Promotion of gender equity, emphasizing pro-women policies and rapid
empowerment of women in all fields.
Promotion and development of the Youth and their potential; and in
general rapid development of our human resources, including achieving universal primary education in the shortest time possible.

IV. The History of Conflict and Dialogue within the SPLM/A:
Fellow Compatriots, since its inception in 1983, the Movement has alwaysreached out to others in a spirit of dialogue, reconciliation and unity. I say this by way of assuring all Southerners that we are fully committed to dialogue, peace and reconciliation with all groups and individuals no matter what differences there were between us. Furthermore, we believe that most of these differences are not real but are either a result of different perceptions or conceptualization of our situation, or are simply created to advance some political agenda or even commercial agenda. In any case we are ever ready to dialogue, to forgive, to reconcile, to do justice to all and to forge greater unity and cohesiveness, and this is made even more urgent now as we enter the 6 year interim period next month, 9th July.

In the first place dialogue is what we have been doing ever sine the SPLM was established in 1983, that is, we have been engaged in a continuous process of dialogue, negotiations and inclusiveness. It is to be recalled that the SPLM/SPLA was constituted from different Southern Sudanese groups from students, young government officials and workers, farmers, various political groups such as NAM, CUSS, SANU, Southern Front, etc., and from political-military groups that had taken up arms before us, such as Anyanya-2 (our first units of Battalions 105, 104, Tiger and Tumsah were mostly composed of Anyanya-2 elements), and other groups like Southern Sudan Liberation Front of those of Pagan Amum, which were already fighting in the Boma area.

The second wave of dialogue, reconciliation, forgiveness and unity came in 1988 with elements of Anyanya-2 and that is how Gordon Kong Chol became a member of SPLA High Command at the time. In Jokmiir when I first met Cdr. Gordon Kong Chol to seal our reconciliation and unity agreement with Anyanya-2, I presented him with an ivory stick as a symbol of peace and my “white” heart or good intentions. Gordon Kong who should be present here will attest to this. Later as a member of the SPLM/A Political Military High Command, I gave Gordon Kong Chol the Code name of “Ivory” to mark this solemn occasion. [Share the joke of the rope and story of the snake in Jokmiir]. Even with General Paulino Matip, my information is that Paulino Matip and the Spiritual Leader, Wurnyang of Gezira Fangak, were coming to join the Movement in 1991, but unfortunately this coincided with the Nasir events of 1991. I stand to be corrected if my information about them is wrong, and in any case nothing is too late as we are discussing a similar scenario today. [General Paulino Matip and General Gordon Kong Chol, my greetings to you and best of regards, I welcome you to this dialogue conference]

The third dialogue was in 1994 when the SPLM held its First National Convention, called to review the situation and resolve the allegations and grievances of the Nasir Faction and the changing national international situation marked by the end of the cold war and the Nasir split. There also followed various grass roots people-to-people peace conferences, such as Wunlit, Liliir, etc. which were held in SPLM/A areas by the Church and other civil society groups and encouraged by the SPLM/A. There were also individual and collective contacts between Southerners as well as international efforts and initiatives. These efforts reinforced the policy of the SPLM/SPLA to promote forgiveness, peace, reconciliation and unity of our people.

The fourth wave of dialogue, forgiveness and reconciliation following the 1991 split in the Movement came in 1995, when we received back the Late William Nyuon and his group, including Cdr. John Luk Jok, under the Lafon Declaration; then the Kerubino Group (1998); the Philip Bepan Group (1998) the Peter Gadet Group (1998); the SSDF (Fangak) Group (2001) under Cdr. Taban Deng Gai, Cdr. Thomas Duoth and Cdr. James Kok and the late Cdr. Michael Top; the SSDF of Cdr/Dr. Riek Machar (2002); the SPLM/A-United of Cdr/Dr. Lam Akol (2003); and EDF of Cdr/Dr. Theophelous Ochang and Cdr. Martin Kenyi (2004), and arrangement are currently under way to integrate the SSLM of Brother Gabriel Yual (2005). We are also talking with other armed groups and some of them are in this conference.

Fellow Compatriots, I want to affirm and assure you that all these groups that have merged with the SPLM have the same and equal rights as members of the SPLM/A that they found in the Movement. You can verify for yourselves by examining the assignments held by people like Taban Deng Gai, Thomas Duoth Guet, James Kok Ruea, Simon Kun Puoc, Thomas Duoth Gatkek, Martin Kenyi, Peter Bol Kong, just to name a few. They participate in military command and political affairs of the Movement equally; and they participate in negotiations and in foreign delegations equally.

It is fortunate and I am happy that the leaders of the Other Armed Groups (OAG) have finally been allowed by the GOS to come to this dialogue conference as it is critical to them and to Southern Sudan. I cleared their coming to this dialogue conference with Austaz Ali Osman Taha when we met in Cairo last week and I commend him for giving them the permission to come.
We also agreed in that meeting that representatives of SAF Military Intelligence could be present in this OAG Dialogue Conference, since they are the ones that maintain and finance the OAGs, and I hope they are here.
The Military Intelligence will of course not be allowed in the coming period after 9th July to continue to finance the OAGs, for that would be against the constitution and therefore illegal, and that could lead to the arrest of any military intelligence officer who after 9th July would take it upon himself to finance counter-insurgency activities in the South or any other part of the country. I will come to the relation of Military intelligence with OAGs later, as I am here talking to my brothers in the OAGs about peace, reconciliation and unity, and stressing the track record of SPLM/A since 1983 in promoting peace and reconciliation.

I am bringing up this aspect of the history of the SPLM/SPLA by way of assurance that we have always been sincere in these various dialogues, forgiveness and reconciliation. We have a good track record of dialogue in good faith, and I want to assure you that this OAG dialogue is the same. We are very sincere about this dialogue I assure you. The CPA says that the OAG will choose either to be incorporated into the SAF or into the SPLA/GOSS, and I want to assure the OAG here that those who will choose to be integrated into the SPLM/A will be treated equally like all others that have merged with the SPLA/GOSS in the past. There is no reason why any of the OAG should choose to join the SAF other than may be because of lack of information. I want to take the opportunity of this podium to assure the OAG that your rightful place belongs in the South and in the SPLM/A and that you will have equal rights and opportunities with your Brothers and sisters who are in the SPLA/GOSS as has happened before with all other groups.

Compatriots, Participants to this Dialogue Conference, I want to elaborate further on what the CPA says about the status of the SPLA and SAF, the status of the OAGs, the role of Military Intelligence in the coming period after 9th July, and after that present reasons as to why the OAGs should integrate into the SPLM/A and the structures of the GOSS rather than into SAF and structures of Northern Sudan, and I request the indulgence of your ears.

V. The Status of the SPLA and SAF in the CPA:

Ref: Security Arrangements Agreement of 25th Sept 2003

SAF & SPLA shall constitute the National Armed Forces.

1. Status of The Two Armed forces

b. As part of a peace agreement and in order to end the war, the Parties agree that the two forces, the SAF and the SPLA shall remain separate during the Interim Period, and further agree that both forces shall be considered and treated equally as Sudan’s National Armed Forces during the Interim Period.

d. The national Armed Forces shall have no internal law and order mandate except in constitutionally specified emergencies.

SAF will be deployed in Northern Sudan and SPLA will be deployed in Southern Sudan.

3. Redeployment

(b) Except for those deployed in the Joint/Integrated Units (JIUs), the rest of the forces of SAF currently in the south shall be redeployed North of the South/North border of 1/1/1956 under international monitoring and assistance within and up to two and half years (21/2) from the beginning of the Pre-Interim Period.

(c) Except for those deployed in the Joint/Integrated Units, the rest of  SPLA forces currently deployed in Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile shall be redeployed South of the South/North border of 1/1/1956 as soon as the Joint/Integrated Units are formed and deployed under international monitoring and assistance.

(d) The SPLM/SPLA undertakes that the demobilized Southern Sudanese from those currently serving in SAF in Southern Sudan shall be absorbed into various institutions of the Government of Southern Sudan along with demobilized SPLA soldiers.

JIUs will be formed of equal numbers from SAF & SPLA.

4. Joint/Integrated Units (JIUs)

There shall be formed Joint/Integrated Units consisting of equal numbers from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) during the Interim Period. The Joint/Integrated Units shall institute a nucleus of a post referendum army of Sudan should the result of the referendum confirm unity, otherwise they would be dissolved and the component parts integrated into their respective forces.

[This means that in order to be in the JIUs you must either be a member of SAF or SPLA. I am aware that some elements in Military Intelligence told some of you that they are giving you 6,000 from their JIUs and then told you to go to your Brothers in the SPLA to ask them for a part of SPLA
component.
This is deliberate misleading as the CPA is clear on this issue. For those OAGs that choose to be integrated into SAF, it their right to be included in the SAF component of JIUs as members of SAF, and it is SAF that will decide how many to include their component of the JIU; and similarly for those OAGs that choose integration into the SPLA, it is SPLA to decide how many to include in the SPLA component of the JIUs, and on this we have already laid a policy that they will get equal chances like others who are already in the SPLA. It is also important to note that they will not only be included in the SPLA component of the JIUs, there is also the Mother SPLA in which the OAGs will be integrated, and there are also DDR programs in the Southern Sudan DDR].

SAF and SPLA will form the JDB of equal numbers each.

5. Command and Control of the Two Forces (SAF and SPLA)

5.1. The Parties agree to establish a Joint Defense Board (JDB) under the Presidency, and shall be comprised of the Chiefs of Staff of the two forces, their deputies and any number of the senior officers to be agreed to by the Parties. It shall take its decisions by consensus and it shall be chaired alternately by the respective Chiefs of Staff.

JDB will command JIUs and coordinate SAF & SPLA.

5.2. Functions of the JDB

The JDB shall perform the following functions:-
(a) Co-ordination between the two forces.
(b) Command of the Joint/Integrated Units.
[It is important to note here that the JDB is not another army to which to belong, it is a command and control organ of the JIUs and a coordination mechanism for the two armed forces (SAF and SPLA), and its composition is already determined in the CPA as consisting of the Chiefs of Staff of SAF and SPLA and their Deputies and four senior and competent officers from each side. And so in order to be in the JDB you must be in these categories specified in the CPA. I bring this up because again some elements people have told you to ask for membership in the JIU. There is of course no problem, for you can be a member of the JDB if either SAF or SPLA appoints you as their Chief of Staff or one of the three Deputy Chiefs of Staff, or among the four senior and competent officers.

SAF and SPLA will be part of the National Security organ.

Ref: Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements
Implementation Modalities: Part I: The Ceasefire Arrangements.

16.4. As per Article (1) (b) and (4) (b) (III) of the Agreement on Security Arrangements, the Armed Forces (SAF, SPLA and JIUs) shall undertake the responsibility of the defense of the country against threats in their areas of deployment pending appropriate decision from the JDB.

SAF and SPLA will participate in DDR programs.

Ref: Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements
Implementation Modalities: Part III: DDR.

24.7. That the DDR is mostly a civilian process although the military input is vital. While disarmament and demobilization are mainly military, the civilian efforts in reintegration are paramount, particularly with reference to decisions of methodology and organization. The military will have input but the decisions and implementation of such programmes are the responsibility of the relevant institutions created for this purpose.

25.1.2. The Northern Sudan DDR Commission (NDDRC) and the Southern Sudan DDR Commission (SDDRC) shall be mandated to design, implement and manage the DDR process at the northern and southern sub-national levels respectively.

25.1.3. The State DDR commissions shall be entrusted with the responsibility of implementation of the programmes at the state and local levels.

VI. The Status of OAGs in the CPA

Integrating into SAF/GONU
Integrating into SPLA/GOSS

Ref: Chapter VI: Security Arrangements: 25 September 2003

7. Status of Other Armed Groups (OAGs) in the Country

(a) No armed group allied to either party shall be allowed to operate
outside the two forces.

(b) The Parties agree that those mentioned in 7(a) who have the desire and qualify shall be incorporated into the organized forces of either Party (Army, Police, Prisons and Wildlife forces), while the rest shall be reintegrated into the civil service and civil society institutions.

(c) The Parties agree to address the status of Other Armed Groups in the country with the view of achieving comprehensive peace and stability in the country and to realize full inclusiveness in the transition process.

Ref: Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements
Implementation Modalities: Part I: The Ceasefire Arrangements.

11. Other Armed Groups:

11.1. In accordance with Article 7 (a) of the Agreement on Security
Arrangements, the Parties agree to expedite the process of incorporation and reintegration of armed groups allied to either Party, into their armed forces, other organized forces, the civil service and civil societal institutions.
11.2. The Parties agree to each setting up “Incorporation and Reintegration Ad hoc Committee” to implement the provision of sub-section 11.1 above.

11.3. In accordance with the Framework Agreement on Security Arrangements during the Interim Period, no armed group allied to either party shall be allowed to operate outside the two forces. Other Armed Groups (OAGs) who have a desire and qualify shall be incorporated into the organized forces of either party (Army, Police, Prisons, and Wildlife Forces), while the rest shall be reintegrated into the civil service and civil society institutions.

11.4. Upon signature of this Agreement, the process of incorporation of individual members of all other armed groups, who desire and qualify shall start as soon as possible into the ranks of either SAF or SPLA or integrated into organized forces (police, prisons and wildlife services), while the rest shall be reintegrated into the civil service or civil society institutions.

11.7. Upon signature of this Agreement, the process of incorporation of individual members of all other armed groups, who desire and qualify shall start as soon as possible into the ranks of either SAF or SPLA or integrated into organized forces (police, prisons and wildlife services), while the rest shall be reintegrated into the civil service or civil society institutions.

11.8. By D Day + 6 months, the OAGs Collaborative Committee after
ascertaining the strength and armament conditions of OAGs units, shall ensure freedom of choice for all OAGs members to join either Party they so desire to be incorporated in, provided that no other armed groups shall continue to have a separate existence outside the command of either SAF or SPLA.
11.9. By D Day + 12 Months, the OAGs Collaborative Committee shall finish the incorporation process of OAGs members who desire and qualify into the armed forces of either Party and police, prisons, wildlife service and civil service.

[The above means that there will be no OAGs after July 9th 2005. You either belong to SAF or SPLA. If for example you choose to be integrated into AF, say with rank of Brigadier, it means you become a regular officer in SAF and you will be like any other Brigadier in SAF. It means you will have a assignment in SAF as commander of some unit or as staff officer in some garrison. You will go to work at 8 A.M. and out at 2 P.M., or whatever the time work ends. You will have the salary of allowances like any other Brigadier of your status [on Permanent List, Temporary List or Honorary List?], and you will get your salary and allowances through your unit not through Military Intelligence, unless this is your official unit. You will not be “Gowat al-Sadika” under Military Intelligence, you will be just SAF].

[Secondly, it is also to be noted also that after 9th January 2006, that is in six months time, there will be only SPLA, SAF and JIUs deployed in Southern Sudan, and by July 9th 2007 at the latest, that is, by two year’s time at the maximum, there will be only SPLA and JIUs deployed in the South, as all SAF forces outside the JIUs shall have by that time been withdrawn to North as provided for by the CPA].
12. Foreign Insurgency Groups:

12.1. The parties have resolved to end the presence of the foreign
insurgency groups on the Sudanese soil;

12.2. The parties shall work together to disarm, repatriate or expel these
groups as soon as possible.

VII. Status, Role and Conduct of Armed Forces after July 9th

Ref: Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements
Implementation Modalities: Part I: The Ceasefire Arrangements.

1. General and Fundamental Provisions

1.2. The Parties shall always refrain from any act or acts that may in any way spoil the peace process. They shall unceasingly create and maintain a conducive atmosphere for peace and tranquility;

1.12. The Parties shall commit themselves that all forces, troops under
their respective command and forces allied and affiliated to them at all
levels and rank and file shall fully cease fire and stop hostilities;

1.14. The Parties agree not to arm, train, harbour on their respective
areas of control, or render any form of support to external subversive elements or internal armed groups;

Ref: Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements
Implementation Modalities: Part II: The Armed Forces.

16.1. The two Armed Forces and the JIUs shall be regular, professional, and non-partisan armed forces. They shall respect the rule of law and civilian government, democracy, basic human rights, and the will of the people.

17.6. In the event of any external or internal threat, the JDB shall,
subject to section 16.2 above, decide on how to address the situation. The JDB shall decide whether all forces, the JIUs or either force (SAF and SPLA) shall handle the threat alone or collectively. The JDB may also decide on the appropriate support and reinforcements that other forces shall lend to the forces facing direct threat and aggression. In a joint operation, JDB shall determine lead HQS for that operation.

18.1. The line of redeployment of SAF and SPLA shall be South/North Border of 1/1/1956 as came in Article 3 (b), in the Agreement on Security Arrangements during the Interim Period signed on 25th September, 2003.

VIII. Deployment of the JIUs and SPLA in Southern Sudan

The SPLA will be deployed in Southern Sudan as shall be decided by the SPLA GHQ according to the strategic requirements for the defense of the country from the South, while the JIUs shall be deployed as agreed in the Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements. Except for the JIUs and SPLA no other forces shall be deployed in the South. The following are the areas agreed for the deployment of the JIUs in the South.

20.14 JIUs Detailed Deployment:

20.14.1. First JIUs Infantry Division – Equatoria: Deployed in:
(1) Juba, (2) Torit, (3) Kapoeta, (4) Yei, (5) Jabor, (7) Maridi, (Mundari, (9) Yambio and (2) Tambura.

20.14.2. Second Infantry Division – Upper Nile: Deployed in:

(1) Malakal Town, (2) Nasir Town, (3) Bounj, (4) Melut, (5) Bentiu Town,  (6) Pariang and (7) Bor Town.

20.14.3. Third Infantry Division – Bahr el Ghazal: Deployed in:

(1) Wau, (2) Tonj, (3) Rumbek, (4) Shambe, (5) Aweil (6) Raja, (7) Gogrial and (8) Abyei

I am bringing up the areas of deployment of the JIUs because I am aware that there are elements in Military intelligence that are reported to be telling the OAGs to capture this or that place from the SPLA , for example, Akobo or Maiwut. There is no need for this, because the only places the JIUs will be deployed are the ones listed in the CPA, and Akobo and Maiwut are not included. In Greater Upper Nile the places for deployment of the JIUs are only the nine places I mentioned before, i.e., Malakal Town, Nasir Town, Bounj, Melut, Bentiu Town, Pariang and Bor Town.

IX. Relation of Military Intelligence to OAGs after July 9th 2005

From all that I have just said, the OAGs will cease to exist after July 9th as they shall have by then chosen to be incorporated into either SAF or SPLA
– Refer to Article 11.8. of the Ceasefire Arrangements, which says: “By D Day + 6 months, the OAGs Collaborative Committee after ascertaining the strength and armament conditions of OAGs units, shall ensure freedom of choice for all OAGs members to join either Party they so desire to be incorporated in, provided that no other armed groups shall continue to have a separate existence outside the command of either SAF or SPLA”

Any SAF military officer who after this date shall continue to sponsor the OAGs, by giving them money, ammunition, guns, etc., outside what is specified by military regulations, shall do so at his own risk, as such an officer shall be acting outside the constitution, and shall be arrested and prosecuted under the law.

It is to be noted that those from the OAGs who shall be integrated into the SAF, shall have the same conditions of service like any other officer in the SAF, and similarly those who will be integrated into the SPLA shall have the same conditions of service like any other SPLA officer. I am aware that SAF Military Intelligence used to draw budgets for financing the OAGs. This was okay because the Sudanese army was using counter-insurgency to fight an insurgency in Southern Sudan, but with the CPA the insurgency in Southern Sudan is over, and so the counter-insurgency also must be over. Secondly, there will be a new Government in Khartoum in which the SPLM will have a share of the Presidency and significant presence in the Cabinet. This new Government of National Unity cannot approve a budget for counter-nsurgency to fight itself. It is also to be noted that after July 9th there shall be no OAGs who are outside SAF or SPLA command, and all OAGs shall be subjected to the military command of either Party. This means that any activities by OAGs after July 9th will be considered to be sanctioned by the side they have been incorporated into, and that side shall be held accountable for those activities by the GONU and by the UN peace mission.

X. Why OAGs Should Integrate into the SPLA and GOSS, and those who integrate into SAF should conduct themselves normally like any other officer or soldier in SAF

They are largely SPLA by origin;

They are Southern Sudanese;

To enhance unity of Southern Sudan: We need peace and stability for development;

To participate in the protection, Security and development of Southern Sudan;

To ensure and enhance implementation of the CPA, and both the NCP and SPLM want the CPA implemented;

To ensure and guarantee the exercise of the right of
self-determination after the six years of the Interim Period;

 Because both the insurgency and counter-insurgency are over as a result of the CPA, and both the NCP and SPLM are committed to a just and fair solution to the issue of OAG as came in the CPA. For its part the SPLM is willing and ready to integrate the OAGs into the SPLA and structures of the GOSS;

Because they would prefer to be handled under Southern Sudan DDR for those who will not be in SAF, SPLA and JIU, and even for those who will be integrated they will eventually benefit from the Southern DDR after they retire. For example, those incorporated into SAF Colonel to Major General will all be retired within four years, even those from rank of Major. As for those integrated as 2nd Lt to Captain, they will be required to pass their promotions exams, and if they fail they will be dismissed. This is the law of the SAF.

Finally my advice to you is to be incorporated into SPLA and GOSS structures, as this is good for you personally and for Southern Sudan publicly. However, if still for some reason you choose to be incorporated into SAF, then work and live peacefully with others and do not accept to be used by anybody for counter-insurgency purposes in the South, because there is no insurgency in the South, and the new GONU will not allow anybody to use you for counter-insurgency for that matter.

XI. Principles for Integration of OAGs

Equal treatment with other SPLA forces and this has been the case for all forces that have merged into the SPLA. I assure you of this;

Recognition and harmonization of ranks. I assure you of this; it has been done before. If there are complaints, they come mostly from those who stayed in the Movement, and feel cheated when they see their colleagues several steps ahead of them. But this is a small price to pay for the unity of our people and they understand;

 Equal chances with other SPLA forces in participation in the JIUs, in the Mother SPLA and in at all levels of command and in all other structures of GOSS;

Equal chances with other SPLA forces and personnel in participation in DDR programmes;

Equal chances with other SPLA forces and personnel in training both locally and abroad;

Equal chances with other SPLA forces and personnel in absorption into other organized forces and civil service.
XII. General Amnesty for all:

I would like finally to assure you of a general and unconditional amnesty to all OAGs and all those others who for one reason or other decided to fight the SPLM/A, some even did not make any such decision, but in the circumstances of Southern Sudan and of war, they simply found themselves on the Government side fighting the SPLM/A. I want to state here in front of you that, as Chairman of SPLM and Commander-in-Chief of the SPLA, that all will enjoy full and unconditional amnesty, whether you are integrated into the SPLA and GOSS structures, or for reasons only known to you choose to be
integrated into SAF and central Government structures you have complete amnesty. The situation has changed and will continue to change in both South and North, and we must put the past behind us and move forward to develop our country.

This amnesty is necessary because I want unity of Southern Sudan. I want complete peace and stability all over Southern Sudan, so that we implement our vision of governance and development. By the end of the six year Interim Period I want Southern Sudan to be earning at least two billion dollars from oil revenues, two billion dollars from tourism, at least six billion dollars from agriculture and other enterprises, so that we have annual revenues of at least ten billion dollars. All this requires peace and stability all over Southern Sudan. Over the six years I want Southern Sudan transformed into the heaven on earth of Africa and within this period I want the vision of a truly New Sudan achieved, a prosperous New Sudan that belongs equally to all its citizens, whether they are of Arab origin or African, whether they are Muslims or Christians, whether they are female or male, or otherwise failing to achieve a truly New Sudan, the people of Southern Sudan would obviously not vote to continue to be second class citizens, they would opt out for full independence.

XIII. Conclusion:

Fellow Southern Sudanese, I would like to emphasize that the CPA with all its merits belongs to all of us. It is a good Agreement for Southern Sudan and for the Sudan as a whole, and so I appeal to you, to all southern Sudanese, to support the CPA and to achieve consensus around it. Secondly, I want to say that whereas the Agreement was negotiated by the SPLM and NC-GOS, the CPA does not belong to the SPLM and NC-GOS; it does not belong to John Garang and Ali Osman; it belongs to all Sudanese; it belongs toyou; it belongs to all Southern Sudanese; and so you own it and use it for the development of Southern Sudan and provision of basic services to our people.
The CPA has provided us with enormous opportunities. In summary it has made us achieve the following: the Right of Self Determination, North/South Border Demarcation, Real Power for Southern (one country two systems model), an independent Army during the Interim Period, four sources of revenues (a) 50% of oil revenues, (b) 50% of non-oil central government revenues generated in Southern, (c) revenues generated by the GOSS by virtue of its taxing powers; and (d) international assistance to Southern Sudan, which will come directly to Southern Sudan. In addition we have achieved strength in the Three Areas (Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile and Abyei). And in GONU Southern Sudan shall have at least 10 out of 30 Full Cabinet Ministers and at least 10 State Ministers.

In all respect, the CPA is also good for others. The CPA is not only good for Southern Sudan; it is also good for the NCP and for other political forces in the North. For the NCP they become our partners for at least six years, and I want to pay compliments to the NCP for their contribution to the peace agreement. For the other political forces in the North the CPA achieves all the objectives they have struggled for including Democracy and elections, Interim Government, Interim Constitution and Human Rights. That is why I spent two weeks in Egypt this month to help in bringing the NDA into the CPA in North-North dialogue, and indeed we succeeded to do this, as the NDA joined the NCRC and will be part of the GONU after July 9th. The CPA can also be adapted and applied to bring peace in other parts of the country such as Darfur and Eastern Sudan, and the SPLM will work with the NCP and the resistance movements in these areas to bring a fair and just political settlement to Darfur and Eastern Sudan.

Finally, I want to leave you with words of assurance and hope. Firstly, we are not anybody’s burden; we are masters in our own house. We are confident in ourselves and of the future. There are those who might entertain the false beliefs that we cannot govern ourselves, we should not and cannot let their thought patterns influence us. Let us collectively go down in history as the generation of South Sudanese that turned Sudan around-by putting an end to discrimination, racism, inequality, division, exploitation, and marginalization at best, and slavery and casual murder at worst. Let us unite against ethnic, religious, and racial divides to restore personal dignity for all. Let us move from total economic dormancy to total vibrancy; from relegation and resignation to a cycle of poverty, destitution and misery to activism, hope, and excitement. Let us reject being mere spectators in life, to becoming masters of our own destiny. A Bishop friend of mine yesterday told me a joke that three people went to see God, and the Almighty asked them what they wanted. One of them said he wanted wisdom, the second said he wanted riches, and the third, a Southern Sudanese, said he was only accompanying the other two. You will guess who wanted wisdom and who wanted riches, but what I want to tell Southerners is to stop accompanying others and be masters of their own destiny; I say the same for all Sudanese and for all people of Africa.

I want in closing to assure you all once more that there shall be enough room for all Southern Sudanese who wish to participate, and by way this assurance I often have quoted the Gospel of John 14 V 1-2. “Do not be worried and upset” Jesus told them. “Believe in God and believe also in me. There are many rooms in my Father’s house, and I am going to prepare a place for you. I would not tell you this if it were not true”. So, I say to all Southern Sudanese that there will be many rooms in the GOSS and GONU, and all are welcome in this big house called Southern Sudan. In the legislature for example Southern Sudan shall have 135 members in the Central Parliament, 170 in the Southern parliament, and about 400 in the Parliaments of the ten Southern States; that alone is more than 700 legislators. In the Executive Southerners will have 10 full Ministers and at least 10 State Ministers in the GONU and about 20 Ministers in the GOSS and some 40 Ministers in the State Governments; these are more than 70 Ministers. Then you have the judiciary and civil service. And with the massive development we shall launch the private sector will be very lucrative and full of jobs. As you can see there will be enough room for every one; our problem will actually be lack of manpower.

I want to conclude by assuring you that the SPLM will continue to be
steadfast, that the SPLM will continue to be a movement of the people and for the people; the SPLM shall not betray your cause and trust as we have not betrayed you over the last 22 years of struggle and consistency. The SPLM shall continue its vision and ideals that it has sacrificed for over the last 22 years and for which we have shed tears and blood. Let me remind you of these ideals.

1. Our struggle has been for freedom, liberty, equality, justice, human rights and democracy. We can not replace these ideals with a system of their opposites. We cannot replace injustice with injustice or abuse of human rights with another system of abuse for human rights. The SPLM will stand by these ideals. The SPLM will do everything to fight corruption, nepotism and parochialism. We will be the model for Africa and indeed of the world, let us not be modest about this; we have a bright future ahead, let us unite and dream together; it is not bad to dream, for that is how we humans climb great heights and even greater heights we never dreamed were possible to be reached.

2. During the long struggle we have stood for these ideals. This is why we have released thousands of POWs over the last 22 years. Despite what others say about us, a Movement that is not dedicated to the ideals of freedom, justice and human rights would not keep and feed POWs when we have so little. Right from the very beginning in 1983 we defined the object of combat not to be to kill the other guy, the enemy, but to render the other guy non-combative, and therefore if an enemy soldier has been disarmed following combat, killing that soldier is considered by SPLA law and code of conduct as murder.

3. The SPLM treatment of POWs is the result of our having become liberated. I see myself as a human being no greater than any and inferior to none. And when I look at another’s face I recognize another human being; indeed I see the face of God and I respect all human beings as bearing the image of God and as children of God. Humanity is universal that is why we interbreed as one species. God created us in equality and dignity; it is people and governments that degrade God’s creation. It is because of these beliefs that we have spared the lives of thousands of POWs despite our difficult circumstances as guerrillas with very little material means.

4. This is the legacy that we want the SPLM to bequeath to the people of Sudan and to future generations. We want to leave behind a culture of non-violence, forgiveness, reconciliation, peace, consensus-making and democracy, justice, freedom, human rights rule-of-law, incorruptibility, integrity and patriotism so that these ideals are permanently embedded in our constitution, structures of governance and are nurtured over time so that they become part of the culture of the New Sudan. We bring a new culture, the culture of the New Sudan, and it is you people of Southern Sudan and other marginalized areas and all the oppressed of Sudan who will be in the forefront of the struggle to realize the New Sudan.

I thank you for your listening and I wish you all the best in this very
important dialogue conference between the SPLM/A and OAGs. As I said before your rightful place is to be integrated into the SPLM/A and GOSS structures.
Perhaps you did not have sufficient information might have decided prematurely to be incorporated into the SAF, but it is not too late because the CPA requires that you be adequately informed so that you make informed decisions in your own interest. I want to assure you again in closing I personally welcome you into the SPLM/A and GOSS. As for those of you who will continue to choose to be incorporated into SAF after this dialogue conference, you of course have that freedom. You are a Sudanese citizen, and if you choose SAF, then make sure you get your rights in SAF, and we will also help you to get your rights in SAF. I want to end with a small story of a gazelle that may be familiar to some of you. [Relate the Story].
This story depicts the present situation of Southern Sudan. I appeal to you and through you to all Southern Sudanese that this time around let us not miss the gazelle, we have a great opportunity. I say the same for the whole Sudan; we must not miss the opportunity of a new beginning and the march to the New Sudan. Thank you very much.

Again, I leave with the same appeal of peace, reconciliation, forgivenessand unity, and my personal assurances. Thank you and thanks to President Moi and the MAI for organizing and hosting this OAG dialogue conference, and I thank you all for coming.(End)

(Heritage) – Khartoum, Monday, Nov., 2, 1987, (PAGE 4)

Colonel Dr. John Garang Speaks To Heritage On (War and Peace in the Sudan)–
1.

Last year Heritage interviewed leading personalities at home and abroad. The interview was a part of the paper’s contribution to the present search for peace in the country.
First Heritage interviewed Comrade Mengistu Haile Mariam in Addis Ababa in December last year. Comrade Mengistu generously offered his views on the subject of peace and how it could be achieved. His was followed by Prime Minister Sadiq el Mahdi, who also gave his views about the subject, last April.
Then early last month our Editor Arop Madut who conducted the interviews with the two leaders, flew down to Nairobi where he had the chance to talk to the SPLM/SPLA leader, Col. Dr. John Garang de Mabior. Below is the full text of the interview. The rest will be serialised in the subsequent issues:

Arop Madut:

Q: 1 From what one has learned so far so you were not satisfied with the terms of the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 on the South:: yet you accepted to be absorbed into the Sudan Army. Your brief comment:

DR JOHN GARANG:

A: It is true that I was not satisfied with the terms of the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972. It’s also true that I was absorbed into the Sudan National Army when the agreement was implemented. Not only was I dissatisfied with the Addis Ababa Agreement on the Southern Sudan, I was not satisfied with the objectives and the aims of the Anya Nya as a movement. This was because the Anya Nya at that time stood for the secession of southern Sudan to form a separate sovereign state. Before I joined the Anya Nya Movement, I went to the camp of General Joseph Lagu, the Commander of the Anya Nya to brief me about the objectives of his movement. From his briefings it was clear that his Movement was a separatist movement. I told him point blank that I was opposed to secession movements. I left in disappointment. I decided to go and continue with my graduate studies. After reconsidering my position after six months, I decided to join the Anya Nya Movement despite my disagreement !
with its objectives. These objectives, I thought, could not be changed unless one did participate in the movement itself. So as a matter of principle, I joined the Anya Nya with a view of making fundamental changes in its aims and objectives. I have, needless to say, been on record as early as 1970 about the terms of the unity of the country, which should therefore be on new basis. Our plans to make new changes in the Anya Nya movement were pre-empted by the Addis Ababa Agreement that ended the 17 years war that has been ranging in Southern Sudan since 1955. Our work to transform the Anya Nya Movement from a reactionary to a genuine revolutionary movement was thereby brought to a halt. Meanwhile the agreement was accepted by Southerners because jobs were given. The ruling clique in Khartoum had then realized that what the Janubiin (Southerners) wanted were jobs. So why not give them jobs? Joseph Lagu was therefore taken into the National Army as a Major General, Abel Alier as a Minister and I was absorbed into the Sudan Army.

Q: 2 Can you enlighten us as to why you were opposed to the Addis Ababa Agreement before you could see it operational?
A: We were opposed to the terms of the Addis Agreement because its basic terms and the basis for the Agreement were first to absorb the Anya Nya into the National Army, second to integrate it after absorption and third to destroy it. So you have a process were the main aim was to achieve a cheap victory over the Anya Nya forces. In brief the concrete basis for the Addis Ababa Agreement was to disarm the Anya Nya forces that had proved formidable in the battlefield through peace. All the other coding; vis-à-vis the regional self-government Act, the ministerial posts and all things connected with the local autonomy were only peripheral. The main objective to be exact was to pull out the armed component of the Anya Nya Movement, to neutralise it and finally destroy it.

Q: 3 Since you said all the Anya Nya officers were aware about the harm and the strategic plans of the Sudan govt. in regard to the future of the Movement, why did you accept to be absorbed into the Sudan National Army?
A: We tried to oppose it but our voices were few and we realised that it was not going to be successful and opportune because the masses of the people in the south of Sudan were not prepared to support our move at that time to continue with the war. So we made the analysis of the situation. Late Brigadier Emmanuel Abur, Lewa (Major General) Joseph Kuol Amum – now with us, myself and many young officers, sat down, analysed the situation and decided to oppose the Agreement. After the meeting we circulated a document to that effect. It was sent to all the Anya Nya major camps in Bahr El Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile Provinces. That Document should now be with the Sudan Military Intelligence office in Khartoum. As part of your journalistic research, you can try to find it. However, that document was betrayed by someone we use to call Giant (Saturnino). This man surrendered it to General Joseph Lagu in Juba and one of our officers Kamilo was arrested in Lobone. Gen. Lagu gave this document to the Military Intelligence Branch and I believe it is still in their file in Khartoum. This was we thought, going to be a futile opposition because the South, the springboard of our opposition was not prepared to back us. Many southern people were prepared for jobs than the continuation with the war. The priority was rather who would get what jobs. Who would get PS, who would get a group VII, who would be a director, who would be a Minister. On our side in the Anya Nya Armed Forces, we were struggling for ranks. The atmosphere was therefore not conducive for the continuation with the war. We recognised that people wanted peace not another war. Any popular struggle, naturally must involve the people. So seeing that the people were not ready for the continuation of the war we thought it would be futile to fight on. We thus suspended our activities, and knowing the character of the Agreement we accepted to be absorbed into the national army. Of course we were aware that the contradictions and the conflicts.

Q: 4 Many people have been led to believe that the reasons that led to the rise of the SPLA/M was the division of the South into mini-regions and the subsequent introduction of the Islamic Sharia Laws in 1983. Would you agree with this assessment?
A: I would not agree with this assessment and you would definitely agree with me that it was not the ‘Kokora’ or the division of the South into small regions or the introduction of the Islamic Sharia laws that led to the rise of the SPLA/SPLM. Of course these factors did have some bearing on the said situation. What actually triggered off the rebellion was, not these issues. We went to the bush before the South was divided. Although the discussion about the division of the South had been going on for a long time the South was divided in May while the Sharia Law was introduced in September. To be fair, what triggered off the rebellion was the plan to transfer the absorbed Nya Nya forces to the North and thereby integrating them all over the Sudanese armed forces where they would become individuals there and there thus eventually; through old age, premature pension, death and dismissals, the phenomenon of the Anya Nya force within the Sudanese army would disappear. This, in reality, was the main objective of Addis Ababa. This was why we precisely opposed the terms of the Addis Ababa Agreement. I had predicted it, and was proved right.

Q: 5 Do we understand that you were during your absence from the country in constant touch with those whom you believe would help you launch a revolutionary movement?
A: Definitely we were in frequent contact with each other. We were not only in contacts, we were active. We were even engaged in sabotage activities in places like Wau, Malakal and other places. We were active during the ten years between 1972-1982 planning to launch the Peoples Revolution.

Q: 6 Many people have been made to believe that the war you are waging in the South against the Khartoum govt. has been imposed on you by certain circumstances. Would you agree to this statement?
A: It depends on the connotation of war being imposed on me, or the SPLA. Essentially the war was not imposed on me but on the Sudanese people by certain circumstances. It has not been imposed on me as an individual. As an individual I cannot afford to fight the Sudan Government or the Sudan Army. There should be objective conditions that can make a people angry to force them fight a war.

Q: 7 What I meant by the war being imposed on you is that, you were on annual leave in Bor town when the battalion 105 mutiny took place that you took over when the commander of the rebel garrison Major Kerubino was wounded. In other words many people believe that you did not plan this war, you were just dragged into it.
A: It is not true that the war was imposed on me by the circumstances you have just described. This is what some people say to explain their arguments. It may be the timing to start the movement that might have been imposed on me by the said circumstances. For your information, the Bor incident of May 1983 was not a mutiny by Battalion 105 as it is being claimed in certain quarters. We have been planning to start this movement and Bor was not our primary target. Our plan was to move onto Juba, Capture it and make it our springboard to launch the movement. If the movement had started in Bor it was because Major General Siddiq Al Banna, the then commander of the Southern Command who wanted to pre-empt our move struck first. In reality, our plan to launch the present movement started in February 1983. At that time Comrade Chagai who is now our commander in Bil Pam and who was our runner came to Khartoum in February for consultation concerning our plan. On his arrival, we discussed the possibility and plans for me to come to Malakal in order to coordinate our activities. And because Salva Kiir was an intelligence Officer in Malakal, it was therefore possible for us to coordinate our activities.
After we had discussed our plans, Chagai returned to Malakal. On his arrival to Malakal, Salva Kiir sent an urgent telegram urging me to come to Malakal to attend the sickness of my brother whom he said was extremely sick. He said my presence in Malakal was a must. I took a seven-day leave to attend my brother’s sickness. Of course I did not have a brother in Malakal let alone the fact that he was sick. So I came to Malakal with William Abdalla Chuol, a member of our organization, and who had been living with me for three weeks, in my house at Haj Yousif in Khartoum. After several meetings in Malakal, we decided to send William Abdalla Chuol to Gordon Kong of the Anya Nya Two at Bill Pam so as to put all his forces on full alert for the impending assault on Juba in August 1983. Having coordinated our plans, I went back to Khartoum. Our plan was, that the Anya Nya Two forces were to assemble in Pachala and Waat areas. William Nyuon our present Chief of Staff was to command Waat and Kerubino Kuanyin to command Bor. The operation was to be launched from Bor, with the forces in Pibor Pachala, Akobo and Waat giving support. We thought that if the assault on Juba failed we would have, at least, had some base to continue with the movement. In May, Chagai came back to Khartoum with the information that the situation was deteriorating fast and that the assault on Juba planned for August was not going to be possible. So I took annual leave in order to go to Juba in order to see the exact situation. If the situation, in my assessment was not going to reach August, I would therefore proceed to Kapoeta to make sure that the Battalion 117, one of our strong support units support our move. Of course, in order to attack Juba we would need uprising in our garrisons, which were being transferred to the North. We knew of course that Battalions 117 in Kapoeta and 111 at Rumbek would be ready to join us. As for battalion 110 in Aweil, we could not count very much on it because most of the soldiers from this unit.
On my arrival to Juba I found that the situation was tense. There was the question of money for the soldiers, which was reported to have triggered off the rebellion in Bor, Pibor, Pachala and Akobo. This issue kept the people moving between Bor and Juba in effort to diffuse the situation. In my assessment, the situation had already reached a point where it could no longer be diffused. The attack on Bor was in fact imminent. I had sent my family ahead with instructions to proceed to Bor and that I would follow later. When I reached Juba on the 9th of May I put up with Peter Cirillo, who was Deputy to Siddiq el Banna, Commander of the Southern Command, “of course, when you are planning illegal or under-ground activities it is always best to be close to the Authority. So in Khartoum I was very close to Generals Yousif Ahmed Yousif and Sowar el Dahab. I was also very close to General Abu Kadok, the army top brass. We used to have dinners together. My calculation was that if there were intelligent reports about my activities, their reaction would be ……. “John waled kues wa mamumkin Yamoul Hajat zeeda…” John is a good boy, and it is not possible for him to do things like this. As I said before I put up with Peter Cyrillo the present Governor of Equatoria. I would dress up every morning and go to the office with him.
On the 12th of May, I went to the office of General Siddiq al Banna. On seeing me he said “John when did you come to Juba” “three days ago I replied. “What do you want here and where are you going to? (“Mashi Fi Eijaza syiatak’) I am going on leave sir,” I replied. He said, “Inta fi Eijaza….Inta men ayi mahal?” Are you on leave and where do you come from?” “From Bor,” I answered. I could see his face suddenly changed. John if I were you, I would not go to Bor. Why sir, I am an officer on leave and Bor is my home. I have officially been given leave by the General Headquarters, Khartoum. Moreover I have my agriculture project in Bor which I intend to organise”. I explained. He said, “If I were you John, I would not go to Bor. To be frank with you John, General Al Banna continued. Those of Kerubino have rebelled and as far as the Sudanese Army is concerned, Bor, Pachala and Pibor are no longer part of the Sudanese Army… They are rebels. If you go there and if they don’t kill you it means that you are with them.” I am very happy with your advice Sir. But what you have told me has made it very necessary for me to go to Bor. “Why”? He asked. “I have sent my family to Bor four days ago. My family came ahead of me and are in Bo,” I replied. So, with your permission, Sir, If I leave tomorrow for Bor, go and collect my family and come back the following day, will that be acceptable to you Sir? If you stick to that programme, if you go tomorrow and come back the next day, there will be no problem.

So, I said “thank you very much syiatak. You are really a senior officer. This is an advice a senior officer like you can give to his junior officers.” “But syiatak.” I continued. “I am happy because I am a senior officer in the Sudanese Army. I am also the Deputy Director of the Military Research Unit. If there is something of that nature, I should have not been given my leave in the first place. In the second place, I should have been briefed in Khartoum. I don’t blame you anyway but those of Khartoum who gave me leave without briefing me and allowed me to go to Bor where there are military operations. This is unbecoming. But nevertheless you have saved the situation ‘Syiatak’. That is why it is always necessary to have a good commander. You have briefed me about the situation in Bor. I will go to collect my family tomorrow. Thank you syiatak”. I gave him a salute and left the office.
Siddiq Al Banna might have been a big fool. He knew the exact situation. As a veteran soldier, he should have not allowed me to go to Bor. However, I left for Bor the following day. It was on the 13th of May when I reached Bor. On the 14th Salva Kiir Mayardit, one of our co-ordinators in Malakal sent us an urgent message. The message stated that Bor would be attacked within the next 48 hours. That the Buffalo-planes were transporting troops to Akobo. That troops were being massed in Akobo in order to attack Pibor and Pachala. That Bor would be attacked from Juba. From this message, we knew that the attack was coming and made preparations for it. We made the home of Dr. Lueth as an assembly place for discussing war plans. There was a Sudan Army company under a major at Langbar, north of Bor and the Battalion 105 at Malual-chaal south of Bor under Kerubino.
So we made a brief meeting about how to proceed with the war. I told Kerubino that since I was on leave I would go to Langbar to tie down the company there. I told him that if we were attacked from the rear at Langbar and attacked from Juba would be a disaster since it would dislodge us altogether.
So on May 14, I went to Langbar as planned, to be around as a senior officer. Abel Alier was there. And in order to make friends with the Commander at Langbar, we used to play cards with him and other officers. So on the morning of May 16, at 5 am the attack came from Juba as expected. I then sent Kerubino to command the troops of Battalion 105 and went to Langbar to save the situation from being attacked from the rear. At one time the Radio communication set of the attacking forces from Juba went off the air. So the commander of Langbar was ordered to send a force to Bor to see what was going on there. He gave me the message and asked me what he could do.
As a senior officer, I said, I advise that you do nothing. Because, I continued, “You are a company and if you send a platoon you would be left with only two platoons, and if the rebels come here they will over-run your camp. Moreover you have Sayed Abel Alier here. You have the white men of the Jonglei Projects and those of the De groot here. These are your responsibilities. What had happen to the Radio we do not know. But it could be some technical fault”. I assured him. “So let us sit and wait for two to three hours. There may come an answer from Juba informing us that they are on the air again”. So he listened to my advice and did not send any force. After three hours the reply came asking him not to send any force because the Radio set was on the air again. That was one occasion.
The second occasion, was when Kerubino was shot in the arm and was taken to Bor Hospital. The commander of Langbar received another message from the attacking forces that Kerubino was shot. The message ordered him to prepare a force to go to the Hospital. He gave me the message. I told him not to go to the Hospital because, I said, the people in Juba might not know what might be going on in Bor theatre of operations. I told him that Kerubino might have not come to the Hospital alone, may be with more than a company being aware that you have only a company here. He might have come with two companies. If he has a company you need three companies to attack him because the rebels are in a better position. They are better prepared and ready to repulse an attack on them than we are”. So I asked him to leave anything to me. I told him that I would diffuse the situation because I had been the commander of Battalion 105 before. I told him that, as their former commander, most of the rebels knew me and that they would not harm me if I go to them. I told him that I would go to the Hospital and if Kerubino was wounded and in the Hospital, if he was there, I would come back and give him the answer. I assured him that I would come back to decide what kind of action to take. He was happy!!!
So I went to the Hospital. We took Kerubino and sent him across the river. I then returned to Langbar and told the Company Commander that Kerubino was taken to the Hospital and that he should send the message to Juba that Kerubino was brought to the Hospital, treated and had been taken away by the rebels. He immediately sent the message. So from what I have just told you, you could see that the claim that the war was imposed on me by circumstances is not true. We have been planning since 1970s to launch this movement.

Heritage, Khartoum. Monday 9, Nov., 1987, pp4.

Q: 8 Can you brief us as to what at the onset led to the split in the SPLM, which gave birth to the Anya Nya II organization? What actually went wrog? How are you trying to resolve it?
A: This is another great misunderstanding that there was a split in the SPLM/SPLA movement that gave birth to Anya Nya Two organization. This is not true. These are two different organizations with totally different aims and objectives. Anya Nya Two started as a result of the Akobo mutiny in 1975 led by Lt. Vincent Kwany, in which Colonel Abel Chol was killed. The Akobo mutineers then organized themselves into Anya Nya Two whose aim was to revive the Anya Nya One Movement disbanded in 1972 following the Addis Ababa Agreement. The Anya Nya Two at that time was supported by Libya and Bil Pam was their guerrilla camp before we came.
When I was at the General Headquarters in Khartoum, we used to be briefed about Bil Pam. The reports we had is that Gordon Koang had 7,000 strong, that Yagoub Ismail was with several thousand men at arms and Abdalla Zakaria had many thousands…. So you can see the Anya Nya Two was already an existing movement before the birth of the SPLA. There is no question, therefore, of the split in the SPLM that gave birth to the rise of the Anya Nya Two Movement. In short, the Anya Nya Two Movement was formed eight years before the SPLA came into existence. The objective of the Anya Nya Two from the onset of its inception was again for the separation of the Southern Sudan from the rest of the country.
So when we came in 1983 we organized the SPLM/SPLA. The Anya Nya Two meanwhile continued as an independent movement. Our objective was therefore to influence the Anya Nya Two and to have them join us. The Anya Nya Two, on the other hand, was trying to influence us to join them. Thus at the start (1983), we had two movements with different objectives.
While the SPLM was for the unity of the Sudan, the Anya Nya two was for the separation of the Southern Sudan. Our immediate task after we formed the SPLM/SPLA was to try to regroup the scattered fighting forces that we found, politicise them, win their confidence and make them organic to the SPLA. It is worth to note here that the Anya Nya Two was not only confined to Upper Nile. It was stronger in Bahr El Ghazal.
So we succeeded in getting the whole of the Anya Nya Two of Bahr El Ghazal and thereby incorporated it into the SPLA. Most of the Anya Nya Two in Upper Nile were also incorporated into the SPLA. Some of them are now holding high ranks in the SPLA. Major John Kulang who is an alternate member of the SPLA/SPLM Military High Command was a member of the Anya Nya Two organization when he joined us.
So in reality, it was Anya Nya Two that was split; some of them the majority I should say, joined us while the rest remained with Gordon Koang and continued to maintain their separate identity. Some of the politicians who came with us following the Bor incident notably Samuel Gai Tut, Akuot Atem and Gabriel Gany who essentially opted for separatism joined Anya Nya Two and managed to take over its leadership. These politicians had assumed that since the Nuer nationality was at the Ethiopian Sudanese border, they would keep away anybody coming to join us. This strategy led, sadly to say, to the deaths of many people who were coming from Bahr El Ghazal in Fangak.
So it was our failure to win all of the Anya Nya Two that led to the continuation of the Anya Nya Two as a movement. The failure of the Anya Nya Two, on the other hand to get us into their movement, let to the existence of two movements.
Later on Anya Nya Two, which was a genuine movement fighting for the separation of Southern Sudan, was transformed into a government militia. The brainchild of this tribal militia was Daniel Koat Matthews, the then Governor of Upper Nile. We have now in our file the copy of the letter addressed to His Excellency President Nimeiri.
The content of that letter was aimed at the destruction of the SPLM/SPLA by organising tribal militias. The Anya Nya Two was thus superseded by the SPLM, so to speak. From thence on the Anya Nya Two through Daniel Koat Mathew’s agitation, became a government militia just like the Murahelin forces of Southern Kordofan, like the Mundari militia, like the Ismail Konyi Militia and like the Fertit militia of Western Bahr El Ghazal. It therefore became the aim of the SPLA movement never to allow or give free hand to these militiamen to divert the people’s revolution. The policy of organising tribal militias needless to say, was started by Nimeiri and Daniel Koat, continued by Sowar El Dahab and is being promoted by Sadiq El Mahdi, It is therefore the aim of the SPLM do deny Sadiq El Mahdi or whoever is in Khartoum to continue to use these militias. We shall try and struggle to influence them. We have more and better arguments for them to join us than for them to join the Sudanese Army. The militias are beginning now to realise that, they have been deceived by the government for quite a long time. Good example is that Gordon Koang at one time was promised that he would be appointed the commander of the Southern Command and the Anya Nya Two the Government of the Southern Sudan (HEC) if his movement could succeed to defeat the SPLM/SPLA. But then as the governments in Khartoum came and went these promises were not honoured, Gordon Koang did not become the commander of the Southern Command with the rank of Major General as promised nor did the Anya Nya Two become the regional Government in Juba. At the end the Anya Nya Two started to realise that they were being taken for a rough ride. We have explained to them these things from time to time. They have at last realised these false promises, which are now crucial to the present ongoing reconciliation process. As I have said before these are politicians who take advantage of the name of Anya Nya Two in order to make money in Khartoum, Nairobi or other place

Q: 9 What about the claim that the quarrel between the SPLA and the Anya Nya II started in Addis Ababa when you arrived there in 1983. It was alleged that you held election as to who should have been the chairman of the movement. The report had it that Akuot Atem was elected the first chairman of the SPLM, that Samuel Gai Tut was to be the commander in chief and you the chief of staff. It was alleged that the split came as a result of leadership as well as ideological differences. What is your brief comment on these allegations?
A: This is not true. There were no elections held and there would have not been any elections since we did not have constituencies to hold some sort of election. A simple explanation is that the SPLA was formed in side the Sudan, and by the soldiers who defected from the Sudanese Army. Whereas, the Anya Nya Two was a movement that was already in existence by the time we formed the SPLM/SPLA.
The question which arose at the time we arrived there was whether the new comers that where pouring out of the country were going to identify themselves with the SPLA or with Anya Nya Two. Of course it was a matter of choice and those of Akuot Atem, Samuel Gai Tut and Gabriel Gany decided to join Anya Nya Two. In fact everyone was free to join any of the two Movements without any quarrel. The quarrel only erupted, when the Anya Nya Two was transformed into a government militia by Daniel Koat. Otherwise there were no conflicts between the two organisations before the transformation of Anya Nya Two from a genuine secessionist Movement to a government militia.

Q: 10 It is now four years since you launched SPLA movement. Looking back today, would you say the objectives for which it was launched are being realised?
A: Looking at the four years of our struggle, I would say, yes, the objectives are being realised. The Primary objective is of course the unity of the Sudan, which should be on new basis. We are trying to build a new Sudan free of religious and racial discrimination, a Sudan that is free from the two families rule. We want to build a new Sudan devoid of all kinds of sectarianism. In the past our people used to talk about north and the southern conflict. Now I am glad to say, the Sudanese are no longer talking about the solution of the so called problem of the Southern Sudan but that of the Sudan as a whole.

Q: 11 The Prime Minister Sadiq el Mahdi has been quoted as saying that your forces have been meeting tremendous difficulties in the battle fields against the strong Sudanese army. That they are being pushed back every time they try to take to offensive. What is the situation in the battlefields?
A: That might be Sadiq’s wish that the SPLA forces are suffering in the battle fields. But facts are there for anybody to see.
The true picture about the situation is that when we met with Sadiq in July last year it was clear that he was going to launch a massive military offensive against the SPLA having achieved the type of peace he wanted. This was obvious from his face. I even told him, Mr. Prime Minister don’t go and do what I see in your eyes. Don’t go and launch a military offensive against the SPLA. Don’t try this because you will not be able to defeat the SPLA. I told him further that if he wanted to defeat it, he should go and recruit six hundred thousand new recruits. Then he would be able to attack us. But I cautioned him that if he recruited six hundred thousand he would definitely recruit them from the south, the east and the west of Sudan. These are the areas of recruitment into the Sudanese Army.
Mr. Prime Minister, I assure you that six hundred thousand this would be good for the SPLA. Because, you will recruit them, train them, arm them and then deploy them against us. When you deeply deploy them against us one third of these recruits will defect to us”. I warned the Prime Minister. This is how the SPLA was formed and this is how it thrives. Two hundred thousand out of the six hundred thousand will surely join us. I wanted to warn him, that in order for a conventional army to fight these two who would then be guerrillas, you need a ratio of one to ten. To fight the two hundred thousand of your own creation which will defect to us in addition to the existing SPLA forces, you need another army of Two ‘Million’. This will go on indefinitely. So Mr. Prime Minister don’t attempt to do this”. I concluded.
He did not listen to my advice. In stead he went and launched a massive military operation against us. He was even quoted as boasting that he would celebrate the 1987 Intafadha (April Uprising) in Buma our Headquarters. So, we took the Prime Minister’s challenge very seriously, took all the necessary measures and effectively repulsed his offensive. We did not only repulse the massive military offensive but the Prime Minister did not celebrate the Al Intifadha in Buma. In stead we captured the strategic town of Pibor which is not very far from Buma and which we still hold. We also captured another strategic town of Jekou, which we are still holding. Most recently we captured Mayom in Bentiu area, which we also are holding. We have now extended the war to Western Equatoria Province where we were not there before. Major James Wani Igga Alternate member of the SPLA/SPLM Political-Military High Command is now on the Zairian border. We have also extended the war to Southern Kordofan and Major Yousif Kuwa Mekki Alternate member of the SPLA/SPLM is the Zonal Commander there. We have also extended the war to Southern Blue Nile.
So, to come to your question, the Prime Minister’s massive military offensive has effectively been halted. On the contrary, the SPLA is on the move. The situation on the ground is therefore very favourable to the SPLM/SPLA. That the SPLA is on the move is not a claim by us, but a truth. We have more than 200 prisoners of war and they are in our POW camps. Lt. Colonel Salim Saed former commander of Jekou himself talked over Radio SPLA. It was very clear from Colonel Salim’s speech, as a man who had been in a trench for a long time, and who knows the heat of the battle, that the situation is in our favour. He is, in fact, a better authority to speak the truth about what is going on in War Zone One, than Sadiq. The army in the South knows better how the war is going on there, not Sadiq who has never been in a trench. On my part, I spent eight hours in a trench during the capture of Jekou. I am therefore in a better position to know what is actually going on in the South. Prime Minister Sadiq has never been to the war theatre. He is either not being well briefed by his commanders or he deliberately ignores the facts.

Q: 12 Certain quarters inside and outside the Sudan do claim that foreign hands are behind the SPLA successes in the battlefields against the Sudanese army. They point accusing fingers at Ethiopia, USSR, Cuba, GDR, as being on the top of the lists. What is your reaction to these accusations?
A: This is a complete nonsense. We have never had a single foreigner fighting on our side in the battles we have been engaged in ever since the war started in 1983: and we will not in the future accept any foreigners to fight on our side. This is a Sudanese war and therefore a purely internal affairs. It originated within the Sudanese body-politic. It is a known fact that the first soldiers of the SPLA were from battalion 105 and 104, and does not need any expert explanation. So, there are no foreign personnel in our army. The charge that there are foreigners helping us are just mere malicious propaganda. However, all the Sudanese public is all aware that there are no foreigners in our forces.
Before we launched the SPLM/SPLA, I was a Colonel in the Sudanese Army not in the Ethiopian, GDR, or Cuban Army, I was in Khartoum and many officers, like Kerubino Kwanyin, William Nyuon, Arok Thon, Daniel Awet, Bona Baang and many others were in the Sudanese Army. Other officers were in the Sudanese civil service or other sectors of Sudanese life. Dr. Lam Akol and Dr. Riek Machar were lecturers at the University of Khartoum. James Wani Igga was working in Juba. Kuol Manyang was the Director of the Multi-Purpose Training Centre in Juba. John Kulang was in the Sudanese Army. These officers are members in the SPLA/SPLM Political-Military High Command.
There is absolutely no foreigners fighting on our side. On the contrary, it is Sadiq Al Mahdi who used foreigners. He invaded the Sudan in 1976 with murtazagha (mercenaries). The murtazagha forces were crushed simply because they were foreigners or at least there were foreign elements in that force. The Sudanese Army took it as a challenge that foreigners were invading the Sudan. Where as we have been able to maintain our ground, made gains and consolidate our positions for the last four years. If we did not base our movement on the Sudanese people we would have been dislodged a long time ago.

Q: 13 In regards to logistics, where do you get your arms and ammunitions?
A: When we launched the movement in 1983, we started with the arms and ammunitions of Battalion 104/105. In 1984 we got a windfall of armaments and ammunitions from Libya. A lot of people say we got our arms and ammunitions from Ethiopia. This is not true. Others think that we get our arms from the Soviet Union. This is also not true. The only foreign country that helped us was Libya. I was in Tripoli for eleven days in April 1984. At that time we had mutual hostility against Nimeiri. “An enemy of your enemy is your friend!” So goes the saying. We reached a good understanding with Ghaddafi and so he gave us lots of arms and ammunitions including anti-aircraft missiles. We knew of course that this would be a temporary support because once Nimeiri was overthrown this support would come to an end. So, we stockpiled a lot of arms and ammunitions. Having received these arms we became very strong and began over running enemy camps, making many ambushes and virtually annihilating military convoys and taking all their arms. The annihilation of Sudanese Para-troopers between Bor and Juba in 1985 is a case in point. The armaments we got when our forces captured Pibor enabled us to arm two battalions.
To sum up, our initial sources of armaments were battalions 104/105. We had a foreign source of armaments, which was Libya. Now all our arms procurement comes from the Sudanese Army. We are getting more arms and ammunitions overrun army garrison after army garrison. We are indeed making ambushes and are getting lots of armaments daily.

Heritage, Khartoum, Monday, Nov., 16, 1987, pp4.

Q 14. On the ongoing war, the SPLM leadership is being accused of using food relief as a weapon aimed at attempting to win public support to your side? What is your brief comment?
A. Definitely, I don’t agree with this accusation. For how can we use food relief as a weapon? And what is the argument in support of this accusation?

Q: 15 The argument in support of this accusation is that when the international relief agencies wanted to airlift food to the famine-stricken Southern Sudan in the middle of 1986 through “Operation Rainbow,” the SPLA threatened to shoot down any plane that would fly over the areas you control; thus making it difficult for the food to reach the people that needed it. This is the charge.
A: When I was fighting in Kapoeta, Mike Wooldrige of the BBC came to me and told me that Sadiq El Mahdi had agreed that the international relief organisations could work with the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (SRRA) the humanitarian Branch of the SPLM, provided that, he added, the SPLM allow food convoys by air and by land to go to the government control towns. My answer was in the affirmative. We agreed that the SRRA, the international relief organisations and the Sudan Government Relief Agency to sit down and provide modalities, ways and means whereby food could reach the targeted populations in the towns and in the countryside, provided that the food was not used either by the Sudanese Army or by the SPLA soldiers. This would mean that the operations be monitored by the three parties concerned.
So, Mr Bradley of the “Operation Rainbow” came and asked whether we were serious. As an element of goodwill he requested us to allow a few flights so that the process was seen to be working. So, we allowed few flights. Then, he went to the Sudan Government side and requested that it allowed a few flights to the SPLM control areas to distribute some food there. The Sudan Government rejected the request. We turned down Mr. Bradley’s request because we believed that the Sudan Government’s intention was to send the relief aid to the towns under its control while the majority of the people living in the countryside and who were badly in need of the relief were left without help. We therefore interpreted the Sudan Government’s rejection of Mr. Bradley’s proposal as hostile, for if it was not, Sadiq El Mahdi would have accepted it.
So we said that any aircraft which would attempt to come to the Southern Sudan would be considered as hostile. This was however another area of misunderstanding in regard to the ‘Operation Rainbow’. This misunderstanding was a result of agitation from Khartoum.
As regards to the allegation that we were the ones who refused the “Operation Rainbow” to fly food to the hunger stricken in War Zone One, I would say that this is not true. It was not us who refused the said Operation. It was Sadiq El Mahdi who frustrated the efforts of the International Relief Agencies to airlift food to the hungry people in the south after publicly he had been on the record that he would accept the International Relief Organisations to work with us. However, our side of goodwill was implemented while the Sudan Government side of goodwill was not. We were not in anyway obliged to accept food to be taken to the towns under Sudan Government control. Our move to prevent food to be taken to the towns was justified because we were getting reliable reports that, this food was being used by the Sudan Government Army.
If the Sudan Government side had agreed and allowed the Relief Agencies to work on both sides to the conflict, the next stage would have been to develop a mechanism whereby the three sides, namely the SPLA, the Sudan Government and the International Community would monitor how food was to be used on both sides to the conflict.
In brief, the Khartoum authorities completely refused the monitoring process. They were interviewed by the BBC, and they flatly said they would not accept the monitoring of food distribution.

Q: 16 What do you propose to be done in this connection while the war goes on?
A: Now that there is drought in the south, the most affected areas by the war, it extremely becomes very necessary to get food to the needy. In this connection, we would hold to the same formula that the SRRA, our humanitarian wing; the International Community and the Sudan Government humanitarian wing to sit down and device ways and means to get food to the affected areas both in the towns and in the countryside and to monitor its distribution so that it is not used either, by the Sudan Government troops or by the SPLA forces.
The three parties namely the SPLA, the Sudan Government and the International Community can form a committee to monitor the transport and distribution of this food. We can assign our own personnel to the government control towns if the Sudan Govt. guarantees to their security. We would also give security to the Sudan Govt. personnel who would be monitoring food distribution in the areas under our control. This, is in our opinion, would be a way out of this misunderstanding.
On my part as a leader of the SPLM, I will have no opposition to the formation of this committee. Rather, I bless and encourage it because there is going to be famine this year. Our people are going to suffer and they will die if nothing is done urgently.
At this juncture, I appeal to the concerned relief agencies to reactivate the relief operations to the areas affected by the droughts.

Q: 17 The SPLA/SPLM pledge that it is fighting to liberate the whole Sudan is being ridiculed by some individuals both from the north and the south. The northerners say to liberate the Sudan from who? The southerners on the other hand say, they do not want to shed their blood to liberate the Arab portion of Sudan. What would you tell these compatriots?
A: This question to liberate the Sudan from who has for a long time been asked by the people who are interested in perpetuating differences between the north and south of the Sudan that have been imposed by certain circumstances and promoted by their clique regimes in Khartoum. In fact, when these compatriots say to liberate the Sudan from who; the answer they expect is from the Arabs. This is the context of their agitation. What I would tell these compatriots is that I had been on record and I am saying this again that when we in the SPLM speak about the liberation of the Sudan, we use it in a broader sense.

As far as the SPLM philosophy is concerned the question that arises is not to liberate the Sudan from who but to liberate it from what? In my speech to the people of my village sometimes back, I demonstrated this point very clearly. I told them that during the dry season the women of the village have to walk 15 miles to get water from a well. If we reduce that distance from 15 miles to one mile or zero mile, if we locate the well in the village you will have essentially liberated these women from walking 15 miles. This is what we mean to liberate a person from what not from Who? I explained to them. Looking at it in this context, we mean to liberate the people from neglect. In our Sudanese situation, the whole countryside has completely been neglected by those that have been in power in Khartoum since independence.
The successive regimes in Khartoum have been putting all our foreign reserves on air coolers, on refrigerators, on television-sets, on good cars and all kinds of comfort. Whereas, our foreign reserves should have been spent on things like bore wells in the villages, haffirs and life-saving drugs for rural people just to mention but a few. This is what when we refer to the term ‘liberation from what’.
Another good example to demonstrate the misinterpretation of the term liberation is that before Nimeiri was overthrown, Sadiq’s wife was quoted in one of her talks with our people in London as saying….. “Ya jama’a , izza intum ta shill al ‘L’ da” If you can take away this ‘Letter L’ so as to read The Sudan Peoples’ Movement, we shall all join this Movement. But to say, “The Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement…. To liberate the Sudan from who?” She asked.
This is the context in which the agitators in Khartoum would like to use the word liberation so as to distort it to mean a small thing that would mean the liberation of Sudan from the people. This is not how we use it. We in the SPLM use it in the sense that we want to liberate the Sudan from circumstances: the circumstances of oppression, of exploitation, of neglect which the majority of Sudanese find themselves in not only in the south, but all over the country, including Khartoum the capital of the whole country.
If for instance the tens of thousands of our people living in the carton huts in Khartoum are resettled in some decent places, if we make shelters at least for these people, we will have liberated them from these carton houses. This is our concept of the liberation. To come to the point the term Liberation is being ridiculed from that perspective by the people from the north because they want to associate it with racism.
On the other hand, some people from Southern Sudan ridicule the term by saying…. “Why should Southern Sudanese shed their blood in liberating the whole of the Sudan!”?
“Here again, this comes through sheer ignorance as to what the term liberation is all about or they deliberately want to distort it with the aim of ridiculing the Movement. These are the same southerners who claim that they would join the SPLA if it was fighting for the liberation of the southern Sudan. They insist that they would join the SPLA/SPLM if we change our manifesto to speak about the liberation of the south. This is rubbish.
Okay, let us speak about those who want to liberate the south. If they are going to liberate the south what method are they going to use? If they are going to liberate the south through fighting, then they need not to be told that the liberation of the south and of the whole Sudan involves fighting.
So, we invite those who want to liberate the south to come. Let them come. Nimule is still under the Army of Khartoum. Let them start fighting the Sudan army from there. When they reach what in their calculation, is the end of southern Sudan, let them stop. We will have a territorial army. We will have a home guard. We will deploy them on the Zairian border, on the Ugandan border, on the Kenyan border and on the Ethiopian border. In the meantime, the rest of us who would want to continue up to Khartoum and to Wadi Halfa will continue.
Secondly and most fundamentally, I would like to say that both the southerners and the northerners who make these ridicules do not completely understand the dynamics of how the liberation is going to take place. Those who make these ridicules from the north think that a southern army will eventually march into the north. The southerners who think that southerners should not shed their blood in order to liberate the whole Sudan think that a southern army will march to the north. This is not how we see things as happening. We see things as happening through the process of northerners themselves being involved in the struggle.
Now our forces are in southern Kordofan. We have lots and lots of recruits from southern Kordofan. The force that is in southern Kordofan, half of it is composed of the citizens of the area. So the process of liberating the whole country will involve the northerners in the fighting. They will not be standing in the dark watching the liberation going on. This is of course a very mechanical way of looking at a social reality. In deed as the war engulfs the whole country it will mean the involvement of all the people in the liberation.
To be specific the people of southern Kordofan are already involved and their own son Major Yousif Kuwa Mekki is their commander in southern Kordofan. The same is happening in southern Blue Nile. We have Malik Agar. He is the son of the area and he is fighting there. So, there is no question, you see, of southerners going to shed their blood while the northerners just fold their hands and wait for their liberation to take place. That is not how it will work.
There is no question of northerners thinking that a southern Sudanese army is going to invade their part of the country. This is a complete misunderstanding of reality, either innocently or deliberately construed in order to distort our objectives and ridicule them for political purposes.

Q: 18 Some Sudanese describe the SPLA/SPLM as a regional movement. What have you done so as to give it a national character?
A: In the first place, SPLM is not a regional movement. It is true, it started from a certain region which happens to be the southern Sudan. But this does not make it regional. It will be regional if its objectives are regional. So, we have regional parties like the southern Sudan Political Association (SSPA) for example. By their own definition of the objectives the members of SSPA have made themselves regional. There is also the General Union of the Nubas (GUN). By their definition, its members have made their organisation regional. So by our definition, we are not a regional organisation.
If you look at the other parties which claim to be national e.g. the Umma Party, You will find that what makes the Umma Party national is its claim, otherwise one can say that it is a regional party. The Umma Party is a movement that was started and is still based on the Ansar. There is therefore nothing one can say is national about the Ansar sect. I do not know how many the Ansars are. They may be three million compared to 22 million, the entire population of the Sudan according to the 1983 census. The Ansar sect is a regional organisation if the definition I stated above is applied to them. But because of their claim to the national rights, the Ansar Sect is a national organisation according to the definition of its objectives. The same thing can be applied to the DUP, which is based on the Katimmiyia Sect. So, there is nothing really that can make these parties national. They can as well be termed as regional like the SPLM if it were a regional organisation.
So one can say that the SPLM started at a certain time and at a certain place; but what is important is that the inner core that is its objectives, which are, needless to say, national.
In regard to the other part of question as to what we have done to give it a national character, I would say that, firstly by definition of its objectives and secondly its consistency with the definition of these objectives, which have gone beyond the region from which it started. As we have pointed out before, we are now in Southern Kordofan. So you can no longer talk about the SPLM being a southern Movement because we are already entrenched in southern Kordofan and southern Blue Nile and hopefully we will soon be in other areas.
We do admit people from all parts of the country and we have been doing this. At present, we have people not only from the Nuba Mountains and the Southern Blue Nile but also individuals from other places in the northern Sudan. There are people from Shendi, who are in our Movement. A regional party would not admit people from that region. A national party admits people from any part of the country. SPLM is therefore a national Movement.

Q: 19 In an interview with this paper last April, the Premier Sadiq El Mahdi warned that southerners and especially the Dinkas, would be exterminated by the northerners who are being turned military by the continuation of the war. And in order to save them from being wiped out, he advised that the SPLA/M must end the war in favour of peaceful settlement. What is your response to this suggestion?
A: If the Prime Minister has made this statement, then one would say that it is very unfortunate because he is not speaking as a national leader. By making such a statement, the Prime Minister is perhaps thinking about certain tribes in a certain perspective as not being a part of his constituency. By making such a statement, he is telling these tribes “look, if you are giving me trouble, I am going to kill you”. This is not the talk of a Prime Minister, but of a leader of a small place like Khartoum. This statement is very unfortunate for Premier Sadiq because it makes him very small indeed. This is not a responsible statement. It was just an idle talk. It wouldn’t worry the Sudanese people as a whole. This is because, here is a portion of the country that somebody who claims to be the Prime Minister for the whole country, consciously programmes the extermination of people he claims to lead. No wonder, events like the Dhain massacre, and the massacre in Wau go to support such threats. In fact, one would say the Prime Minister is not only expressing threats but is actually doing it, if he is not attempting to do it. It is upon the Sudanese people to take necessary measures in order to rid the Sudan of this cancer. If the Prime Minister is talking about exterminating this or that tribe, then he needs not be reminded that nobody is going to be exterminated while lying down. Because if it comes to extermination, it will no longer be the Dinkas to fight against such mad ideas but the rest of the Sudanese people will struggle against the implementation of such ideas. The Sudanese people needless to say, the Dinkas included have the will and stand to do this.

Q: 20 Some Sudanese are saying that the war you are waging in the south is hindering development and progress in the whole country and particularly in the north. They go as far as suggesting that it would be better for the two parts of the Sudan to form two separate states in order to accelerate rapid development. What is your brief comment on this statement?
A: It is true the war is hindering development in our country. The question one should ask before answering this question is the development for Who? The Sudanese people have not benefited from whatever development there was. We are fighting first for a new Sudan in which all the Sudanese people all nationalities will be one people. Having achieved this objective, we will surely benefit from that development. So the development that we are hindering or which is being hindered by the war could mean development for the small clique in Khartoum. We are happy that the Chevron Oil Company operations have been stopped because the development that might have been made as a result of the oil revenue would have not benefited the Sudanese people. It would have only benefited the Nimeiri system thereby prolonging his dictatorial rule. If the oil had been prospected and refined under Nimeiri’s rule, he would have not been overthrown. The same thing can be said about the Jonglei Canal.
So, to answer your question, I would say, yes, development is being hindered in order to achieve higher objectives, which we strongly believe will result into faster development for the benefit of all.
Development is in fact being hindered because of the war and we are going to continue to hinder it until higher goals are achieved.

Q: 21 What about the assertion that it would be better for the south to separate so as to accelerate socio-economic development in the northern Sudan?
A: Separation of any part of the Sudan is not in our objectives. We are fighting for a united new Sudan and will fight against anybody who wants to dismember the Sudan, be they southerners or northerners.
I am aware that there are some people in Khartoum who say that (al harab bigha ghali) the war has become very expensive and that it would be better to give the south independence or let the south go. This is ridiculous because nobody has the right to give independence to anybody in this country. Giving independence is not like a cup of tea, one can give to someone and say, have it, it is yours. No, it does not work like that. “Bene wa benak” (between me and you who has the power in his hands in Khartoum to give the south independence? It is my conviction that nobody has this right and I don’t think that the talk about giving the south independence is a serious matter. It might be a mere propaganda being played up by certain individuals who want Sadiq El Mahdi to unite what they call the Arab north against the so called, African south.
Even if the southerners want to secede, I can assure you that nobody will in this country give them the chance to take such a step. In brief secession is not in our objectives and we, in the SPLM, will fight any ideas or actions aimed at dismembering the Sudan.

Q: 22 Reports coming out of the Southern Sudan indication that towns are being razed to the ground and much property being destroyed. Who is doing this destruction?
A: When there is fighting, things get destroyed on both sides. The aim of the war in fact is to make the other side non-combatant. You simply make him non-combatant by disarming him. If things get destroyed, it is because the destructions are the effects of the war.

Q: 23 It is almost three years now and the people have been talking about convening of the national constitutional conference. There are indications that suggest that it may or may not take place soon. What in your view are the obstacles impeding the progress towards the conference?
A: The main obstacle hindering the convening of the constitutional conference is, what I would call entrenched sectarianism in Khartoum. In fact, Sadiq El Mahdi and his group do not want to go to the National Constitutional Conference. When Nimeiri was overthrown, the SPLM and the Sudanese political forces in the country were in dialogue among themselves. These dialogue culminated in the Koka Dam Declaration. The Umma Party was a signatory to the Koka Dam Declaration. Instead of implementing it, Sadiq El Mahdi began to say that the two parties, the DUP and NIF, are not a party to the Koka Dam Declaration.
Instead of working with the rest of the political forces in order to convince the other two parties, from the alliance, Sadiq took an awkward position and began to assert that the DUP and NIF are not a part to the Koka Dam Declaration and that it would not only be implemented but not honoured.
It is our view that if the Prime Minister is serious about holding of the National Constitutional Conference, it should have been his responsibility and all of us who were involved in the Koka Dam, to convince the DUP and NIF to join the Alliance. This is an indication that the Umma Party and Sadiq in particular is not interested in the convening of the Constitutional Conference. Despite this he himself appears to be interested in the conference. The second indication is that as soon as Sadiq came to power in 1986 he began to talk about a national committee instead of implementing the Koka Dam Declaration. In fact there was no need to have another national committee since a 12 men liaison committee formed by the Koka Dam Assembly from among the members of the parties and political forces who attended the meeting, including the SPLM, was already in existence. Our reaction to the call by the Prime Minister for a national committee was that there was no need to have another committee when we already have a format forum for discussing the national issues.
So, when we shot down the plane over Malakal, the Prime Minister took the advantage of the incident and declared the SPLA as a terrorist organisation with which he will never talk. He even forbade other political forces from contacting us. This was very unfortunate because these actions were actions of somebody who is not interested in the convening of the national constitutional conference and the peaceful settlement of our problems. It is true we shot down a plane. In a war situation things get shot. People get shot. Tanks get shot and planes get shot. In our situation, we had given warnings that we would shoot down any aircraft flying over the airspace under our control because Khartoum was using civilian aircrafts to ferry military equipment to its besieged garrisons in the south. However, despite this warning, a plane was sent. Be that as it was, one would say that, what we shot down was the plane. But what Sadiq shot down was the whole peace process. If we are criminals then Sadiq is more a criminal than us.
So, that was about the Koka Dam. The other problem, which impeded the process toward the constitutional conference was the Prime Minster’s attitude towards the said conference. Sadiq El Mahdi has been putting obstacles after obstacles so that the National Constitutional Conference does not take place under the terms of Koka Dam Declaration. So, he terminated the peace talks. Other incidences, including the seven Bishops’ peace Mission to Addis. Of course, when a person close to you dies, there is a period of mourning and then after that life is to continue normally. So, when Sadiq was mourning the plane the funeral could not go on indefinitely. So, the Bishops came to break the stalemate of not talking to one another about the peace process and I believe they had the blessing of the Prime Minister. We met the Bishops, discussed with them, and we assured them about our willingness and eagerness to talk peace. After we talked with them we issued a joint communiqué!
After they returned home Sadiq did not see it necessary to meet the Bishops in order to brief him about their peace mission.
The third indication to show the Prime Minister’s reluctance to the holding of the constitutional conference is the declaration of the state of emergency. So we have now triple emergencies: The first state of emergency was declared by Nimeiri; when Sowar El Dahab came he imposed his state of emergency without first repealing the one imposed by Nimeiri; when Sadiq came, he too declared his own. These, to my mind, are obstacles impeding the constitutional conference. In order to have conducive atmosphere for peace talks the state of emergency should be lifted at least in the north where there is no war. If the state of emergency is not lifted what is the use of talking about the Sudan as being an example of democracy.
The fourth indication is that recently the National Alliance gave a memorandum to the Prime Minister, Sadiq El Mahdi on the peace process. But he criticised the Alliance for not condemning the SPLA. When one is engaged in the search for peace, and is determined to hold dialogues with the parties concerned there is no sense in insisting that the other party to the conflict be condemned. In fact there are many things that can be condemned about Khartoum, e.g. the barbaric incidences like the Dhain Massacre and the Wau killing of many innocent civilians.
The fifth indication to prove that the Khartoum Government is not interested in the present search for peace is that, when the African Parties came to meet us about the peace process, we agreed and issued a joint communiqué calling for the convening of the national constitutional conference. Instead of blessing the African Parties’ peace initiative, the Prime Minister went on record to condemn those who took part in the delegation. He condemns the Addis Ababa Peace Forum, the Kampala Quest for Peace and the Nairobi Search For Peace Communiqués, before these parties could return to Khartoum. He even threatened that he would dismiss the Ministers from the Council of the South who took part in these conferences before they could explain their position. He wants to dismiss the people who came to prepare the ground for the national peace conference. This again is an indication for lack of seriousness on the part of the Prime Minister in regard to, the holding of the national constitutional conference. I understand from some of the African Parties’ members that when they moved in the Parliament sometime back, the idea of forming a parliamentary committee to explore ways and means of bringing about peace in our country and to re-initiate contacts with the SPLM, the motion was defeated by the Prime Minister’s own Party.
The last point is my talk with him. I told him when we were parting that “Mr. Prime Minister, if I were you, I would, on arrival at Khartoum Airport, announce that I am implementing the Koka Dam Declaration. “If you do this, Mr. Prime Minister, I assure you I will declare a cease-fire the following day.” This was a challenge to him and I expected him, as a statesman, if he is one, to take it up seriously. I told him not to worry about what the DUP and NIF would think or do. I also told him to scrap the Islamic Sharia because it was not enacted by any Act of Parliament but by a mad dictator called Nimeiri. I told him not to stick to state of emergency and Sharia because they were not his responsibility. I told him that whatever the DUP and NIF opposition were, their voices were being drowned by those Sudanese, who have been suffering and who want peace. I also told him that I knew what he was going to do despite my advice. He asked me how I knew it? I told him that I was reading his mind because he was sectarian in thinking. “You are going to intensify the war with the hope that you will defeat SPLA. Or at least bring it to manageable size and then hold your version of the National Constitutional Conference.
So to sum up my answer to your question, I would say that the above facts are the main obstacles impeding the convening of the constitutional conference because the Prime Minister wants to convene it when it suits him and when he is the initiator of such a conference.
So, when the Parliamentary group want to initiate the peace talks, he says no, when the Church leaders want to initiate the talks he says no; if the SPLM wants to initiate peace talks he says no, and when we want to hold the conference through the Koka Dam Declaration, he says no… Instead he declared the state of emergency. The blame is therefore on the Prime Minister, who wants to hold the constitutional conference when it best suits him but not when it best suits the Sudanese people.

Q: 24 The recent peace offensive which resulted in the Addis Ababa peace forum, the Kampala quest for peace, and the Nairobi search for peace communiques is being seen in certain quarters as an attempt by the SPLM leadership to rally the Africa countries behind the SPLA so as to enable it fight against the Arab north? Do you agree with this sort of speculation?
A: The Addis Ababa Peace Forum, the Kampala Quest For Peace and the Nairobi Search For Peace meetings were in fact aimed at attempt to re-initiate the peace talks which were brought to a halt following the last Malakal plane incident in order to keep the ball of peace rolling despite the Prime Minister’s opposition. Our view in this regard is that if the Prime Minister and his party do not want to talk peace with us, we can talk with many other Sudanese political parties who are willing to talk with us. So, we have started to talk with African parties and will be in contact with those political forces that are ready and willing to join the peace talks we have already started. I do not therefore agree with the speculations that the recent peace offensive aimed at attempt to rally African countries to support us in the war we are fighting. These countries are poor and would be senseless to involve them in our own conflict. Moreover, they have their own problems. However,!
we have never sought any military assistance or any other support from these countries. We simply went to Addis, to Kampala and Nairobi purely to search for peace.

Q: 25 There have been some talks about the SPLA reconciliation with the Anya Nya II, are there attempts to do the same with other militias, that all Sudanese concentrated their efforts in the ongoing search for peace with less friction and quarrels?
A: Besides reconciling with Anya Nya Two, we want to come to terms with all the peace loving Sudanese including those who are opposed to our cause. In the light of this we are trying to reconcile with all the militias that have been unleashed against us and against the innocent and helpless Sudanese. We are trying to reconcile with them because we want to show them that fighting the SPLA on the side of the Sudanese Government is not in their interest nor is it in the interest of all the Sudanese people in general. The Messeryia, the Baggara Arabs of the Southern Kordofan and Darfur for example have for centuries been co-existing with the Dinka sharing pastures and the water of River Kiir (Bahr El Arab). There had been, of course, conflicts between the Dinka and the Messeryia over the pastures and water of River Kiir throughout the history of their co-existence but they were able to device successful ways and means of how to contain those conflicts. But the introduction!
of the Murahelin forces of the tribal militia by Nimeiri, promoted by Sowar El Dahab and fully implemented by Sadiq El Mahdi, has complicated the matters in the area, as this has injected a political element into what were essentially traditional conflicts. In our view the introduction of tribal militias to fight the SPLA on behalf of the Government is not in the interest of the tribes that are being involved in the conflict that is not theirs. We have been trying telling these government sponsored Messeryia militias that while they are fighting the SPLA their godfathers are sitting in Khartoum peacefully not being affected by the war. We told them that the Prime Minister and those who support them do not have cattle that will die in case there is no water and pastures. We do hope that these compatriots, who have been misled into believing that they can defeat the SPLA on behalf of the national army, will refrain from being used by the Khartoum politicians and to resume their normal traditional life.
So to answer your question, I am glad to say that efforts are being made to contact all the militia men in order to reach a peaceful settlement with them. In fact we have already started contact with the Messeryia Murahelin forces so as to come to terms with them. We are also looking forward to organise meetings with all the tribes that share the water of River Kiir. Similarly, we are talking with the Mundari Militia men and have gone a long way into making full settlement with them. The good news is that most of the Mundari Militia men have already joined the SPLA. The Ismail Konyi Militia had already been incorporated into the SPLA except for about 150 who had run to Malakal together with Ismail himself when Pibor fell into the hands of SPLA. In fact after the fall of Pibor we went on a political campaign in Murle villages and managed to win over 1,000 Konyi’s Militia men who are now part of the SPLA forces. In regard to the Fertit Militia we are exerting efforts to bring peace between them and the Jur-Luo on one hand and between them and the Dinka on the other hand. I am glad to inform you that we have succeeded to restore peace between the Murle and the Anyuak between the Nuer and the Dinka Bor and between the Dinka and Toposa who have been fighting one another for many years. These efforts to reconcile the tribes have been going on, are going on and will continue to go on until complete peace and stability is established all over the region.

Q: 26 Since you launched the SPLAM you have not visited any Arab country. You did not even ask either for military or humanitarian assistance. If what I have said is correct, will you not agree with the people who think that you are fighting for the liberation of the Africans of the Sudan from Arab domination?
A: As I have said some where in this discourse, there are people who insist and take pride in trying to play up the differences between the peoples of African stock and the peoples of Arab origins, in this country, the differences which were essentially imposed by certain circumstances. Those who try to play up these differences want to perpetuate them for their political gains. If these were not their intentions, they would not continue to ignore the fact that we are not fighting for the Africans only in the Sudan. We have been on records since we launched the Revolution that we are fighting for the whole Sudan. If there are some compatriots who still doubt our intention to fight for the whole country, I would tell them that time has come for them to recognise this fact and begin to approach us from that perspective, and sooner they do this the better it will be for the interest of the peace and the stability of our people.
It is indisputable that it was Libya, which gave us our only foreign assistance. As regard to the allegation that I have never visited any Arab countries, I can say that this is not true. I was in Tripoli for eleven days in 1984. Moreover the first country that gave us our only foreign assistance was Libya. I was also in Aden for six days at the same time when the Sudanese Minister of Defence Osman Abdalla was visiting the Democratic Republic of Yemen. I sent a delegation to Egypt and was met by President Hosni Mubarak. Egypt was therefore the third country we had contacted. We did also had contact with Jordan. They wrote to us one time and we replied them. So, you can see that we are in contact with Arab countries. The allegation is therefore not true. We are not fighting for the Africans in the Sudan.

Q: 27 Officials of the Sudan govt. strongly believe that you are not going to win this war because your constituency, the Southern Sudan is not behind you as was the case with AnyaNya movement. They also believe that the continuation with the war is just an adventure on your part. What will you say about this assertion?
A: That we have a support, a popular support in the Southern Sudan is not just a claim, but a fact that does not need lecturing to people about it. In fact who does not know that we have the support in the South? If there are some people who say that we do not have support in the South it is not because they believe in what they are saying but do not intend to admit the reality of the situation. We do have support in the South otherwise people would have not been joining the SPLA in their thousands. The fact that tens of thousands of people are joining us daily is a simple indication that we do have and continue to enjoy a popular support in the Southern Sudan. An out-standing indication to support our claim that we have a popular support is that we out-lived Nimeiri’s regime; we had out-lived Sowar El Dahab; we had out-lived Sadiq one, Sadiq two and we will definitely out-live Sadiq three. As a matter of facts, those who think and believe that we do not have a popula!
r support are either not following the events that are taking place in the war theatre or want to mislead the public opinion away from us in order to buy time… In short, I would like to affirm to you that we do have a popular support in the South.
What I would like to underline or correct at this juncture is that our constituency is not the Southern Sudan our constituency is the Sudan as a whole and we have never been vague about it. We have been saying it over and again that we are not fighting because of the so-called problem of the Southern Sudan but for the creation of a new Sudan; a Sudan that is free of exploitation, oppression and abuse of human rights; a Sudan where every body is equal before the law, a Sudan where all citizens do enjoy equal rights; a Sudan that does not chop off the limbs of citizens who commit crimes as a matter of survival. The whole Sudan is therefore our constituency. The fact that we happened to have started the Sudan Peoples Revolution in the South of the country, does not deny us our pledge to liberate the Sudan from circumstances of exploitation and oppression. That the South is a starting point where the people’s revolution was launched is important. But all the same our constituency remains the whole Sudan. The proof is that we are gaining more and more support as the war moves northwards; and are convinced that we will in the end win the support of the rest of the regions of the Sudan.

Q: 28 THE SPLM APPEAL TO THE WORKERS, PEASANTS, SOLDIERS AND INTELECTUALS HAVE MADE MANY PEOPLE THINK THAT YOUR MOVEMENT IS MARXIST-LENINIST ORIENTED AND THAT YOUR CLAIM THAT YOU ARE A NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT IS JUST A MERE CAMOUFLAGE. WHAT IS YOUR REACTION TO THIS ARGUMENT?

A: When the SPLM addresses itself to the Sudanese people, it is appealing to the majority of the Sudanese and the majority of the workers, peasants, soldiers and intellectuals. This is the spectrum of the Sudanese people. Those who are left out of the spectrum, may be, are the two families namely the Mahdi and the Mirghani families and their supporters who have been exploiting the Sudanese people for the last thirty-one years. So, you can see the appeal itself cannot make us Marxist or Leninist, as many people would like to describe us. As you have rightly said before, our appeal is primarily to the exploited and the down trodden members of our public, the peasants, the workers, the soldiers and the intellectuals. Those who prefer to call us communist do not seem to understand what communism is all about. Essentially, communism in its classical sense socialises Capital. In Southern Sudan for instance, there is no capital to be socialise. Even if our movement wants to go Marxist-Leninist, it cannot, because the conditions just are not there now as there is no capital to socialise in the Southern Sudan. Frankly speaking our immediate problem is not what ideology should be adopted in the Sudan. Our main concern is the creation of a new Sudanese nation. We must build a nation before we concern ourselves with other matters. In fact, the political power in Khartoum since 1956 has been in the hands of the two family parties; (the Umma, DUP) and the National Islamic Front with its confusionist tactic of using religion as its constituency. The Khartoum regimes had for a long time exploited and neglected the majority of the Sudanese, the peasants and the workers just to mention a few. They do not effectively participate in the government of their country. The economic development on the other hand is being geared toward the interest of these two families and their parties without considering the interests of the majority of the Sudanese
people.
The SPLM is not therefore fighting in order to import a foreign ideology into the Sudan. Rather, we are fighting for a new system that will speed up economic development and equitable distribution of our vast national and natural resources, which had for a long time been neglected. Indeed our resources are quite vast. We have a potential Agricultural land of about 20 million acres. Less than 15 millions of this land, are under cultivation.
We have vast oil and minerals resources; we have enough water and fish resources in addition to potential hydro-electric power. At this juncture, I would like to state we are going to spare no efforts to rid the Sudan of a system based on sectarianism, on racism, on religion, on family and to establish a national democratic government that is well equipped to accelerate the development of these resources for the benefit of our people and within a united Sudan. These are our objectives.
To come back to your question, I would say that we are in a process of a nation formation. We are going to rejuvenate the Sudan and make it a nation that is proud of itself, a Sudan that is not just a mere bridge between the Arab and the African worlds as it has been described. This in our view will be a very dirty bridge. Of course, when people walk on a bridge, it is bound to be dirty. So we do not want the two family-parties to continue to walk on the Sudanese people be they Arabs or African. In short, we want to build a nation that will be proud of itself, that will make its rightful contribution both in African and the Arab world and in the world at large. This is the objective we want to achieve.

Q: 29 FROM WHAT YOU HAVE JUST SAID, IT DOES SEEM THAT YOUR MOVEMENT HAS AN IDEOLOGY BUT YOU WANT TO DEFER IT TO SOME LATER STAGE OF YOUR STRUGGLE. DON’T YOU THINK THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR YOU TO COME UP WITH A DEFINITE IDEOLOGY SO THAT THE SUDANESE PEOPLE CAN BE ABLE TO JUDGE WHETHER YOUR MOVEMENT IS A LIBERAL, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC OR MARXIST? WHAT IS YOUR FEAR?

A: We are not deferring our ideology as you have said, for some later stage of our struggle. We have been saying it and are on record about the type of system we want to establish in the Sudan. But if some people fail to recognise it, it may be because they do not want to recognise what we have been saying about what we want. We have said it many times, in our literature and some of my speeches that we want to form a new Sudan, and of course the formation of new Sudan itself must have basis. At present the basis for the new Sudan are being created, and this is something you Sudanese intellectuals must look into, find out the factors that bring us together and to build on it. In fact our history did not begin with the British colonialism, or the Turkish intrusion into our country; nor did it start with the coming of Islam or the rise of the Mahdia. It did not either begin at the 1947 Juba Conference or in 1955 when a garrison in Torit revolted. We believe that the hi!
story of the Sudanese people dates back to many thousand years. We have, therefore, been here all along. When some people talk about the ancient Egyptian civilisation, ancient Egypt or the Pharonic Egypt, one should answer the question as to who were these people and where they went… This is us, we got displaced. We got pushed down and down. We must rise up a proud nation that can look after itself.

Q: 30 ASSUMING THAT YOU HAVE SUCCEDED TO FORM A NEW SUDAN WITH YOU AS ITS LEADER, WHAT IN YOUR OPINION, WOULD BE THE BEST SYSTEM UNDER WHICH THE NEW COUNTRY WILL BE GOVERNED?

A: Obviously, Sudan is a vast country, the big great country, I would say, in Africa. As such it cannot be ruled exclusively from the centre. The power must of course be devolved to the regions. You may call them regions or federal states. This is however just semantic. What is important in this regard, is the content of the devolution of power to the people for the purpose of administration and economic development in the regions or states; the intention of which is, of course, to take the government to the grassroots: the grassroots to effectively to participate in the development of the country and they in turn benefit from this development. So, the structure of the rule or the power structure, must be decentralised, with of course, the central government in the national capital in Khartoum or some other place, that can be selected as the capital of the whole country.

Q: 31 IN REGARD TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, WHAT TYPE WOULD YOU RECOMMEND, THE CENTRALISED ECONOMY OR THE OPEN MARKET ECONOMY?

A: You know there are certain things that can best be done by individuals and there are others, which must be done collectively. Like wise there are many projects that can best be managed by the central government others by the regional or local governments. Given our vast mineral and other natural resources, there is no way that an individual can for instance, develop and run a hydro-electric plant. A project of this kind can best be managed by a central government or regional governments. In the same way heavy industries can be run by central government. The establishment of schools and hospitals can be carried out by the central authority, as well as by regional authorities. Private schools and clinics, can be opened by individuals. Co-operative societies are areas in which groups of persons can be involved for the benefit of the people. So, you see you can have private enterprises run by individuals, you can have co-operative societies run by a group of people, !
you can have regional corporations but you must have central government institutions.
So, if you look at all these things, you cannot make a clear cut answer as to say, at the present moment, what type of economic order or development one can predict will be best for our country. Once we have succeeded to achieve our objectives, our experts will have to sit down and sort out the best ways of accelerating the economic development in our country.

Q: 32 CAN YOU ENLIGHTEN US AS TO HOW YOU ADMINISTER THE TOWNS AND AREAS UNDER YOUR CONTROL?

A: We administer the liberated towns and areas through committees. There are village committees, town committees and district committees. We will have provincial committees when we move to the cities. These committees are responsible for the administration of the villages, towns and the areas under our control. When we liberate a District we have to set up an administrative machinery to over see public as well as inter-personnel matters. We also have District Councils, which have various functions such as education, veterinary, agriculture, judiciary and medical services. All these services are supervised by an administrator. Besides we have District Councils and the District Political-Military High Command. A District Council is composed of members elected by the village committees. The District Council is headed by an Administrator. The present Administrator of Pibor for example, is Mr. Clement Katinya, a former administrator in Malakal. He replaced Mr. Ater Dak who has been transferred to the Headquarters. We give some military training in our military and political schools. They participate in battles before they are posted to run the liberated areas. All the administrative structure is under an Area Commander who heads the District Military-Political High Command. The District High Command is the policy making body as well as the executive organ in a District. The District Administrator is a member of the District High Command. The political officer, the intelligence officer and the members of the District councils are also members of this policy making body. In summery, it is through this process that we run the administration in the liberated areas.

Q: 33 DO YOU INTEND TO ESTABLISH A GOVERNMENT ONCE YOU HAVE LARGER AREAS UNDER YOUR CONTROL?

A: Well, it depends on what you mean by a government. What I have described above is a form of government. Of course, we don’t call it a government. We call it a provisional administration. In other words we do not have a government in a sense that this is a ministry of education, a ministry of health or a ministry for agriculture. We just set up an administration from the grassroots to provide services and other development activities. Coming from the base, we are essentially establishing an administration as we go along with the liberation of the whole country. But we do not have a government in the sense you might have conceived in your mind or in the conventional sense. We are not therefore going to declare that we have a government.

Q: 34 JUDGING FROM THE EVENTS THAT HAVE BEEN TAKING PLACE IN OUR COUNTRY DURING THE LAST FOUR YEARS, ONE WOULD BE BOUND TO CONCLUDE THAT THE WAR YOU ARE WAGING AGAINST THE SUDAN GOVERNMENT MAY, IF IT IS NOT BROUGHT TO A SPEEDY END, LEAD THE SUDAN INTO A LEBANESE-LIKE SITUATION. WHAT IN YOUR VIEW CAN BE DONE IN ORDER TO AVOID THE LEBANESE EXPERIENCE?

A: It will be very unfortunate if we go in for a Lebanese-like situation in which all factions in the country are fighting one another indiscriminately. I am sure nobody among the peace-loving Sudanese would like to see us follow the Lebanese experience where the warring factions do not differentiate friends from enemies. However, we cannot dismiss the fact that we have some bad elements in our society who would like to Lebanise the Sudan. These people are there and will do all kinds of things to instigate and promote sectarian ideas and actions that will push us into a Lebanese-like situation. Of course, we would not allow this to happen.
To answer your question…what can be done to avoid Lebanising the Sudan, my only advice is that first, all Sudanese political forces and the Sudanese people at large must fight against any attempt to Lebanise our country. We must also fight against attempts to implement them. In our view the only way to avoid any disastrous approach to Sudanese problem, is to hasten the process of dialogue and to restore peace in our country as soon as possible. The restoration of peace is of vital importance if we are to concentrate all our efforts on the development of our human and natural resources. This will, of course, demand that the current war be brought to a speedy end. We should not have a cause for quarrel because we are a large country with huge untapped resources enough for all of us.
The second thing that must be done if we are to avoid disastrous approach to our problems is for the Sudanese to get rid of sectarianism, racial and religious discriminations as well as the system based on a family rule. These factors must be eradicated immediately because they have bled our country for the last thirty-one years of its political independence. Regrettably, Sudan has not known peace since it obtained its political independence. There was the 17 years old war, there was the nine years of uneasy peace, then came the Anya Nya Two war. It is now going to be five years since the SPLA started the present war. Finally, the Sudanese people must realise that we have been at war with one another precisely because while some of us are trying to establish a multi-nationality and multi-religious society, there are others who are trying to create a mono-nationality and mono-religious nation. In our view we must get rid of these factors because they have been responsible for the three-decade-old instability in our country. Indeed, thirty-one years of instability is a long period in the history of a nation. We must therefore draw useful lessons from our immediate history to recognise the fact that the above factors cannot advance our cause. On the contrary they are responsible for our continued disunity. These factors left unresolved will never make us build a united and proud nation. In order to avoid the Lebanese experience, we must create a conducive atmosphere for the building of a new Sudan; a Sudan that is free of all forms of discriminations; a Sudan of equality and justice; a Sudan that is a home for all of us.

CONFIDENTIAL REPORT

On the Joint meeting of the SPLM/A leadership Council, General Military Command Council, Heads of Commissions, SPLM Secretariats, SPLM County Secretaries, Civil Society & Community Leaders.

RUMBEK 29TH OF NOVEMBER TO 1ST OF DECEMBER 2004

DAY 1 Opening Prayer: Rev. Clement Janda
Introduction: Cdr. Dr. Riek Machar
Briefing: Cdr. Salva Kiir Mayardit

Introduction

Cdr. Dr. Riek Machar Thanked Cdr. Mark Nyipuoch, Cdr. Dr. John Garang and the other participants and announced the beginning of the meeting, which had been ordered by the Chairman. The first part of the meeting comprised of the leadership council, the Secretariats, and the members of the General Staff. The second part was composed of the members of IGAD team, and the Commissioners and Secretaries of the SPLM.

In the opening of the meeting the Chairman Cdr. Dr. John Garang, thanked members of the SPLM/A national leadership Council and welcomed all the participants who traveled to Rumbek. ‘I thank you in the name of the Almighty God. To begin with I wrote two messages:

One on 14/11/004 (No. 001/11/004) to address the following accusations/rumours;
• That there was a meeting held in Nairobi under the Chairmanship of myself where Cdr. Salva Kiir would be replaced by the Chairman with Cdr. Nhial Deng.
• That I went to Kampala and met with Cdr. Pieng and ordered him to arrest Cdr. Salva Kiir Mayardit.
• That Cdr. Malual Majok went to Ramciel to collect forces to go and arrest Cdr. Salva Kiir Mayardit at Yei.

They are all lies and a big propaganda initiative.

The second message was on 23/11/04 calling for this meeting which we are now convening today and where I want to make a general briefing about the signing of peace next month in which each and every one should be informed accordingly.

Cdr. Machar then welcomed Cdr. Salva Kiir Mayardit to brief the national leadership meeting where he welcomed the Chairman and C-in-C and the national leadership. ‘I confirm the two messages read to you by the Chairman are all true. The rumours came from Nairobi and around the leadership of the SPLM/A. The second message I got was through Cdr. Pagan Amum who was visiting the liberated areas with friends from friendly countries. I requested Cdr. Mabior Kuer to ask the HQs why I am not talking directly to the Chairman. I spoke to the Chairman when he was in Kampala and he told me that I should meet him in Yirol, which I didn’t reply to in the light of the rumours.

The rumours implied that I will be arrested at Ramciel where the Chairman was, so I decided not to go. When I received that rumour, I called the security personnel in Yei and discussed the issue in length with them. I also informed them to find out where the sources of the rumours from Nairobi were coming from, which they did.

After I spoke with the Chairman, I also met Cdr. Pieng in Yei for the whole day and he was advising me to join the Chairman in Yirol, which I refused. After that I met Cdr. Kuol Manyang and Cdr. Deng Alor. They came from Nairobi with information that I should go to Nairobi for reconciliation between the two of us. I considered the word reconciliation as something very serious, and therefore decided to tell them that I will not go to Nairobi. The HQs of the Chairman complained that they were calling me and that if I recognized their number, I would switch off the telephone. That is not true; I never received any call from them and switch off my telephone.

I assure you that the allegation that I am against peace is not true. I am really for peace so that the International Community could rescue our suffering people. People of Bahr El Ghazal have suffered too much from repeated famine and from the Arab militias – and for these reasons I am the first to embrace peace to relief them from suffering. Peace efforts such as the Wunlit Peace Conference have up to date ceased hostilities between Western Upper Nile and Bahr El Ghazal; and that is good. So I need peace. There are those who want to create confusion in the Movement and fabricate such things. I don’t have personal problem with the Chairman.

If we are National Leaders, which I don’t believe we are because we have no cohesion within our leadership structure, let us be sincere with ourselves. After meetings are concluded, we run to foreign countries. There is no code of conduct to guide the Movement’s structures. When the Chairman leaves for abroad, no directives are left and no one is left to act on his behalf. I don’t know with whom the Movement is left with; or does he carry it in his own brief case?

The Chairman killed the national Executive Council (NEC) by creating the leadership Council. But there is no provision in the Convention for a ‘Leadership Council’. Does he want to revive the Political Military High Command? The Leadership Council creates a situation where all are directly reporting to the Chairman – including SPLM County Secretaries. When I mentioned these facts, they should not be construed to be my personal or family problems. Those around the Chairman don’t tell him the opinion of the public. The Chairman is everything, from a finance officer to one at the lowest level.

Corruption, as a result of the lack of structures, has created a lack of accountability which has reached a proportion that will be difficult to eradicate.

In fact, there are many outstanding administrative problems that require our attention. These include the infrequent converting of conferences at the leadership level, causing an absence in the SPLA/M chain of command and making others to directly communicate with the Chairman without following the right procedures. This should be corrected. If the responsibility of Governors goes directly to the Chairman, what will be the work of Cdr. Daniel Awet? I hope Cdr. Daniel Awet will address all those things. The Chairman should not make appointments of SPLM County Secretaries; it is the work of the Governors.

The other issue I would like Comrade Chairman to address is how the CANS structures are now operating, e.g., take the absence of the SPLM Regional Secretary for Bahr El Gazal from his area of responsibility while there has been sporadic tribal feuds within the region – and which has resulted into sectional conflict. The Chairman most of the time send Cdr. Deng Alor on foreign missions which were supposed to be the work of Cdr. Nhial Deng.

There are several other administrative issues that require correction. We are three Deputies without functions. The Chairman is responsible for all systems including the Army General Headquarters. Our HQs. started in Yei, then Rumbek, then new Cush and now Ramciel. When are we going to establish our HQs? The deputies of the General Staff are the ones commanding the forces; they should stay in the General Headquarters instead of commanding. Yet the Chairman is the one who dismantled the General Headquarters. Comrade Chairman, the establishment of the General headquarters hasn’t been fulfilled and this I have been requesting ever since Yei was liberated. Branch officers such as the Director of Military Intelligence and his deputy are now in your Headquarters, though they are supposed to remain at the General Headquarters. The Chairman concentrates on his headquarters forgetting the rest of the army. It is only his headquarters, which has military uniforms, boots and other supplies.

Our present situation requires us to be organized and prepared. If peace is signed, the question is; what have we done in training our military cadres so that they meet the standard of their counterparts in the integrated army. There are rumours that the Chairman had already selected by name those Commanders who would command the Joint Integrated Army. What about the rest of the army and who will pay them? The Chairman seems to have taken the Movement as his own property. As we leave Rumbek after this meeting, I would like to see that all our administrative issues be addressed and implemented following this meeting’s resolutions.

I would also want Comrade Chairman to give me full powers of the Chief of the General Staff (COGS) to enable me expedite the regrouping and reorganization of the SPLA, and if Comrade Chairman sees that I am not able to do that job, then he can appoint another person to do it.

The Chairman is to be 1st Vice-President of the Sudan and the head of the Government of Southern Sudan, but he is not talking to Southerners. The North is organizing southern militias so that we fight among ourselves. We must unite our own ranks and not just unity with the north. On a personal basis, I don’t have any problems with the Chairman but our working relationship is bad and leaves a lot to be desired.

I would also like to say something about rampant corruption in the Movement. At the moment some members of the Movement have formed private companies, bought houses and have huge bank accounts in foreign countries. I wonder what kind of system are we going to establish in South Sudan considering ourselves indulged in this respect.

2nd Session

 Response from the Chairman. I give the floor to the national leadership to comment on what had been said by Cdr. Salva Kiir, I don’t want this to be a debate between Cdr. Salva Kiir and I.

Edward Lino thanked the Chairman and said we are really in need of resolving the problems within the SPLM/A. The people of Abyei are accused of being Dr. John’s supporters and as such, are victimized for that. Cdr. Pieng made an intervention that Cdr. Edward was not addressing the issues.

Cdr. Elijah Malok stated he really supported what Cdr. Salva Kiir said, and recommended that a collective leadership be created. Here in Bahr El Ghazal Cdr. Deng Alor has been away for too long and these are known facts; the leadership council should address and resolve these outstanding issues and go back on the right track. Let us form committees to reorganize the army, since all the units are here. I don’t believe what Cdr. Mayardit said about the people being victimized. Structures are to be recognized right way as a government so let us reorganize them and work in the right way as a government.

Dr. Justin Yac. I will go with the suggestion of Cdr. Pieng that the Chairman response to the issues raised by Cdr. Salva Kiir.

Cdr./Dr. John Garang I will give my contribution to what has been raised; that firstly we need to dispose of rumours. In the whole of South Sudan, there is a general concern from the citizens, and in Yei, the officers and citizens believe there is a danger facing the Movement. We have to clear the danger and give our people assurances.

Cdr. Salva Kiir and I have been together in the movement for 22 years, and have been close friends, and we will continue that way. 22 years of friendship can’t be thrown away by rumours; Cdr. Salva will be with me now until the end of the interim period and beyond, and I will cite what was said when I visited Malual Kon and the “Luak” of the family of Cdr. Salva where I entered the house to show comradeship and a long cherished friendship. At a meeting while visiting there we were told, “You are the two orphans” left because the original members of the High Command died, both of us will carry on to bring peace.

I cited what happened at New Site recently when the Chiefs a ceremony where a bull was sacrificed to show how we are united. At the spiritual performance, one traditional leader said that 4 things will happen:-
1. The bull will urinate.
2. The bull will fall down.
3. The bull will face the North.
4. The bull will die without being slaughtered.

And all the four happened.

The allegation that I was going to dismiss Cdr. Salva and arrest him was not only a lie, but it did not even occur in my mind. I was preoccupied with the peace process and not trying to create a crisis. Before UN Security Council Meeting, I received a telephone call from President Bush who said that he now had those who will work with him during the next four years and that I am one of them. President Bush said, “John don’t let us down. We want peace before the end of the year”.

The allegation that I will be replacing Cdr. Salva was a bad lie. If Cdr. Salva was dismissed and replaced with Cdr. Nhial Deng Nhial, it would mean that I would have dismissed all those senior to Cdr. Nhial which includes Cdr. Riek, Cdr. James, Cdr. Daniel Awet, Cdr. Lual Diing, etc. – which would be bad for the Movement. So this allegation is a lie. The crisis only has the support of our enemies who want a crisis in the Movement. This situation was created by our enemies because they do not want to sign the peace agreement.

The Chairman pointed out that the GOS has never been happy with the protocols, specially the Machakos protocol, because of the self-determination clause. The GOS and their supporters don’t accept the security arrangement and the Wealth Sharing Agreement, which gives the South of Sudan 51%. The Khartoum Government wants to reject the agreement being signed or at least delay it. By delaying in signing, Khartoum will gain $2.5 billion from the oil revenues, which we must prevent by all means possible. Khartoum was unhappy with the Power Sharing and 3 areas protocols. Neither I nor Cdr. Salva had any interest in delaying the peace agreement. I have nothing to gain by dismissing Cdr. Salva.

Finally I have never had any thought of dismissing Cdr. Salva. And it should be considered a lie. This rumour has caused commotion everywhere in Southern Sudan, Khartoum and the Diaspora – so I will assure our people everywhere and send a strong message to Khartoum Government that they will not divide the SPLM/A.

Cdr. Salva and I are innocent of the situation, and four of our leaders will appear in a press conference telling the whole world about our unity and that there is no problem among SPLM/A members. Secondly, I want to assure you of my confidence in Cdr. Salva Kiir Mayardit. My relationship with Cdr. Salva goes back to 1983 – Cdr. Chagai Atem, Kerubino and many others were close to me. I still have personal relationship with Cdr. Salva and I trust and have confidence in him. This is needed now than ever before. I want Cdr. Salva to be around me during the interim period, and beyond.

The Government of Sudan called upon all the Newspapers to stop making allegations against the Movement. So let us put that issue to rest.

Secondly, Cdr. Salva said that I brought all the officers around me, leaving him alone in vacuum. What I can say is that is not true.

On internal reforms, I agree that reforms are necessary. We are all behind them. We have been making reforms since 1983, e.g., the Zonal Command, Political High Command, NLC, NEC, etc.. these structures can be changed but the objective remains the same. Our imperfect structures have brought us to the present day. Let us not throw away these structures now, otherwise we will throw ourselves away.

The Chairman urged the meeting to introduce changes slowly. He said he is for change but slow change. The Chairman reiterated that all SPLM/A members will be protected; he assured all members that no one will be left out. On the issue of new comers who are said to be taking over the Movement, he said we should accept all southerners new or old because there are more southerners than members of the SPLM/A who must be accommodated; but no newcomer will displace anyone who has been with us for years.

On the appointment of Governors; all Governors will be appointed from their respective areas, e.g. in Lakes the Governor here will come from Lakes. As for States, people of each State will form their governments with no marginalization within States.

As for the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS), there will be representation based on the states, fairness and justice. Similarly at the Central Government, there will be State representation. All Governments, whether GOSS or State Governments will be based on modern standardized structures.

The army will be organized based on modern standards. The SPLM will be reorganized democratically. There will be a mult-party system. There will be no need for coup d’etat anymore, so for example my friend Dr. Riek Machar will not need to make a coup because he can form his own party if he is discontented with SPLM.

The issue now is how to achieve a Comprehensive Peace Agreement. After that, the 2nd national Convention will be convened as soon as possible after the peace agreement is signed. The NIF Government is not happy having to sign the agreement on or before 31st December 2004. The Government is not happy with the UN Security Council Resolution1574. The NIF want to create an armed group loyal to them. They also want to create a political group from among southerners to be used by them. We must stop such a move that will create enemies among Southerners to fight among themselves.

South-to-South dialogue must be organized properly, but the leadership has refused outside mediation. I told the European groups about our stand on this. The Power Sharing protocol states that the SPLM will form the Government in the South. The protocol give 15% to non-SPLM/A members and 15% to members of other parties. There will be discussions therefore with Southern parties.

On Civil Society, we need to dialogue with them including the Churches. On top of that, lawyers and other concerned members will write a constitution for Southern Sudan. There will be a constitution for states and the rule of law will be established.

Finally, regarding our vision and strategies; we must continue with our programmes because we are succeeding in the process. I reject the view that there are some of us who are unionists and others separatists within the SPLM/A. There are no such differences among our people. We are all for the unity of Southern people, and the Movement will carry out the referendum. As for members of the Khartoum National Government who have mutinied, there is a group calling themselves SPLM/A members. I told them that we want peace and we don’t want you to be SPLM/A now. I told the group to organize their own independent Movement, and not be associated with SPLM/A.

On the structures the only way to resolve it is through the national Convention, which should be convened as soon as possible.

3rd Session

Cdr. Deng Monydit. Greeted everyone and praised the leaders for coming together. He stated his appreciation of the response given by the leadership; ‘I want to say I am happy to discuss what was about to be stolen from us, and it is not the concern of those in London. This struggle is not the private property of anybody. Whoever says the Movement is his property is wrong, for the movement is for all.

Cdr. Garang Mobil. I thank the leaders. Since 1997 I decided to stay in my house because I did not believe that our problems should be solved by violence. Facts must be stated now in order to solve them once and for all. On the ‘orphans’ there six (6) members who died and only two (2) are left. The question I want to discuss today, is that there is a problem but the Chairman keeps saying there are no problems, only a ‘gap’ between him and Cdr. Salva. He will not accept there are problems in the New Sudan. But if the problem is not solved, there will be no peace. I also want to say that the movement is in the hands of a few and many are alienated. National resources must be shared by all, no matter how small it is. The structures are controlled by a few minority groups, and this must be sorted out now in Rumbek. This minority group is the problem; hand picking people must stop now because it is creating problems.

Cdr. Agassio Akol. There is a problem because many people avoid Cdr. Salva as Deputy Chairman and Chief of the General Staff. The Governors and their deputies bypass Salva and correspond directly with the Chairman of the Movement, which I consider to be outside proper procedure. Cdr. Salva said that in his talks, he raised specific issues which he needed answers on. The Chairman must have failed to answer these issues, otherwise, the talks would have ended. Cdr. Salva said he did not blame anyone but the Chairman. He wanted the Chairman to tell him whether he was wrong or not. For example Cdr. Salva questioned the legitimacy of the leadership Council, as he considered it to be illegal.

The National Convention is unlikely to come soon to solve the problems of our structures; the convention has no importance for now. For Cdr. Salva, structures cannot be done by a Convention. So who is going to organize the army? {Cdr. Mark Nyipuoc intervened by saying a press conference should be made.}

Cdr. Taban Deng Gai. I want to express my appreciation and happiness for this meeting. It is good to discuss issues of this nature, which appear to divide our movement. I want to congratulate the leaders for agreeing to come to attend the meeting. I want to congratulate Dr. Riek, Ayendit and others for the mediation. If we had such mediation in 1991, there would have been no problems that year, and the coup d’etat would not have taken place. This meeting is on internal issues. Those in Khartoum are happy to see the SPLM/A destroyed by Southern interests. But we are now victorious for we have stopped that disaster. As for our system, there are institutions but not functioning ones. The Leadership Council will not take us anywhere. The era of the Political Military High Command is gone. We must have a modern system of government created by the following committees:
1. Committee for the Army;
2. Committee for the Government;
3. Committee for the Judiciary; and
4. The Parliament.

Justice Ambrose Riny. I greet the Leadership and SPLA officers. In 1994 the Convention created institutions. When I talked about the independence of the Judiciary, many officers reacted against it. It was the intervention of the Chairman who permitted the Committee to complete its work. There have been difficulties and roadblocks by those who did not want a system. There have been difficulties in implementing the resolutions. In 2004, the leadership Council was set up to replace the NLC and NEC. The Leadership Council has no legal base to exist. The Chairman dissolved legally instituted organs of the movement as contained in the national convention of 1994, but unilaterally established illegal institutions which are not supported by any legal provisions of the convention thereof.

I want to say that a lot has been done by a few. Most of the things done are imperfect, but they have served us. I appreciate what has been done on South-South dialogue under the SPLM/A Secretary General. The Chairman was supposed to establish a constitutional committee to draft our constitution. We must come together in a place where all departments are residing; there should be one center for the government of SPLM/A to stop all these rumours.

I would like to point out that many members of the movement have lost their ability to sit in an office. I want to point out an incident where a commander told me that what Dr. John or Cdr. Kuol Manyang say ‘up there’ does not work in the South. What kind of a system is this, if it is not respected by its officers? There is no system respected in this movement. I suggest that a committee be formed to organize the army and a conference to inform the world and our supporters that there is no problem from within.

Mama Kezia. I thank both leaders for coming together to discuss all the issues. I was happy with the 1st Vice-Chairman for saying everything in his heart. The rumours outside are bad. Both leaders say it was only a misunderstanding. I appreciate what is happening and I call upon Rev. Clement Janda to bless our conclusion. I agree with the 1st Vice-Chairman that there is something wrong with our system. After the death of the Chairman of my commission, no one has been appointed, and therefore there is no one to report to. For me it took three (3) years to see the leader of the movement. There isn’t a good system. But I think that from now on there will be a system in place.

Cdr. Pieng. Greetings. I will be saying something different; that I have not been happy with our meetings that end without resolutions. I am a revolutionary soldier. I have both military and political interest and if anybody things I don’t have both, he is lying. I am not happy with the response of the Chairman; there are problems to be addressed, and these problems must be solved now.

The Chairman has not committed mistakes; for me, they are unintended mistakes, for the Chairman could not create problems for himself. I mentioned that during the time of Kerubino there were problems. There were rumours that the Chairman was going to throw away his SPLM/A cadres and replace them with people who have not been in the movement since its inception. There must be committees to reorganize the movement; I agree with Cdr. Elijah Malok’s call for a system and committees. When the Chairman goes away on a visit, he never leaves anyone to act where officers should report to.

Cdr. David. Greetings. I blame the Chief of the General Staff for having failed to do anything until now. But nothing is too late; I suggest that the army be organized now. First create a General Command for the SPLA, for there is no army without a General Staff.

Cdr. Oyai Deng. I want to add my voice of being happy to participate in this meeting. When the movement started, you were seven (7) and now you are only two (2) remaining. Some said that you conspired against those who died and now you are conspiring against yourselves. I am shocked to hear Cdr. Salva talk here only about Bahr El Ghazal and not the South in general give he is a leader for all. I strongly agree with Cdr. Salva that when the Chairman goes away, he locks the South in his bag. This is wrong. Cdr. Salva has the right to question anything wrong. There is a problem that must be solved by taking the right decisions.

Cdr. Gier Chuang. I understand what is happening; I didn’t believe that Dr. John will sit near Cdr. Salva again today. I am happy to see this conference. Many people have died due to internal differences and I refer to what had happened in the 1991 crisis. There must be resolutions for all issues, which bring about conflicts; there must be committees established, specially for the SPLA. I also pointed out that during the December 2003 meeting in New Site, there were no representatives from the army. What is a government without an army.

Cdr. James Oath. I greet the gathering. When the movement started you were seven (7) and now you are only two (2) – five died having problems with you (Dr. John). Why do you have problems with your colleagues? The leadership has disabled the movement, so why keep it? Why is there a GMC, because it has never met until now? There is no SPLA ready to fight, and for me there is no army to order. If I am ordered to arrest Cdr. Salva, I do not have an army to arrest anyone. Even the Chief of Staff cannot order me to do anything because there is no army. There is no chance to meet the C-in-C – it will take long time to meet him. This is not good, therefore a committee must be formed now to sort everything out.

Cdr. Oboto Mamur. Greetings. The Chairman always had problems with his colleagues. Now you are two (2) and you are turning against yourselves. Chairman you have been lying throughout since 1983. A Chairman should trust his deputies because there is a big problem here. I ask the Chairman whether he has mandated us to judge him? And if so, we will pass our judgment on him now. We don’t want to talk for the sake of talking. There must be a committee to follow up on all the resolutions agreed on here. And I add, the convention will not solve our problems.

Cdr. George J. Deng. This meeting is a good opportunity to talk today in front of other commanders. The reply by Cdr. John to Cdr. Salva is not convincing at all. My suggestion is that a committee must be formed to organize things right away. There is no longer any army. Therefore a committee has to be formed for the agreement to succeed. I view the SPLA as my home; if the leaders want to go then it is up to them.

Cdr. Malong Awan. Everyone is waiting for the outcome of this dispute. Both leaders therefore should solve their differences. If they don’t solve their differences then they should remain inside this room until the crisis is over. Nor should we blame our enemies for the rumours came from ourselves – we should not blame outsiders. For example Ayen Maguat went to talk to Cdr. Salva. Many from Yei volunteered to go to talk to Cdr. Salva. She complained that Cdr. Wani Igga was in Yei but failed to talk to Cdr. Salva. Instead he went to his village. This was not good leadership and I disagree with Cdr. Wani Igga’s position.

Session 4.

Cdr. Santo Ayang. I thank the communities of Bahr El Ghazal, Bor and the committees that went to Yei. Without them things would have got out of hand. The Chairman must tell us the truth about the source of these rumours. All that was circulated was not rumour, and no one was bribed by the enemy. You tell the world that you brought peace to Sudan, but the reality is that peace was brought about by those who fought for it and died. Those around you only please you and do not tell you the truth. I support the formation of committees suggested by Taban Deng Gai.

Cdr. Ayuen Jongror. The conflict is within the leadership. When conflict arises, it must be resolved immediately. The two of you must be in one place and not in Nairobi and Yei. The style of your leadership is causing lots of problems. The GMC Secretariat was supposed to be formed, but since then, nothing has happened. The GMC should meet to discuss the issues of the army and structures of the Movement must be formed before the convention.

Cdr. Elias Wai. There is fire so we need it not to burn further. Cdr. Salva is not convinced. All are not convinced with the reaction of the Chairman towards issues raised by Cdr. Salva Kiir. The Chairman is placing his relatives in key positions including Elijah Malok, too old, for example, to hold the position of Governor of the Central Bank. Note, there might be popular uprising one day and the army will join the public.

Cdr. Jadalla. We are here to solve our problems. Committees should be formed to investigate the rumours. You think you are the founder of this movement, and as such, that you can do what you want without consulting people? The public is not ready for more problems.

Cdr. Patrick Aitang. We are talking about rumours, but what do we do next? The letter alleged to have been written by Equatorians caused serious tensions. Thanks to Cdr. Salva for salvaging the situation. The ball is now in the court of the Chairman and he should come out with the facts leading up to this dispute. The Chairman should be bold and form the necessary structures.

Cdr. Kitchener. The Chairman and Salva should work together until the end of the liberation struggle. We need leadership to lead us.

Cdr. Ayual Makol. To achieve our objective, we must be united. If the two leaders of the Movement only agree to disagree, then it will lead to internal warfare. Form a committee to investigate the rumours

Cdr. Dominic Dim. I agree that the Leadership Council should be abolished and the commissions replaced by the NEC. The Chairman has locked the NEC in his boxes. Dr. John’s response to Cdr. Salva was neither good nor sufficient. For me, there is still a problem as people still remain suspicious of the Chairman’s intentions. I reiterate that if the problem in question is not resolved, there will be a bigger problem in the Movement. I suggest that the Chairman be clear on resolving this conflict. We should remember how General Swar El Dahab was forced to take over during the crisis at that time. Cdr. Salva was asked by many people to take over, but he refused to do so. I support the formation of committees to restructure the movement and provide us with collective leadership.

Cdr. Bior Ajang. I thank the previous speakers. Cdr. Salva has the right to blame the Leadership Council. The rumours are no longer rumours, but facts as said by Cdr. Salva. There is a problem and that problem should be solved now. I support the formation of committees. What transpired in Yei was the product of two rumours; 1) the arrest of Salva Kiir, and 2) the dismissal of Cdr. Salva Kiir.

Cdr. Salva Kiir gave us the chance and invited us to meet. I thank the bodyguards of Salva for handling the situation very wisely. Dr. John has no powers to dismiss Cdr. Salva because the national Convention elected both of them. I emphasize that rumours do not only originate from Nairobi. Yei is also a source. I support formation of committees.

Cdr. Ismail. We should combat the rumours. It is very unusual for a Deputy Chairman not to have easy access to the Chairman. However, forming committees is another way of avoiding the problem. The explanation of the Chairman hasn’t convinced most of the people nor answered what was raised by Cdr. Salva.

 Cdr. Dau Akec Deng. I thank the 1st Vice-Chairman for his stand.

Lt. Col. Mathiang Rok. This meeting has saved the lives of many people in the South. I would like to quote from Francis Mading’s book; “things that are not said divide people”. The Leadership Council has taken the powers of the NLC. People still doubt the Chairman’s comments were satisfactory. There are many ‘huddles’ in the system, e.g. the Leadership Council has taken up the role of the National Convention. Our main concern is how the structures will be made functional. We are here to bring peace and harmony among ourselves. If there is anything, which is not clear, it should be said now!

Cdr. Chagai Atem. These rumours started in 1994 and I was the chief negotiator between the two. Now they are caught red handed again.

Father George Kinga. I greet and thank the leaders. The four leaders are great and must be respected. The issues are institutional ones. I also support the formation of committees.

Mr. Pascal Babindi. I am happy to have the chance of addressing this important and historic meeting. The restructuring we decided on at the Gorok NLC meeting pushed us ahead. I am confident that the reforms that shall soon be made will also push us ahead.

Cdr. Achol Marial. A committee should be formed to investigate into where those rumours originated from. I appeal to the leadership to mobilize resources prior to the formation of ministries.

Dr. Komanyangi. The formation of committees shall lead to a final solution to all our problems. I suggest that we give ourselves time for these deliberations to continue for one more day so that all issues are exhausted.

Cdr. Simon Kun Pouch. The speakers have not talked on how to combat corruption. The formation of a committee to work out functions for our structures is not really a priority because they already exist, we need only to share power and prepare job descriptions for all the institutions of the movement.

Cdr. James Kok Ruea. A preparatory committee for the Convention should be formed within the shortest time possible. We should work on the structures that will make the Movement function during the interim period as follows: 1) 1st Vice Chairman to chair the GMC, 2) 2nd Vice Chairman to chair the committee for the interim period and 3) 3rd Vice Chairman to chair the committee for National Convention.

Mr. Muhammad Marjan. I believe that the world is looking forward to knowing what our movement will be like once peace is signed and we emerge as a government.

Cdr. Michael Makuei Lueth. There is no need to form a committee to investigate the rumours, which were circulating, unless Cdr. Salva insists that they have never been rumours. I call upon both the Chairman and Cdr. Salva to build confidence between themselves. I assure the Chairman that as we are entering a new era, and if we remain in an unprepared manner, we will eventually be finished. The immediate establishment of our structures is necessary. The distribution of powers is also necessary. The army must be organized. There is also the importance of speeding up South-South dialogue before we enter the forthcoming era. The other issue is corruption. I am saying that the leadership is not committed to fighting corruption. I am against the suggestion that there should be a committee for the army’s reorganization. It is for the COGS, his deputies, and the directors to sit at the GHQs and issue orders according to the plans they set. The national Liberation members sh!
ould not blame the Chairman alone. In Gorok, the NLC gave the Chairman a blank cheque to restructure the movement, and that was when things started to go wrong.

DAY 2

Session 1

Opening remarks by the Master of ceremony after prayers noted that the present meeting has come out in the internet; and a warning was given to those who might have done so.

Mr. Kosti Manibe. I want to add my voice to those who have already spoken. I express my appreciation to those concerned for having resorted to peace negotiations and to end the conflict through dialogue. I am happy that the 1991 disaster has been avoided. I acknowledge the existence of gaps in the system and I call upon the leaders to address the communication needs. I stress the need for media to send accurate messages to our people, enemies, etc.. The Movement should have a capacity for communication to deal with the media when required. I point out that a lot has been achieved – 90% of the objectives have been achieved. There are structures, but a lot of work requires to be done

The JAM’s programme on capacity building should be followed. Functions will be set out. On policy issues, I suggest that a lot remains to be done to build confidence in our system and institutions. I suggest that there is a need to form a small committee to look into the minutes of this meeting and to identify the crucial issues that needs resolutions as soon as possible. Such information should be disseminated.

Cdr. John Luke. I am happy that the rumours have been resolved. The rumours of the dismissal of Cdr. Salva has been on air for a long time. There were other rumours that Cdr. James Wani was going to be replaced by Cdr. Pagan. Some responsible people in the Leadership Council have been quoted as saying that Cdr. Salva, with support from Bona Malual, will make a coup. There has been a problem among members of Leadership Council who have been complaining a lot. There is no system, especially in the office of the Chairman, which is treated as a private entity. The office of a leader must be well organized and staffed properly to do its work.

On the responsibility of leadership, Cdr. Dr. John should not be blamed alone because there are others. The dissolution of the Leadership Council will not mean that a normal system will be established. No proper changes will take place, even if the Leadership Council is dissolved. If Dr. Garang dissolves the Leadership Council, he will appoint the same people in the L.C. There is no need to make changes now until peace is signed. The formation process f or the government needs wide consultation; people should wait for a month until peace is signed.

The Chairman is being accused for not implementing decisions. In the army, if you need structures, I see Cdr. Salva as a political figure; so a pure army officer should be appointed as Chief of Staff and Cdr. Salva should be given a Commission. This way, the army should be run by an army officer who is not a politician.

Why is the leadership avoiding South-South dialogue? The Chairman refused to accept dialogue, but claims it after others implemented it. It was Cdr. Salva who supported the Wunlit Peace Conference – but the Chairman was against it. At the recent conference in Nairobi organized by the Kenyan Minister for Planning, the SPLM/A failed to attend because the Chairman had refused to let the SPLM attend. Cdr. James Wani is weak and the Chairman uses him to kill things related to South-South dialogue. The NLC is dead and I suggest that an emergency convention be organized immediately.

 Cdr. Marc Nyipouch. Cdr. Marc stated that the rumour that madam Nyandeng was arrested with 3.5 is libel and defamation. He continued to cite the case of General Lagu during the Regional Government. On the issue of Governor Deng Alor, Cdr. Marc said that Cdr. Deng collects money from abroad, banks it with the Chairman’s or his (Deng’s)
bank account, and that is why Deng Alor was taken away from the region – just to do that. Something Nhial has failed to do but what Deng is able to do. Deng should either be a Governor of Bahr el Ghazal or be replaced.

Mr. Arthur Akuien. I am being called the Finance Secretary but without any finance. I want to point out that the rumours have been destructive and that the leadership style encourages such rumours. I want to say that the Chairman does not delegate powers to his deputies. The Chairman is responsible for creating this crisis in the movement.

On the structures, there are structures. But the Chairman after appointing someone to a position does not work with him, but he will appoint someone else to do the work, which is wrong. The Chairman creates all these problems within the system, and this is why he is being blamed. I also point out when a senior person tries to discipline a junior, the Chairman always fails to solve the problem among the staff and instead interferes. The leadership style of the Chairman’s work is bad and cannot be corrected. The Chairman has not been doing well in his job and he may be forced to leave his office before six years.

Dr. Justin Yac. The Chairman is good for external contacts but within his own institutions he is not good. The Chairman is good in talking but poor in doing things. The Cdrs. Condemned him the day before and I quote Cdr. Salva who said that “Dr. John does not forget and does not forgive”, and who ever quarreled him ended up dead.

Many people know the Chairman’s abilities and weaknesses for the last twenty-two years. The Chairman can impress people when he talks, but lacks action. The commanders the day before gave the Chairman grade F because he failed to adequately answer the issues raised by Cdr. Salva. The Chairman should not think that he is always right; rather he must admit his mistakes. The Chairman must work with a team and not be a leader of the NLC and Chairman of SPLM. Leadership must be collective.

The officers the other day faced the Chairman with hard facts, but we have not been telling the Chairman the truth. We are also to blame. The Chairman should respond to issues of structures to avoid the recurrence of this problem. The Chairman can listen and write on issues, but he always discards them. The Chairman has been everything ever since the movement started. I call upon the Chairman to work with people and not alone. The Chairman should know that he has been wrong because some of the members have not been telling him the truth. Some leaders should be blamed for not doing their part, for many have not been doing things properly. I repeat what Cdr. Salva said that Dr. John does not forget and forgive. So I want to say that those without guns are vulnerable. The Cdrs. Are secure because they have guns to protect themselves from the Chairman, but I ask, who is going to protect those of us without guns?

I call upon Dr. John to listen to all the demands and that he (the Chairman) should make changes and suitable structures. I also suggest that the Rumbek meeting should come up with resolutions that we support the finalization of the peace agreement now, all should be committed to the peace process.

On the issue of dissolution of the leadership council, there is no difference so no changes are necessary. I urge the Chairman to work closely with his aids. We have sat here because we are part and parcel of the executive and leadership as well. Mr. Chairman, I urge you to treat us equally and remove doubts that there are people you prefer.

Cdr. Elijah Malok. I propose the formation of three (3) committees, and that they remain here in Rumbek to start their work as we may have problems with resources and the committees should finish before December 31st.

Cdr. John Koang Nyuon. I thank the Chairman and his 1st Deputy to have responded positively to our wish to sit, as we are doing now to discuss and resolve issues that create misunderstandings. Rumours always create problems. The availability of Thuraya telephones in abundance is really a problem as some of their users can verbally reveal our secrets for the sake of money or any other reason. The reaction by some officers is appreciated, as they only want the resolution of our outstanding problems.

I suggest the formation of regional committees to organize our army within the coming month since you mentioned that peace is likely to be signed by the end of December. I see this as the immediate priority other than the rest we are now discussing – as other structures already exist. To organize the army is not so difficult.

A clarification was made by 1st Vice Chairman Cdr. Salva Kiir Mayardit: “What brought us here to meet is the question of the rumours, which have been circulating. As the Chairman read in his messages, we haven’t reached a conclusion, as we have not known from where they emanate. When I went to greet the Chairman it was immediately announced that Cdr. Salva has met with Dr. John and their differences are resolved. The question is how does this news go out? I believe that they are not from my part. The rumours came from Nairobi not from Yei”.

Cdr. Abdelaziz Adam Alhilu. The structures formed during the 1st national convention exist, the only thing is that they are not effective due to meager resources. The lack of adequate resources is the main problem that affects their functioning. Instability is also a factor. A system normally operates when the enemy is inactive.

The establishment of structures at present when peace is not yet signed will also put us in difficulties, so it is important to wait for a conducive atmosphere. I agree with the suggestion for the 2nd national convention to take place as soon as possible. I don’t agree with those who say committees should be formed to organize the army. I see it fit that local committees shoulder such responsibilities provided that resources are made available.

Cdr. Daniel Awet Akot. This is a good opportunity for one to air out what had been said before, As Dr. John and Cdr. Salva put it, that they don’t have personal or political problems – then that is appreciated.

Cdr. Ayuen Alier. If the style of leadership is changed, things will automatically change for the better. The whole issue is our general problem not only the Chairman and his deputies. Our top leaders restricted travel to Nairobi with their officers, but that cannot work. Every-body gets there on his own. There is a necessity that capacity building starts now. Cdr. Ayuen made the additional observation, that the lack of self- confidence is always the cause of our problems, and as for rumours, which have been confusing, I assure you that those who have self-confidence cannot be affected by rumours.

The suggestion by Cdr. Elijah Malok that committees be formed and start their work here in Rumbek is supported by me. The delegation for the peace talks should be the only ones to go: let us support peace because it is the requirement for now. Mr. Chairman I end by thanking both of you for having cooled your nerves. Come together to discuss so that we can resolve whatever problems are facing us.

Cdr. Kuol Manyang. I think this meeting is historical and as we enter a new era, we are going to be more united after this meeting. You differ with someone and you reconcile. Differences are natural. A person can easily make a problem between him and another. We have to unite and this is how you can overcome rumours, which confuses the people. Like the recent situation, I was informed through unofficial channels that Cdr. Salva had been removed. I called Cdr. Deng Alor and we were joined by Cdr. Awet and we went to Cdr. Salva and told him that what is being alleged is a lie, and that there was no meeting held concerning this. We then moved to Nairobi where we communicated this issue to Dr. John Garang and that was when this meeting was planned and Cdr. James Kok and Cdr. Nhial were asked to organize transportation to this end.

So I thank both Cdr./Dr. John Garang and Cdr. Salva Kiir for having attended this meeting and permitting us to discuss and come up with decisions that promotes unity and harmony. Differences between Cdr. Salva and Dr. John existed from a long time ago, as Cdr. Chagai mentioned, but there was no decisive steps taken to resolve them until today.

As for structures, they are there. The only problem is how to maintain and have them effectively function due to a lack of resources. Our structures have to be operationalized. But the matter is not a question of dissolving other bodies such as the Leadership Council, NLC and so on. I don’t have any objection with the formation of committees, but I only say that reorganization of the army must be the responsibility of COGS and his Deputies. I urge both of you, the Chairman and Cdr. Salva to open a new page in order for us to go forward.

Cdr. Nhial. People should be judged by what they have contributed to the Movement. We should sincerely address our issues. I am absolutely prepared for the proposal to dissolve the Leadership Council and we all see what scenario we can take.

To have structures and institutions you need to have three things; 1) the structure itself, 2) resources, and 3) the people, because its people who run the structures. The resources and the personnel go together. Without having prepared for this, it is now one of the serious problems we face as we enter the forthcoming era.

CDr. Malik Agar. The current issue of the differences between the Chairman and his deputy is surprising in that I was aware of this even ten years ago. Whenever it is about to be addressed, each of them says there is ‘no problem’. The big problem is trust among yourselves. This needs to be rebuilt and you will be the ones to arrive at sound solutions to the existing problems.

Comrade Chairman, as we enter the new era, we shall be competing with other parties. Let us start with the effective establishment of our structures and draw up our programmes. We need a system. I have worked as a Governor for ten (10) years; yet, I could have committed many mistakes during that time. Has the Chairman any day called me to tell me that I have made a mistake? There is no system here.

The issue of reorganizing the army is a burning issue as most of the soldiers are now in an unorganized form and this will work against us. As monitors will verify, we don’t have the army. The distribution of powers is the vital issue to avoid future misunderstandings.

Cdr. Pagan Amum Okech. Comrade Chairman, I will focus on the crucial issue, but before that, I want to tell you this. We are here to discuss the rumours that have been circulating and which almost created a very serious development within the movement’s liberated areas, in Khartoum and among the Diaspora. My advice is to the Southerners who have fought for the last twenty two (22) years. I am first going to concentrate on the recent rumours. Cdr. Gier happened to ring me asking me whether I came across information from Yei that the leadership have met and decided to remove him from the second position. I advised Cdr. Gier not to believe that because it is a rumour, and if it spreads, it will create confusion. He then heeded my advice. Again Cdr. Deng Alor phoned to me on the same issue, but I also told him that these are rumours and Cdr. Salva should not believe such rumours. There had been meetings in Khartoum and there was a public statement made by Uncle Bona Malual and r!
etired General Joseph Lagu. If the enemy succeeds in dividing us, it may lead to our failure and peace may not be achieved.

This time is very critical Cdr. Salva and Cdr. Chairman; if we say we will remain here to deal with the rumours only, I think we will be here up to the coming year. I advise both of you to put aside these rumours. Even though we did not defeat the enemy, what we had achieved will make the enemy coincide with what we tell them. At this crucial moment we must think thoroughly of what we should do to enable us go forward. This is my appeal to both of you Cdr. Salva and Cdr. Chairman. There is another rumour now that I want to take the place of Cdr. James Wani Igga. I assure you Cdr. Wani that there is nothing like this at all.

The establishment and building of structures at this particular time is vital. Our priority is now to finalize the peace talks. The Chairman and his deputies must go to Nairobi so that we are not considered intransigent because the process can easily be derailed. Concerning the reorganization of the COGS and his deputies, we can do that unless the problem of resources hinders us.

Cdr. James Wani Igga. I congratulate the Chairman for calling this important meeting. I also congratulate Cdr. Salva for having attended this meeting. This paves a way for a solution to our problems. I thank both of you for your patriotic stand since the beginning of the struggle – both of you have collectively worked to protect this movement from upheavals. I consider you as the central pillars of this Movement. Let me come to the main topics, which are the SPLM/A’s major problems. Solving a problem is like bringing pus out from somebody’s gull. Problem No. 1, we are not working as a team, which results in disgruntlement.

No. 2, we have the structures formed in the 1994 Convention which were only the NEC & NLC, but by 1998, people became fed up of those structures. I appeal that we keep these structures but make necessary changes. I would like to underline something connected with structure. In 1998 we came out with a constitution named the SPLM constitution. This was not passed by the NLC because they were expecting a state constitution. But we had agreed to use that constitution, and there are structures there. In one of the L.C. meetings we had revised the constitution and even the manifesto. Up to now, we had passed four (4) documents. The SPLM constitution. The SPLM manifesto. The 3rd document is the SPLM policy on dialogue and it concerns how we go about South-South dialogue. Our main constraint in starting South-South dialogue is the lack of money. Documents No. 4, is the SPLM policy on the transformation of Sudan. All these documents are there ready. Comrade Chairman, our constraint i!
n the political Affairs Commission is lack of facilities, but we have really tried our best. As for the army reorganization, if we become surprised by the signing of the peace deal, I think it will be difficult to regroup our army simply because we don’t have resources. Once peace is signed, there is going to be the establishment of standard national structures. Structures are our No. 2 problems, including the official management of office institutions.

Cdr. Wani listed other problems:
No. 3: The existence of a Kitchen Cabinet is deplorable and creates doubts and mistrust.

No. 4: The geographical imbalances found in the movement. If this is not addressed, we will never be in harmony.
No. 5: Poor chain of command.
No. 6: Spread of rumours.

Let’s come to the question of rumours. When rumours were developing I was in Nairobi and I went to Kampala. When I reached Kaya, I was being asked what had happened. I was then told that you are coming from Nairobi and that you met and decided to replace Cdr. Salva with Cdr. Nhial. I told that that this is just rumours and I believe that Cdr. Salva will not believe this. He will immediately throw it out the window.

Problem 7: Lack of implementation of resolutions and the lack of a follow up body. Our resolutions always die on the paper.
Problem 8: Corruption which remains rampant in the Movement. Corruption must be fought for example, some years back the Chairman in a meeting informed us that Cdr. Deng Alor brought some money from Nigeria, but how that money was spent had never been explained to us again. I ask the question where is the transparency and accountability we talked about?

Problem 9: Lack of cooperation, accompanied by sabotage. Some work for the
downfall of others without any accountability.

Problem 10: Neglect of the army and its welfare.
Problem 11: Absence of job description, which cause confusion.
Problem 12: Nepotism. It should be fought.

There are two examples to illustrate the issue of nepotism. One is the removal of Aleu Anyeny from his position and his replacement by the Chairman with an officer from his home village. Another is the appointment of Dr. Lual Deng as an advisor to the Chairman. We all heard this in a meeting in which the Chairman announced Lual’s appointment without any official procedures followed. When I talk about regional imbalances, all I need to say is that no Equatorian was even allowed to be a signatory of the six protocols. We are making history and this history should involve all the people of New Sudan. The protocols are only signed by individuals from Bahr el Ghazal, Upper Nile, Nuba Mountains and Funj!

Problem 13: Neglect in the chain of command, which has led to indiscipline.

Cdr. Wani proposed a way forward. I suggest that an investigation committee be appointed by the Chairman to find out the origination of these rumours. Let’s avoid ‘Kitchen Cabinets’ and combat corruption. We need a mechanism to be adopted to fight corruption. Let’s respect the chain of command. Let’s avoid any regional misbalancing. Job descriptions must be effected. South-South dialogue advanced. The convening of the second National convention requires additional money. The reaction of the Chairman to all the listed problems is necessary. As a sign of true reconciliation, they need to warmly greet themselves in front of us here, then follow that up with a joint statement. A traditional ceremony should be carried out by some of the elders here. We take what had happened like a normal wave when in a canoe. Let us reconcile so that we defeat our common enemy.

Cdr. Riek Machar. I was struggling whether to speak or not because of the nature of the issues being raised. When we met as a Leadership Council, there were divergent views. Before that I met Aleu Anyieny and he told me that if you are going to talk to Cdr. Salva, don’t talk about the problems being personal. These problems are administrative. Serious rumours have also been circulating in London when I was there. They talked about a ‘change of the guards’ and the removal and replacement of Cdr. Salva by Cdr. Nhial. I appealed to the participants in that meeting that we should unite since we are entering peace, because if there is a split, the enemy may dishonour the agreement we had already signed. In any case, suppose we sign the peace, the SPLA will be a national army whereas the SPLM will be competing with other political parties. The SPLA must retain an independent national character.

Concerning the structures, I have participated in a workshop on the formation of structures at all levels including the transformation of the SPLM into a political party. These are all being worked out. We are only behind in our military preparations. This doesn’t need a committee to do that. The COGS, his deputies, directors, and local commanders can do that. The army is the most important element to protect the gains of the struggle and as such we need to organize it and take care of them and their families. We all have to participate in calling them to report to their units or camps where they should regroup and organize. Our chiefs are important institutions that can effectively participate in this endeavor.

Another problem we will face is the returnees, which are estimated to be up to 4 million residing in exile for almost fifteen years. They have acquired different attitudes, culture and perspectives. Not only are they in the north, but we have a good number of our people living in various western countries. We will be confronted by all these groups with a series of problems of cultural differences and we must be prepared to integrate these two groups into our civil life and norms.

I believe that unless something happens in Khartoum, the war is over. Unless the enemy causes us to split, the war is over. This requires us to expedite the reorganization of the army. I do not agree with Mathiang Rok about his suggestion that committees be formed to discuss the six (6) signed protocols. In addition, we should be privileged that the UN SG visited Africa to discuss the issue of peace in Sudan – The first time it happened was during the decolonization of Africa – making the achievement of peace highly likely this year.

As for South-South dialogue, we can start now. We should be prepared to negotiate with whatever party is ready to dialogue. If we wait until the government is formed, they will be the ones to undermine the GOSS. We must achieve consensus. Let us not delay south-south dialogue. The lack of dialogue can be a source of disunity, but if we handle it properly, it can also be a source of unity and this will allow the people to rally behind the leadership. There is a need to call the NLC as soon as possible to deliberate on the agreement. What I mean is the current NLC. The next convention, which needs to be convened as soon as possible, will elect a new NLC and who will be charged with the responsibility of working on a national constitutional government of south Sudan, etc.. From now, we have agreed that the judiciary be independent.

Session 5

Cdr. Salva Kiir Mayardit. Greetings to the Chairman and Madame de Mabior and others in this meeting. We apologize for not allowing you to attend the first meeting, which lasted for two days. The second meeting is composed of SPLM Counties Secretaries, civil society, women groups, the youth, etc.. The decision was deliberate and we did not want the meeting to be talking shop.

I have no more to say. The issue which brought us here have been raised and you all have given your concerns. Let us take the line of peace to be the priority. In the absence of peace we must be prepared for war. There had been many Security Council resolutions of the same nature passed like this of Sudan, but have not been implemented, such as the PLO, Western Sahara, etc..

I thank those who have exerted efforts to travel from their various locations to Yei where they met me on the situation. As I told you, there were no personal problems, they are administrative given my profession, and I know that rumours are dangerous. Rumours must be treated as rumours, but there is no smoke without fire. I don’t agree with Cdr. Wani that these rumours were created by the enemy. There are people among us who are more dangerous than the enemy. I must warn the Chairman that Nimeiri was made to be unpopular by his security organs. Those who are misleading you and giving you false security information about others will suffer with you together or leave with you. The government, which is going to be led by you must include all. Without unity, the agreement will be a source of our disunity. We are not organized in all aspects, and as such will be exploited by other political parties that are more organized. The lack in our structures and political guidance will l!
ead us to a very serious political defeat. Mr. Chairman, you have talked about people eating the boat while we are in the middle of the river. Let me add this; the issue is not eating the boat in the middle of the river. The issue is that there are a few who have already crossed to the other side of the river and when the remaining ones asked them to bring the boat, they refused to return the boat. This is the problem

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Minutes of Historical SPLM Meeting in Rumbek 2004.

SPLM/A Founders

Minutes of Historical SPLM Meeting in Rumbek 2004.

At the end of 2004, while the Sudanese people were closely following Naivasha peace talks with a lot of expectations for freedom and democratic transformation, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) was plagued with rumors and accusations of conspiracy.

To put an end to this acute crisis, an extraordinary meeting was convened to dissipate rumors and misunderstanding related to the removal of the deputy chairman of the SPLM, Salva Kiir Mayadrit and his replacement by the young Nhial Deng Nhial.
The importance of this meeting stems from the fact that it safeguarded the unity of the SPLM at a critical stage and paved the way for signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on January 9, 2005.The following is the full text of the minutes of the three-day meeting which took place in Rumbek from November 29 to December 1, 2004; one month before the signing of the CPA.
CONFIDENTIAL REPORT ON THE RUMBEK MEETING 2004
On the Joint meeting of the SPLM/A leadership Council, General Military Command Council, Heads of Commissions, SPLM Secretariats, SPLM County Secretaries, Civil Society & Community Leaders.
RUMBEK 29TH OF NOVEMBER TO 1ST OF DECEMBER 2004
DAY 1: Opening Prayer: Rev. Clement Janda
Introduction: Cdr. Dr. Riek Machar
Briefing: Cdr. Salva Kiir Mayardit
Introduction.
Cdr. Dr. Riek Machar Thanked Cdr. Mark Nyipuoch, Cdr. Dr. John Garang and the other participants and announced the beginning of the meeting, which had been ordered by the Chairman. The first part of the meeting comprised of the leadership council, the Secretariats, and the members of the General Staff. The second part was composed of the members of IGAD team, and the Commissioners and Secretaries of the SPLM.
In the opening of the meeting the Chairman Cdr. Dr. John Garang, thanked members of the SPLM/A national leadership Council and welcomed all the participants who traveled to Rumbek. ‘I thank you in the name of the Almighty God. To begin with I wrote two messages:
One on 14/11/004 (No. 001/11/004) to address the following accusations/rumours; • That there was a meeting held in Nairobi under the Chairmanship of myself where Cdr. Salva Kiir would be replaced by the Chairman with Cdr. Nhial Deng.
• That I went to Kampala and met with Cdr. Pieng and ordered him to arrest Cdr. Salva Kiir Mayardit.
• That Cdr. Malual Majok went to Ramciel to collect forces to go and arrest Cdr. Salva Kiir Mayardit at Yei.They are all lies and a big propaganda initiative.
The second message was on 23/11/04 calling for this meeting which we are now convening today and where I want to make a general briefing about the signing of peace next month in which each and every one should be informed accordingly.
Cdr. Machar then welcomed Cdr. Salva Kiir Mayardit to brief the national leadership meeting where he welcomed the Chairman and C-in-C and the national leadership. ‘I confirm the two messages read to you by the Chairman are all true. The rumours came from Nairobi and around the leadership of the SPLM/A. The second message I got was through Cdr. Pagan Amum who was visiting the liberated areas with friends from friendly countries. I requested Cdr. Mabior Kuer to ask the HQs why I am not talking directly to the Chairman. I spoke to the Chairman when he was in Kampala and he told me that I should meet him in Yirol, which I didn’t reply to in the light of the rumours.The rumours implied that I will be arrested at Ramciel where the Chairman was, so I decided not to go. When I received that rumour, I called the security personnel in Yei and discussed the issue in length with them. I also informed them to find out where the sources of the rumours from Nairobi were coming from, which they did.
After I spoke with the Chairman, I also met Cdr. Pieng in Yei for the whole day and he was advising me to join the Chairman in Yirol, which I refused. After that I met Cdr. Kuol Manyang and Cdr. Deng Alor. They came from Nairobi with information that I should go to Nairobi for reconciliation between the two of us. I considered the word reconciliation as something very serious, and therefore decided to tell them that I will not go to Nairobi. The HQs of the Chairman complained that they were calling me and that if I recognized their number, I would switch off the telephone. That is not true; I never received any call from them and switch off my telephone.
I assure you that the allegation that I am against peace is not true. I am really for peace so that the International Community could rescue our suffering people. People of Bahr El Ghazal have suffered too much from repeated famine and from the Arab militias – and for these reasons I am the first to embrace peace to relief them from suffering. Peace efforts such as the Wunlit Peace Conference have up to date ceased hostilities between Western Upper Nile and Bahr El Ghazal; and that is good. So I need peace. There are those who want to create confusion in the Movement and fabricate such things. I don’t have personal problem with the Chairman.
If we are National Leaders, which I don’t believe we are because we have no cohesion within our leadership structure, let us be sincere with ourselves. After meetings are concluded, we run to foreign countries. There is no code of conduct to guide the Movement’s structures. When the Chairman leaves for abroad, no directives are left and no one is left to act on his behalf. I don’t know with whom the Movement is left with; or does he carry it in his own brief case?
The Chairman killed the national Executive Council (NEC) by creating the leadership Council. But there is no provision in the Convention for a ‘Leadership Council’. Does he want to revive the Political Military High Command? The Leadership Council creates a situation where all are directly reporting to the Chairman – including SPLM County Secretaries. When I mentioned these facts, they should not be construed to be my personal or family problems. Those around the Chairman don’t tell him the opinion of the public. The Chairman is everything, from a finance officer to one at the lowest level.Corruption, as a result of the lack of structures, has created a lack of accountability, which has reached a proportion that will be difficult to eradicate.
In fact, there are many outstanding administrative problems that require our attention. These include the infrequent converting of conferences at the leadership level, causing an absence in the SPLA/M chain of command and making others to directly communicate with the Chairman without following the right procedures. This should be corrected. If the responsibility of Governors goes directly to the Chairman, what will be the work of Cdr. Daniel Awet? I hope Cdr. Daniel Awet will address all those things. The Chairman should not make appointments of SPLM County Secretaries; it is the work of the Governors.
The other issue I would like Comrade Chairman to address is how the CANS structures are now operating, e.g., take the absence of the SPLM Regional Secretary for Bahr El Gazal from his area of responsibility while there has been sporadic tribal feuds within the region – and which has resulted into sectional conflict. The Chairman most of the time send Cdr. Deng Alor on foreign missions which were supposed to be the work of Cdr. Nhial Deng.There are several other administrative issues that require correction. We are three Deputies without functions. The Chairman is responsible for all systems including the Army General Headquarters. Our HQs. started in Yei, then Rumbek, then new Cush and now Ramciel. When are we going to establish our HQs? The deputies of the General Staff are the ones commanding the forces; they should stay in the General Headquarters instead of commanding. Yet the Chairman is the one who dismantled the General Headquarters. Comrade Chairman, the establishment of the General headquarters hasn’t been fulfilled and this I have been requesting ever since Yei was liberated. Branch officers such as the Director of Military Intelligence and his deputy are now in your Headquarters, though they are supposed to remain at the General Headquarters. The Chairman concentrates on his headquarters forgetting the rest of the army. It is only his headquarters, which has military uniforms, boots and other supplies.
Our present situation requires us to be organized and prepared. If peace is signed, the question is; what have we done in training our military cadres so that they meet the standard of their counterparts in the integrated army. There are rumours that the Chairman had already selected by name those Commanders who would command the Joint Integrated Army. What about the rest of the army and who will pay them? The Chairman seems to have taken the Movement as his own property. As we leave Rumbek after this meeting, I would like to see that all our administrative issues be addressed and implemented following this meeting’s resolutions.
I would also want Comrade Chairman to give me full powers of the Chief of the General Staff (COGS) to enable me expedite the regrouping and reorganization of the SPLA, and if Comrade Chairman sees that I am not able to do that job, then he can appoint another person to do it.The Chairman is to be 1st Vice-President of the Sudan and the head of the Government of Southern Sudan, but he is not talking to Southerners. The North is organizing southern militias so that we fight among ourselves. We must unite our own ranks and not just unity with the north. On a personal basis, I don’t have any problems with the Chairman but our working relationship is bad and leaves a lot to be desired.
I would also like to say something about rampant corruption in the Movement. At the moment some members of the Movement have formed private companies, bought houses and have huge bank accounts in foreign countries. I wonder what kind of system are we going to establish in South Sudan considering ourselves indulged in this respect.
2nd Session
Response from the Chairman. I give the floor to the national leadership to comment on what had been said by Cdr. Salva Kiir, I don’t want this to be a debate between Cdr. Salva Kiir and I.
Edward Lino thanked the Chairman and said we are really in need of resolving the problems within the SPLM/A. The people of Abyei are accused of being Dr. John’s supporters and as such, are victimized for that.
Cdr. Pieng made an intervention that Cdr. Edward was not addressing the issues.
Cdr. Elijah Malok stated he really supported what Cdr. Salva Kiir said, and recommended that a collective leadership be created. Here in Bahr El Ghazal Cdr. Deng Alor has been away for too long and these are known facts; the leadership council should address and resolve these outstanding issues and go back on the right track. Let us form committees to reorganize the army, since all the units are here. I don’t believe what Cdr. Mayardit said about the people being victimized. Structures are to be recognized right way as a government so let us reorganize them and work in the right way as a government.Dr. Justin Yac. I will go with the suggestion of Cdr. Pieng that the Chairman response to the issues raised by Cdr. Salva Kiir.
Cdr./Dr. John Garang I will give my contribution to what has been raised; that firstly we need to dispose of rumours. In the whole of South Sudan, there is a general concern from the citizens, and in Yei, the officers and citizens believe there is a danger facing the Movement. We have to clear the danger and give our people assurances.
Cdr. Salva Kiir and I have been together in the movement for 22 years, and have been close friends, and we will continue that way. 22 years of friendship can’t be thrown away by rumours; Cdr. Salva will be with me now until the end of the interim period and beyond, and I will cite what was said when I visited Malual Kon and the “Luak” of the family of Cdr. Salva where I entered the house to show comradeship and a long cherished friendship. At a meeting while visiting there we were told, “You are the two orphans” left because the original members of the High Command died, both of us will carry on to bring peace.I cited what happened at New Site recently when the Chiefs a ceremony where a bull was sacrificed to show how we are united. At the spiritual performance, one traditional leader said that 4 things will happen: –
1. The bull will urinate.
2. The bull will fall down.
3. The bull will face the North.
4. The bull will die without being slaughtered.
And all the four happened.The allegation that I was going to dismiss Cdr. Salva and arrest him was not only a lie, but it did not even occur in my mind. I was preoccupied with the peace process and not trying to create a crisis. Before UN Security Council Meeting, I received a telephone call from President Bush who said that he now had those who will work with him during the next four years and that I am one of them. President Bush said, “John don’t let us down. We want peace before the end of the year”.
The allegation that I will be replacing Cdr. Salva was a bad lie. If Cdr. Salva was dismissed and replaced with Cdr. Nhial Deng Nhial, it would mean that I would have dismissed all those senior to Cdr. Nhial which includes Cdr. Riek, Cdr. James, Cdr. Daniel Awet, Cdr. Lual Diing, etc. – which would be bad for the Movement. So this allegation is a lie. The crisis only has the support of our enemies who want a crisis in the Movement. This situation was created by our enemies because they do not want to sign the peace agreement.The Chairman pointed out that the GOS has never been happy with the protocols, specially the Machakos protocol, because of the self-determination clause. The GOS and their supporters don’t accept the security arrangement and the Wealth Sharing Agreement, which gives the South of Sudan 51%. The Khartoum Government wants to reject the agreement being signed or at least delay it. By delaying in signing, Khartoum will gain $2.5 billion from the oil revenues, which we must prevent by all means possible. Khartoum was unhappy with the Power Sharing and 3 areas protocols. Neither I nor Cdr. Salva had any interest in delaying the peace agreement. I have nothing to gain by dismissing Cdr. Salva.Finally I have never had any thought of dismissing Cdr. Salva. And it should be considered a lie. This rumour has caused commotion everywhere in Southern Sudan, Khartoum and the Diaspora – so I will assure our people everywhere and send a strong message to Khartoum Government that they will not divide the SPLM/A.
Cdr. Salva and I are innocent of the situation, and four of our leaders will appear in a press conference telling the whole world about our unity and that there is no problem among SPLM/A members. Secondly, I want to assure you of my confidence in Cdr. Salva Kiir Mayardit. My relationship with Cdr. Salva goes back to 1983 – Cdr. Chagai Atem, Kerubino and many others were close to me. I still have personal relationship with Cdr. Salva and I trust and have confidence in him. This is needed now than ever before. I want Cdr. Salva to be around me during the interim period, and beyond.
The Government of Sudan called upon all the Newspapers to stop making allegations against the Movement. So let us put that issue to rest.
Secondly, Cdr. Salva said that I brought all the officers around me, leaving him alone in vacuum. What I can say is that is not true.
On internal reforms, I agree that reforms are necessary. We are all behind them. We have been making reforms since 1983, e.g., the Zonal Command, Political High Command, NLC, NEC, etc.. these structures can be changed but the objective remains the same. Our imperfect structures have brought us to the present day. Let us not throw away these structures now, otherwise we will throw ourselves away.
The Chairman urged the meeting to introduce changes slowly. He said he is for change but slow change. The Chairman reiterated that all SPLM/A members will be protected; he assured all members that no one will be left out. On the issue of new comers who are said to be taking over the Movement, he said we should accept all southerners new or old because there are more southerners than members of the SPLM/A who must be accommodated; but no newcomer will displace anyone who has been with us for years.
On the appointment of Governors; all Governors will be appointed from their respective areas, e.g. in Lakes the Governor here will come from Lakes. As for States, people of each State will form their governments with no marginalization within States.
As for the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS), there will be representation based on the states, fairness and justice. Similarly at the Central Government, there will be State representation. All Governments, whether GOSS or State Governments will be based on modern standardized structures.The army will be organized based on modern standards. The SPLM will be reorganized democratically. There will be a mult-party system. There will be no need for coup d’etat anymore, so for example my friend Dr. Riek Machar will not need to make a coup because he can form his own party if he is discontented with SPLM.
The issue now is how to achieve a Comprehensive Peace Agreement. After that, the 2nd national Convention will be convened as soon as possible after the peace agreement is signed. The NIF Government is not happy having to sign the agreement on or before 31st December 2004. The Government is not happy with the UN Security Council Resolution1574. The NIF want to create an armed group loyal to them. They also want to create a political group from among southerners to be used by them. We must stop such a move that will create enemies among Southerners to fight among themselves.
South-to-South dialogue must be organized properly, but the leadership has refused outside mediation. I told the European groups about our stand on this. The Power Sharing protocol states that the SPLM will form the Government in the South. The protocol give 15% to non-SPLM/A members and 15% to members of other parties. There will be discussions therefore with Southern parties.On Civil Society, we need to dialogue with them including the Churches. On top of that, lawyers and other concerned members will write a constitution for Southern Sudan. There will be a constitution for states and the rule of law will be established.
Finally, regarding our vision and strategies; we must continue with our programmes because we are succeeding in the process. I reject the view that there are some of us who are unionists and others separatists within the SPLM/A. There are no such differences among our people. We are all for the unity of Southern people, and the Movement will carry out the referendum. As for members of the Khartoum National Government who have mutinied, there is a group calling themselves SPLM/A members. I told them that we want peace and we don’t want you to be SPLM/A now. I told the group to organize their own independent Movement, and not be associated with SPLM/A.
On the structures the only way to resolve it is through the national Convention, which should be convened as soon as possible.
3rd Session
Cdr. Deng Monydit. Greeted everyone and praised the leaders for coming together. He stated his appreciation of the response given by the leadership; ‘I want to say I am happy to discuss what was about to be stolen from us, and it is not the concern of those in London. This struggle is not the private property of anybody. Whoever says the Movement is his property is wrong, for the movement is for all.
Cdr. Garang Mobil. I thank the leaders. Since 1997 I decided to stay in my house because I did not believe that our problems should be solved by violence. Facts must be stated now in order to solve them once and for all. On the ‘orphans’ there six (6) members who died and only two (2) are left. The question I want to discuss today, is that there is a problem but the Chairman keeps saying there are no problems, only a ‘gap’ between him and Cdr. Salva. He will not accept there are problems in the New Sudan. But if the problem is not solved, there will be no peace. I also want to say that the movement is in the hands of a few and many are alienated. National resources must be shared by all, no matter how small it is. The structures are controlled by a few minority groups, and this must be sorted out now in Rumbek. This minority group is the problem; hand picking people must stop now because it is creating problems.
Cdr. Agassio Akol. There is a problem because many people avoid Cdr. Salva as Deputy Chairman and Chief of the General Staff. The Governors and their deputies bypass Salva and correspond directly with the Chairman of the Movement, which I consider to be outside proper procedure. Cdr. Salva said that in his talks, he raised specific issues which he needed answers on. The Chairman must have failed to answer these issues, otherwise, the talks would have ended. Cdr. Salva said he did not blame anyone but the Chairman. He wanted the Chairman to tell him whether he was wrong or not. For example Cdr. Salva questioned the legitimacy of the leadership Council, as he considered it to be illegal.The National Convention is unlikely to come soon to solve the problems of our structures; the convention has no importance for now. For Cdr. Salva, structures cannot be done by a Convention. So who is going to organize the army?
Cdr. Mark Nyipuoc intervened by saying a press conference should be made.
Cdr. Taban Deng Gai. I want to express my appreciation and happiness for this meeting. It is good to discuss issues of this nature, which appear to divide our movement. I want to congratulate the leaders for agreeing to come to attend the meeting. I want to congratulate Dr. Riek, Ayendit and others for the mediation. If we had such mediation in 1991, there would have been no problems that year, and the coup d’etat would not have taken place. This meeting is on internal issues. Those in Khartoum are happy to see the SPLM/A destroyed by Southern interests. But we are now victorious for we have stopped that disaster. As for our system, there are institutions but not functioning ones. The Leadership Council will not take us anywhere. The era of the Political Military High Command is gone. We must have a modern system of government created by the following committees:
1. Committee for the Army;
2. Committee for the Government;
3. Committee for the Judiciary; and
4. The Parliament.
Justice Ambrose Riny. I greet the Leadership and SPLA officers. In 1994 the Convention created institutions. When I talked about the independence of the Judiciary, many officers reacted against it. It was the intervention of the Chairman who permitted the Committee to complete its work. There have been difficulties and roadblocks by those who did not want a system. There have been difficulties in implementing the resolutions. In 2004, the leadership Council was set up to replace the NLC and NEC. The Leadership Council has no legal base to exist. The Chairman dissolved legally instituted organs of the movement as contained in the national convention of 1994, but unilaterally established illegal institutions which are not supported by any legal provisions of the convention thereof.
I want to say that a lot has been done by a few. Most of the things done are imperfect, but they have served us. I appreciate what has been done on South-South dialogue under the SPLM/A Secretary General. The Chairman was supposed to establish a constitutional committee to draft our constitution. We must come together in a place where all departments are residing; there should be one center for the government of SPLM/A to stop all these rumours.I would like to point out that many members of the movement have lost their ability to sit in an office. I want to point out an incident where a commander told me that what Dr. John or Cdr. Kuol Manyang say ‘up there’ does not work in the South. What kind of a system is this, if it is not respected by its officers? There is no system respected in this movement. I suggest that a committee be formed to organize the army and a conference to inform the world and our supporters that there is no problem from within.
Mama Kezia. I thank both leaders for coming together to discuss all the issues. I was happy with the 1st Vice-Chairman for saying everything in his heart. The rumours outside are bad. Both leaders say it was only a misunderstanding. I appreciate what is happening and I call upon Rev. Clement Janda to bless our conclusion. I agree with the 1st Vice-Chairman that there is something wrong with our system. After the death of the Chairman of my commission, no one has been appointed, and therefore there is no one to report to. For me it took three (3) years to see the leader of the movement. There isn’t a good system. But I think that from now on there will be a system in place.
Cdr. Pieng. Greetings. I will be saying something different; that I have not been happy with our meetings that end without resolutions. I am a revolutionary soldier. I have both military and political interest and if anybody things I don’t have both, he is lying. I am not happy with the response of the Chairman; there are problems to be addressed, and these problems must be solved now.The Chairman has not committed mistakes; for me, they are unintended mistakes, for the Chairman could not create problems for himself. I mentioned that during the time of Kerubino there were problems. There were rumours that the Chairman was going to throw away his SPLM/A cadres and replace them with people who have not been in the movement since its inception. There must be committees to reorganize the movement; I agree with Cdr. Elijah Malok’s call for a system and committees. When the Chairman goes away on a visit, he never leaves anyone to act where officers should report to.
Cdr. David. Greetings. I blame the Chief of the General Staff for having failed to do anything until now. But nothing is too late; I suggest that the army be organized now. First create a General Command for the SPLA, for there is no army without a General Staff.
Cdr. Oyai Deng. I want to add my voice of being happy to participate in this meeting. When the movement started, you were seven (7) and now you are only two (2) remaining. Some said that you conspired against those who died and now you are conspiring against yourselves. I am shocked to hear Cdr. Salva talk here only about Bahr El Ghazal and not the South in general give he is a leader for all. I strongly agree with Cdr. Salva that when the Chairman goes away, he locks the South in his bag. This is wrong. Cdr. Salva has the right to question anything wrong. There is a problem that must be solved by taking the right decisions.
Cdr. Gier Chuang. I understand what is happening; I didn’t believe that Dr. John will sit near Cdr. Salva again today. I am happy to see this conference. Many people have died due to internal differences and I refer to what had happened in the 1991 crisis. There must be resolutions for all issues, which bring about conflicts; there must be committees established, especially for the SPLA. I also pointed out that during the December 2003 meeting in New Site, there were no representatives from the army. What is a government without an army.
Cdr. James Oath. I greet the gathering. When the movement started you were seven (7) and now you are only two (2) – five died having problems with you (Dr. John). Why do you have problems with your colleagues? The leadership has disabled the movement, so why keep it? Why is there a GMC, because it has never met until now? There is no SPLA ready to fight, and for me there is no army to order. If I am ordered to arrest Cdr. Salva, I do not have an army to arrest anyone. Even the Chief of Staff cannot order me to do anything because there is no army. There is no chance to meet the C-in-C – it will take long time to meet him. This is not good, therefore a committee must be formed now to sort everything out.
Cdr. Oboto Mamur. Greetings. The Chairman always had problems with his colleagues. Now you are two (2) and you are turning against yourselves. Chairman you have been lying throughout since 1983. A Chairman should trust his deputies because there is a big problem here. I ask the Chairman whether he has mandated us to judge him? And if so, we will pass our judgment on him now. We don’t want to talk for the sake of talking. There must be a committee to follow up on all the resolutions agreed on here. And I add, the convention will not solve our problems.
Cdr. George J. Deng. This meeting is a good opportunity to talk today in front of other commanders. The reply by Cdr. John to Cdr. Salva is not convincing at all. My suggestion is that a committee must be formed to organize things right away. There is no longer any army. Therefore a committee has to be formed for the agreement to succeed. I view the SPLA as my home; if the leaders want to go then it is up to them.
Cdr. Malong Awan. Everyone is waiting for the outcome of this dispute. Both leaders therefore should solve their differences. If they don’t solve their differences then they should remain inside this room until the crisis is over. Nor should we blame our enemies for the rumours came from ourselves – we should not blame outsiders. For example Ayen Maguat went to talk to Cdr. Salva. Many from Yei volunteered to go to talk to Cdr. Salva. She complained that Cdr. Wani Igga was in Yei but failed to talk to Cdr. Salva. Instead he went to his village. This was not good leadership and I disagree with Cdr. Wani Igga’s position.
Session 4.
Cdr. Santo Ayang. I thank the communities of Bahr El Ghazal, Bor and the committees that went to Yei. Without them things would have got out of hand. The Chairman must tell us the truth about the source of these rumours. All that was circulated was not rumour, and no one was bribed by the enemy. You tell the world that you brought peace to Sudan, but the reality is that peace was brought about by those who fought for it and died. Those around you only please you and do not tell you the truth. I support the formation of committees suggested by Taban Deng Gai.
Cdr. Ayuen Jongror. The conflict is within the leadership. When conflict arises, it must be resolved immediately. The two of you must be in one place and not in Nairobi and Yei. The style of your leadership is causing lots of problems. The GMC Secretariat was supposed to be formed, but since then, nothing has happened. The GMC should meet to discuss the issues of the army and structures of the Movement must be formed before the convention.
Cdr. Elias Wai. There is fire so we need it not to burn further. Cdr. Salva is not convinced. All are not convinced with the reaction of the Chairman towards issues raised by Cdr. Salva Kiir. The Chairman is placing his relatives in key positions including Elijah Malok, too old, for example, to hold the position of Governor of the Central Bank. Note, there might be popular uprising one day and the army will join the public.
Cdr. Jadalla. We are here to solve our problems. Committees should be formed to investigate the rumours. You think you are the founder of this movement, and as such, that you can do what you want without consulting people? The public is not ready for more problems.
Cdr. Patrick Aitang. We are talking about rumours, but what do we do next? The letter alleged to have been written by Equatorians caused serious tensions. Thanks to Cdr. Salva for salvaging the situation. The ball is now in the court of the Chairman and he should come out with the facts leading up to this dispute. The Chairman should be bold and form the necessary structures.
Cdr. Kitchener. The Chairman and Salva should work together until the end of the liberation struggle. We need leadership to lead us. Cdr. Ayual Makol. To achieve our objective, we must be united. If the two leaders of the Movement only agree to disagree, then it will lead to internal warfare. Form a committee to investigate the rumours
Cdr. Dominic Dim. I agree that the Leadership Council should be abolished and the commissions replaced by the NEC. The Chairman has locked the NEC in his boxes. Dr. John’s response to Cdr. Salva was neither good nor sufficient. For me, there is still a problem as people still remain suspicious of the Chairman’s intentions. I reiterate that if the problem in question is not resolved, there will be a bigger problem in the Movement. I suggest that the Chairman be clear on resolving this conflict. We should remember how General Swar El Dahab was forced to take over during the crisis at that time. Cdr. Salva was asked by many people to take over, but he refused to do so. I support the formation of committees to restructure the movement and provide us with collective leadership.
Cdr. Bior Ajang. I thank the previous speakers. Cdr. Salva has the right to blame the Leadership Council. The rumours are no longer rumours, but facts as said by Cdr. Salva. There is a problem and that problem should be solved now. I support the formation of committees. What transpired in Yei was the product of two rumours; 1) the arrest of Salva Kiir, and 2) the dismissal of Cdr. Salva Kiir. Cdr. Salva Kiir gave us the chance and invited us to meet. I thank the bodyguards of Salva for handling the situation very wisely. Dr. John has no powers to dismiss Cdr. Salva because the national Convention elected both of them. I emphasize that rumours do not only originate from Nairobi. Yei is also a source. I support formation of committees.
Cdr. Ismail. We should combat the rumours. It is very unusual for a Deputy Chairman not to have easy access to the Chairman. However, forming committees is another way of avoiding the problem. The explanation of the Chairman hasn’t convinced most of the people nor answered what was raised by Cdr. Salva.
Cdr. Dau Akec Deng. I thank the 1st Vice-Chairman for his stand.
Lt. Col. Mathiang Rok. This meeting has saved the lives of many people in the South. I would like to quote from Francis Mading’s book; “things that are not said divide people”. The Leadership Council has taken the powers of the NLC. People still doubt the Chairman’s comments were satisfactory. There are many ‘huddles’ in the system, e.g. the Leadership Council has taken up the role of the National Convention. Our main concern is how the structures will be made functional. We are here to bring peace and harmony among ourselves. If there is anything, which is not clear, it should be said now!
Cdr. Chagai Atem. These rumours started in 1994 and I was the chief negotiator between the two. Now they are caught red handed again.
Father George Kinga. I greet and thank the leaders. The four leaders are great and must be respected. The issues are institutional ones. I also support the formation of committees.
Mr. Pascal Babindi. I am happy to have the chance of addressing this important and historic meeting. The restructuring we decided on at the Gorok NLC meeting pushed us ahead. I am confident that the reforms that shall soon be made will also push us ahead.
Cdr. Achol Marial. A committee should be formed to investigate into where those rumours originated. I appeal to the leadership to mobilize resources prior to the formation of ministries.
Dr. Komanyangi. The formation of committees shall lead to a final solution to all our problems. I suggest that we give ourselves time for these deliberations to continue for one more day so that all issues are exhausted.
Cdr. Simon Kun Pouch. The speakers have not talked on how to combat corruption. The formation of a committee to work out functions for our structures is not really a priority because they already exist, we need only to share power and prepare job descriptions for all the institutions of the movement.
Cdr. James Kok Ruea. A preparatory committee for the Convention should be formed within the shortest time possible. We should work on the structures that will make the Movement function during the interim period as follows: 1) 1st Vice Chairman to chair the GMC, 2) 2nd Vice Chairman to chair the committee for the interim period and 3) 3rd Vice Chairman to chair the committee for National Convention.
Mr. Muhammad Marjan. I believe that the world is looking forward to knowing what our movement will be like once peace is signed and we emerge as a government.
Cdr. Michael Makuei Lueth. There is no need to form a committee to investigate the rumours, which were circulating, unless Cdr. Salva insists that they have never been rumours. I call upon both the Chairman and Cdr. Salva to build confidence between themselves. I assure the Chairman that as we are entering a new era, and if we remain in an unprepared manner, we will eventually be finished. The immediate establishment of our structures is necessary. The distribution of powers is also necessary. The army must be organized. There is also the importance of speeding up South-South dialogue before we enter the forthcoming era. The other issue is corruption. I am saying that the leadership is not committed to fighting corruption. I am against the suggestion that there should be a committee for the army’s reorganization. It is for the COGS, his deputies, and the directors to sit at the GHQs and issue orders according to the plans they set. The national Liberation members should not blame the Chairman alone. In Gorok, the NLC gave the Chairman a blank cheque to restructure the movement, and that was when things started to go wrong.
DAY 2
Session 1
Opening remarks by the Master of ceremony after prayers noted that the present meeting has come out in the internet; and a warning was given to those who might have done so.
Mr. Kosti Manibe. I want to add my voice to those who have already spoken. I express my appreciation to those concerned for having resorted to peace negotiations and to end the conflict through dialogue. I am happy that the 1991 disaster has been avoided. I acknowledge the existence of gaps in the system and I call upon the leaders to address the communication needs. I stress the need for media to send accurate messages to our people, enemies, etc.. The Movement should have a capacity for communication to deal with the media when required. I point out that a lot has been achieved – 90% of the objectives have been achieved. There are structures, but a lot of work requires to be done.
The JAM’s programme on capacity building should be followed. Functions will be set out. On policy issues, I suggest that a lot remains to be done to build confidence in our system and institutions. I suggest that there is a need to form a small committee to look into the minutes of this meeting and to identify the crucial issues that needs resolutions as soon as possible. Such information should be disseminated.
Cdr. John Luke. I am happy that the rumours have been resolved. The rumours of the dismissal of Cdr. Salva has been on air for a long time. There were other rumours that Cdr. James Wani was going to be replaced by Cdr. Pagan. Some responsible people in the Leadership Council have been quoted as saying that Cdr. Salva, with support from Bona Malual, will make a coup. There has been a problem among members of Leadership Council who have been complaining a lot. There is no system, especially in the office of the Chairman, which is treated as a private entity. The office of a leader must be well organized and staffed properly to do its work.
On the responsibility of leadership, Cdr. Dr. John should not be blamed alone because there are others. The dissolution of the Leadership Council will not mean that a normal system will be established. No proper changes will take place, even if the Leadership Council is dissolved. If Dr. Garang dissolves the Leadership Council, he will appoint the same people in the L.C. There is no need to make changes now until peace is signed. The formation process f or the government needs wide consultation; people should wait for a month until peace is signed.The Chairman is being accused for not implementing decisions. In the army, if you need structures, I see Cdr. Salva as a political figure; so a pure army officer should be appointed as Chief of Staff and Cdr. Salva should be given a Commission. This way, the army should be run by an army officer who is not a politician.
Why is the leadership avoiding South-South dialogue? The Chairman refused to accept dialogue, but claims it after others implemented it. It was Cdr. Salva who supported the Wunlit Peace Conference – but the Chairman was against it. At the recent conference in Nairobi organized by the Kenyan Minister for Planning, the SPLM/A failed to attend because the Chairman had refused to let the SPLM attend. Cdr. James Wani is weak and the Chairman uses him to kill things related to South-South dialogue. The NLC is dead and I suggest that an emergency convention be organized immediately.
Cdr. Marc Nyipouch. Cdr. Marc stated that the rumour that madam Nyandeng was arrested with 3.5 is libel and defamation. He continued to cite the case of General Lagu during the Regional Government. On the issue of Governor Deng Alor, Cdr. Marc said that Cdr. Deng collects money from abroad, banks it with the Chairman’s or his (Deng’s) bank account, and that is why Deng Alor was taken away from the region – just to do that. Something Nhial has failed to do but what Deng is able to do. Deng should either be a Governor of Bahr el Ghazal or be replaced.
Mr. Arthur Akuien. I am being called the Finance Secretary but without any finance. I want to point out that the rumours have been destructive and that the leadership style encourages such rumours. I want to say that the Chairman does not delegate powers to his deputies. The Chairman is responsible for creating this crisis in the movement.
On the structures, there are structures. But the Chairman after appointing someone to a position does not work with him, but he will appoint someone else to do the work, which is wrong. The Chairman creates all these problems within the system, and this is why he is being blamed. I also point out when a senior person tries to discipline a junior, the Chairman always fails to solve the problem among the staff and instead interferes. The leadership style of the Chairman’s work is bad and cannot be corrected. The Chairman has not been doing well in his job and he may be forced to leave his office before six years.
Dr. Justin Yac. The Chairman is good for external contacts but within his own institutions he is not good. The Chairman is good in talking but poor in doing things. The Cdrs. Condemned him the day before and I quote Cdr. Salva who said that “Dr. John does not forget and does not forgive”, and who ever quarreled him ended up dead.
Many people know the Chairman’s abilities and weaknesses for the last twenty-two years. The Chairman can impress people when he talks, but lacks action. The commanders the day before gave the Chairman grade F because he failed to adequately answer the issues raised by Cdr. Salva. The Chairman should not think that he is always right; rather he must admit his mistakes. The Chairman must work with a team and not be a leader of the NLC and Chairman of SPLM. Leadership must be collective.
The officers the other day faced the Chairman with hard facts, but we have not been telling the Chairman the truth. We are also to blame. The Chairman should respond to issues of structures to avoid the recurrence of this problem. The Chairman can listen and write on issues, but he always discards them. The Chairman has been everything ever since the movement started. I call upon the Chairman to work with people and not alone. The Chairman should know that he has been wrong because some of the members have not been telling him the truth. Some leaders should be blamed for not doing their part, for many have not been doing things properly. I repeat what Cdr. Salva said that Dr. John does not forget and forgive. So I want to say that those without guns are vulnerable. The Cdrs. Are secure because they have guns to protect themselves from the Chairman, but I ask, who is going to protect those of us without guns?
I call upon Dr. John to listen to all the demands and that he (the Chairman) should make changes and suitable structures. I also suggest that the Rumbek meeting should come up with resolutions that we support the finalization of the peace agreement now, all should be committed to the peace process.
On the issue of dissolution of the leadership council, there is no difference so no changes are necessary. I urge the Chairman to work closely with his aids. We have sat here because we are part and parcel of the executive and leadership as well. Mr. Chairman, I urge you to treat us equally and remove doubts that there are people you prefer.
Cdr. Elijah Malok. I propose the formation of three (3) committees, and that they remain here in Rumbek to start their work as we may have problems with resources and the committees should finish before December 31st.
Cdr. John Koang Nyuon. I thank the Chairman and his 1st Deputy to have responded positively to our wish to sit, as we are doing now to discuss and resolve issues that create misunderstandings. Rumours always create problems. The availability of Thuraya telephones in abundance is really a problem as some of their users can verbally reveal our secrets for the sake of money or any other reason. The reaction by some officers is appreciated, as they only want the resolution of our outstanding problems.
I suggest the formation of regional committees to organize our army within the coming month since you mentioned that peace is likely to be signed by the end of December. I see this as the immediate priority other than the rest we are now discussing – as other structures already exist. To organize the army is not so difficult.
A clarification was made by 1st Vice Chairman Cdr. Salva Kiir Mayardit: “What brought us here to meet is the question of the rumours, which have been circulating. As the Chairman read in his messages, we haven’t reached a conclusion, as we have not known from where they emanate. When I went to greet the Chairman it was immediately announced that Cdr. Salva has met with Dr. John and their differences are resolved. The question is how does this news go out? I believe that they are not from my part. The rumours came from Nairobi not from Yei”.
Cdr. Abdelaziz Adam Alhilu. The structures formed during the 1st national convention exist, the only thing is that they are not effective due to meager resources. The lack of adequate resources is the main problem that affects their functioning. Instability is also a factor. A system normally operates when the enemy is inactive.
The establishment of structures at present when peace is not yet signed will also put us in difficulties, so it is important to wait for a conducive atmosphere. I agree with the suggestion for the 2nd national convention to take place as soon as possible. I don’t agree with those who say committees should be formed to organize the army. I see it fit that local committees shoulder such responsibilities provided that resources are made available.
Cdr. Daniel Awet Akot. This is a good opportunity for one to air out what had been said before, As Dr. John and Cdr. Salva put it, that they don’t have personal or political problems – then that is appreciated.
Cdr. Ayuen Alier. If the style of leadership is changed, things will automatically change for the better. The whole issue is our general problem not only the Chairman and his deputies. Our top leaders restricted travel to Nairobi with their officers, but that cannot work. Every-body gets there on his own. There is a necessity that capacity building starts now. Cdr. Ayuen made the additional observation, that the lack of self- confidence is always the cause of our problems, and as for rumours, which have been confusing, I assure you that those who have self-confidence cannot be affected by rumours.The suggestion by Cdr. Elijah Malok that committees be formed and start their work here in Rumbek is supported by me. The delegation for the peace talks should be the only ones to go: let us support peace because it is the requirement for now. Mr. Chairman I end by thanking both of you for having cooled your nerves. Come together to discuss so that we can resolve whatever problems are facing us.
Cdr. Kuol Manyang. I think this meeting is historical and as we enter a new era, we are going to be more united after this meeting. You differ with someone and you reconcile. Differences are natural. A person can easily make a problem between him and another. We have to unite and this is how you can overcome rumours, which confuses the people. Like the recent situation, I was informed through unofficial channels that Cdr. Salva had been removed. I called Cdr. Deng Alor and we were joined by Cdr. Awet and we went to Cdr. Salva and told him that what is being alleged is a lie, and that there was no meeting held concerning this. We then moved to Nairobi where we communicated this issue to Dr. John Garang and that was when this meeting was planned and Cdr. James Kok and Cdr. Nhial were asked to organize transportation to this end.
So I thank both Cdr./Dr. John Garang and Cdr. Salva Kiir for having attended this meeting and permitting us to discuss and come up with decisions that promotes unity and harmony. Differences between Cdr. Salva and Dr. John existed from a long time ago, as Cdr. Chagai mentioned, but there was no decisive steps taken to resolve them until today.As for structures, they are there. The only problem is how to maintain and have them effectively function due to a lack of resources. Our structures have to be operationalized. But the matter is not a question of dissolving other bodies such as the Leadership Council, NLC and so on. I don’t have any objection with the formation of committees, but I only say that reorganization of the army must be the responsibility of COGS and his Deputies. I urge both of you, the Chairman and Cdr. Salva to open a new page in order for us to go forward.
Cdr. Nhial. People should be judged by what they have contributed to the Movement. We should sincerely address our issues. I am absolutely prepared for the proposal to dissolve the Leadership Council and we all see what scenario we can take.
To have structures and institutions you need to have three things; 1) the structure itself, 2) resources, and 3) the people, because its people who run the structures. The resources and the personnel go together. Without having prepared for this, it is now one of the serious problems we face as we enter the forthcoming era.
Cdr. Malik Agar. The current issue of the differences between the Chairman and his deputy is surprising in that I was aware of this even ten years ago. Whenever it is about to be addressed, each of them says there is ‘no problem’. The big problem is trust among yourselves. This needs to be rebuilt and you will be the ones to arrive at sound solutions to the existing problems.Comrade Chairman, as we enter the new era, we shall be competing with other parties. Let us start with the effective establishment of our structures and draw up our programmes. We need a system. I have worked as a Governor for ten (10) years; yet, I could have committed many mistakes during that time. Has the Chairman any day called me to tell me that I have made a mistake? There is no system here.
The issue of reorganizing the army is a burning issue as most of the soldiers are now in an unorganized form and this will work against us. As monitors will verify, we don’t have the army. The distribution of powers is the vital issue to avoid future misunderstandings.
Cdr. Pagan Amum Okech. Comrade Chairman, I will focus on the crucial issue, but before that, I want to tell you this. We are here to discuss the rumours that have been circulating and which almost created a very serious development within the movement’s liberated areas, in Khartoum and among the Diaspora. My advice is to the Southerners who have fought for the last twenty two (22) years. I am first going to concentrate on the recent rumours. Cdr. Gier happened to ring me asking me whether I came across information from Yei that the leadership have met and decided to remove him from the second position. I advised Cdr. Gier not to believe that because it is a rumour, and if it spreads, it will create confusion. He then heeded my advice. Again Cdr. Deng Alor phoned to me on the same issue, but I also told him that these are rumours and Cdr. Salva should not believe such rumours. There had been meetings in Khartoum and there was a public statement made by Uncle Bona Malual and retired General Joseph Lagu. If the enemy succeeds in dividing us, it may lead to our failure and peace may not be achieved.This time is very critical Cdr. Salva and Cdr. Chairman; if we say we will remain here to deal with the rumours only, I think we will be here up to the coming year. I advise both of you to put aside these rumours. Even though we did not defeat the enemy, what we had achieved will make the enemy coincide with what we tell them. At this crucial moment we must think thoroughly of what we should do to enable us go forward. This is my appeal to both of you Cdr. Salva and Cdr. Chairman. There is another rumour now that I want to take the place of Cdr. James Wani Igga. I assure you Cdr. Wani that there is nothing like this at all.The establishment and building of structures at this particular time is vital. Our priority is now to finalize the peace talks. The Chairman and his deputies must go to Nairobi so that we are not considered intransigent because the process can easily be derailed. Concerning the reorganization of the COGS and his deputies, we can do that unless the problem of resources hinders us.
Cdr. James Wani Igga. I congratulate the Chairman for calling this important meeting. I also congratulate Cdr. Salva for having attended this meeting. This paves a way for a solution to our problems. I thank both of you for your patriotic stand since the beginning of the struggle – both of you have collectively worked to protect this movement from upheavals. I consider you as the central pillars of this Movement. Let me come to the main topics, which are the SPLM/A’s major problems. Solving a problem is like bringing pus out from somebody’s gull. Problem No. 1, we are not working as a team, which results in disgruntlement.No. 2, we have the structures formed in the 1994 Convention which were only the NEC & NLC, but by 1998, people became fed up of those structures. I appeal that we keep these structures but make necessary changes. I would like to underline something connected with structure. In 1998 we came out with a constitution named the SPLM constitution. This was not passed by the NLC because they were expecting a state constitution. But we had agreed to use that constitution, and there are structures there. In one of the L.C. meetings we had revised the constitution and even the manifesto. Up to now, we had passed four (4) documents. The SPLM constitution. The SPLM manifesto. The 3rd document is the SPLM policy on dialogue and it concerns how we go about South-South dialogue. Our main constraint in starting South-South dialogue is the lack of money. Documents No. 4, is the SPLM policy on the transformation of Sudan. All these documents are there ready. Comrade Chairman, our constraint in the political Affairs Commission is lack of facilities, but we have really tried our best. As for the army reorganization, if we become surprised by the signing of the peace deal, I think it will be difficult to regroup our army simply because we don’t have resources. Once peace is signed, there is going to be the establishment of standard national structures. Structures are our No. 2 problems, including the official management of office institutions.
Cdr. Wani listed other problems:
No. 3: The existence of a Kitchen Cabinet is deplorable and creates doubts and mistrust.
No. 4: The geographical imbalances found in the movement. If this is not addressed, we will never be in harmony.
No. 5: Poor chain of command.
No. 6: Spread of rumours.
Let’s come to the question of rumours. When rumours were developing I was in Nairobi and I went to Kampala. When I reached Kaya, I was being asked what had happened. I was then told that you are coming from Nairobi and that you met and decided to replace Cdr. Salva with Cdr. Nhial. I told that that this is just rumours and I believe that Cdr. Salva will not believe this. He will immediately throw it out the window.
Problem 7: Lack of implementation of resolutions and the lack of a follow up body. Our resolutions always die on the paper.
Problem 8: Corruption which remains rampant in the Movement. Corruption must be fought for example, some years back the Chairman in a meeting informed us that Cdr. Deng Alor brought some money from Nigeria, but how that money was spent had never been explained to us again. I ask the question where is the transparency and accountability we talked about?
Problem 9: Lack of cooperation, accompanied by sabotage. Some work for the downfall of others without any accountability.
Problem 10: Neglect of the army and its welfare.
Problem 11: Absence of job description, which cause confusion.
Problem 12: Nepotism. It should be fought.
There are two examples to illustrate the issue of nepotism. One is the removal of Aleu Anyeny from his position and his replacement by the Chairman with an officer from his home village. Another is the appointment of Dr. Lual Deng as an advisor to the Chairman. We all heard this in a meeting in which the Chairman announced Lual’s appointment without any official procedures followed. When I talk about regional imbalances, all I need to say is that no Equatorian was even allowed to be a signatory of the six protocols. We are making history and this history should involve all the people of New Sudan. The protocols are only signed by individuals from Bahr el Ghazal, Upper Nile, Nuba Mountains and Funj!
Problem 13: Neglect in the chain of command, which has led to indiscipline.
Cdr. Wani proposed a way forward. I suggest that an investigation committee be appointed by the Chairman to find out the origination of these rumours. Let’s avoid ‘Kitchen Cabinets’ and combat corruption. We need a mechanism to be adopted to fight corruption. Let’s respect the chain of command. Let’s avoid any regional misbalancing. Job descriptions must be effected. South-South dialogue advanced. The convening of the second National convention requires additional money. The reaction of the Chairman to all the listed problems is necessary. As a sign of true reconciliation, they need to warmly greet themselves in front of us here, then follow that up with a joint statement. A traditional ceremony should be carried out by some of the elders here. We take what had happened like a normal wave when in a canoe. Let us reconcile so that we defeat our common enemy.
Cdr. Riek Machar. I was struggling whether to speak or not because of the nature of the issues being raised. When we met as a Leadership Council, there were divergent views. Before that I met Aleu Anyieny and he told me that if you are going to talk to Cdr. Salva, don’t talk about the problems being personal. These problems are administrative. Serious rumours have also been circulating in London when I was there. They talked about a ‘change of the guards’ and the removal and replacement of Cdr. Salva by Cdr. Nhial. I appealed to the participants in that meeting that we should unite since we are entering peace, because if there is a split, the enemy may dishonour the agreement we had already signed. In any case, suppose we sign the peace, the SPLA will be a national army whereas the SPLM will be competing with other political parties. The SPLA must retain an independent national character.
Concerning the structures, I have participated in a workshop on the formation of structures at all levels including the transformation of the SPLM into a political party. These are all being worked out. We are only behind in our military preparations. This doesn’t need a committee to do that. The COGS, his deputies, directors, and local commanders can do that. The army is the most important element to protect the gains of the struggle and as such we need to organize it and take care of them and their families. We all have to participate in calling them to report to their units or camps where they should regroup and organize. Our chiefs are important institutions that can effectively participate in this endeavor.
Another problem we will face is the returnees, which are estimated to be up to 4 million residing in exile for almost fifteen years. They have acquired different attitudes, culture and perspectives. Not only are they in the north, but we have a good number of our people living in various western countries. We will be confronted by all these groups with a series of problems of cultural differences and we must be prepared to integrate these two groups into our civil life and norms.
I believe that unless something happens in Khartoum, the war is over. Unless the enemy causes us to split, the war is over. This requires us to expedite the reorganization of the army. I do not agree with Mathiang Rok about his suggestion that committees be formed to discuss the six (6) signed protocols. In addition, we should be privileged that the UN SG visited Africa to discuss the issue of peace in Sudan – The first time it happened was during the decolonization of Africa – making the achievement of peace highly likely this year.As for South-South dialogue, we can start now. We should be prepared to negotiate with whatever party is ready to dialogue. If we wait until the government is formed, they will be the ones to undermine the GOSS. We must achieve consensus. Let us not delay south-south dialogue. The lack of dialogue can be a source of disunity, but if we handle it properly, it can also be a source of unity and this will allow the people to rally behind the leadership. There is a need to call the NLC as soon as possible to deliberate on the agreement. What I mean is the current NLC. The next convention, which needs to be convened as soon as possible, will elect a new NLC and who will be charged with the responsibility of working on a national constitutional government of south Sudan, etc.. From now, we have agreed that the judiciary be independent.Session 5Cdr. Salva Kiir Mayardit. Greetings to the Chairman and Madame de Mabior and others in this meeting. We apologize for not allowing you to attend the first meeting, which lasted for two days. The second meeting is composed of SPLM Counties Secretaries, civil society, women groups, the youth, etc.. The decision was deliberate and we did not want the meeting to be talking shop.I have no more to say. The issue which brought us here have been raised and you all have given your concerns. Let us take the line of peace to be the priority. In the absence of peace we must be prepared for war. There had been many Security Council resolutions of the same nature passed like this of Sudan, but have not been implemented, such as the PLO, Western Sahara, etc..I thank those who have exerted efforts to travel from their various locations to Yei where they met me on the situation. As I told you, there were no personal problems, they are administrative given my profession, and I know that rumours are dangerous. Rumours must be treated as rumours, but there is no smoke without fire. I don’t agree with Cdr. Wani that these rumours were created by the enemy. There are people among us who are more dangerous than the enemy. I must warn the Chairman that Nimeiri was made to be unpopular by his security organs.

Those who are misleading you and giving you false security information about others will suffer with you together or leave with you. The government, which is going to be led by you must include all. Without unity, the agreement will be a source of our disunity. We are not organized in all aspects, and as such will be exploited by other political parties that are more organized. The lack in our structures and political guidance will lead us to a very serious political defeat.
Mr. Chairman, you have talked about people eating the boat while we are in the middle of the river. Let me add this; the issue is not eating the boat in the middle of the river. The issue is that there are a few who have already crossed to the other side of the river and when the remaining ones asked them to bring the boat, they refused to return the boat. This is the problem.

DR. JOHN GARANG SPEECH – RUMBEK NOV. 2004

Chairman’s Speech to Rumbek Combined Consultative Meeting

(November 28 – 30, 2004)

  1. 1.     Opening greetings and Minute of Silence

 

  1. 2.     Main Rumours to Dispel: (suddenness and intensity of the rumours)
  • Rumours started with story of Chairman’s wife arrested by UK Police …
  • That Chairman said it is Cdr. Salva Kiir that wrote the letter by Equatorians.
  • That Cdr. Salva Kiir is being dismissed and replaced by Cdr. Nhial Deng.
  • That Cdr. Salva Kiir is being arrested, by so and so and forces being moved …
  • The story that Cdr. Salva is marginalized and his work given to others. This feeling might have developed when Cdr. Salva no longer went for the peace talks and therefore I increasingly worked with Cdr. Nhial and Cdr. Pagan. But we all know how I took over the IGAD talks, as this was during the Officers Conference here in Rumbek. I was reluctant to go to Naivasha as you will recall and people pleaded with me including the Officers Conference.  After that both of us could not be in the talks, and indeed since then Comrade Salva has been doing most of the work in the field as you can see from the very few messages I write.
  • There are many other rumours, but these three are the serious ones around which other issues and rumours are built.
  • Affirm that all these are false [expound convincingly at length].

ü  We have 22 years of togetherness with Cdr. Salva in the SPLM/A, he has been my right hand man even when others were senior to him and up to now and he will continue to be my right hand man into peace and during the interim period … 22 years of togetherness and comradeship cannot be blown away by rumours.

ü  Akon story of June 2003 that out of 7 founding members, we are the only two remaining orphans of former PMHC and that we shall take people across the river.

ü   New Site ritual sacrifices by spiritual leaders last July cannot just be forgotten.

ü  My main preoccupation is to conclude and sign peace by 31/12/2004 as demanded by the UNSC, and there is only one month left, why would I create problems by arresting Cdr. Salva and replacing him with Cdr. Nhial?

ü  It is practically and politically not possible to leapfrog Cdr. Nhial to No.2 as alleged by the rumour mongers, for what are the practical and political implications?

ü  As predicted in our 1983 Manifesto it is the NIF regime [Islamic Fundamentalism] that wants to divide us, block the peace agreement and hijack the Movement, and this must not be allowed.  The fact that both of us, Cdr. Salva Kiir and I are here shows the maturity of our Movement and of our people … As the saying goes the NIF hyena has barked and so it will not eat us again.

ü  I want to end this part by assuring you that Cdr. Salva and I are a Leadership package decreed by 1994 NC, and only a NC can dismiss either of us, and so that I intend to dismiss Cdr. Salva cannot be possibly true, I want you to dismiss this malicious lie.  Cdr. Salva and I are two sides of one coin and so that coin can never be divided; the SPLM/A will never be divided; we are not shakable and the Movement and the coming peace are in safe hands; we will take the people across.

  1. 3.     NIF and Outsiders Meddling in the Affairs of the SPLM/A

 

  • How did these rumours start and who is behind them, the rumours must definitely have been created by someone or some people, and for what purpose? 
  • In my view there were two situations: (a) Situation (A) is that of Cdr. Salva, our 1st Vice Chairman and COGS that we know and that I have known for the last 21 years, and (b) Situation (B) is that created by rumours.  These rumours were not created by Cdr. Salva Kiir, they were created by the NIF regime either directly in some cases or through some of our people who need money, and the purpose is clear; it is to block the peace so that it is not signed by 31/12/2004 as demanded by UNSC Res. 1574.  Situation (A) of Cdr. Salva and situation (B) of the NIF are incompatible and were pulling in different and opposite directions. This is why the situation in Yei did not explode.  At end the Cdr. Salva’s situation took the upper hand and won. And in this context I want to commend Cdr. Salva Kiir for controlling the situation; I commend the officers in Yei; the community leaders that were in Yei or came to Yei; others who went to Yei including members of the SPLM-LC, and finally the role played by Cdr. Pieng and Cdr. Malong in their shuttles.
  • Why does the NIF regime want to block peace?  Because they don’t like the six protocols we have signed; they don’t want the 31/12/2004 deadline and they are looking for excuses not to meet this deadline [Narrate the background as to how the UNSC came to Nairobi, the telephone call of President Bush, etc.].
  • The SPLM/A is the struggle and property of the people of New Sudan (South and three areas and rest of Sudan), and they have paid tremendous sacrifices over the last 22 years and in previous struggles.
  • We must honour the struggle and sacrifices of our people by taking the struggle to its logical and final conclusion to achieve the cardinal objectives of the SPLM/A, i.e., New Sudan and the right of self-determination.   These can only be achieved through conclusion and signing of the peace agreement by 31/12/2004 as demanded by the UNSC, and we must not allow the NIF or any situation to delay or disrupt this process.  Across Southern Sudan and New Sudan and the rest of Sudan people want peace; that is the general cry.  If the NIF regime does not hear this and we in the SPLM will deliver this peace.
  1. 4.     Loss of trust and confidence between Chairman and his 1st Vice Chairman
  • The main talk here is that the Chairman does not share issues with Cdr. Salva, does not consult him often, is not as intimate as before, there are others around the Chairman that pull him away from Cdr. Salva, etc …
  • Assurances that this is not true and that the Chairman has every confidence in Cdr. Salva [Relate incidences, e.g., at Malual Gahoth, when Tiger’s plane crushed, at his village and Akon, sending him to South Africa and what I told him; I do send Comrade Salva on diplomatic mission – Egypt, Libya and Algeria and several times to Ethiopia in recent times, etc.
  • Trust and confidence are intangibles that are built over time.  From my side I have not lost that trust and confidence that I have had in Cdr. Salva since 1983, but if there is doubt as there obviously is given the recent developments in Yei then I want to tell you categorically here that I will work hard to repair that perceived damage.
  • Trust and confidence are even more important now then at any other time before, because unlike in the past we shall not be alone in the post conflict era; there will be other political forces in both South and North and we will compete with some of these parties.  It is our cohesiveness and solidity as a political organization that will enable us to deliver both the New Sudan and the exercise of the right of self-determination and development in general.  This requires the social capital called trust and confidence within the leadership of the SPLM, among the cadres and among the rank-and-file.
  1. 5.     Regarding Problems within the Movement and Internal Reforms.
  • Internal reforms necessary and I have talked about this on many occasions.
  • Internal reforms should not be related to or confused with problems created by the current rumours, since these rumours are baseless
  • I am aware there is general concern among the officer corps and rank-and-file that now that peace is coming the SPLM Leadership, and specifically Dr. John, will abandon the cadres of the Movement and embrace outsiders or new comers instead [Dispel this and give convincing explanations why this is impossible to be entertained by the Leadership or by Dr. John in particular]. Include programs of education and development in the next period and how our cadres fit in.
  • The coming peace agreement will impose new structures and there shall be full decentralization to the States and Counties. This coupled with fairness of distribution of jobs at the level of GOSS and GONU will bring justice to all our people of New Sudan. In general peace will bring us responsibilities in the following: (a) SPLM, (b) SPLA, (c) GOSS, (d) NUBA MTS GOVT, (e) SBN GOVT, (f) ABYEI AEC, (g) GONU, (h) STATE GOVTS IN REST OF NORTH, (i) SPLA National Reserve, and (j) above all a robust, strong and rapidly growing economy to provide jobs & services to our people who have suffered so much.
  • Finally, we must hold our 2nd National Convention as soon as time will allow; we already have the resources to do it, and I here directing the full Convention Organizing Committee to sit immediately and plan and expedite preparations to ensure that the 2nd National Convention is held before the end of March 2005.
  1. 6.     Regarding the Peace Process and Prospects
  • Background to the UNSC Nairobi meeting and SC Resolution (sent to all units) and SPLM-GOS MOU.
  • Negotiations by the Technical Committees started on 26/11/2004, and Ali Osman Taha and I will arrive in Nairobi on 5/12/2004 to finish the process.

ü  Outstanding Issues in Ceasefire and Implementation Modalities Annexes – The Committee of Cdr. Nhial will brief you in detail, but in summary …

ü  Guidance from this consultative conference and from the Leadership Council regarding outstanding issues to complete and sign by 31/12/2004.

  • NIF displeasure and ways of resisting ending the war by 31/12/2004 as demanded by UNSC Resolution 1574, or if they are forced to sign the CPA then they will use the same ways to frustrate implementation. This is not a secret, as the Internet and Khartoum newspapers are full of GOS disquiet and plans of how to destroy the Agreement.  NIF will use the following, and they are actually very advanced in using them: –

ü  GOS-Militias (OAGs) and this is why negotiations are difficult, as the NIF does not want to let go of these militias.  The aim and hope is to create an alternative armed Movement loyal to the NIF in the South.

ü  Use of their Coordinating Council reinforced by disgruntled Southern politicians.  The aim and hope is to create an alternative political force in the South that subservient to the NIF.

ü  The NIF has actually already announced that they will implement the Wealth Sharing Protocol as from 1/1/2005 whether there is an agreement signed with the SPLM/A, or not; they have even said that they will implement it without the SPLM/A.

ü  The NIF aims and hopes to combine the two subservient groups (the OAGs and the political militias) to block signing of the CPA or to frustrate implementation, and to turn the six Protocols into their so-called “Peace from within” and to use the developed situation to fight and eliminate the SPLM/A.  This is the meaning of what Beshir announced. The NIF aims and hopes that Southerners will fight over the 50% of oil revenues in the Wealth Sharing Protocol instead of fighting the NIF regime.

ü  It is generally accepted by Southerners, New Sudanists and Sudanese in general as well as by the Region and international community that no political force other than the SPLM/A can successfully maneuver out of the situation and implement the six Protocols.  The SPLM/A has the vision, the record of struggle and sacrifice (social capital) and the commitment.

ü  We will not shy away from multi-party politics and we will challenge the NCP politically and democratically in the North if they continue to make mistakes by sponsoring south-south conflict.

ü  We shall also compete with and defeat all the fake political parties in the South, and let me assure you that we welcome democracy, political pluralism and elections both in the South and North.

  1. Finally Regarding the Vision, Objectives and Strategies of the SPLM/A
  • We must continue with the objective of New Sudan and the exercise of the right of self-determination.  This vision and strategy is what has reached us this far, and it is what will see us through to final victory.
  • The objective of New Sudan and the right of self-determination are not contradictory; as a matter of fact one cannot achieve the exercise of the right of self-determination except through the method of New Sudan.
  • Those who criticize the New Sudan as being in conflict with the right of self-determination and Southern Sudanese independence fail to tell people their method for achieving the right of self-determination of Southern Sudanese independence.  They end up being either AOGs or political militias to be used or manipulated by the NIF.  Our method has worked and is working and that is why the NIF regime is always angry with us and not with the self-appointed saviours of Southern Sudan, since such convoluted salvation is through the enemy.

Rumbek (Day 2)

Day 2 in Rumbek

  1. A.    Concerning Rumours as the Main Problem
  1. Somebody yesterday quoted Dr. Francis Deng that “what is left unsaid is what divides”.  Let us be sincere about this issue.  The main problem confronting us was not that of structures of the Movement.  Ayendit and her delegation did not travel to Yei because of structures; they went to Yei because of rumours surrounding the dismissal and arrest of Cdr. Salva Kiir and a possible split in the Movement as a result of this.  It is the same with the three communities in Yei and all those who traveled to Yei (Kuol Manyang and Deng Alor, Riek Machar’s group and others concerned).  They went to Yei because of the situation created by rumours.  People in the liberated areas including our soldiers are concerned and are waiting for good news as to whether there is a split in the Movement or not.  This is the same for our people in the Diaspora as well as our adversary.
  1. This is the issue I was addressing yesterday in my statement and that is probably why some of you, especially the GMC members, felt that my response was not sufficient.  I did not address the issue of structures sufficiently because, although it is a problem, it is not what caused the situation in Yei. The connection between the commotion that occurred in Yei would be logical only if the rumours were created so that the issue of structures in the Movement are addressed.  Of course you all know here that this is not the case. I think Cdr. Santo Ayang and others pointed this out yesterday in their own way.
  1. The first problem that we need to dispose of therefore is that of the commotion that was created in Yei as a result of the rumours surrounding the dismissal, replacement and arrest of Cdr. Salva Kiir.  Let us not put this under the rug by letting it be overshadowed by the issue of structures.  Let us satisfy ourselves that these rumours were not true and dismiss them sincerely.  I believe that from my part I addressed this issue of rumours and the associated commotion or misunderstanding sufficiently yesterday and I was sincere about. Some people have asked yesterday for a committee to establish the facts. This is okay, but there would be no need for this if we are all satisfied that there was no such a thing, and in that case what we would need to address is how to address such rumours in the future so that they do not cause similar situations as almost happened in Yei, because the enemy will continue to devise more stratagems to divide us.  Some people like Kosti Manibe talked about some of the remedies to avoid creation of such situations in the future.
  1. As I said yesterday, our people everywhere are concerned about the rumours and commotion created in Yei.  If we are satisfied, as I believe we all are, that this problem of rumours about the dismissal, replacement and arrest of Cdr. Salva Kiir and the resulting commotion in Yei has been resolved then it is important and urgent that we move among our people and units to assure them that there was not such a thing, because that is what people are waiting to hear. Let us also tell our Diaspora and the international community, and this can best be done by holding an international press conference either here in Rumbek or in Nairobi with the four of us.
  2. B.    The Second Problem:  Trust and Confidence.

 

  1. The second issue I talked about yesterday was trust and confidence between me and Cdr. Salva Kiir. I considered this to be the second important issue after the rumours, because as some one put it, existence of a confidence gap provided fertile soil for the rumours to germinate. I talked at length about our long relationship since the Sudanese army and since 1983 and as recently as my visit to Akon in May 2003 and the sacrifice that was made at the Chiefs Conference in New Site, and so on.
  1. I think I addressed this issue sufficiently yesterday, except may be for one issue that of personal contact.  When I first came from the long trip abroad, I informed Cdr. Salva that I had arrived back and that I was visiting the Region (Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya).  Cdr. Salva wrote to me welcoming me and informing all units that Comrade Chairman had returned back and is resuming his normal duties – a clear indication that he was acting in my absence, and so again it is not true that Cdr. Salva Kiir does not act in my absence, this is automatic; when the head leaves the deputy acts and there is normally no message sent to all units or departments every time the head leaves.
  1. On the issue of telephone contacts, we had a similar impression as Cdr. Salva.  One of my HQ officers, Major Amat Malual, had difficulty going through to the telephone of Cdr. Salva Kiir.  I was actually forced to go through Cdr. Malong Awan – I asked Cdr. Malong Awan twice to tell Cdr. Salva Kiir that I wanted to talk to him by phone and that I was not going through to him.  I was finally able to talk on the phone by arrangement with Cdr. Oyay Deng Ajak. Obviously we need to improve our communications, including having a hotline as someone suggested.
  1. The issues of a Kitchen Cabinet and some people having bought houses abroad are issues that better communications will solve because I obviously don’t have them.  The rents of the four of us here are being paid for by a friendly Government and I don’t believe any of the four of us has a house anywhere, although there are such rumours.  For those who might have houses they will talk for themselves.
  1. There are other issues of concern that were raise by Cdr. Salva on the question of trust and confidence that I should have addressed and touched on this morning by Dr. Justin Yac.  One is that Dr. John does not forgive those who have quarreled with him.  First I want to say that I do not consider that there has been a quarrel between me and Cdr. Salva.  The commotion in Yei was not caused by a quarrel between the two of us, but by rumours which we are now sorting out.  Secondly, it is not true that I do not forgive people. The five members of the first leadership who died were not because I did not forgive them. William Nyuon had come back to the Movement under complete reconciliation, we know how he died. The same thing for Kerubino.  Joseph Oduho also did not die on our side.  Arok Thon died in a plane crush on the Government side.  It is Majier whose circumstances of death are not clear.  But in the peace talks we made it clear that we are for a South African type truth and reconciliation commission.  As to those of Dr. Riek Machar we are already together as you can see him sitting near me. If anything I am criticized for too much reconciliation and too much forgiveness by even some of you in this hall.  So that I do not forgive is untrue.  I am very forgiving and will continue to be.
  1. The second issue that Cdr. Salva raised was guarantees for those who went public on the Internet and who appeared to support the rumours and commotion in Yei.  Again, I want to say that whereas there are those abroad who are writing all sorts of things, this really should not affect us here in the Movement.  We are one and there is no issue of victimization of anybody, as we have understood and satisfied each other regarding the last events in Yei.  These are the assurances we were giving yesterday, and I want to repeat that the issue of victimization of any sort does not arise at all; it will never happen and all those in this hall and Almighty God above are my witnesses.  So, to use Dr. Justin’s story, the concerns of Aguek Atem have no basis at all.  Let us unite more than at any other time before and move forward together.
  1.  I do not have much else to add on the issue of trust and confidence, except to say that trust and confidence are a form of social capital that people build over time – It is personal and there is very little you here can do about it.  However, from my part I want to assure you that I will work tirelessly to invest in trust and confidence between me and Cdr. Salva.
  1. Regarding the Issue of Structures of the Movement
  1. I agree that I did not address it sufficiently yesterday because I did not think it was the main problem.  It is not what caused the commotion or near-explosive situation in Yei.  This is not to say that the issue of structures is not a problem.
  1. The issue of structures is not new.  Second there is no argument that our structures are perfect, and there is nobody who is refusing that we reform our structures.  It is therefore a misrepresentation of the situation for anybody to suggest that the chairman did not reply the points of Cdr. Salva because the points regarding structures are not his. These are our collective problem and our collective responsibility. The issue of suitable structures for a liberation struggle is not easy and all of us have experimented with several structures since 1983. It was not the Chairman alone, but all of us collectively in the Leadership, whether this is the PMHC, the NLC/NEC or the SPLM-LC.  We used unorthodox means because of the unorthodox situation we are in.  Even the position of the COGS that somebody talked about before as being held by the Deputy Chairman is not the traditional organizational form.  This issue came up in the 1994 NC and my guidance was that let us not be catholic about this issue and that remains my position till today.
  1. The structures that we adopted at various times were dictated by changing situations and all of us participated in those changes and in the evolution of those structures.  Of course I am aware that often the credit goes to all and the blame goes to one in person, the Leader of any organization. In 1999 for example we all participated in the resolution passed by the NLC to restructure the Movement; this was not my decision alone. We were simply trying to solve pressing problems to survive.  The SPLM-LC was actually a compromise as some officers were calling for a return to military rule.
  1. Concerning assignments, these have sometimes been dictated by situations, like when Cdr. Salva Kiir was assigned as a Front Commander for BGR while he was Deputy Chairman and COGS.  This was to solve a particular situation in the Region. This is the same for other similar unorthodox assignments to solve similar situations.  These measures may now look wrong in hindsight, but this is how we got to where we are.
  1. Also the problem of a SPLA GHQ has always been with us. The GHQ has actually been there and is there now in Yei, but there are problems that we know which are associated with its functioning.  We need to solve these problems so that the GHQ functions normally.  The D/COGS at times had field assignments but this happens in many guerrilla situations and does not prevent the functioning of guerrilla GHQ.  We can have them at the GHQ and still we would have the same problems as we have in their absence.  Cdr. Peter Wal Athiu has since returned to GHQ and there is no noticeable improvement.  Now as move towards the peace agreement, we need to complete GHQ establishment and have the COGS and his deputies and other staffs in one place to organize the GHQ and the army.
  1. In the SPLA Act, that has been signed into law, the COGS has wide ranging powers which are organic to that office, the issue is using them and improving on the job description.
  1. Finally, the issue of structures in the transition was actually addressed by a large group of more than 150 cadres, and we discussed the issue of transition in the SPLM-LC.  The result was presented to me in a document entitled (______). I made some corrections and it is now under printing and will be presented by the Economic Commission to the LC.
  1. In it proposals of Transition Teams and Committees or Clusters as the document calls them has been made.  [Read some parts] – funding under the CBTF is also under way as the Economic commission is mobilizing resources.  The proposals of Cdr. Taban Deng and others are actually in this document, where we have three clusters:

(a)   SPLM(b)  SPLA and(c)   CANS

  1. These can be immediately formed and start working to effect the transition leading into Interim Period and formation of the GOSS.  Each of them would be under each of the three Vice-Chairmen and all supervised by the Chairman, and all working in one place as a collective leadership (SPLM-LC and Executive) managing the transition.  This is a good document in my view.  The only thing that might need reconsideration in the document is ISCOORT, so that it simply becomes a Secretariat of the SPLM-LC facilitating its work. What we may add is expediting of holding of the NC.

10.  Closing morale paragraph.