An American-Sponsored Draft Resolution on South Sudan/Sudan Before the UN Security Council

Photo/FILE UN Security Council members vote during a past meeting at the headquarters in New York.

United States of America: draft resolution before The Security Council,

           Security Council
SC/10632

 

Department of Public Information • News and Media Division • New York

 

Security Council

6764^th Meeting (AM)

Security Council Calls for Immediate Halt to Fighting Between Sudan, South Sudan,Resumption of Negotiations, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2046 (2012)

Lays Out Time Frame to Conclude Negotiations under Auspices of AfricanUnion;

Expresses Intent to Take Measures under Article 41 on Sanctions for Non-compliance

         Condemning the repeated incidents of cross-border violence between Sudan and South Sudan, including seizure of territory, support to proxy forces and aerial bombing, the Security Council this morning decided that Sudan and South Sudan must immediately cease all hostilities, withdraw forces, activate previously-agreed security mechanisms, and resume negotiations under threat of sanctions.

          Acting under the binding Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter in unanimously adopting resolution 2046 (2012), the Council decided that the parties must formally convey their commitments to end hostilities, including aerial bombardments, not later than 48 hours from the adoption of the resolution to the African Union and the Security Council.  Within one week, they must activate border security mechanisms, including the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism, without prejudice to ongoing negotiations on disputed areas.

          Within no more than two weeks, the Council decided in addition, Sudan and South Sudan must unconditionally resume negotiations under the auspices of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel to reach consensus on oil and related payments, the status of nationals of one country residing in the other, demarcation of borders and the final status of the disputed Abyei area.  If those negotiations failed to result in agreements within three months, the Council requested the Secretary-General, in consultation with African partners, to report on the status of talks.

           In addition, the Council decided that the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) must cooperate with the High-level Implementation Panel and the Chair of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) to reach a negotiated settlement on security arrangements in Blue Nile and South Kordofan States, strongly urging them to accept the tripartite proposal of the African Union, the United Nations and the Arab League to permit humanitarian access to the population in those two areas.

          On all issues regarding compliance with the resolution, the Council requested the Secretary-General to work closely with the African Union and other African partners and inform the Council within 15 days and in two week intervals thereafter, expressing its intention, in the event that any or all of the parties have not complied with its decisions, “to take appropriate additional measures under Article 41 of the Charter as necessary”, referring to the Article on sanctions.

Following the adoption of the text, Council members took the floor to urge both parties to avert a greater conflagration by compliance with the resolution and to complete the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which ended the decades-long Sudanese civil war.  “Both countries are on the brink of returning to the horrors of the past, taking the entire region with them,” the representative of the United States warned.

         Most speakers expressed strong support for the work of the African Union’s High-level Implementation Panel, with some saying that a main impetus for their affirmative vote for the resolution was the text’s support for the central role of that body.  Some speakers directly warned of their willingness to impose sanctions if compliance was not obtained, while others, including China’s representative, reiterated general reticence on imposing such measures.  While most speakers accorded equal blame for recent violence on the parties, some, including the representative of the Russian Federation, urged a stronger response to South Sudan’s occupation of Heglig, urging that an assessment of damage and other actions be taken.

          Taking the floor following Council members, the representatives of South Sudan and Sudan welcomed the Council’s strong support for the African Union’s role in trying to bring about a peaceful resolution of the Conflict.  South Sudan’s representative underlined his country’s withdrawal from Heglig and called for efforts to bring about Sudan’s withdrawal from Abyei, also requesting international humanitarian aid.

          Sudan’s representative welcomed the condemnation of the occupation of Heglig, but said that the lack of a timeframe for ending support to rebel groups in Sudan would make it harder to achieve peace, and he said his country was not bombing outside its own territory.  He also noted that the African Union decisions on the matter had not advocated the imposition of sanctions.

            Representatives of South Africa, India, Germany, Colombia, France, Togo, Morocco, United Kingdom, Pakistan, Guatemala, Portugal and Azerbaijan also spoke.

            The meeting began at 11:04 a.m. and ended at 12:09 p.m.

Resolution

The full text of resolution 2046 (2012) reads as follows:

“The Security Council,

“Recalling its previous resolutions and statements on the situation in Sudan and South Sudan, in particular resolutions 1990 (2011), 2024 (2011) and 2032 (2011), and its presidential statements of 6 March 2012 and 12 April 2012, andfurther recalling the priority it attaches to the full and urgent advancement of all outstanding issues from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement,

“Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity of Sudan and South Sudan, and to the purposes and the principles of the United Nations Charter,

“Noting paragraph 7 of the 24 April 2012 decision of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union at its 319^th meeting, and reiterating that the territorial boundaries of states shall not be altered by force, and that any territorial disputes shall be settled exclusively by peaceful means,

“Recalling the importance of the principles of the peaceful settlement of international disputes, good neighborliness, non-interference and regional cooperation,

“Deeply committed to seeing Sudan and South Sudan become two economically prosperous states living side-by-side in peace, security, and stability, andunderlining the importance of building mutual trust, confidence and an environment conducive to long-term stability and economic development,

“Condemning the repeated incidents of cross-border violence between Sudan and South Sudan, including troop movements, the seizure and occupation of Heglig, support to proxy forces, and Sudanese Armed Forces aerial bombardments,

“Condemning actions by any armed group aimed at the forced overthrow of the Government of either Sudan or South Sudan,

“Expressing deep concern at the humanitarian situation created by the fighting between Sudan and South Sudan, and the continued fighting in the states of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, in Sudan,

“Strongly condemning all acts of violence committed against civilians in violation of international humanitarian law and human rights law,

“Welcoming the withdrawal from Heglig of the army of South Sudan and callingfor the immediate cessation of aerial bombardments by the Sudanese Armed Forces against South Sudan,

“Strongly condemning the violations of human rights of non-combatants in the affected area, the damage to economic infrastructure, in particular oil installations, and all inflammatory statements, which result in mutual demonization and the threat of hostile action by extremist elements, including xenophobic attacks,

“Calling for an impartial fact finding effort to assess the losses and economic and humanitarian damage, including to oil facilities and other key infrastructure, in and around Heglig,

“Expressing deep concern at the fate of the nationals of both countries resident in each other’s territory, following the end of the transition period that occurred on 8 April 2012,

“Recalling the June 29, 2011 Agreement Between the Government of the Sudan and the Government of Southern Sudan on Border Security and the Joint Political and Security Mechanism, taking note of the commitment in Paragraph 2 to create a safe demilitarized border zone (SDBZ), and the 30 July 2011 Agreement on the Border Monitoring Support Mission Between the Government of Sudan and the Government of South Sudan, which elaborates on the establishment of a Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM) with an area of responsibility corresponding to the SDBZ, and a Joint Political and Security Mechanism (JPSM),

“Recognizing the urgent need for Sudan and South Sudan to commence the process of border demilitarization,

“Deploring the failure of Sudan and South Sudan security forces to redeploy from the Abyei Area in accordance with their Agreement of 20 June 2011 and resolution 1990 (2011),

“Convinced that there can be no military solution to the conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, and stressing the urgent need for a political and negotiated solution, based on respect for diversity in unity,

“Reaffirming its previous resolutions 1674 (2006) and 1894 (2009) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, 1612 (2006), 1882 (2009), and 1998 (2011) on children and armed conflict, 1502 (2003) on the protection of humanitarian and United Nations personnel, and 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009) and 1960 (2010) on women, peace and security,

“Welcoming the continuing efforts of the African Union to support Sudan and South Sudan in addressing the legacy of conflict and bitterness in Sudan, notably through the conclusion of the January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), its implementation, in particular the holding of the referendum on self-determination of South Sudan, and the negotiations on post-secession relations,

“Commending the efforts of the AU High-level Implementation Panel, including its Chairman President Thabo Mbeki, former Presidents Abdulsalami Abubakar and Pierre Buyoya, the Chairperson of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan and South Sudan, Haile Menkerios, and the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) under the leadership of Lieutenant General Tesfay Tadesse,

“Expressing its full support for the 24 April 2012 decision of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union at its 319^th meeting on the situation between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan, in order to ease the current tension, facilitate the resumption of negotiations on post-secession relations and the normalization of their relations, including, in particular the road map outlined in that decision,

“Determining that the prevailing situation along the border between Sudan and South Sudan constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security,

“Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

“1.   Decides that Sudan and South Sudan shall take the following actions with immediate effect
unless otherwise specified below:

(i)   immediately cease all hostilities, including aerial bombardments, with the parties formally conveying their commitment in this respect to the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the President of the Security Council not later than 48 hours from the adoption of this resolution;

(ii)  unconditionally withdraw all of their armed forces to their side of the border, in accordance with previously adopted Agreements, including the Agreement on the Border Monitoring Support Mission of 30 July 2011;

(iii)activate, within no more than a week of the adoption of this resolution, the necessary border security mechanisms, namely the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM) and the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone (SDBZ), in accordance with the administrative and security map presented to the Parties by the AUHIP in November 2011, it being understood that this map in no way prejudices ongoing negotiations on the disputed areas and demarcation of the border;

(iv)  cease the harbouring of, or support to, rebel groups against the other State;

(v)   activate the ad hoc Committee, under the Joint Political and Security Mechanism, to receive and investigate complaints and allegations made by one party against the other;

(vi)  immediately cease hostile propaganda and inflammatory statements in the media, as well as any attacks against the property, religious and cultural symbols belonging to the nationals of the other State, with the two Governments assuming full responsibility for the protection of each other’s nationals in line with international principles, consistent with the Framework Agreement on the Status of Nationals of the Other State and Related Matters initialled in March 2012;

(vii)implement pending aspects of the 20 June 2011 Agreement on Temporary Security and Administrative Arrangements for the Abyei Area, in particular the redeployment, within no more than two weeks of the adoption of this resolution, of all Sudanese and South Sudanese forces out of the Abyei Area;

“2.   Decides that Sudan and South Sudan shall unconditionally resume negotiations, under the auspices of the AUHIP and with the support of the Chairman of IGAD, at a time to be set by the AUHIP in consultation with relevant international partners, but within no more than two weeks from the time of adoption of this resolution, to reach agreement on the following critical issues:

(i)            arrangements concerning oil and associated payments;

(ii)          the status of nationals of one country resident in the other, consistent with the Framework Agreement on the Status of Nationals of the Other State and Related Matters initialled in March 2012;

(iii)         resolution of the status of the disputed and claimed border areas and the demarcation of the border; and

(iv)        the final status of the Abyei Area;

“3.   Decides that the Government of Sudan and the SPLM-North shall extend full cooperation to the AUHIP and the Chair of IGAD, to reach a negotiated settlement on the basis of the 28 June 2011 Framework Agreement on Political Partnership between NCP and SPLM-N and Political and Security Arrangements in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan States;

“4.   Strongly urges Sudan and the SPLM-Ntoaccept the tripartite proposal submitted by the African Union, the United Nations and the League of Arab States, to permit humanitarian access to the affected population in the two areas,ensuring in accordance with applicable international law, including applicable international humanitarian law, and guiding principles of emergency humanitarian assistance, the safe, unhindered and immediate access of United Nations and other humanitarian personnel, as well as the delivery of supplies and equipment, in order to allow such personnel to efficiently perform their task of assisting the conflict-affected civilian population;

“5.   Decides that the negotiations referred to in paragraph 2 above shall be concluded within three months of the adoption of this resolution, and in the event these negotiations fail to result in an agreement on any or all of the issues within the allotted timeframe of three months, requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the AUHIP, the Chair of IGAD, and the Chairman of the AU Commission, to report within four months of the date of this resolution to the Security Council on the status of the negotiations, including detailed proposals on all outstanding issues;

“6.   Requests the Secretary-General to consult with the African Union on the implementation of this resolution and the decisions of the AU PSC, to work closely with the AUHIP in support of its facilitationefforts, and to inform the Security Council within 15 days and in two week intervals thereafter on the status of compliance by Sudan, South Sudan, and the SPLM-N with the decisions set forth in this resolution, and expresses itsintention, in the event that any or all of the parties have not complied with the decisions set forth in this resolution, to take appropriate additional measures under Article 41 of the Charter as necessary;

“7.   Calls upon all parties to promote and protect human rights, including those of women and people belonging to vulnerable groups, to comply with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian and international human rights law, and calls for those responsible for serious violations of such law, including sexual violence, to be held accountable;

“8.   Commends the efforts by UNISFA in carrying out its mandate, expressesits deep appreciation for the work of the Force Commander and the troop-contributing countries, and expresses its intention to evaluate the mandate of UNISFA in the context of compliance by Sudan and South Sudan with the decisions set forth in this resolution, and with the fulfilment of their commitments as set out in the 20 June, 29 June, and 30 July 2011 Agreements;

“9.   Stresses the importance of, and the need to restore, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace between Sudan and South Sudan;

“10.  Decides to remain actively seized of this matter.”

Statements

               SUSAN RICE ( United States) welcomed the Council’s action, which underscored its strong and unanimous support for the road map for peace laid out by the African Union Peace and Security Council.  The current conflict was on the verge of becoming a full scale war.  Both countries were on the brink of retuning to the horrors of the past “and threatening to take the entire region with them.  The fighting must stop, and stop now.”  The conflict did not begin last week, last month, or last year.  The tensions underlying it had long roots, most recently in unresolved issues regarding the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement.  For months, the international community had sent strong warnings to the parties to resolve those issues peacefully.  To date, they had failed to do so.

Throughout the conflict, “there has been a long history of promises made and promises broken,” she said, stressing that, with its vote today, the Council had imposed tight deadlines for action by both sides in line with the African Union road map.  The Council must continue to press both parties to implement that peace plan, including through the withdrawal of all forces from border areas, activating border security mechanisms and ending support for rebel groups working against the other State.  It was also necessary for the parties to return to the negotiating table under the auspices of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel.  That was the only way that further conflict could be avoided.  If the parties failed to carry out all the aims of the African Union plan, the Council was united in its determination to hold them accountable by imposing Chapter VII sanctions on both sides as necessary.

She welcomed the commitment of South Sudan to abide by the African Union road map and the decisions of the Security Council.  The Government of Sudan should clarify its statement of earlier today to accept the African Union road map in full.  The bombing of areas in South Sudan was “deeply alarming and profoundly disturbing, especially in light of South Sudan’s recent steps towards peace.”  Such actions being carried out by Sudan must halt.  Meanwhile, South Sudan should refrain from any retaliation, especially cross-border attacks.  Occupation of Heglig was illegal and must not happen again.

                  LI BAODONG (China) said his delegation was deeply worried about the deterioration in relations between the two countries.   China hoped the two sides would respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and follow the path of peace laid out by the African Union.  Both sides should pursue dialogue and negotiations and make joint efforts to forge good neighbourly relations.  At the same time, the international community should take an objective and impartial stance on the matter and avoid taking sides.  Stakeholders should also refrain from interfering in the mediation efforts.

“We are always very cautious regarding the use or threat of use of sanctions,” he said, expressing support for the African Union’s efforts to solve the dispute.  China hoped both countries would cooperate with the African Union and sought an early and proper solution to the relevant issues.  Taking into account the African Union’s communiqué and the request of both sides, China had voted in favour of the resolution and would continue to take an active role in working with the international community to address the issue.

                    BASO SANGQU ( South Africa) said that his delegation remained concerned that the current escalation had seriously damaged the relationship between Sudan and South Sudan and had brought the two States to the brink of war.  It was clear that there was no military solution to the dispute.  What was required was for the parties to commit to living peacefully side by side, with respect for each other’s territorial integrity.  The parties must commit to the aims of the African Union road map agreed by the Peace and Security Council.  That Council had called on the United Nations to endorse its road map, and South Africa was pleased the Security Council had been able to unanimously adopt the resolution, which should help the African Union as it sought to ensure the parties resumed negotiations.  The onus rested with the political leadership of both countries, which must work to ensure that all their people enjoyed peace, security and development.  “They must give effect to their previous commitment to never return to war,” he said.

                          MANJEEV SINGH PURI (India) also expressed serious concern over developments between the two countries, saying there was an urgent need to settle all issues peacefully through negotiations, under the framework of the Panel headed by Thabo Mbeki.  He stressed his country’s consistent support to the efforts of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel to bring about a situation of two viable stable States in peace with one another.  He hoped that the adoption of the resolution would assist those efforts.

                         PETER WITTIG (Germany), enumerating the worrying events of the past months, said that an unequivocal message had been sent to the parties to end what he called a clear threat to international peace and security.  He strongly supported the leadership role of the African Union on the issue and urged the parties to seize the opportunity posed by the adoption of the text to return to a peaceful resolution of the issue through negotiations.  He affirmed that the Council would remain focused on the issue.

                      VITALY CHURKIN (Russian Federation) said he had supported the resolution insofar as it supported resolution of the conflict through negotiation under the mechanisms of the African continent itself, including Mr. Mbeki’s Panel.  However, in light of the severe repercussions of the occupation of the oil fields of Heglig, it was not appropriate to welcome the withdrawal of South Sudanese troops from that area.  Compensation needed to be provided, among other responses.  He maintained, in addition, that the situation in Sudan’s Blue Nile and South Kordofan States should not be placed under the framework of the resolution, saying that armed groups, supported from outside, were fomenting destabilization in Sudan.  He urged caution in the imposition of sanctions, supported the mediation of Thabo Mbeki to normalize the situation and urged the parties to cooperate with that mediation.

                   NÉSTOR OSORIO (Colombia) found it regrettable that the first steps of the recently-born State of South Sudan would be acts of war.  Peaceful negotiation, using regional organizations, was the only way of resolving such situations.  Supporting the African Union road map of 24 April, he said it was crucial that both parties return to the spirit of compromise that made the Comprehensive Peace Agreement possible.  The adoption of this resolution gave a clear sign of the firm determination of the Council not to allow the situation to worsen further.  The parties must forge a relationship based on cooperation and peaceful coexistence.

                   MARTIN BRIENS ( France) welcomed the adoption of the text and appreciated the work done by the African Union over the past few weeks to ease tensions between the two sides and restart negotiations on unresolved issues regarding the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Thanks to the Council’s decision today, the African Union road map now had the authority of a Chapter VII resolution, and both sides must come back to the negotiating table to deal with those unresolved issues.  This was a clear way forward and it was up to the two Governments to abide by the decisions taken by the Security Council and the African Union.

                   KODJO MENAN (Togo) said his delegation was pleased with the Council’s action, especially since the text just adopted stipulated that urgent measures be taken, so Sudan and South Sudan could return to peace.  After the African Union communiqué on the issue, it was crucial for the Council to act.  Togo believed that the two countries must follow the path of peace and negotiation and, in that regard, welcomed the decision of South Sudan to withdraw its forces from border areas.  Sudan should do likewise and end aerial bombardment, and both sides should return to the negotiations being led by Thabo Mbeki.  Both sides should avoid confrontation and begin good faith negotiations to resolve open issues, in line with the aims of the African Union.

                MOHAMMED LOULICHKI (Morocco) said his delegation had voted in favour of the text because it had called on both Governments to immediately cease violence and begin negotiations.  It had also called on both sides to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.  Morocco believed that priority should be given to dialogue and negotiations.  Neither side should support rebels seeking to undermine the move towards peace, and should instead return quickly to the negotiating table.  Sanctions should be imposed only when there was a necessity to do so, and, quoting a recent Arab League decision, he said that Arab countries were prepared to support the negotiation process.  The Arab countries had also proposed the creation of a commission of inquiry into the damage wrought by the conflict.

                  PHILIP PARHAM (United Kingdom) said that, in recent weeks, the Security Council had expressed its growing alarm at the escalating tensions and violence between Sudan and South Sudan.  With its adoption of the current resolution, the Council had made it clear that the conflict must end.  The text, with the weight of Chapter VII of the Charter, gave full support to the African Union road map, and called on both sides to agree to a cease fire and follow the African Union framework towards peace and lasting security.  The resolution also called on Sudan, South Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army-North (SPLM-N) to actively find a solution to the unresolved issues regarding the Blue Nile and South Kordofan.  The resolution made clear that those parties must comply with all elements of the decisions taken by the Security Council and the African Union.  The United Kingdom hoped Sudan and South Sudan would choose the peace, security and prosperity that the people so desperately needed and deserved.  The African Union had expressed its willingness to support all efforts towards reaching that goal.

                   RAZA BASHIR TARAR (Pakistan), expressing serious concern over the situation, said it was urgent for the international community to urge both parties to return to negotiations and peaceful resolution of their differences.  Supporting the central role of the African Union in the situation and all conflicts in Africa, he said that the Council must stand united behind the Union in the maintenance of peace and security on the continent.  The Council, however, should be cautious in the use of sanctions and he regretted that several proposals from Council members threatened to create fissures between members and that several proposals of the African Union were not taken into consideration.  The tendency of the Council to respond selectively to the Union’s efforts was counterproductive.  He called on both countries to “help us help them” find a peaceful resolution of the situation.

                  GERT ROSENTHAL (Guatemala), also expressing alarm, said both parties had the responsibility for the resumption of armed activity.  In voting for the resolution, he was responding to the appeal of the African Union, as well as the need to maintain international peace and security.  There was now a new opportunity to highlight all the elements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to achieve a firm and lasting peace within the framework of cooperation between both countries.

                  JOÃO MARIA CABRAL (Portugal), also expressing deep concern, urged both parties to respond favorably and immediately to today’s resolution and the work of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel.  He also stressed the importance of implementation of the provisions of the resolution that focused on human rights and humanitarian concerns.

                Council President AGSHIN MEHDIYEV (Azerbaijan), speaking in his national capacity, took note of the Council’s deep commitment to the viability of Sudan and South Sudan, and said that it was important that the resolution supported the central role of the African Union, as well as the peaceful settlement of disputes and the inadmissibility of the use of force and seizure of territory.  He welcomed the end of the occupation of Heglig and said additional steps should be taken, including an assessment of the losses incurred.

             DENG ALOR KUOL, Minister of Cabinet Affairs of South Sudan, said that his Government appreciated the Council’s prompt response to the African Union’s request to reinforce that regional body’s decisions regarding his country and Sudan.  He recalled — and reiterated his Government’s support for — its withdrawal of its police force from the Abyei Area on 28 April.  His Government expected the international community to exert efforts to ensure the “immediate and complete withdrawal of Sudan Armed Forces” from that area, he said, also noting that his Government had already committed to a cessation of hostilities and the resumption of negotiations under the auspices of the High-level Implementation Panel.  South Sudan welcomed the Council’s commitment to strengthen the African Union-led process through the active participation of the United Nations, the Chairman of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and other international partners.

“We appeal to the United Nations and its Member States to urgently mobilize humanitarian assistance for the population affected by Sudan’s continuous aerial bombardment and ground incursions in the northern States of South Sudan,” he said, also calling for urgent assistance for the tens of thousands of civilians displaced by the Sudanese Armed Force’s invasion of the Abyei Area last May.  Finally, he said that South Sudan looked forward to good faith implementation of the resolution just adopted.

              DAFFA-ALLA ELHAG ALI OSMAN (Sudan) saluted all Council members who had insisted that the current text condemn the violence in Heglig, describing it as encroachment on his country’s territorial integrity.  He also thanked those members that had called for conducting a fact-finding mission to investigate the extent of the damage done by SPLM-N in Heglig.  He welcomed the efforts of the African Union to promote peace and security throughout the continent and especially welcomed the recent statement that placed the African Union High-level Implementation Panel at the head of the negotiation process.

“We intend to keep this process within the African continent under the leadership of Mr. Mbeki,” he said.  At the same time, he said that peace between the two countries would only be achieved through halting all forms of support and sheltering of rebel armed groups.  He was concerned that the Council’s current resolution did not set out timeframes on that matter, as it had in other areas.  “This we find impracticable,” he said, also expressing concern about recent declarations by the Government of South Sudan to return to Heglig.  He also called for accuracy regarding talk about “aerial bombardment”.  Sudanese forces did not bombard any areas inside South Sudan, but his country had the right to use any means to rebuff and ward off any aggression within its own territory, including using its air force.  With all that in mind, he said that security issues between the two countries should be given priority when negotiations were restarted.

As for South Kordofan and Blue Nile, he said the African Union communiqué did not request putting maters regarding those areas under Chapter VII.  The African Union had requested endorsement of its road map, but did not include those areas.  In addition, the Council’s resolution threatened the use of sanctions, while the African Union had not posed such a request.  The Council must verify its actions in such matters and Sudan would make known its particular reservations regarding that matter.  He reiterated his Governments support for and belief in the Charter-mandated principle of State sovereignty and territorial integrity.

* *** *

        Recalling its previous resolutions and statements on the situation in Sudan and South Sudan, in particular resolutions 1990 (2011), 2024 (2011) and 2032 (2011), and its Presidential Statements of 6 March 2012 and 12 April 2012, and further recalling the priority it attaches to the full and urgent advancement of all outstanding issues from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity of Sudan and South Sudan, and to the purposes and the principles of the United Nations Charter,

Noting paragraph 7 of the 24 April 2012 decision of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union at its 319th meeting, and reiterating that the territorial boundaries of states shall not be altered by force, and that any territorial disputes shall be settled exclusively by peaceful means,

        Recalling the importance of the principles of the peaceful settlement of international disputes, good neighbourliness, non-interference and regional cooperation,

Deeply committed to seeing Sudan and South Sudan become two economically prosperous states living side-by-side in peace, security, and stability, and underlining the importance of building mutual trust, confidence and an environment conducive to long-term stability and economic development,

Condemning the repeated incidents of cross-border violence between Sudan and South Sudan, including troop movements, the seizure and occupation of Heglig, support to proxy forces, and Sudanese Armed Forces aerial bombardments,

Condemning actions by any armed group aimed at the forced overthrow of the government of either Sudan or South Sudan,

Expressing deep concern at the humanitarian situation created by the fighting between Sudan and South Sudan, and the continued fighting in the states of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, in Sudan,

Strongly condemning all acts of violence committed against civilians in violation of international humanitarian law and human rights law,

Welcoming the withdrawal from Heglig of the army of South Sudan and calling for the immediate cessation of aerial bombardments by the Sudanese Armed Forces against South Sudan,

Strongly condemning the violations of human rights of non-combatants in the affected area, the damage to economic infrastructure, in particular oil installations, and all inflammatory statements, which result in mutual demonization and the threat of hostile action by extremist elements, including xenophobic attacks,

Calling for an impartial fact finding effort to assess the losses and economic and humanitarian damage, including to oil facilities and other key infrastructure, in and around Heglig,

Expressing deep concern at the fate of the nationals of both countries resident in each other’s territory, following the end of the transition period that occurred on 8 April 2012,

Recalling the June 29, 2011 Agreement Between the Government of the Sudan and the Government of Southern Sudan on Border Security and the Joint Political and Security Mechanism, taking note of the commitment in Paragraph 2 to create a safe demilitarized border zone (SDBZ), and the July 30, 2011 Agreement on the Border Monitoring Support Mission Between the Government of Sudan and the Government of South Sudan, which elaborates on the establishment of a Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM) with an area of responsibility corresponding to the SDBZ, and a Joint Political and Security Mechanism (JPSM),

Recognizing the urgent need for Sudan and South Sudan to commence the process of border demilitarization,

Deploring the failure of Sudan and South Sudan security forces to redeploy from the Abyei Area in accordance with their Agreement of June 20, 2011 and resolution 1990 (2011),

Convinced that there can be no military solution to the conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, and stressing the urgent need for a political and negotiated solution, based on respect for diversity in unity,

Reaffirming its previous resolutions 1674 (2006) and 1894 (2009) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, 1612 (2006), 1882 (2009), and 1998 (2011) on children and armed conflict, 1502 (2003) on the protection of humanitarian and United Nations personnel, and 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009) and 1960 (2010) on women, peace and security,

Welcoming the continuing efforts of the African Union to support Sudan and South Sudan in addressing the legacy of conflict and bitterness in Sudan, notably through the conclusion of the January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), its implementation, in particular the holding of the referendum on self-determination of South Sudan, and the negotiations on post-secession relations,

Commending the efforts of the AU High-level Implementation Panel, including its Chairman President Thabo Mbeki, former Presidents Abdulsalami Abubakar and Pierre Buyoya, the Chairperson of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan and South Sudan, Haile Menkerios, and the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) under the leadership of Lieutenant General Tesfay Tadesse,

Expressing its full support for the 24 April 2012 decision of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union at its 319th meeting on the situation between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan, in order to ease the current tension, facilitate the resumption of negotiations on post-secession relations and the normalization of their relations, including, in particular the Roadmap outlined in that decision,

Determining that the prevailing situation along the border between Sudan and South Sudan constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security,

        Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1.     Decides that Sudan and South Sudan shall take the following actions with immediate effect unless otherwise specified below:

(i)     immediately cease all hostilities, including aerial bombardments, with the parties formally conveying their commitment in this respect to the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the President of the Security Council not later than 48 hours from the adoption of this resolution;

(ii)    unconditionally withdraw all of their armed forces to their side of the border, in accordance with previously adopted Agreements, including the Agreement on the Border Monitoring Support Mission of 30 July 2011;

(iii)   activate, within no more than a week of the adoption of this resolution, the necessary border security mechanisms, namely the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM) and the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone (SDBZ), in accordance with the administrative and security map presented to the Parties by the AUHIP in November 2011, it being understood that this map in no way prejudices ongoing negotiations on the disputed areas and demarcation of the border;

(iv)   cease the harbouring of, or support to, rebel groups against the other State;

(v)    activate the ad hoc Committee, under the Joint Political and Security Mechanism, to receive and investigate complaints and allegations made by one party against the other;

(vi)   immediately cease hostile propaganda and inflammatory statements in the media, as well as any attacks against the property, religious and cultural symbols belonging to the nationals of the other State, with the two governments assuming full responsibility for the protection of each other’s nationals in line with international principles, consistent with the Framework Agreement on the Status of Nationals of the Other State and Related Matters initialled in March 2012;

(vii)  implement pending aspects of the 20 June 2011 Agreement on Temporary Security and Administrative Arrangements for the Abyei Area, in particular the redeployment, within no more than two weeks of the adoption of this resolution, of all Sudanese and South Sudanese forces out of the Abyei Area;

2.     Decides that Sudan and South Sudan shall unconditionally resume negotiations, under the auspices of the AUHIP and with the support of the Chairman of IGAD, at a time to be set by the AUHIP in consultation with relevant international partners, but within no more than two weeks from the time of adoption of this resolution, to reach agreement on the following critical issues:

(i)     arrangements concerning oil and associated payments;

(ii)    the status of nationals of one country resident in the other, consistent with the Framework Agreement on the Status of Nationals of the Other State and Related Matters initialled in March 2012;

(iii)   resolution of the status of the disputed and claimed border areas and the demarcation of the border; and

(iv)   the final status of the Abyei Area;

3.     Decides that the Government of Sudan and the SPLM-North shall extend full cooperation to the AUHIP and the Chair of IGAD, to reach a negotiated settlement on the basis of the June 28, 2011 Framework Agreement on Political Partnership between NCP and SPLM-N and Political and Security Arrangements in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan States;

4.     Strongly urges Sudan and the SPLM-N to accept the tripartite proposal submitted by the African Union, the United Nations and the League of Arab States, to permit humanitarian access to the affected population in the two areas, ensuring in accordance with applicable international law, including applicable international humanitarian law, and guiding principles of emergency humanitarian assistance, the safe, unhindered and immediate access of United Nations and other humanitarian personnel, as well as the delivery of supplies and equipment, in order to allow such personnel to efficiently perform their task of assisting the conflict-affected civilian population;

5.     Decides that the negotiations referred to in paragraph 2 above shall be concluded within three months of the adoption of this resolution, and in the event these negotiations fail to result in an agreement on any or all of the issues within the allotted timeframe of three months, requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the AUHIP, the Chair of IGAD, and the Chairman of the AU Commission, to report within four months of the date of this resolution to the Security Council on the status of the negotiations, including detailed proposals on all outstanding issues;

6.     Requests the Secretary-General to consult with the African Union on the implementation of this resolution and the decisions of the AU PSC, to work closely with the AUHIP in support of its facilitation efforts, and to inform the Security Council within 15 days and in two week intervals thereafter on the status of compliance by Sudan, South Sudan, and the SPLM-N with the decisions set forth in this resolution, and expresses its intention, in the event that any or all of the parties have not complied with the decisions set forth in this resolution, to take appropriate additional measures under Article 41 of the Charter;

7.     Calls upon all parties to promote and protect human rights, including those of women and people belonging to vulnerable groups, to comply with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian and international human rights law, and calls for those responsible for serious violations of such law, including sexual violence, to be held accountable;

8.     Commends the efforts by UNISFA in carrying out its mandate, expresses its deep appreciation for the work of the Force Commander and the troop-contributing countries, and expresses its intention to evaluate the mandate of UNISFA in the context of compliance by Sudan and South Sudan with the decisions set forth in this resolution, and with the fulfilment of their commitments as set out in the June 20, June 29, and July 30, 2011 Agreements;

9.     Stresses the importance of, and the need to restore, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace between Sudan and South Sudan;

10.   Decides to remain actively seized of this matter.

UN Council aims for Wednesday vote on Sudan crisis

By AFP: Wednesday, May 2  2012 

The UN Security Council hopes to vote Wednesday on a resolution that could threaten Sudan and South Sudan with sanctions if they do not stop fighting, diplomats said.

China and Russia, veto-wielding permanent members, are however leading resistance to any warning of international action against the rival countries, which many fear are headed for all-out war.

Sudan on Tuesday warned its southern neighbour, which split away last year, over widening “aggression” as the South alleged fresh clashes despite an African Union peace initiative in the oil-fuelled conflict.

Khartoum charged that “South Sudan and its army are working to widen the aggression and occupy some disputed points and areas by force. Sudan cannot allow the occupying troops to impose their power.”

More than a week ago South Sudanese soldiers said they had completed a withdrawal from Sudan’s main oil region of Heglig, which they occupied for 10 days, while Sudan launched air strikes across the border.

In New York, a resolution drawn up by the United States calls on the two countries to “immediately cease all hostilities” and withdraw troops to their own territory, in line with the call made by the African Union.

The resolution would threaten “additional measures” under Article 41 of the UN Charter, which allows for non-military sanctions.

China, which has strong trade ties with both Sudan and South Sudan, and Russia traditionally oppose warnings of sanctions. And the resolution could change before any vote, diplomats told AFP.

“This time it is less the Russians and more the Chinese,” one senior Western diplomat said on condition of anonymity. “If they keep on not liking it, they might abstain. I don’t think they will veto.”

China is more likely to accept the resolution as the request for possible sanctions has come from the African Union.

“It is much more difficult for the Chinese and Russians to say no to an AU request than a Western plan,” the envoy added.

Under the resolution, the two countries would have two weeks to “unconditionally” start talks under AU mediation on borders and sharing oil revenues, and they would have three months to conclude an accord.

UN leader Ban Ki-moon would have to report to the Security Council every two weeks on the crisis.

China and Russia are nervous even though no automatic sanctions are mentioned, diplomats said. “They oppose even the mention of Article 41,” one diplomat told AFP.

Speaking after talks with Sudan’s Foreign Minister Ali Karti in Moscow on Monday, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said his country was ready to support the resolution.

“It may include measures of economic pressure. But I would repeat that this is not an automatic decision, but only an intention depending on how the resolution is implemented,” he told reporters.

http://www.nation.co.ke/News/africa/UN+Council+aims+for+Wednesday+vote+on+Sudan+crisis/-/1066/1397996/-/167lcg/-/index.html

International Crisis Group: Preventing Full-Scale War between Sudan and South Sudan

Brussels  |   18 Apr 2012

Sudan and South Sudan are teetering on the brink of all-out war from which neither would benefit. Increasingly angry rhetoric, support for each other’s rebels, poor command and control, and brinkmanship, risk escalating limited and contained conflict into a full-scale confrontation between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army (SPLA). Diplomatic pressure to cease hostilities and return to negotiations must be exerted on both governments by the region and the United Nations (UN) Security Council, as well as such partners as the U.S., China and key Gulf states. The immediate priority needs to be a ceasefire and security deal between North and South, as well as in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. But equally important, for the longer-term, are solutions to unresolved post-referendum issues, unimplemented provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) (that ended the civil war in 2005), and domestic reforms in both countries.

The most recent fighting between the SAF and SPLA arose amid a murky mix of armed actors and interests in the contested borderlands, including a variety of northern opposition forces and proxy militias. The exact cause is vigorously disputed, but the flare-up is the predictable outcome of negative trends: conflicts in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile; lack of agreement on transitional economic and financial arrangements between the two countries; Khartoum’s seizure of Southern oil; South Sudan’s decision to stop oil production; and sporadic cross-border attacks and bombings. It occurs amid mutual recriminations: of Khartoum arming Southern rebels and the SPLA providing material support to its former brothers-in-arms now fighting for the Sudanese Peoples’ Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, as well as political support to members of the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) seeking to topple President Bashir.

In part to prevent the resupply of the SPLM-N, the SAF has also bombed refugee camps and towns in South Sudan and recently attacked Bentiu, the capital of Unity State. Complicating matters are divergent views within the capitals and hardliners seemingly working to undermine negotiated settlements, as demonstrated by the scuttling of the much anticipated North-South presidential summit on 3 April.

The end result is that, following renewed clashes, the SPLA has taken control of the disputed Heglig oil fields and stopped about half of Sudan’s 115,000 barrels-per-day oil output. This has dealt a further blow to Khartoum’s economy, already reeling from separation and the additional fall in revenue that resulted from Juba’s decision in January to stop exporting oil through Sudan’s pipelines. The beleaguered Khartoum regime, which is under pressure on political, economic, and multiple military fronts and increasingly concerned about the prospects of an Arab Spring uprising, cannot afford to sustain such losses.

Risky strategies

A game of “chicken” appears to be underway, in which both sides embark on risky strategies in the hope that the other will blink first. If neither does, the outcome will be disastrous for both.

Some suspect that President Kiir’s tactics are intended to provoke a popular uprising in the North — that he is gambling the attack on Heglig may be the proverbial straw that breaks the back of the ruling National Congress Party (NCP). However, little thought seems to have been given to the consequences if President Bashir is removed from power. Unlike Egypt, Sudan lacks a single, legitimate institution that could manage a peaceful transfer of power. Bashir, who became president following a 1989 military coup, and his close associates have fragmented the security services and rely on personal loyalty and increasingly expensive patronage to retain control. He and security hardliners continue to pursue divide and rule tactics to prevent the emergence of a unified counterweight to NCP dominance of the centre. Bashir’s fall could trigger a wild scramble by multiple armed actors for control of Khartoum and other parts of the country that would be hard, if not impossible, to restrain.

Kiir and the SPLM are also dangerously exposed. With South Sudan’s decision to stop oil production, 98 per cent of its governmental revenue has disappeared. Reserves and other stop-gap measures can only tide Juba over for some months, after which the SPLM would have to impose draconian budget cuts, including on the SPLA, which is a fractious force that includes many former foes. Khartoum has a long history of supporting its enemy’s enemies. At relatively little cost it could continue to support Juba’s opponents and compound domestic instability for a government already plagued by weak institutions, limited reach and increasingly untenable financial circumstances.

Khartoum and Juba need to exercise restraint and consider carefully the consequences of their actions. The decision to abandon negotiations and resort to increasingly bellicose posturing can only hurt both.  Each government, with its own domestic challenges, may reap short-term political benefit from externalising its problems, but there is no military solution, and both sides would suffer from all-out war. The destruction of oil infrastructure would have long-term economic consequences. Stability is necessary in both the North and the South for either to develop and prosper and, in turn, enjoy long-term stability.

Decades of mutual distrust

Decades of mutual distrust prevent either side from making good-will gestures and pursuing win-win negotiations. In such a febrile environment, the UN Security Council must reassert itself to preserve international peace and security. It should mobilise all possible leverage to bring the parties back to negotiations and agreement on the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM), as well as encourage implementation of the border monitoring tasks outlined for the UN Interim Security Force in Abyei (UNISFA) in Resolution 2024 (2011), particularly near Heglig and Jau.

The parties and UNISFA must operationalise the JBVMM to investigate and verify claims either side is undermining peace or violating existing and future agreements, including for the necessary withdrawal of SPLA forces from the Heglig area and cessation of SAF bombing of South Sudanese territory. The monitoring mechanism needs to be flexible with high mobility. Lessons should be drawn from previous monitoring missions in Sudan, during which building confidence among Sudanese parties and supporting mutually-agreed arrangements were at least as important as verifying and reporting on legal obligations.

Unimplemented CPA provisions and deferred post-referendum issues

Fundamentally, the current conflict is rooted in the CPA’s unimplemented provisions, such as the status of Abyei, the cancelled popular consultations in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile and disputed borders, as well as unresolved issues stemming from separation. While they have acknowledged their interdependence, the two countries must still reach detailed agreements on many divisive issues, such as the joint exploitation of oil, transitional financial arrangements, citizenship, security and trade. The time for posturing and brinkmanship is past; they must return to the table promptly and sustain the focus and commitment necessary to hammer out and implement deals. Otherwise, if these critical issues are allowed to fester, they will undermine any ceasefire or limited peace deal.

Absent the democratic transformation long overdue in Khartoum, Sudan remains unstable as power, resources and development continue to be overly concentrated in the centre. A “new South” has emerged in Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile that – along with Darfur, the East and other marginal areas – chafes under NCP domination. Because of historic ties, and despite South Sudan’s separation, the North’s centre-periphery wars continue to draw in Juba.

The call by the North’s opposition parties for a national dialogue in the context of a wider constitutional review conference suggests a way forward. Such a conference should be seen as a more extensive national consultative process, to accommodate the stymied popular consultations in the transitional areas and the Darfur people-to-people dialogue. Those latter two processes, if run separately, will not lead to political stability and lasting peace in the whole country.

A new unified international strategy

With developments increasingly appearing to be spiralling out of control, a new strategy is needed to avert an even bigger crisis. As Crisis Group noted in its 26 September 2011 Conflict Alert, any solution must be comprehensive. The international community must focus not only on North-South issues or the situation in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, but also require the NCP to agree to an immediate, inclusive, national reform process. The first priority needs to be for a security deal that stops both the fighting between the North and the South, as well as Khartoum and the SRF, but for this to hold it must also be clearly linked to binding commitments to discuss and implement political reforms.

The UN – the Security Council – should exert pressure on the two presidents to meet and negotiate an immediate ceasefire. This should be based on the 29 June 2011 Agreement on Border Security and the Joint Political and Security Mechanism, as well as the 10 February 2012 Memorandum of Understanding on Non-Aggression and Cooperation. They also need to reach common ground on a security deal for Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile based on the 24 June 2011 Framework Agreement, to be monitored by an enhanced JBVMM.

To encourage reforms in Khartoum, a united international community, particularly the African Union (AU), Arab League and UN, should put pressure on the NCP to accept a free and unhindered national dialogue aimed at creating a national stabilisation program that includes defined principles for establishing an inclusive constitutional arrangement accepted by all. A national reform agenda should include a program that accommodates all the people of Sudan and supports inclusive governance. The NCP must make genuine efforts to end impunity in Darfur, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile and allow humanitarian agencies unhindered access, as well as support the efforts of the AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and UNISFA to protect civilians.

If the NCP commits seriously to such a national reform agenda, regional actors and the wider international community should offer assistance. Major players like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, the Arab League, China, the U.S., EU and AU must recognise that reform is necessary for stability and requires their support. If the NCP accepts an inclusive reform process, for example, the U.S. should provide incentives under its normalisation package to bolster that process. These could include easing debts, lifting economic sanctions and removing Sudan from its list of state sponsors of terrorism. Meanwhile, North-South relations may also be improved by greater domestic stability in South Sudan. Building institutions, extending service delivery, bolstering economic growth, and calming inter-communal tensions are among the priorities, and will be served in part by advancing promised political reforms. This includes an opening of political space inside and outside the SPLM, and an inclusive constitution-making process, that should be supported by partners and donors.

http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/alerts/2012/sudan-preventing-full-scale-war-between-sudan-and-south-sudan.aspx

Recent Reports from the International Crisis Group on South Sudan

China’s New Courtship in South Sudan, Africa Report N°186, 4 Apr 2012

Following its oil interests and other opportunities to Juba, China is building a new relationship with South Sudan but finds itself drawn into a dangerous dispute that risks bringing the Sudans back to conflict.

South Sudan: Compounding Instability in Unity State, Africa Report N°179 , 17 Oct 2011

Unity State, a territory of unique importance and complexity in the fragile new country of South Sudan, faces a perfect storm of political, social, economic, and security dilemmas.

Politics and Transition in the New South Sudan, Africa Report N°172, 4 Apr 2011

Now that South Sudan’s self-determination has been realised, long-suppressed grievances and simmering political disputes have re-surfaced, threatening instability on the eve of independence.

Negotiating Sudan’s North-South Future, Africa Briefing N°76, 23 Nov 2010

As South Sudan’s critical self-determination referendum looms, the foundation for a constructive relationship between North and South is yet to be laid.

Sudan: Defining the North-South Border, Africa Briefing N°75, 2 Sep 2010

Sudan’s North and South must take political action to define their mutual boundary if they hope to avoid future complications, including a return to conflict.

Sudan: Regional Perspectives on the Prospect of Southern Independence, Africa Report Nº159, 6 May 2010

If, as likely, South Sudan decides to secede from the North at its January 2011 self-determination referendum, it will need support from Sudan’s neighbours to ensure the decision is respected and new conflict is prevented.

Jonglei’s Tribal Conflicts: Countering Insecurity in South Sudan, Africa Report N°154, 23 Dec 2009

Conflicts among tribes have claimed several thousand lives in South Sudan in 2009, with the worst violence in and around the vast, often impassable state of Jonglei. Violence often afflicts pastoral communities, but in this area it has taken on a new and dangerously politicised character.

Press Statement from the UN Security Council on South Sudan, Sudan’s Crisis over Heglig/Paanthou/Aliiny

Department of Public Information • News and Media Division • New York

Security Council

6749^th Meeting (PM)

As Violence between Sudan, South Sudan Threatens Return to ‘Full-Scale War’,

Security Council Demands End to Cross-Border Clashes, Force Redeployment

Alarmed by escalating conflict between Sudan and South Sudan — as manifested most recently by the seizure of oil fields in Sudan — the Security Council this afternoon demanded that both sides immediately end cross-border violence and support to armed proxies and redeploy their forces from forward positions.

“The recent violence threatens to return both countries to full-scale war and the period of tragic loss of life and suffering, destroyed infrastructure, and economic devastation, which they have worked so hard and long to overcome”, the Council said in a statement delivered by Susan Rice of the United States.

To defuse the situation, immediate actions demanded by the Council include withdrawal of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) from the oil-rich area of Heglig in Sudan, an end to aerial bombardments by Sudan’s air force and redeployment of the forces of both sides 10 kilometres outside the North-South borderline specified in their agreements of 29 June and 30 July 2011.

The Council also reiterated its demand that both parties redeploy their forces immediately from the disputed Abyei area.  In addition, both sides were urged to take immediate steps to establish a demilitarized border zone and activate the border monitoring mechanism already agreed upon, with the support of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNIFSA).

Towards lasting peace, the Council called on the Governments of Sudan and South Sudan to “urgently and peacefully” resolve issues regarding Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei and all other outstanding matters of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which ended their decades-long conflict.  For that purpose, the Council called on the leaders of both States to hold a summit, as previously planned, and to work with the related African Union high-level panel.

The meeting began at 3:05 p.m. and ended at 3:12 p.m.

Presidential Statement

The full text of the statement contained in document S/PRST/2012/12 reads as follows:

“The Security Council expresses its deep and growing alarm by the escalating conflict between Sudan and South Sudan, as manifested most recently by the seizure and occupation of the town of Heglig and its oil fields in Sudan by the SPLA.  The recent violence threatens to return both countries to full scale war and the period of tragic loss of life and suffering, destroyed infrastructure, and economic devastation, which they have worked so hard and long to overcome.  The Security Council demands a complete, immediate, and unconditional:  end to all fighting; withdrawal of the SPLA from Heglig; end to SAF aerial bombardments; end to repeated incidents of cross-border violence between Sudan and South Sudan; and an end to support by both sides to proxies in the other country.

“The Security Council affirms its strong commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Sudan and South Sudan.  It recalls the importance of the principles of good neighbourliness, non-interference and regional cooperation.

“The Security Council demands that both sides redeploy their forces 10 kilometres outside the North/South 1/1/1956 borderline in accordance with their Agreements of 29 June and 30 July 2011.  It urges Sudan and South Sudan to take immediate steps to establish a Safe Demilitarized Border Zone and activate the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism, and reiterates its readiness to continue to support the parties in implementing this Agreement with the support of UNISFA, in accordance with resolution 2024 (2011).  The Security Council calls on Sudan and South Sudan to respect the letter and spirit of the Memorandum of Understanding on Non-Aggression and Cooperation of 10 February 2012.

“The Security Council reiterates its demand that Sudan and South Sudan urgently redeploy their security forces immediately from the Abyei Area in accordance with their Agreement of 20 June 2011 and resolution 1990 (2011).

“The Security Council calls upon the Governments of Sudan and South Sudan urgently and peacefully to resolve the fundamental issues of security and border management, the situations in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, and Abyei and all outstanding CPA issues that are fuelling the mistrust between the two countries.  It further calls on the leaders of Sudan and South Sudan to meet immediately in a summit as previously planned in order to advance the issues that stand in the way of achieving lasting peace.

“The Security Council underscores its support for the continuing efforts of the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel to assist Sudan and South Sudan to reach agreement on all outstanding issues, and encourages continuing partnership with the United Nations in this regard.

“The Security Council views the current situation as a serious threat to international peace and security.  It will continue to follow the situation closely, and will take further steps as necessary.  The Security Council looks forward to receiving a briefing from the AUHIP and Special Envoy [Haile] Menkerios in the coming days.”

http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2012/sc10606.doc.htm

Why Bashir wants to meet Salva Kiir

By Monica Lakes

Before stating the reasons about why Bashir wants to meet Salva Kiir, one would first have to outline that Khartoum has never honoured any agreement since creation. It is their sworn position that they (old and new NCPs) have and will never implement any agreement with infidels or even with muslims who are not of the Arab origin. The proof is that the CPA protocols on Abyei for self determination and popular consultation for Southern Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile were never implemented. This is not to mention the old agreements: Addisababa agreement (1972) and the Khartoum/Fashoda agreements of 1997. There were even more other dishonoured agreements dating back to pre 1956. Anyway, that is history and it is necessary to reflect back those lessons.

We are talking about the recent Addisababa agreement that was initialed by Pagan Amum, the Chief negotiator on behalf of Juba. On the part of SPLM, it can be stated with confidence that there was and still, no hidden agenda about signing the agreement. SPLM initialed the agreement in good faith so that the two sister countries of South Sudan and Sudan live as good neighbours and for the people in both countries to enjoy life and rebuild their livelihoods peacefully.

 However, when it comes to the NCP with its known records of reneging, stalling and abrogating agreements, many things come into consideration. First, let us examine this story before finding the reasons for the NCP in supporting the agreement and what caution that the SPLM government in Juba may need to take.

The story is about a lion that camouflaged itself as a cow and joined a herd of cattle. When the herdsman settled his cows and was tying down the animals into their respective positions for the night, he saw the cow-lion smiling to itself in anticipation of what will happen in the night. The lion imagined that during the dark night, the first victim would be the herdsman himself in which case, the whole herd of cattle will remain as the lion’s property after the elimination of the owner. The herdsman after discovering the plot pretended that he did not see anything. He then made plans that resulted in successfully slaying the beast before it implemented its treacherous intentions.

The negotiating committees have gone to Ethiopia many times to discuss pending CPA issues and with no breakthrough. Then, in what would have been an NCP success story when the AU was supporting the NCP position on oil, the SPLM foiled up everything and concluded the abortion with closure of the oil pipelines. Khartoum pretended that it would not hurt their economy, but the truth is that it bites large chunks of it daily. Like a tired fish that allows itself on a pulling hook so as to gather strength to let go, the NCP found interest in the logic of the SPLM’s sincere position of the “mutual interest” for the people of both countries to be free and live peacefully – Simple and attractive.

Bashir and his NCP are now sure that they have made adequate plans. First, Bashir has made great homework within the AU. The AU believes in them more than in the SPLM. Whatever their manner of work may be, it is just the same approach as the one with Scott Gration when he (Scott) was the USA representative in Sudan. Scott had always believed in the NCP. In addition, the NCP has rallied Eritrea, the new Islamists in Egypt and Libya, and then Chad and Central Africa, on its side. These countries are all working to see to it that there must be a destablised South Sudan through a regime change that will keep the country ungovernable for as long as it can take to erase traces of SPLM in the entire South Sudan and Sudan. Already, the NCP has trained militias that can be deployed to attack South Sudan from their soils. They will provide logistics and material support to the militias.

The NCP has cowed some other neighbouring countries such as Kenya and putting them to dummy status. Ethiopia and Uganda are the two countries the NCP seems to be getting some difficulties with in implementing their treacherous agenda against South Sudan. In its quest for wider influence internationally, the NCP has secured China and Russia (UN veto holders) for protection against economic sanctions and arms embargo. The Islamic Middle East, especially Iran, is fully behind Khartoum in providing military and economic support.

On the military front, Sudan will not defeat SPLA-N because the closure of oil pipelines has denied it of financial income to pay the mercenaries and purchase of arms. Sudan’s short term plan is therefore to accept the agreement so that the pipelines are opened and for them to make a speedy plunder of oil. Recently, Omer Bashir went to China and was advised to accept the agreement and China will help on rapid stealing of the South Sudan oil and delivery of lethal fighter planes to Khartoum to use in its monger war against Southern Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile, and also as deterrent to South Sudan.

The plan by the NCP for the meeting is to buy time so that the NCP makes its treacherous plans against South Sudan complete. It would be advisable to inspect Omer Bashir when he is coming to meet Salva Kiir. He may be carrying explosives. Moreover, the security in Juba must step up vigilance so that the NCP trained terrorists that have infiltrated the city should never get any chance to implement their dirty and treacherous plans.

 

Monica Lakes

Sudanese air strike hits South Sudan, breaking non-aggression pact signed last week

Photo: VOA

Map of Sudan and South Sudan

 

South Sudan: Khartoum Violates Non-Aggression Pact

Peter Heinlein | Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

South Sudan is accusing neighboring Sudan of bombing southern targets, days after the two sides signed a non-aggression deal. The allegation threatens already troubled talks on sharing oil revenues.

South Sudan’s chief negotiator at the African Union-mediated talks, Pagan Amum, said Sudanese jets bombed an area in the south’s Unity state, not far from the two countries’ disputed border. He gave few details, saying word of the attack had just been received.

The bombing, if confirmed, would be the first violation of a non-aggression agreement signed Friday at the beginning of a round of talks on oil and other contentious issues. Amum accused Khartoum of continuing its attempts to destabilize the border.

“That is a bad sign that the government of Sudan is not serious to non-aggression, but we expressed our hope the government of Sudan would now end its attacks on South Sudan, particularly areas of bombardment,” said Amum.

Speaking to reporters, Amum said the south is continuing to take a tough line on the main issue in the six days of talks – sharing oil revenues. He said any decision to reopen the pipeline that carries southern oil to international markets would only come after Khartoum pays for oil it took from the pipeline while the payments dispute raged last month.

“There is no way for us to resume unless the government of Sudan pays the south the market value of all the oil they have stolen, which is in excess of $500 million. We cannot export our oil if it is not secure and safe, if the government of Sudan are practicing state piracy. It would be dangerous for us to send even one barrel, not millions,” said Amum.

South Sudan took the bulk of Sudanese oil when it became independent last year, but the oil must pass through the north to reach Port Sudan on the Red Sea.

Khartoum’s negotiators did not speak to reporters as they left the African Union headquarters, where the two sides briefed the AU Peace and Security Council.

The talks, mediated by former South African president Thabo Mbeki, are expected to carry on through at least Wednesday, but diplomats close to the negotiations say they may be extended if there is any sign of a deal that might open the oil pipeline.

Experts say the pipeline shutdown is costing both countries hundreds of millions of dollars a month in lost revenues.

http://www.voanews.com/english/news/South-Sudan-Khartoum-Violates-Non-Aggression-Pact-139299998.html

Sudanese air strike hits S Sudan, breaking pact: army

(AFP) –   

JUBA — Sudanese warplanes dropped several bombs wounding four soldiers in a contested area claimed by South Sudan, breaking a fresh non-aggression pact between the two sides, Juba’s army spokesman said Tuesday.

“Sudanese Armed Forces airplanes bombed the Jau area in Unity state on Sunday, wounding four of our soldiers,” South Sudanese army spokesman Philip Aguer told AFP.

South Sudan — which declared independence from former civil war enemies in north Sudan in July — has accused Khartoum of carrying out several bombing raids in frontier regions of its territory, claims denied by the northern army.

The bombings took place in oil-rich areas along the disputed border with the rump state of Sudan, which both sides claim as theirs. The Jau area has seen several bombings in recent months as well as fighting between the two sides.

“There were several bombs launched from Antonov aircraft,” Aguer said.

The region borders Sudan’s Southern Kordofan state where rebels — once part of the ex-guerrilla turned official South Sudanese army — are battling the Khartoum government forces.

Sudan and South Sudan signed a non-aggression pact late Friday over the disputed border in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa, a move praised by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon.

However, Aguer said the latest bombings showed the deal had not been taken seriously by Khartoum.

“Nothing has changed, it is business as usual for them,” Aguer said.

Gideon Gatpan, minister of information for Unity state, confirmed there had been “several bombings” on Sunday in the Jau area.

According to the pact, the two sides agreed to “respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity” and to “refrain from launching any attack, including bombardment.”

Border tensions have mounted since South Sudan split from Sudan in July, becoming the world’s newest nation.

South Sudan took three quarters of Sudan’s oil when it gained independence, but all pipeline and export facilities are controlled by the north.

Last month, the South halted oil production — accounting for 98 percent of government revenue — after Juba accused Khartoum of stealing $815 million worth of crude oil.

The latest round of talks between Khartoum and Juba continue in Addis Ababa to resolve the furious oil crisis.

The UN chief last week warned that tensions between the two nations could escalate if outstanding issues are not resolved.

However, the South has demanded that a deal includes settlement on the undemarcated border, parts of which cut through oil fields, as well on Abyei, a Lebanon-sized region claimed by both sides but occupied by northern troops.

At least 105,000 Sudanese refugees have fled into South Sudan since fighting erupted in the states of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile last year, after Khartoum moved to assert its authority in the wake of southern secession.

The refugees are adding to the woes of the grossly impoverished South, which is reeling from internal crises including a wave of bloody ethnic violence, rebel attacks and severe food shortages.

In addition, Juba is struggling to support over 364,000 people who have returned to their homeland since October 2010 from the north, where they fled during the war.

An estimated 700,000 ethnic southerners remain in north Sudan, where aid officials are increasingly concerned for their future, with an April 8 deadline approaching for them to either register or leave Sudan.

http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gQMkFvUoOaLtq_M7H3FxDw9HyZbQ?docId=CNG.f403ea8aad2faad073236239e9b0c0df.a01

South Sudan Accuses Sudan of Air Attack

Posted Tuesday, February 14th, 2012 

South Sudan has accused Sudan of carrying out airstrikes on a disputed border town, just two days after the neighboring countries signed a non-aggression pact.

Authorities in South Sudan say Russian-made Antonov jets dropped several bombs on the town of Jau on Sunday, wounding at least four people.

South Sudan claims Jau is located inside its Unity state, while Sudan puts the town inside its own state of Southern Kordofan.

Disputes over borders and oil have raised tension between the two Sudans, and leaders on both sides have suggested the countries could go to war.

On Friday, an African Union mediation team persuaded the two Sudans to sign a non-aggression pact. The countries have accused each other of supporting the other’s rebels, and the south says the north has bombed its territory on several occasions.

The AU is hosting talks in Addis Ababa aimed at settling the dispute over oil revenues, the biggest source of income for both countries.

South Sudan took 75 percent of Sudan’s oil when it declared independence in July. But the landlocked south must rely on pipelines that run north to an export facility at Port Sudan.

The two sides are embroiled in a battle over how much money South Sudan should pay to use the pipelines and Sudan’s export facilities.

The dispute prompted Khartoum to seize South Sudan’s oil at Port Sudan. South Sudan responded by shutting down all oil production.

http://blogs.voanews.com/breaking-news/2012/02/14/south-sudan-accuses-sudan-of-air-attack/

South Sudan Oil Dispute Raises Specter of War

Gabe Joselow | Juba, South Sudan

http://www.voanews.com/MediaAssets2/ThePlatform/jwplayer/5_8_licensed/player.swf

South Sudan and Sudan have been engaged in a war of words since the south stopped pumping oil to the north in a dispute about pricing. Both sides have warned that a return to violence is a possibility.South Sudan is retooling its armed forces – working to strengthen the former rebel Southern People’s Liberation Army into a more formal military.

Soldiers here at the Bilpam military base in Juba could be called into battle sooner than expected, if a bitter oil dispute with Sudan turns from a war of words into action.

The south shut off oil flows to the north, claiming Sudan has stolen millions of dollars worth of crude. Khartoum says it confiscated the oil to compensate for unpaid transit fees.

South Sudanese Deputy Defense Minister Major Majak D’Agoot said such actions represent a serious threat to the new nation.

“I don’t want to pinpoint it to any particular source, but anything that tends to threaten our core interests as a nation of course will have to be responded to,” said D’Agoot.

Although Major D’Agoot did not specifically say Sudan was the primary threat to South Sudan, outside his office a statue of former SPLA General John Garang points firmly toward the north.

Amanda Hsiao of the Enough Project says the oil shutdown also could provoke Sudan to take action.

“With the South saying that, one: they’re willing to break of relations completely with the North; two: that they will seek alternative pipelines so that their oil doesn’t have to flow to the north, Khartoum is left with very little options in terms of dealing with its economic situation. Remember it’s a regime that has few friends in the international community,” said Hsiao.

South Sudan declared independence from the North last July, following decades of civil war that killed more than one million people.

Sporadic fighting has continued. In the past year, Sudan has bombed areas near the border where it suspects Southern-backed militias to be active, including an attack on Abyei in May of last year that displaced up to 100,000 people.

The leaders of both nations have said a return to war is a possibility.

On the streets of Juba, a rapidly developing capital, businessmen are nervous about the prospect of violence.

Michael Toma sells automotive supplies at the Jebel market.

“In my own opinion, I for one think war – I don’t want to rule out war because war is inevitable. However, I’d like to ask the two authorities to work together and come into dialogue so we can reach a harmonious conclusion that’s going to benefit either country,” said Toma.

Others, like Simon Gatdier Yieh, say if Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir wants war, he will get it.

“If the Bashir came with the peace then our president will talk to the Bashir in a peaceful manner. If the Bashir wants to fight with the people of South Sudan we are ready, even now we are ready,” said Yieh.

Both countries are dependent on South Sudanese oil and, as a prolonged shutdown continues to drain their two economies, tensions are bound to increase.

http://www.voanews.com/english/news/South-Sudan-Oil-Dispute-Raises-Specter-of-War-139288673.html

 SOUTH SUDAN – PS to absorb returning workers
PS News
JUBA: 8 February 2012: A plan to employ up to 3000 returning South Sudan workers in Government agencies and institutions, as well as the private sector, has been announced. Chair of the committee tasked with accommodating the returning workers, …

Rick Santorum and Christians in Peril
Huffington Post (blog)
Right now, millions of Christians in Nigeria and Sudan are being bombed, starved, ethnically cleansed, or intimidated. Evidently Santorum wasn’t referring to them, however, because they are black and African, and they don’t have votes in the Republican …

South Sudan officials welcome Israel’s Spacecom
IT News Africa
Israel’s communications satellite company Spacecom, hope recent discussions with South Sudanwill boost their communications and telecommunications industry role in the world’s youngest nation . South Sudan’s Telecommunications Ministry said officials …

South Sudan Accuses Sudan of Air Attack
Voice of America (blog)
South Sudan has accused Sudan of carrying out airstrikes on a disputed border town, just two days after the neighboring countries signed a non-aggression pact. Authorities in South Sudan say Russian-made Antonov jets dropped several bombs on the town …

South Sudan Oil Dispute Raises Specter of War
Voice of America
February 14, 2012 South Sudan Oil Dispute Raises Specter of War Gabe Joselow | Juba, South Sudan South Sudan and Sudan have been engaged in a war of words since the south stopped pumping oil to the north in a dispute about pricing…

Migration group says South Sudanese strike deal with Sudan to resettle by April 8
KSPR
By AP GENEVA (AP) — The International Organization for Migration says Sudan and South Sudanhave signed a deal allowing half a million South Sudanese to choose where they want to live. But IOM spokesman Jumbe Omari Jumbe says the deal sets an April 8 …

Obama’s 2013 Budget Includes $2.4 Billion in Possible Debt Relief to Sudan
LoanSafe
The Sudanese government has been intensively pressing the international community to have its external debt canceled as a reward for letting South Sudan secede peacefully last July after recognizing the referendum results conducted in early 2011…

South Sudan’s inflation drops to 48%
Sudan Tribune
By Julius N. Uma February 13, 2012 (JUBA) – South Sudan’s inflation, which in December of last year stood at a whopping 65.6% dropped to 47.8% in January, the country’s national bureau of statistics said in its latest report…

Sudanese air strike hits South Sudan, breaking pact AFP JUBA, South Sudan — Sudanese warplanes dropped several bombs wounding four soldiers in a contested area claimed by South Sudan, two days after agreeing to a non-aggression pact, Juba’s military spokesman said Tuesday. “Sudanese Armed Forces airplanes …

Bashir’s Satanic Dance in Darfur: What it is all about.

By Monica Lakes: monicalakes@yahoo.co.uk

The Sudan government’s policy that has been anything, but terrorism, is planning to launch surprise attack on South Sudan. Possessed by fear, jealous and sense of shame for the way the racist Islamist Arabs have mismanaged Sudan for over 100 years, they are trying every wicked plan to engage South Sudan in war and continuous plunder of the oil and other resources. In his wisdom, Bashir is making partial peace in Darfur while killing other Darfurians (the game of divide and rule or kill a slave with a slave policy). While pretending to make peace in Darfur, he declares war on the Republic of South Sudan and is already waging war on the people of Southern Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile. Is it lunatic or an act of a desperate dying buffalo!

Yesterday (6 February 2012) in Darfur, Omer Bashir, the liar, thief and murderer, who is wanted on uncountable charges of genocide and human rights violations, was dancing in one of his would be ever last wicked appearances in public. Besides him sat a subdued Idris Derby, the man of Chad who Bashir has terrorized and humiliated repeatedly to a point of submission through Sudan army repeated invasions in an attempt to overthrow him. Idris Derby accepted to do the dirty work for Bashir and is rewarded with marriage of the daughter of Bashir’s field commander terrorist Janjaweed, Musa Hilal.

As a prime driver of terrorism in Africa and worldwide, the NCP Bashir has been encouraged by the triumphant rise of Islamic forces in Libya and Egypt. Moreover, the terrorist NCP has cowed down both Chad and Eritrea into submission. These two countries had suffered terrorist activities when the NCP government used to train Islamists against them. The two presidents of Chad and Eritrea feared the NCP’s wrath and therefore submit themselves to Khartoum’s whims. Chad paid heavily when Sudan and trained Islamists almost overthrew Chad in 2009 had the French forces based in N’jemena not intervened and rescued Idris Derby from Bashir.

President Derby has at last raised up a white flag with both hands to Bashir. Last month in Khartoum, Idris Derby of Chad married the daughter of the well known terrorist, Musa Hilal, so as to cement the their unhealthy relationship as companions in crimes and genocide in Darfur. The terrorists managed to even register the support of the United Nations on their side when Gambari of the UN was among the best men of the wedding party. Omer Bashir, Ali Karti, Ali, Mustafa Ismael, Ali Nafie, indeed, all the chief terrorists were in the wedding party.

In fact, the NCP terrorism is successful in achieving their foreign policy objectives. For example, when the Kenya lawyers declared a legal principle position regarding the indictment of Omer Bashir towards the end of last year, Bashir swiftly asked the Kenyan Ambassador to leave Khartoum within 24 hours. The Kenyan government had to kneel on its knees to beg Sudan to keep diplomatic relations alive between the two countries. Kenya took lessons from both Eritrea and Chad. These NCP’s lessons of success are sharpening its terrorist appetite to do the same to Ethiopia and Uganda. DR Congo and Central Africa Republic are NCP’s quiescent and willing centres of political influence. They can positively respond to Khartoum’s hour of call should the need arise. Currently, Chad, Central Africa Republic and Sudan, have jointly deployed armies along their borders with the Republic of South Sudan in support of Khartoum’s military incursions into South Sudan.

This is the NCP’s grand terrorist strategy in dealing with South Sudan. Within Sudan, Omer Bashir has made a fresh call for more Sharia by making Islam and Arab culture as only sources of law making. His declared position is that all the Sudanese are Arabs and Muslims and so they must also be compelled terrorists.

The Republic of South Sudan is safe from this wicked Arab Islamic racist agenda because they made a wise choice during referendum to be free. The hope for the marginalized people of Sudan lies with South Sudan.

What is giving the NCP Sudan legitimacy to conduct terrorism without impunity in Africa? There are two main reasons:

One, the NCP started stealing the oil of South Sudan since before the CPA until today. The NCP government then used the oil revenues to influence political decisions of some poor African neighboring countries.

Secondly, the retreat of the counter terrorism forces from confrontation to appeasement. NCP is getting support militarily and economically from Iran, Russia and China.

After terrorizing and subduing Chad, Eritrea and Kenya, the next NCP’s divergent agenda is to capture the great Lakes region in Africa to connect to coastal regions from the horn of African and West Africa and converging on Cape Town. The Islamists assumption is that South Sudan will just be a dead apple once the faces of the ignorant African countries are covered with the oil money. For example, the last sad AU recommendation regarding the talks to reward Khartoum for having stolen oil was sad and by far falls below the level of political consciousness.

Any such suggestion that rewards Sudan government for having stolen oil of South Sudan is non starter.  The NCP thus concludes that the old Sudan will get re-united through the support of these African countries and also with help of those South Sudanese who are still working with NCP as mercenaries.

Sudan denies targeting civilians in southern province, after US-built school reported bombed

( Ryan Boyette / Associated Press ) – In this photo taken Wednesday, Feb. 1, 2012, school Pastor Zachariah Boulus stands next to a building in the compound of the Heiban Bible College, following a bombing on Wednesday, at the school which was built by Samaritan’s Purse, a North Carolina-based aid group, in Heiban, Southern Kordofan, Sudan. Sudan’s military bombed the Bible school built by a U.S. Christian aid group, prompting students and teachers at the school to run for their lives in the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan state and the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations condemned the attack.

By Associated Press, Updated: Saturday, February 4, 10:01 AM

KHARTOUM, Sudan — A Sudanese newspaper says a military spokesman has denied that the country’s air force has bombed civilians in a southern province.The independent Akher Lahza daily ran the report Saturday, one day after teachers said that a Bible school had been attacked.

The paper quoted Col. Sawarmi Khalid Saad as saying that reports of civilians being targeted were “Western plots” to damage Sudan’s image.Pictures obtained by The Associated Press on Friday showed two demolished buildings in the Nuba mountains in South Kordofan state. No one was reported to have been hurt or killed in the Wednesday attack.U.S. ambassador to the U.N. Susan Rice said she was outraged by the “heinous” bombing.The school was built by Samaritan’s Purse, a North Carolina-based aid group.

Copyright 2012 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/sudan-denies-targeting-civilians-in-southern-province-after-us-built-school-reported-bombed/2012/02/04/gIQArTQPpQ_story.html

Sudan: Statement by the Press Secretary on Aerial Bombardments in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States

2 FEBRUARY 2012

PRESS RELEASE

Washington, DC — The United States strongly condemns the bombing by the Sudanese Armed Forces of civilian populations in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States in Sudan. Aerial attacks on civilian targets are unjustified and unacceptable. Such attacks are a violation of international law and compound the ongoing crisis in these areas.

We continue to be deeply concerned by the ongoing fighting and lack of humanitarian access in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States in Sudan, which is causing tremendous human suffering, death, and displacement.

In particular, we urge the Sudanese government to grant immediate and unconditional humanitarian access to civilian populations in need in these areas. More than 500,000 people are affected by this conflict, and without humanitarian access by March, the situation in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile will reach Stage 4 of a humanitarian emergency, one step short of full-scale famine. We believe that this conflict can only be resolved by dialogue, not through violence, and we encourage all parties to negotiate a peaceful settlement.

http://allafrica.com/stories/201202030046.htmlSudan denies targeting civilians in southern province, after US-built school …

Washington Post – ‎

KHARTOUM, Sudan — A Sudanese newspaper says a military spokesman has denied that the country’s air force has bombed civilians in a southern province. The independent Akher Lahza daily ran the report Saturday, one day after teachers said that a Bible …

Sudan: US-Built Bible School Bombed

New York Times –

Sudan’s military bombed a Bible school built by an American Christian group in the Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan State. Two stone school buildings were demolished in the attack on the school, Heiban Bible College, which was built by Samaritan’s …

 Aid Groups Ask US to Consider Cross-Border Aid Effort in Sudan

Voice of America – ‎‎

February 03, 2012 Aid Groups Ask US to Consider Cross-Border Aid Effort in Sudan James Butty A coalition of human rights groups Thursday has appealed to the Obama administration to lead a cross-border aid operation into South Sudan to deliver …

 Sudan Bombs US-Funded Bible School, US Condemns

NPR – ‎‎

by AP NAIROBI, Kenya (AP) — Sudan’s military bombed a Bible school built by a US Christian aid group, prompting students and teachers at the school to run for their lives in the Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan state. The US ambassador to the United …

 Sudan bombs US-funded Bible school

News24 – ‎Feb 3, 2012‎

Nairobi – Officials say that Sudan’s military has bombed a Bible school built by a US Christian aid group, prompting students and teachers at the school to run for their lives in the Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan state.

 Sudan Bible School Bombing: United States Condemns Attack

Huffington Post – ‎Feb 3, 2012‎

JASON STRAZIUSO 02/ 3/12 12:43 PM ET AP NAIROBI, Kenya — Sudan’s military bombed a Bible school built by a US Christian aid group, prompting students and teachers at the school to run for their lives in the Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan state.

 US accuses Khartoum of bombing civilians

Reuters Africa – ‎Feb 2, 2012‎

WASHINGTON (Reuters) – The United States accused Sudan’s government on Thursday of carrying out air strikes on civilians in the restive border states of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile and said the attacks were compounding a crisis in the two areas.

 Samaritan’s Purse Bible School Bombed in Sudan

Christian Broadcasting Network –

A Christian school built by Franklin Graham’s charity Samaritan’s Purse was bombed in Sudan, Friday. Eight bombs were dropped on the Heiban Bible College in South Kordofan state near the border with South Sudan. Two school buildings were destroyed in …

USA / Statement by the Press Secretary on Aerial Bombardments in Southern …

StarAfrica.com – ‎Feb 3, 2012‎

WASHINGTON, February 3, 2012/African Press Organization (APO)/ — The United States strongly condemns the bombing by the Sudanese Armed Forces of civilian populations in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States in Sudan. Aerial attacks on civilian …

 US condemns bombings in Sudan’s S. Kordofan, Blue Nile

Zawya (registration) – ‎Feb 2, 2012‎

WASHINGTON, Feb 03, 2012 (AFP) – The White House on Thursday condemned the “unjustified and unacceptable” bombing of civilians by the Sudanese military in the states of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. President Barack Obama’s spokesman Jay Carney …

Is the NCP Crumbling Down?

By Namaa Faisal AL Mahdi

January 31, 2012 (LONDON) – In an unexpected set of events, National Congress Party’s key members turn against their own political party in Gadaref, Nyala, Kosti, Tagali & Port Sudan, heralds a new phase of national rebellion and protest politics in Sudan

“To revolt is a natural tendency of life. Even a worm turns against the foot that crushes it. In general, the vitality and relative dignity of an animal can be measured by the intensity of its instinct to revolt.”

Mikhail Bakunin

News fresh from Tagali on the 31st of January 2012 -confirm assumptions, of a deep and escalating crisis hitting the ranks and the heart of the National Congress Party (NCP), the ruling party of the Sudan. The historic town of Tagali, in the State of Southern Kordofan, which saw the birth of the Mahdi’s led revolt at the turn of the 20th century, is seeing a different kind of crisis; its commissioner who has rebelled against International Criminal Court (ICC) indicted State Wali Ahmed Haroon, has been relieved of his duties, amidst news of wide arrests amongst his (NCP) colleagues and an ever more intensifying battle with the Kauda Alliance Forces.

News of frustrations, unrest and resignations amidst the National Congress Party ranks also dominate recent news from Port Sudan, Red Sea State.

Protests have become epidemic to Sudanese society, there were even news of protests on the 31st of January, by the government of Sudan’s oppression and torture machine, the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), an organisation which seems primarily responsible for spying on Sudanese citizens as well as the abduction and detention and interrogation and torture of all Sudanese who openly and or secretly defy the national government.

Prior to the NISS protest as a result of government announced reductions in their bonuses, 700 prominent military officers from Sudan’s Armed Forces (SAF) presented president Omer Hassan al-Bashir and minister of defence Abdel Rahim Mohammed Hussein with a memo which was reported to include several demands including military and political reforms as well as a warning against any military engagement with Sudan’s newest neighbour South Sudan. Government of Sudan’s second vice president al Haj Adam Yousif as well s defence minister Abdul-Raheem Mohammed Hussein have repeatedly threatened to start a war with South Sudan over some unresolved issues which include the protested oil rich region of Abyei and the Sudan’s government accusations to South Sudan of harbouring and supporting the rebel Kauda Alliance Forces.

Last year unrest amidst the Sudan’s Armed Forces (SAF) led to relief from duty and forced retirement of 12 Armed Forces Commanders, the list which was published by the online news paper Hurriyat included major operations commanders who included el-Fasher Brigade Commander, el Tayeb Musbah, Nyala Brigage Commander Ahmed Abdoon, Manager of the Ministry of Defence Office al Naeen Kidir and Commander of the Army Intelligence Services Abbas Taje el Deen.

Earlier last week, commissioner of Kosti, White Nile State and vice chairman of the National Congress Party’s White Nile State branch rebelled against the National Congress Party and government and declared himself a self appointed Wali, a revolution which might have cost him his new anticipated role as commissioner of Rabak and a potential stretch in the Sudan’s notorious political prisons.

An escalating crisis in Gadaref State is also reaching boiling point, with The State’s Wali, 0Karam Allah Abbas openly criticizing the national governments superimposed governmental structure named the “Wide Based Government”. The wide based government is the current governmental structure involving the participation of 14 non elected political party members at all levels of the Sudan’s governance, which raises challenges of public sector’s expansion and raises questions of governance legitimacy. Also Fuelling the crisis in Gadaref is the national government’s imposed restrictions of governmental and State spending; National Congress Party led government earlier this year announced via the Central Bank of Sudan in Khartoum a set of restrictions on access to governmental bodies to loans from national banks and on governmental bodies spending.

Four days of protest initially ignited by National Congress Party leading member, ex National Minister of International Trade Dr. Abdul-Hameed Musa Kasha, brought the Sudanese army into the streets of Nyala to contain the people’s revolt. The incident which left at least four people dead, following Sudanese authorities use of live ammunition to disperse protesting crowds, also showed extreme restraint and wisdom from the Kauda Alliance Fighting forces who chose not to intervene in the town’s civil protests at the heart of Nyala city centre, an intervention which could have led to more life losses. The Kauda Alliance Forces were just on the periphery of the town at the time- engaged in numerous battles with the SAF.

Kasha who was unconstitutionally relived from elected post and replaced by an unelected central government appointed Wali, used his tribal influence, as well as the safety net of being a leading member of the National Congress Party to ignite the protests, the protest eventually burned most of the NCP’s buildings in Nyala town and has also led to mass arrests amidst the State’s student population and National Congress Party and other political party members.

Overshadowing the horizon is news of conflicting memos of reform presented to the heads of government by a phantom Islamic movement. The Islamic Movement or Islamic National Front and or the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan was an organisation of Islamic elites, which according to ex Islamic Movement leaderships statements, was dissolved in 1989 as part of a policy to remove 60% of the active membership, whilst leaving 40% to dissolve into the various National Congress Party government structures and leadership; within the remaining 40% in governance ( 20%) volunteered to lead deadly missions in the 22 year old civil war between the north and south, 10% left out of their own accord and 10% remained at the heart of governance.

The movement also saw further fractures with the overthrowing of its reforming leader Dr Hassan el Turabi at the turn of the century and the formation of an opposition movement under his leadership, the Popular Congress Party (PCP).

At the same time, the government is trying to remove attention from its ongoing political and dire economic crisis by fuelling religious conflicts and launching unfounded attacks on Sudanese opposition parties, government affiliated religious bodies have so far issued an official claim of apostasy against the leader of the opposition Umma Party, el Saddig el Mahdi and Imam of the Ansar sect and leader of the opposition Popular Congress Party Dr Hassan el Turabi.

Sudan is currently undergoing a deep economic crisis caused by the loss of over 75% of its oil revenue after the south became an independent country as well as poor management of governmental finances, a civil war in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile State as well as excessive governmental spending on the army police and national security services, estimated at nearly 30% of the forecasted 2012 annual budget , spending in presidential affairs estimated at nearly 5% , whilst spending in all basic necessary services such as education, health and support for business and agriculture estimated was forecasted at less than 1.2 % .

Short lived protests and demonstrations start quickly and just as quick are dispersed by national police forces’ use of heavy tear gas, heavy wooden sticks to beat protestors to a pulp and mass arrests. These sporadic bursts of protests have been ongoing since the coming to power of the National Salvation regime in 1989. On the 4th of January 2012, Chief of Police, State of Khartoum announced that his police force has successfully dispersed and successfully dealt with over 450 incidents of anti-government protests in Khartoum State alone.

Sudanese people cannot be ruled via a dictatorship or tyranny despite the general misconception and overriding assumption by the schooled Sudanese elites, who have deliberately and purposely participated in stealing the people’s will and democratically elected governments since the country’s independence in 1956. Schooled or mis-educated elites assume that a superimposed dictatorship or guardianship is the only feasible way to rule Sudan.

This misjudgement was inherited or taught to Sudanese schooled elites, who failed and continue to make their own sense and sound judgment about the state of their own country. The statement was made 127 years ago by General Charles Gordon’s on a nation he has failed to rule and to bring into submission:

“The Sudan is a useless possession, ever was and ever will be …..it can not be governed except by a dictator who may be good or bad!”

General Charles Gordon

Despite this being the overriding assumption of many Sudanese schooled, who have since Sudan’s independence formed part of the elite decision makers who ruled the country; evidence of continual revolution against tyranny proves the exact opposite.

The writer is a London-based Sudanese activist. She can be reached at namaa09@hotmail.com

http://www.sudantribune.com/Sudan-is-heading-towards-a-perfect,41480#tabs-1

South Sudan’s Leader Rejects AU Proposal for Oil Deal With Sudan
Bloomberg
South Sudanese President Salva Kiir said he rejected an African Union proposal to end an oil dispute with Sudan because it required the south to pay the north billions of dollars and use its pipelines to export crude…

Help Arrives For The Survivors Of Violence In South Sudan
YouTube
A spate of violence in South Sudan’s Jonglei State has driven thousands of people from their homes and into the bush, where they survived on what they could find. WFP has reachd 80000 people in the region with emergency food rations and is working with …

SPLM-N Statement on the Captured Chinese Workers in South Kordofan State

Dear All,

Please find attached a statement concerning the Chinese workers in South Kordofan State.
Thanks
Anwar Elhaj
SPLMN Representative to the US

Press Statement- Chinese.doc 25K   View   Download

Statement

Sunday January 29^th, 2012

The SPLM-N is a national liberation movement that seeks democracy, just peace, equal citizenship and social justice. It has been attacked by the dictator General Omar al-Bashir who is indicted by the international criminal court and who displaced more than half a million citizens of Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile, banned the SPLM-N, committed war crimes, and denies access to humanitarian assistance.

SPLM-N has nothing against China and the Chinese, and it is part of the forces that are looking for peace, stability, and co-existence worldwide. The leadership of the SPLM-N and I, the Secretary General, together with the SPLM-N Chairman are exerting the maximum effort to obtain accurate information from our forces in the field regarding the Chinese who were detained in Southern Kordofan. If it is SPLA-N forces that the Chinese citizens are with, be assured that they will be in safe hands and they will be released.

What we stand for before and after this incident are democracy and a just peace. This should be better understood by China and that the National Congress government of General Bashir is a government that will never deliver good relations between Sudan and China. They are massacring and committing war crimes against the Sudanese people and therefore they cannot sustain relations with any country in the world.

The interests of China and the international community are better served by the democratic forces in Sudan. We are right now in contact with Beijing through one of the SPLM-N’s associates in Beijing to assist in resolving this situation.

 

 Yasir Arman,

 Secretary General,

 Sudan People’s Liberation Movement North

January 29, 2012

Sudan Military May be Poised for Major Offensive

Photo: Satellite Sentinel Project

Satellite image of helicopters at the Sudanese airbase at Kidugli.

Analysts say new satellite images of Sudan’s Southern Kordofan State indicate a major government military offensive is about to begin against the Nuba people.  The images were released Wednesday by the Satellite Sentinel Project (SSP).

Government forces have been fighting the rebel SPLA-North Sector in Southern Kordofan, causing thousands of civilians to flee to South Sudan.

De Capua interview with Nathaniel Raymond

“What we’re seeing is the grounds for issuing a Human Security Alert, which we issued today,” said Nathaniel Raymond, director of the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative in Cambridge, Massachusetts, which analyzed the images.“Satellite imagery collected by DigitalGlobe has captured evidence of road construction and the presence of heavy armor units in position to the Kauda Valley. The Kauda Valley is where at least 200,000 civilians of the Nuba people are currently taking refuge,” he said.

No escape?

Images also indicate the route that’s been used by thousands of civilians to cross into South Sudan appears to be under the control of the Sudanese Armed Forces. Raymond said the route “appears to be blocked, limiting the movement of civilians who may still be trying to flee the Kauda Valley and the Nuba mountains.”

There are also images of an airbase where improvements are being made.

“We see the construction of an airstrip at Talodi, which is approximately 30 miles or 50 kilometers from Kauda Valley. Why this is important is that the runway there is being lengthened to approximately 1800 meters. It takes 1500 to 1550 meters to land an Antonov. An Antonov is the plane which has been used to drop bombs and explosive ordinance of many types. With this new strip, they will be able to conduct high tempo air operations into the Kauda Valley, combined with the infrastructure improvements needed to deploy heavy armor in coordination with that air support,” said Raymond.

Witnesses say it was an Antonov plane that dropped bombs Monday on a refugee center just across the border from Southern Kordofan in South Sudan. Images also show helicopter gunships at the Kadugli airbase

The Satellite Sentinel Project issued a Human Security Alert last year for the disputed oil rich region of Abyei two months before it was attacked by Sudanese forces. “We saw almost an identical force pattern and infrastructure pattern prior to the invasion of Abyei region,” said Raymond.

Final assault

Analysts believe the military offensive could begin soon. “At this point, there’s approximately 8 to 9 weeks before the start of the rainy season. And it makes sense based on the very clear statements of indicted war criminal Governor Ahmed Haroun and President Bashir that they intend to take the Kauda Valley, if possible, likely before the rainy season begins again,” he said.

The Satellite Sentinel Project said the images indicate “preparation for a final assault against the Nuba people.” It said when the fighting began last June in Southern Kordofan there were more than one million Nuba people in the state. It estimates there are now between 200,000 and 400,000.

“During that time you have had more than half of the Nuba population killed, displaced internally or displaced into South Sudan,” he said, adding, “It is crucial to note that this is occurring with the backdrop of what we call a green famine. The Famine Early Warning System, the United Nations and the U.S. government have made it very clear that the food security situation in the Nuba Mountains and the Kauda Valley is precarious.”

The SSP said reports from the ground say the price of sorghum has skyrocketed.

Raymond said, “People are eating reserve foods and in some cases eating bark and leaves. If there is not immediate humanitarian assistance into this restricted area, it is a very real possibility that a famine could occur by some estimates as early as March. And we’re talking 200,000 civilians at least cut off from escape, cut off from humanitarian aid and cut off from protection.”

http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/decapua-southern_kordofan-25jan12-138034648.html

Satellite Images Show Artillery Barrage in S. Kordofan

Joe DeCapua

Photo: Satellite Sentinel Project

Images of smoke plumes indicate a Sudanese armed forces artillery barrage against SPLA-North rebels in Toroge in Southern Kordofan State.

For the second time this week, new satellite images have been released for Sudan’s Southern Kordofan State, where Sudanese armed forces have been fighting the rebel SPLA-North Sector.

The Satellite Sentinel Project (SSP) said Friday’s images indicate an apparent artillery barrage and an attempt to block civilians from crossing the border into South Sudan.

DE CAPUA – SOUTHERN KORDOFAN – SATELLITE UPDATE 1-27-12

“The latest images are probably some of the most visually striking we have captured so far at Satellite Sentinel,” said Nathaniel Raymond, head of the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, which analyzes the satellite images.

Smoke Plumes

“One of the lead images,” he said, “is six plumes of grey smoke consistent with an artillery barrage on a ridge in the area known as Toroge. And that area, according to information we received last night from sources on the ground, has been the site of fighting for the past two days or so.”

Images indicate Sudanese forces are at battalion strength on the Buram-Jau Road. It’s been the main route civilians had been taking to South Sudan to escape the fighting. The road leads to the Yida refugee camp in South Sudan.

Earlier this week, the SSP released images showing a build-up of Sudanese forces in Southern Kordofan, along with road construction. It said the information indicated a pending military offensive against the Nuba people in the Kauda Valley.

“It does not show the beginning of the offensive that we fear will take place in the next few weeks,” said Raymond. But he added that the position of the Sudanese troops has created a “choke point” on the Buram-Jau Road, which is about 45 kilometers north of the Yida camp.

“The position is described as a choke point because it sits directly across the road and in a mountainous area where there is basically one way down that stretch to get to the border with South Sudan. And now we know why there has been a decreasing flow of civilians across that border,” he said.

Accusations and denial

The Sudan Armed Forces have accused the Satellite Sentinel Project of helping the SPLA-North rebels by providing them with information.

“My reaction to that accusation is simply this – The Satellite Sentinel Project and the analytic operation that we run at the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative is party to the Red Cross NGO code of conduct, which means that we are impartial. We do not provide information to either side. What we do provide information about is specific to one thing: threats against civilians,” Raymond said.

He said the SSP does not provide GPS coordinates.

“We do show specific information, yes, when it’s relevant about the Sudan Armed Forces’ bases and positions. But that’s when those bases and positions are threats to civilians,” he said.

A spokesman for Sudanese forces, Col. Al-Sawarmi Khalid Said, is quoted as saying the SSP is “carrying out a hostile operation” and that the armed forces are responsible for protecting civilians.

Raymond rejected those comments. He said, “South Kordofan and the Blue Nile have been the site of clear evidence of mass atrocities against the civilian populations there. We have documented evidence of systematic house to house mass killing in Kadugli, the displacement of the entirety of the Dinka-Not population from Abyei, the bombing and burning and armored attacks on civilian villages in Blue Nile and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians,” he said.

He added, “If the Sudan Armed Forces is responsible for civilian protection, then it is no surprise why so many civilians have fled.”

The SSP has called on the international community to “take responsibility for civilian protection.”

http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/decapua_s_kordofan_plumes_27jan12-138205919.html

South Sudan, Kenya Sign Deal to Build Pipeline
Wall Street Journal
By NICHOLAS BARIYO LONDON—South Sudan and Kenya signed an agreement to build an oil pipeline between the two countries, Martin Heya, the commissioner in charge of petroleum at Kenya’s Energy Ministry said Wednesday. The pipeline will provide a …

Sudan Military May be Poised for Major Offensive
Voice of America
Government forces have been fighting the rebel SPLA-North Sector in Southern Kordofan, causing thousands of civilians to flee to South Sudan. De Capua interview with Nathaniel Raymond download iconDownload: MP3 Right click (Control click for Mac) and …

US State Department: Briefing on Issues of Ongoing Concern in Sudan and South Sudan

Special Briefing

Ambassador Princeton Lyman
Special Envoy for Sudan

Via Teleconference

January 25, 2012

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AMBASSADOR LYMAN: Thank you very much. Thank you all for coming and being on the line. I wanted to just bring everybody up to date on a number of issues that we’re following very closely related to Sudan and South Sudan. So let me discuss them briefly and then happy to take your questions about them.

One of the issues that we are extremely concerned about is the situation in the states of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. These are states in the Republic of Sudan; that is, the North. But a conflict has been raging there since last May, arising from issues never fully resolved in the civil war because people in those states, particularly in the Nuba Mountains, fought with the South. And though they remained in the North, their issues were to be resolved in a process called popular consultations. Those did not get finished and a conflict broke out. A very serious armed conflict broke out last year.

Now, what we are very concerned about right now is that there are predictions of a major humanitarian crisis in those areas, particularly Southern Kordofan. You know there’s this predictive mechanism called FEWS NET, the Famine Early Warning System Network. They – if you go on their website, you’ll see they have produced two maps, one the situation now – excuse me – and one predicting for March. By March, they feel that a large number of people, a quarter of a million or more, will be – will reach what they call emergency status, which is one short of famine. And this is very alarming to us.
We have strongly urged the Government of Sudan to allow international humanitarian aid – that is, World Food Program, UNICEF, et cetera – to come in, in all parts, across lines of whoever’s holding territory. They have refused to do so. They don’t want international involvement in this area, which they think is an internal matter and a conflict area. But we have been saying and saying to our African partners that we just can’t – the world can’t stand by and watch famine take place in an area, and know nothings being done.

So we’ve been working very hard, leading up the Africa Union meeting at the end of this month, to urge the Government of Sudan to open up international access and to do so soon. We’re under a lot of pressure if that doesn’t happen to look at other alternatives, but they all contain serious risks in doing so. So our preferred alternative – very far first alternative – is for the Government of Sudan to do this. The UN has made proposals to the government, but they haven’t been accepted yet.

The second issue that I would like to touch on is a – ongoing negotiation and dispute between Sudan and South Sudan over the distribution of oil revenues and financing. You’ll recall that after the secession of the South, 70 percent of the oil was in the South but all the infrastructure for exporting it – pipelines, et cetera – are in the North. So the two countries really are dependent on each other in the oil sector. It was also understood that when the North, now the Republic of Sudan, lost that much revenue there would be a transitional financial arrangement in which the South would ease that transition.

They’ve been negotiating and arguing over this for some time. The negotiations reached a very serious point in the last few weeks when the Republic of Sudan, in the North, began to divert Southern oil from the pipeline and to block ships with Southern oil from leaving the port, claiming this is a way to collect transit fees that they claim the South wasn’t paying. And they imposed a fee of $32 a barrel, which is quite high, for that.

After negotiations, which are still going underway, failed to reach an agreement, South Sudan said, okay, we’re going to shut off the oil, we’re going to start closing the wells, and we’ll suffer until we build a new pipeline through Kenya but we just can’t take this anymore; they’re stealing our oil.

It is a very bad situation, and both sides could get hurt very, very badly. The African Union High-Level Implementation Panel – this is the panel headed by Thabo Mbeki and former president of Burundi Pierre Buyoya and Nigerian former head of state General Abubakar – has been running negotiations on this in Addis. They’re working very hard. They’re very close to a proposal which should be able to reconcile the different interests and come up with a solution.

We’re very concerned that this negotiation succeed and before too much damage is done to the oil sector and the infrastructure, that the South feels that they can stop shutting off the production and go back to full production. So this is a quite urgent matter on which we are working very hard.

The third area I want to touch on is the situation in Jonglei. That’s a state in South Sudan. You’ll recall about two weeks ago there was a major conflict between two ethnic groups, the Lou Nuer and the Murle. There have been attacks back and forth between these groups over cattle, kidnapping of women and children, et cetera. And in this latest incident, 6,000 or so young Nuer marched on the Murle to regain the cattle, to regain the people who were kidnapped, and we feared a major massacre.

Fortunately, with the help of UNMIS, et cetera, the Murle were warned in the town of Pibor. Most of them left, and after some skirmishing and some people getting killed, perhaps several hundred, the young Nuer have started to go back. But now the Murle are undertaking revenge attacks.

In the meanwhile, the people who fled Pibor are displaced people in various towns, and we think more are in the bush. So the UN, USAID, humanitarian NGOs are all working to try and reach these people and get them humanitarian assistance.

This is a situation that demonstrates the tensions and traditional and otherwise that exist in South Sudan that have sort of – were set aside in the campaign for independence and the successful independence July 9^th but now, coming to the surface, demonstrate how much the Government of South Sudan must do to improve both its security sector capabilities, but also its outreach to these communities and conflict resolution and development programs here and elsewhere in South Sudan.

So I wanted to touch on all three of those, because they are all very serious situations on which we have been working very heavily here and in the field and in our diplomacy, both in Europe, the Arab world, Africa, et cetera. So let me stop there and open it up. Happy to take your questions.

MODERATOR: We’ll go ahead and take a few questions from here in the room and then we’ll turn it over to the callers. Does anyone here in the room first have a question? Andy, go ahead.

QUESTION: Yeah. On the issue of Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan and the potential famine or food emergency, I’m wondering what you can tell us about the contingency planning, should Sudan continue to refuse access to aid groups. I understand that there has been some discussion of unilateral aid operations. Is that true? How is that possible without Sudanese Government approval? And how advanced are those – is that planning?

AMBASSADOR LYMAN: Well, we – right. We have said to the government in Khartoum for some time that we are feeling a lot of pressure if there’s no international access to look at ways in which assistance would be carried across the border without their approval. But we know there are a lot of risks to that. We know the government would be opposed to it. We have to look at the possibility of it, but we’ve made no decision to do that because it has a lot of complications.

But at the same time, we’re very worried about what happens if they don’t allow international assistance, so we continue to press heavily for international accepted assistance by the government even as we look with a good deal of apprehension at what alternatives might be possible.

QUESTION: And under that alternative plan, would that be something the U.S. is considering doing on its own, or is it something that the U.S. and neighbors are talking about?

AMBASSADOR LYMAN: We haven’t reached that point yet, and so we’re not at a point where we could get into any details as to what is possible or not. But we do know that other countries are concerned, not necessarily engaged in the same kind of planning but very concerned about this humanitarian situation.

QUESTION: And just a final one on this, on this line. Is the AU meeting and whether or not the AU takes it up as a formal subject – is that a sort of a hard or soft deadline here, because you have only until March?

AMBASSADOR LYMAN: It’s a very important date because if you want to do something by March, considering positioning of food, et cetera, it takes quite a while, several weeks, the humanitarian agencies say. So if the meeting doesn’t resolve this by the end of January, we’re going to be in a serious situation.

QUESTION: Ambassador Lyman, Rosalind Jordan of Al Jazeera English. Talk a little more about the political considerations around Khartoum’s refusal so far to allow outside interference. Why would it be to Khartoum’s benefit to not have outsiders intervening in this near-famine situation?

AMBASSADOR LYMAN: Well, of course, I can’t speak for the government, but the arguments that they have advanced to us on this are several. First of all, they say they’ve learned the lessons of Darfur; you let the international community in and the next thing you know, you’ve got a UN peacekeeping operation, you’re charged with human rights violations, there’s a peace process, and then, like Naivasha and the CPA, you lose part of your territory. So they say we’ve learned that lesson, we’re not going to do it again. That’s one line of argument.

The second is that they think the food will go to supporters of the SPLM and their North – the people they’re fighting, and therefore will prolong the conflict. So those two are the main reasons that they advance. They also deny that the situation is that serious, but we just have these predictions that are based on a lot of data.

QUESTION: And what are some of the environmental factors that may have led to this near-famine situation?

AMBASSADOR LYMAN: Two things in particular. The nature of the conflict – the Sudanese armed forces has done a great deal of bombing, and the bombing has hit the civilian population and has prevented them from planting this last year. It also forced many of them to live in caves rather than be able to tend their farms, et cetera. So they lost the planting season.

And second, because international access hasn’t been allowed, all the stocks that were there from the World Food Program, UNICEF, et cetera, are exhausted. So those two factors are the main ones.

There’s about 50,000 refugees in South Sudan and Ethiopia already from these two areas, but we see in these predictions a quarter of a million people or more who might be affected. This could be a major, major calamity. And for Africa, it seems to me this is something that shouldn’t be tolerated.

QUESTION: And does the U.S. have an assessment of whether this potential plan from the AU, from the Mbeki group, let’s call it, could actually work if some sort of resolution is reached between now and next Tuesday?

AMBASSADOR LYMAN: I only have the general outlines of the proposal. They’re being presented today to the parties. But my information is that this proposal will address the basic concerns of the North and South; that is, how to assure that there’s enough oil for the refinery in the North, which is a major concern of theirs, and a prospect of this transitional assistance while recognizing that the South has a legitimate claim about all this diverted oil and that has to be costed, and that the fees for transit are – that there’s a mutual basis for determining those.

I haven’t seen the details of the proposal. We think it’s going to address all these things, and we hope once it’s on the table that both sides will refrain from these kind of unilateral steps.

Let me just say one more thing on the humanitarian issue, because I’ve told you what I think are the arguments from Sudan, but let me tell you the arguments we have advanced on the other side. We think it would look very bad for the Government of Sudan to deny international assistance when the world is watching and a major famine could take place. We don’t think this is in the interest of the Government of Sudan, it’s not in their interest in world opinion, it’s not in the interest of them as a protector of their own citizens. These are all their own citizens.

Second, we think that – and this goes beyond the immediate humanitarian situation – ultimately there has to be a political solution here. They have fought in the Nuba Mountains before during the civil war. It never ended. So it – there has to be eventually a political solution. Making the humanitarian gesture now may create an atmosphere for that, but the most important is for the government to recognize they have this responsibility and the world will respond positively if they say yes, we have this responsibility, we’ll bring in agencies that we can trust – World Food Program and UNICEF, and monitor – and have it monitored and do the right thing.

MODERATOR: Operator, do we have any reporters on the line who would like to ask a question?

OPERATOR: To ask a question at this time, please press *1, un-mute your phone, and record your name when prompted. To withdraw your request, you may press *2. Once again, to ask a question, please press *1. I currently show no questions at this time.

MODERATOR: Andy, go ahead.

QUESTION: I’ve got another one. On the oil, on South Sudan’s decision to stop the oil production, in your view, how long can this go on? Number one, do you have any position on whether or not this was a wise bargaining move? Was this the right thing for them to do? Did they have any other option? And number two, how long can this go on before you start having very serious issues with the infrastructure and that it sort of really affects the viability of their finances?

AMBASSADOR LYMAN: I’ve heard mixed reaction – responses to that question. There is some feeling that in just three and a half days after they shut down the wells, you will get into a situation which will be very costly and time-consuming to restore production. I’ve heard different assessments of the impact on the pipeline and the environmental damage, some predicting very serious damage and costs. Others are saying less so. I don’t have a firm feeling, but there is a general feeling that it’s going to be very costly.

Is it a good tactic? I was just in South Africa, as you know, Andy, and I was reminded that Nelson Mandela also often had to take the country to the brink but never crossed it, even in the most tense times. I think the Government of South Sudan was outraged and angry and took the situation to the brink, but I’m afraid in this they may be crossing over and costing themselves in the long run when they have so many development needs.

So I think I can understand the anger, I can understand the response, but I’m very worried that they go over the brink here and then have to pay a price that will hurt the people of South Sudan for a long period of time.

QUESTION: Well, both in this case with the oil fees and with the fighting between traditional groups, does this suggest that perhaps the new government isn’t quite capable of dealing with these very serious fundamental issues? And if it’s not fully capable, what can the U.S. do to support them to prevent things from going over the edge?

AMBASSADOR LYMAN: I think the Government of South Sudan is faced with a number of challenges and still has a relatively thin layer of trained civil servants, professionalized military command and control systems, et cetera. And the country was so devastated by the civil war that there is just basic, basic development needs all throughout the country.

So I think the challenges are very great, and they must be able to dedicate their efforts, time, and resources to those demands. And that’s why getting a resolution of this issue and not losing their main source of revenue for the next couple years is vital if they’re going to be able to tackle this. And they’re going to need a lot of help. They’re going to need a lot of help to do this.

QUESTION: How is the U.S. prepared particularly to help them develop a revenue stream, since I would imagine that things such as property taxes that we have here in the U.S. aren’t as readily accessible for government operations?

AMBASSADOR LYMAN: Right now, oil provides 98 percent of the budget of South Sudan. And the other alternatives are still very, very underdeveloped. Most of the people live in the rural area. They’re poor. It’s not a commercialized agricultural sector. Even though there’s potential there, they import most of their food. So there isn’t really a solid tax base that can even begin at this point to compensate for the loss of oil revenue.

Now, we are helping, along with others, to develop agriculture. We had a big conference here called the South Sudan Engagement Conference, where we encouraged private sector investment. There was a lot of interest in it. I think over the longer term, they must diversify away from oil, but that’s going to take several years at best.

QUESTION: I’m just wondering if you could tell us a little bit about your – the tenor of your conversation with Khartoum these days. I mean, we have another report this morning that aircraft, presumably Sudanese aircraft, have bombed a refugee camp in South Sudan. This seems to be recurring practice. How are you reacting to that, and what’s your message to them? And are they – what are they telling you?

AMBASSADOR LYMAN: Well, we are concerned about this. This is the second bombing of a refugee camp in South Sudan. It violates all the rules regarding refugees. And we have raised that, raised that in the UN Security Council as well as with the government in Khartoum. Their reaction has been mixed on the first incident. I haven’t seen their reaction to this incident yesterday. But they went through a number of explanations on the last one, which – some of which were not credible, et cetera.

This is, again, as we’ve said to the government in Khartoum, an example of why this war is bad for everybody. And bombing South Sudan is only going to aggravate the situation. The Republic of Sudan claims that South Sudan is feeding this rebellion, and if that were stopped, the rebellion would end. That’s just not accurate. Even if there were assistance from the South, that isn’t what’s at the heart of this conflict.

So we’ve raised this very much with Khartoum. They haven’t appreciated our doing so, but we have. And we have continued to discuss with the Government of Sudan the importance of resolving the issues in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, that that these are getting in the way of our normalization process, and we’ll continue to have that dialogue.

QUESTION: You mentioned that you raised it at the Security Council. Do you think that this is something that – what would you want the Security Council to do, should these attacks continue? And does that risk complicating the bilateral issues? I mean, if you bring it into the Security Council, won’t that complicate the Sudan-South Sudan track?

AMBASSADOR LYMAN: Well, it can if the Government of Sudan sees it that way. One of the points that we have tried to convey is that we’re not doing these things just to be antagonistic to the Republic of Sudan. These are ways in which the two countries can be at peace, and that includes the Republic of Sudan. Having a war in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, still conflict in Darfur, trouble in the east – this isn’t providing a future for the people of the Republic of Sudan.

So when we raise these issues, et cetera, they see it often as antagonistic. We see it as, look, this is the pathway to the future of a peaceful Republic of Sudan. And sometimes we’re like ships crossing in the night, but that’s really the tenor of what we’re trying to say.

QUESTION: Given all of these problems that you’ve just discussed, are you concerned that the – sort of the victory that was the July independence declaration and all of the work that went into that is in danger of being unraveled, that the Sudan project is, in both cases, South and North, is really at risk of going right back off the rails now?

AMBASSADOR LYMAN: I don’t think either Sudan or South Sudan wants or intends to go back to full-scale war. I really – I’m almost totally convinced of that. That doesn’t mean that they have a good relationship at all and that there aren’t a lot of friction points on the border, over Abyei, over oil. And the relationship is bad. So there is a danger that things could get out of control, that incidents could lead to greater conflict. That’s why these issues are so terribly important, not only in and of themselves but to prevent exactly what you’re talking about. But I think both sides recognize that going back to full-scale war would be disastrous. So I think we still have to look upon that successful independence of the South as a great achievement and be thankful for it.

MODERATOR: Operator, we’ll go for one last chance and see if there are any calls in queue. Are there any calls in the queue right now?

OPERATOR: I show no questions.

MODERATOR: Okay. Thank you, Operator. With that, I think we end our session. Thank you, Ambassador Lyman.

AMBASSADOR LYMAN: Well, I want to thank you all. These are issues that we think are of great importance for this – the Administration is heavily focused on these issues, and we hope that we can do everything we can to help resolve them. So thank you very much.

MODERATOR: Thank you.

# # #

http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/2012/182488.htm

South Sudan’s Doomsday Machine

By ALEX DE WAAL

Published: January 24, 2012

South Sudan was born as an independent nation on July 9, 2011, with good will and a bounty. Three hundred and fifty thousand barrels of oil per day provided the government with $1,000 per year for each of its 8 million citizens.

But the only pipeline to market runs through northern Sudan, giving the government in Khartoum control over South Sudan’s economic artery. And on independence day there was no agreement on the terms of pipeline use.

When Sudan was still one country, 50 percent of the revenue from southern oil went to the central treasury, comprising 40 percent of its budget. After July 9, Khartoum received nothing — not even a transit fee. International promises of debt relief and lifting economic sanctions, to fill a part of the budget gap, came to nothing. Continued negotiations — convened by the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel on Sudan, which is headed by former President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and to which I am an adviser — have failed to resolve the issue.

On Jan. 20, South Sudan announced the dramatic step of shutting down oil production, with immediate effect. As oil money comprises 97 percent of the South’s budget, it seems a suicidal step. The rationale is that for the last month, Khartoum has been diverting the oil to its own refinery and filling three tankers.

A year ago, President Omar al-Bashir congratulated his southern counterpart, President Salva Kiir, on independence and promised a new and peaceable chapter in the troubled history of north-south relations. This quickly turned sour, particularly with the outbreak of war in two areas of northern Sudan — Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile — where about half of the population is loyal to the former rebels of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, who are now the government in the South. Although the northern branch of the party supposedly split off, the South does not disguise its solidarity with its former comrades in arms.

Khartoum’s delegates to the just-concluding talks in Addis Ababa complain bitterly. “Why should we allow Southern oil to go free to market, when the money from its sales is used to arm rebels who want to destroy us?” They follow it up with a promise — we will reconcile our respective claims after we agree on a transit fee that matches a third of the budget gap.

The South counters, “Why do we allow our oil to be stolen and the money used to buy weapons to kill our comrades in arms? Khartoum has always wanted to control the South and its readiness to strangle us financially shows that they will never allow us to be truly free.” The Southern government in Juba has floated plans for a new pipeline through Kenya. Optimistically, this may cost $3 billion to $4 billion and take three years to build, but many Southern leaders would rather leave their oil in the ground than submit to Sudan’s coercion.

So South Sudan has set off its economic doomsday machine. The shutdown of wells is already beginning and within a week the oil companies will begin flushing the pipeline with water, so that the oil it contains doesn’t jam and turn into a 600-mile asphalt tube. After that, the best case would be six months’ work to reopen exports.

The South’s lead negotiator, Pagan Amum, said he was at peace with himself when he explained: “This is a matter of respect. We may be poor but we will be free.”

But South Sudan is a fragile state, as the recent interethnic killings in the Jonglei area show, and it will need massive foreign aid to compensate for the lost $650 million per month.

A northern general remarked, “The shutdown will hurt us but it will kill them.” But Sudan cannot be stable if its southern neighbor is in crisis.

Based on its principle that Sudan and South Sudan should be two viable states, at peace and mutually supportive, the African Union panel has proposed an agreement. This will keep the oil flowing, stop the unilateral diversion of southern oil by the north, and provide enough funds to cushion the economic crisis in the north. China — the main buyer of Sudanese oil — the United States and the United Nations have endorsed the African Union’s plan.

President Bashir and President Kiir are due to meet in Addis Ababa on Friday. This is the last chance, not only for the two to snatch a deal on oil, but also to stop an escalation into a wider north-south war. The two must step back from the brink.

Alex de Waal is the executive director of the World Peace Foundation.

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/25/opinion/south-sudans-doomsday-machine.html?_r=1

“Sudan, South Sudan, and the Oil Revenues Controversy:

Khartoum’s Obstructionism Threatens War”

Overview

There has been much discussion about the intensifying dispute between Khartoum and Juba over how much in transit fees the Republic of South Sudan (RSS) should pay the northern regime in order to transport its oil to Port Sudan on the Red Sea.  This has all been brought into the sharpest possible focus with the January 20 decision by the Government of South Sudan to halt shipments to northern Sudan and begin constructing an alternate pipeline route to the Kenyan coast.  Formal announcement was made by RSS President Salva Kiir on January 23.  This is not, however, one bad decision somehow mirroring Khartoum’s “equally bad” decision to begin massive sequestration of South Sudanese oil and oil revenues, as some would have it.  Alex de Waal, an advisor for the almost inexplicably ineffective African Union mediating team, writes tendentiously:

“When Sudan was still one country, 50 percent of the revenue from southern oil went to the central treasury, comprising 40 percent of its budget. After July 9, Khartoum received nothing—not even a transit fee.” (New York Times, January 24, 2012)

What de Waal does not mention here is the expressed, indeed eager willingness of the leadership in South Sudan to arrive at some reasonable agreement on transit fees.  But instead of negotiating such a fee, Khartoum has proposed a fee of $32 per barrel (more recently, this was upped to $36 per barrel)—roughly a third the cost of a barrel of Sudanese crude oil.  This is a preposterous figure compared with other transit fee arrangements (e.g., the Russian oil pipeline through Ukraine, Chad’s oil pipeline through Cameroon; see below).  Moreover, de Waal’s implicit suggestion that an independent South Sudan should be obliged to replace 40 percent of Khartoum’s budget revenues is absurd, the more so since the budget gap is largely a function of profligate military and security expenditures, amounting to roughly half the real budget.  Much of this military force and equipment continues to be directed against the South, as well as the border regions of South Kordofan, Blue Nile, and Darfur.

The South did make an offer of some $5.4 billion dollars to assist in Khartoum’s transition from dependence on Southern oil revenues, a figure judged reasonable by economists of the International Monetary Fund’s and the AU, according to Pagan Amum, chairman of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and chief RSS negotiator on oil issues:

“[Pagan] said that the International Monetary Fund, the African Union and South Sudan have agreed on a figure of $5.4 billion.” But in reply, “[northern] Sudan is demanding $15 billion in compensation for lost oil revenues after South Sudan’s independence.”  Also according to Pagan, and confirmed by subsequent statements from Khartoum, the regime “doesn’t want the African Union to mediate negotiations with the south.” (Bloomberg News, November 22, 2011)

Khartoum’s demand for $15 billion, almost three times the figure cited by Amum as having been judged fair by the IMF and AU, is not an economic calculation but rather a transparent grab, based on nothing but greed and a desire to push negotiations to the brink.  Like the $36 per barrel transit fee, this is simply not a good faith negotiating starting point.  Rather, it is a deliberate obstructionism.

With the sequestration of oil and oil revenues—in an amount that now approaches $1 billion—Khartoum has effectively compelled South Sudan to conclude that the regime has no intention of arriving at a reasonable resolution of these issues. The regime clearly felt that Juba had no choice except to capitulate.  The decision to build to the south, announced and vigorously defended by President Salva Kiir, demonstrates that this calculation by Khartoum was a serious error—if, in fact, Khartoum was simply playing a kind of negotiating brinksmanship.

But the regime’s actions have a larger context than de Waal’s narrow and misleading analysis would have us believe.  One key part of that context is the report today from the UN High Commission for Refugees that Khartoum’s military aircraft have again attacked Sudanese civilians in a refugee encampment inside South Sudan’s Upper Nile State, very close to the previous bombing of (New) Guffa on November 8, 2011.  The attack on Elfog refugee encampment wounded one boy, and has left fourteen people missing (Reuters [Juba] January 24, 2012). It bears comparison with yet another aerial attack by Khartoum, this on the refugee camp in Yida, Unity State (November 10, 2011), where one bomb landed right on the edge of a makeshift school in which shortly before some 200 students had been present.

This is not new.  Khartoum has bombed what is now the sovereign territory South Sudan repeatedly over the past 15 months—in Unity State, Upper Nile State, Western Bahr el Ghazal, and Northern Bahr el Ghazal.  An aerial attack on December 28 and 29 in Western Bahr el Ghazal reportedly killed some 40 people.  All these attacks are chronicled at www.sudanbombing.org.

Why these aerial attacks on civilians and humanitarians matter—beyond their brutal human destruction and displacement—is that they demonstrate, yet again, Khartoum’s continuous and flagrant violations of signed agreements, in this instance the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005), which guaranteed the South the right of self-determination.  This self-determination exercise has taken final form in the creation of the Republic of South Sudan, a sovereign nation whose territory cannot be bombed without violating Khartoum’s commitment to uphold the outcome of the Southern self-determination referendum (January 9, 2011). Khartoum’s cross-border aerial attacks also constitute egregious violations of international law, including international humanitarian law.

All this poses an inescapable question in the mind of Southerners: why should we trust any agreement—whether on transit fees or some other future contractual arrangement—with a regime that, without hesitation, bombs our people on our land?  The fate of Abyei—seized militarily by Khartoum on May 21, 2011—also weighs heavily in the calculations of the Southern leadership.  Here again, in conspicuous violation of the Abyei Protocol of the CPA and the decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) (July 2009), Khartoum first denied the promised self-determination for the “residents of Abyei” as that region is defined geographically by the PCA.  Then—in the wake of a silent military coup that secured a firm grip on political power in Khartoum—the regime moved into Abyei with its Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and heavily armed Misseriya militia forces in May.  The more than 100,000 indigenous Dinka Ngok displaced from Abyei into South Sudan have no prospect of returning to their homeland as long as Khartoum retains military control of the region, as it clearly intends.  This seizure included the Diffra oil site, which though not especially productive, nonetheless generates approximately 2,000 to 2,500 barrels of crude oil per day, or roughly $75 million per year.  This is not an inconsequential amount of revenue for South Sudan, especially since there is evidence of other potential oil reserves near Diffra.

De Waal reduces all of this to a single sentence: “The rationale [for the decision of the South to stop transporting oil to the north] is that for the last month, Khartoum has been diverting the oil to its own refinery and filling three tankers.”  This is hardly trivial for cash-strapped South Sudan.  Moreover, it is a disingenuously partial explanation of the difficult and costly decision by the South, and reflects nothing so much as the African Union’s penchant for “moral equivalence” when attempting to arbitrate between Khartoum and Juba—and frequently siding with Khartoum in ways large and small.  The AU mediation team led by former South African president Thabo Mbeki, and which de Waal advises, failed miserably in Darfur, and then moved on to Abyei, where it failed just as miserably.  In both cases failure came in large part because the African Union, and Mbeki in particular, were perceived by both Darfuris and the Dinka Ngok of Abyei as siding with Khartoum.

There is, crucially, another reason that Khartoum may have compelled this decision by Juba concerning the future of Southern oil.  For it continues a pattern of sustained, intense, and destructive economic warfare against the South by Khartoum—something de Waal makes no mention of, even as it has been conspicuous for more than a year.  And the purpose of this warfare is not only to destabilize the South, to deny it as much as possible the opportunity for economic development, but to provoke actual military confrontation and to create from this a casus belli for renewed war.  In such a war, Khartoum’s generals presume that they would be able to seize at least some of the South’s oil fields by force.  Ominously, on several occasions the SAF has attacked South Sudan on the ground in the oil regions, not simply from the air (most notably at Jau in Unity State).  These actions are so clearly provocative that it is difficult not to see them, along with aerial attacks on military and civilian sites inside South Sudan, as attempts to spark a response that will grow into a much larger conflagration, for which (Khartoum assumes) both sides will be blamed equally and urged to “show restraint,” without any acknowledgement of what is even now clearly aggression on the part of Khartoum’s forces.

None of this is mentioned by de Waal, nor does he mention the compelling evidence that Khartoum is supporting renegade militia groups operating in South Sudan.  Much of this evidence comes from the Small Arms Survey, which has in a number of authoritative reports compared equipment captured from rebel groups by the (southern) Sudan People’s Liberation Army, as well as by the SPLA-North, with equipment captured from Khartoum’s regular and militia and regular forces in South Kordofan and Blue Nile.  Instead of mentioning this highly destabilizing proxy military campaign by Khartoum, de Waal emphasizes instead only that “the northern branch of the party [the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-North] supposedly split off [from the Southern SPLA/M, but] the South does not disguise its solidarity with its former comrades in arms.”  In fact, the SPLA/M-North—which has linked with other rebel movements from (north) Sudan’s marginalized regions—formally separated from the SPLM/A (South) on September 8, in accordance with the terms of the CPA.  There is no evidence of substantial aid from the South to the rebels fighting in South Kordofan or Blue Nile; every regional source I have consulted, while admitting we can’t know for sure, indicates a belief that material support, if it exists, is minimal.  Again, in an effort to fashion a moral equivalence between Khartoum and Juba, de Waal tendentiously and selectively presents current realities on the ground.

If Khartoum were attempting to create a factitious casus belli—one whose only requirement is that it not be immediately dismissed by the Arab League, the African Union, various allies at the UN, or the UN Secretariat—its actions would be exactly what we have seen since the seizure of Abyei on May 21: move next to attack South Kordofan (June 5), then Blue Nile (September 1), all the while denying humanitarian access to increasingly distressed populations.  This has created an enormous population of internally displaced persons and refugees, in both Ethiopia and South Sudan, and further strains the capacity of Juba to respond to crises elsewhere in the country.  The international community seems painfully ill-equipped diplomatically to respond to Khartoum’s military attacks on civilians, the consequent humanitarian issues, and the growing stream of refugees, now likely exceeding 150,000.

At the same time, receiving so little focused international diplomatic attention, Khartoum refuses to negotiate reasonably about border delineation (20 percent of the 2,100-kilometer north/south border remains undelineated, more than half a year after Southern independence); and the regime refuses to permit demarcation of what actually has been delineated (including the delineation of Abyei as rendered in the “final and binding” decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration).  Southerners—defined ethnically, not by place of birth—are being stripped of their citizenship in (north) Sudan, and are subject to increasing harassment and denial of opportunities for education, medical treatment, and other services, as well as jobs.  Christians and Christian churches in the north are facing an unprecedented assault by the regime, whose president, Omar al-Bashir, insists on a constitution based on sharia (Islamic law) and on an exclusively Arab identity in defining Sudan.

Despite the effort by de Waal and others, including the Obama administration in the U.S., to frame the dispute over oil transit fees as one involving two equally recalcitrant parties, equally guilty of peremptory and dangerous decisions, any fuller look at the history of the past year will reveal clearly that neither the political nor the moral equities in this dispute are at all comparable (see detailed timeline for this period at http://goo.gl/UJgwN).   Khartoum has assumed the posture of aggressor, both in the realm of economic relations and in offensive military actions against the South and the border regions.  To ignore these basic facts, to ignore the fundamental asymmetry in the respective positions of Khartoum and Juba, is to distort in highly consequential fashion the challenges at hand.  Certainly “moral equivalence” of the sort de Waal and others are trying to force into the negotiating context is a victory for the National Islamic Front/National Congress Party regime, and is perceived as such, both in Khartoum and Juba.

To those who doubt that Khartoum is as cynical as this analysis suggests, that the regime is as given to mendacity as I argue, I would point to two recent statements by the regime’s ambassador to the UN, Daffa-Alla Elhag Ali Osman.  In the first, the ambassador declared that the humanitarian situation in the Nuba and South Kordofan is “normal,” an assessment that flies in the face of every single humanitarian indicator the international community has received, including the forecast by the Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWSNet) of near-famine conditions by March.  To risk hundreds of thousands of lives in an effort to deflect international pressure gives us a perfect picture of how the Khartoum regime regards the African peoples of these regions, as well as its willingness to lie in the most brazen fashion imaginable.  In an earlier statement, Khartoum’s UN ambassador declared of the November 10 bombing of Yida refugee camp that it was a fabrication and never occurred, this despite the fact that the attack had by that point been confirmed by journalists present during the attack, humanitarian personnel on the ground in Yida, as well as a UN investigation.

This is the negotiating face of the National Islamic Front/National Congress Party, and de Waal seems unwilling to confront it squarely.  And this in turn augurs very poorly for the success of the AU-mediated negotiations in Addis Ababa, which have been extended beyond January 24, but without any indication of progress.

Further context for the present dispute over oil transit fees

Despite the basic clarity of moral and political equities in the stand-off over oil revenues, there is a good deal that makes this discussion difficult and complicated.  We have only partially relevant precedents for such fees, although Khartoum’s proposal of $36 per barrel is indeed preposterously out of line with those we do have.  For example, Ukraine receives from Russia $7.80 to $9.50 per ton of oil transported through its territory by means of the immense Druzhba pipeline (there are approximately seven barrels in a ton of oil, so the price per barrel in transit fees would be $1.10 – $1.36). In 2009 Cameroon was negotiating an increase in the transit fee for oil from Chad passing through its territory from $0.41 to $1.00 per barrel.

Construction recovery costs for the partners of the Greater Nile Operating Company (Unity State) and Petrodar (Upper Nile) have either been recovered or very soon will be; Khartoum’s Sudapet is only a five percent partner in these two consortia. Indeed, since the 1990s Khartoum has been the beneficiary of major foreign technical expertise and capital investment; negotiations over the value of the infrastructure that remain in the south should certainly be part of broader negotiations about oil revenues.  But these costs should be separated from those for the continuing costs of transit fees and fees for the use of Port Sudan.  What Khartoum has attempted to do by sequestering large quantities of oil unilaterally, on the basis of a $32 per barrel transit fee, is not to calculate what a fair charge is for infrastructure, port fees, and transit fees; rather, it has estimated the size of its deficit and calculated the transit fee accordingly.  No matter that 75 percent of oil production comes from the South (which also has 80 percent of known reserves).  The regime is, in effect, charging South Sudan for its own gross economic mismanagement of the northern economy.

There are other important issues bearing on negotiations over oil revenues.  The north/south border is still undefined in key oil producing regions, including Abyei.  Losing the Bamboo and Heglig sites in the “final and binding” delineation of Abyei by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (July 2009) was a bitter disappointment to Southerners.  They abided by its terms, however, even as Khartoum has conspicuously not done so; and the military seizure of Abyei ensures that no resolution of this crisis is possible in the foreseeable future–certainly not for the more than 100,000 Dinka Ngok who remain displaced following the May 21 military occupation.

We should also recall that transparency in accounting, both for production and revenues figures, never figured in Khartoum’s sense of what it was obliged to provide the South, even after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005).  Given the complexity of the royalties contracts with China National Petroleum Corp., Malaysia’s Petronas, and Canada’s Talisman Energy (later replaced by India’s ONG), as well as the opaque rendering of costs for infrastructure and equipment, it is very difficult to know where a fair starting point might be in calculating what Khartoum has actually paid for and what it has received from these foreign nationals—and what it has already received from South Sudan since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.  The International Monetary Fund did a disastrously bad job monitoring oil revenues and military expenditures in the period 2000 – 2002, and has done little better subsequently; all we may be sure of is that huge amounts of these revenues went to profligate military spending and to lining the pockets of the regime and its cronies.

During the entire interim period (January 9, 2005 – July 9, 2011), Khartoum never made a good faith effort to provide transparent and plausible production or revenue figures to the Government of South Sudan (GOSS).  Of the roughly 50 percent of oil revenues from production in the South that were to have gone to the GOSS, hundreds of millions of dollars were diverted or disappeared by means of bookkeeping legerdemain.  Under the current regime, we are unlikely ever to know how many hundreds of millions of dollars the desperately needy South was denied during this six and a half year interim period.  It is not a figure that de Waal contends with in his account of oil revenue negotiations or how this reneging and withholding has affected Southern attitudes towards Khartoum.

Yet other relevant issues go back to Khartoum’s conduct of war later in 1990s through 2002, and the brutally destructive population clearances in the oil concession areas of what are now Unity State and Upper Nile State.  Ruthless displacement, deliberate attacks on civilians, stoking of ethnic tensions, and the use of foreign commercial actors as cover for these activities—all this defined early activities by Khartoum and the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC), and somewhat later Petrodar in Upper Nile.  The largest partners in both consortia are the national oil companies of the People’s Republic of China, and they were as ruthless in their extraction efforts as Khartoum was energetic in creating a cordon sanitaire for what was at the time known as Western Upper Nile.  Amnesty International reported at the time a chilling observation about Chinese workers: they were armed and appeared ready to use their weapons (May 3, 2000).

The oil concession areas throughout Sudan were considered by Khartoum to be their mineral wealth fiefdom: the designation and sale of concession blocks, their security, and the complex royalty agreements that were signed at the time involved no consultations with the people of the South.  And as Khartoum was generating greater and greater external debt, even during this period of new oil wealth, no thought was given to development needs in the South—or indeed in any other marginalized region of Sudan.  Indeed, there are reports that Khartoum’s engineers were directed after January 9, 2005 to extract oil horizontally from the South through well sites just north of the border; oil so extracted then became “northern” oil production, with 100 percent of the revenues going to Khartoum.  Oil fields in South Sudan were also pumped more rapidly during the interim period than is consistent with maximum long-term production.

The regime’s present suggestion that South Sudan should absorb some of this enormous Khartoum-generated debt—expended disproportionately on military acquisitions that continue to be directed against the people of the South—is simply grotesque.  Even so, there can be little doubt that Khartoum’s present obstructionism is part of a larger strategy, whether it be one of continuing, widespread economic warfare against the South—or deliberate provocation of the Republic of South Sudan, with an aim to creating a military response from the SPLA and thus a casus belli that will justify a military seizure of Southern oil regions.

The Breaking Point for Peace

There is considerable skepticism about the Southern leadership’s optimistic estimate (roughly a year) for the time necessary to construct an alternate pipeline to the Kenyan coast.  Clearly Khartoum has assumed an insurmountably lengthy time-frame in judging that the South would never go so far as to shut down oil transport to north Sudan.  And indeed, most estimates average around two to three years for construction, although the Chinese built the pipeline from Heglig to Port Sudan in approximately a year, and Beijing has put in a bid to build the pipeline southward.  Juba would obviously push hard for construction to be as rapid as possible, and would also begin to build domestic refineries that could be supplied by Southern crude.  In short, Juba is clearly prepared to call Khartoum’s bluff—and this creates an extremely dangerous situation.

But without a fundamental shift in the negotiating posture of Khartoum, one that the AU is extremely unlikely to push for, to judge by de Waal’s skewed assessment of the two parties, the talks in Addis will break down on Friday (January 27) when Presidents Salva Kiir and Omar al-Bashir are scheduled to meet.  But we should keep in mind the clear possibility that a collapse of these talks is in fact deliberate on Khartoum’s part: since an already highly distressed northern economy would implode with the precipitous loss of all oil revenues from the South, economic woes of all sorts could be collectively blamed on a hostile and “belligerent” South.  The regime would blame this implosion not on its own gross mismanagement of the economy, its vastly excessive military and security expenditures, or its accrual of an unsustainable external debt of more than $38 billion—but rather on the South.  The generals in Khartoum who now make decisions about war and peace will have their pretext for war—a war that will be justified, in a grim irony, as punishing the South for its “economic warfare” against the north.

If war comes—and it almost daily appears more likely—it will be a war emerging from the indifference, foolishness, and cowardice of an international community that refuses to see the Khartoum regime for what it is, or even to speak honestly about what it has done and continues to do to the marginalized peoples of Darfur, Eastern Sudan, Abyei, Blue Nile, South Kordofan, and increasingly the border regions inside South Sudan.  We have reached the “brink of war” that de Waal speaks of not because of what South Sudan has done, but because of what the international community has not done.

January 24, 2012

_____________________________
Eric Reeves
Smith College
Northampton, MA 01063

ereeves@smith.edu
413-585-3326
Skype: ReevesSudan
www.sudanreeves.org

http://www.sudanreeves.org/2012/01/25/sudan-south-sudan-and-the-oil-revenues-controversy-khartoums-obstructionism-threatens-war/

South Sudan roads ministry unveils 10-year plan

South Sudan roads ministry unveils 10-year plan
Middle East North Africa Financial Network
JUBA, Jan 21, 2012 (Sudan Tribune – McClatchy-Tribune Information Services via COMTEX) — South Sudan’s roads and bridges minister, Gier Chuang Aluong, spoke to journalists at a press conference in Juba on Tuesday about a 10-year strategic plan that …

South Sudan to unveil pipeline plans next week: minister
Chicago Tribune
JUBA/BEIJING (Reuters) – South Sudan will announce plans for an oil export pipeline through East Africa next week, a priority for the new nation because its crude is “no longer safe” in Sudan, a government spokesman said on Saturday. …

US looks at possible aid for Sudan border states
Reuters Africa
Activist groups have urged Washington to help in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan, where Sudanese government troops have repeatedly clashed with rebels following the independence of South Sudanin July. The fighting has already forced about 417000 …

Over 120000 affected by South Sudan clashes – UN Xinhua 20 (Xinhua) — More than 120000 people affected by the recent violence in South Sudan’s Jonglei state may need emergency assistance, which is twice the original estimate, the United Nations humanitarian official in the African country said on Friday. …

Fire guts parking yard at South Sudan-Ugandan border New Vision By Vision Correspondent A fire has reportedly broken out at a parking yard in Nimule town at boarder of South Sudan and Uganda. A police officer at the scene who did not want to be quoted says the fire broke about a few minutes ago, followed by a loud …

South Sudan: Plan scales up critical aid as violence continues Reuters AlertNet Child rights organisation Plan International is scaling up its relief food distribution in Pibor County –South Sudan as tribal violence continues to rage in the strife-torn region. The additional food supplies, secured from the World Food Programme, …

South Sudan: Zimbabwean Appointed Deputy Special Representative for Unmiss AllAfrica.com Juba — The United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon today announced the appointment of Mr. Raisedon Zenenga, a Zimbabwean, as the Deputy Special Representative (political) in the United Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). …

Nigerian peacekeeper killed in Darfur ambush: UN AFP UN leader Ban Ki-moon strongly condemned the attack on the patrol in South Darfur and called on the Sudanese government to carry out a speedy investigation. The joint UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) said the attack was staged around midday, …

South Sudan plagued by ethnic violence GlobalPost James Kumen a young district administrator stands in the compound where he sleeps in Jonglei state South Sudan. Armed only with a credit-less satellite phone and a university education he is responsible for administering dozens of remote hamlets and…

South Sudan Struggling in Face of Growing Refugee Crisis

Monday, January 09, 2012 

“South Sudan is one of the poorest and least developed nations in the world, and the influx of refugees is placing enormous strain on already scarce resources.” Fran Equiza, Oxfam’s Regional Director in Horn, East and Central Africa

Boston, MA – infoZine – Six months since South Sudan’s independence, the world’s newest nation is struggling to cope with a major refugee crisis and massive internal displacement, international agency Oxfam said today.Tens of thousands of people have fled violence in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan across the border in Sudan, and an estimated 60,000 people have also reportedly been affected by last week’s fighting in the South Sudan state of Jonglei.

Over 55,000 refugees have arrived in Upper Nile state in South Sudan in recent months, fleeing conflict in Sudan’s Blue Nile region. More people continue to arrive and are sheltering in newly established refugee camps where food and other essential services are in short supply. Oxfam is boosting its water and sanitation work for 25,000 of the new arrivals.

The worsening conflict along the border between Sudan and South Sudan has led to growing fears of a major food crisis, as insecurity has restricted local agriculture and limited aid and market supplies. Parts of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile are expected to reach emergency levels in early 2012, with early warning systems predicting that food insecurity will reach Phase 4 of 5 – one step below famine levels. Such a crisis is likely to force more refugees into South Sudan, Oxfam said. Around 20,000 people have already fled Southern Kordofan, and thousands more are displaced within the region. Due to conflict and insecurity, many of the rural areas on both sides of the new border remain inaccessible to humanitarian organisations.

“It is six months since South Sudan’s independence and there is much we should be celebrating. But the growing crisis along the border threatens to derail any progress. South Sudan is one of the poorest and least developed nations in the world, and the influx of refugees is placing enormous strain on already scarce resources,” said Fran Equiza, Oxfam’s Regional Director.

Oxfam called on all parties to the conflict to immediately cease hostilities and ensure humanitarian aid can reach all people in need.

http://www.infozine.com/news/stories/op/storiesView/sid/50282/

We must act to stop South Kordofan becoming the next Darfur

The international community must stop history repeating itself in South Kordofan, Sudan, where it is estimated that 1.4 million people have been killed or injured by the military, and many live in fear of attacks.

Children take cover in caves in the hills above Kauda in the Nuba mountains, following repeated aerial bombardment of their towns by Sudanese armed forces. Photograph: Phil Moore

Last month the newest country in the world, the Republic of South Sudan, celebrated independence. But across the border in South Kordofan state people are living on the frontline, trapped in a war zone and deprived of their rights to basic humanitarian aid. As war planes bomb civilian areas and intense fighting continues, many innocent people are living in fear of attack.

I have firsthand experience of the brutality of war, torn from my family as a child and forced to fight during the civil war between the government ofSudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army. Southern Kordofan state was one of the hardest hit regions in a war that lasted more than 20 years and claimed more than 2 million lives, including my mother’s.

We cannot turn a blind eye and let history repeat itself. UN human rights officials have already warned that acts committed in South Kordofan may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. Although exact numbers of people killed and injured remain unconfirmed – as access has been nearly impossible because of insecurity and government restrictions – it is estimated that a total of 1.4 million people have been affected by the conflict. More than 200,000 people have fled their homes, unable to cultivate their land as planting season begins. This puts them doubly at risk, with no means of earning a living or growing their own food. As a result, an estimated 4 million people in Sudan are likely to face high levels of food insecurity over the next few months, during an especially precarious time for large parts of Africa.

Unexploded weapons have been found on the grounds of three schools and land mines are hindering attempts to deliver life-saving aid. Aerial bombings, shooting and shelling continues in what increasingly appears to be a targeted campaign against the Nuba people. Despite their affiliation with the southern rebels during the civil war, the Nuba’s homeland was excluded from the referendum on independence, so it remained in Sudan when the new southern country was formed. South Kordofan was only granted a so-called “popular consultation”, which would allow citizens to make their own choices, but even this has failed to happen.

Marginalising, oppressing and attacking borders has been the approach of the government in Khartoum for decades, and has been a chief reason for the conflicts in Darfur, the south and the east. As the international community continues to search in vain for a solution to the ongoing conflict in Darfur, the same pattern of violence and deprivation is now playing out in Southern Kordofan, with fears that it could become an escalating conflict and even spread to Blue Nile state.

But it is not too late for the international community to stop a humanitarian crisis from happening. Representatives from the governments of Sudan and South Sudan met last week in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia to restart negotiations. They must act now by agreeing on a ceasefire and by allowing aid to reach those who desperately need it.

The international community, through the UN security council, should authorise a robust UN peacekeeping mission with a mandate to protect civilians from further violence. Anything less would be to abandon the Nuba people, and indeed all communities in Southern Kordofan, in their hour of need. The people of Southern Kordofan – and the international community – will have to live with the consequences for years, if not decades, to come.

US congressional committee holds hearing on South Kordofan’s ‘ethnic cleansing’

August 4, 2011 (WASHIGTON) – Accounts of atrocities allegedly committed by Sudan army in the country’s state of South Kordofan were recited in a hearing organised by a US congressional committee on Thursday.

Since 5 June, Sudan’s army has been fighting a war against rebels of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in the country southern state of South Kordofan, which borders the war-battered western region of Darfur and the newly independent state of South Sudan.

More than 72,000 people were displaced by the fighting as it intensified with heavy aerial bombardment by Sudan army, according to UN figures. A large number of people are believed to be killed amid reports that Sudan army has been targeting the African Nuba population many of whom are aligned with the rebels.

UN agencies accused Sudan of hampering access of humanitarian aid to the affected population.

US congressman Chris Smith, who chairs the house congressional panel on African issues and international human rights, convened an emergency hearing on Thursday and listened to three “witnesses” who recounted claims of “ethnic cleansing, murders, rapes” and a burgeoning humanitarian crisis in the area.

“Whatever the numbers involved, we can be sure that the suffering of the people in Southern Kordofan, especially the Nuba people, has been catastrophic,” Smith said in his opening remarks.

The hearing, entitled “Southern Kordofan: Ethnic Cleansing and Humanitarian Crisis in Sudan,” received testimonies by Andudu Adam Elnail, a bishop at the Anglican Diocese of Kadugli in South Kordofan, Bradford Phillips, President of Persecution Project, and Luka Biong Deng a member of South Sudan’s ruling SPLM the political wing of the SPLA.

All three witnesses spoke of wide-ranging atrocities committed by the Sudan army against the Nuba population, and called on the US Administration to rally international efforts to stem the crisis.

“These are not statistics; these are real people. The only reason they are being exterminated is because they are African. We can’t sit by and watch it happen,” Phillips said. “Mr. President what are you going to do? You know it’s happening; what are you going to do?,” he added.

Bishop Andudu said his own Anglican cathedral, offices and home in South Kordofan’s state capital of Kadugli were ransacked and looted. He also said a member of his congregation reported seeing mass graves less than a mile away.

He called on the US and other members of the international community to begin to “translate moral outrage into effective action” to save lives.

“The Nuba people fear that we will be forgotten, that the world will stand idly by while mass killings continue without redress,” he said. “Our hope is that the United States will lead the international community in taking prompt, effective action to protect tens of thousands of displaced people, including an untold number of civilians being killed house-to-house and bombed by their own government.”

Last month, the Sudanese parliament issued a resolution denouncing the “hostile” activities of the US congress against the country. The legislative body also called for reviewing the bilateral ties and instituting a “tit for tat” policy in dealing with Washington.

However, the resolution was unexpectedly criticised by the country’s minister of foreign affairs who described the move as “excessive zeal”

(ST)

GlobalPost: Grisly details of South Kordofan recounted

WASHINGTON, Aug. 5 (UPI) — Ethnic cleansing is emerging as part of the growing humanitarian emergency unfolding along the border between Sudan and South Sudan, a U.S. panel was told.

U.S. Rep. Chris Smith, R-N.J., presided over a hearing before a House subcommittee on human rights in Africa. Witnesses said there were worrying trends emerging in the border region separating the two Sudans.

Human Rights Watch in a July report called on the U.N. Security Council to take measures to ensure international monitors could get access to South Kordofan state to verify claims of ethnic cleansing.

U.N. officials had said there was evidence that at least 150 bodies, which bore the characteristic skin color of Nuban descent, were discovered in the region, suggesting the conflict was ethnically motivated.

Satellite imagery reportedly depicts what are believed to be mass graves related to ethnic violence in South Kordofan state along the border between the two Sudans. Officials in the Sudanese government denied civilians were targeted in any attacks.

Smith’s panel heard what it described as “grisly” details of the crisis unfolding in South Kordofan.

“Whatever the numbers involved, we can be sure that the suffering of the people in South Kordofan, especially the Nuba people, has been catastrophic,” he said in a statement.

South Sudan gained independence in July as part of a comprehensive peace deal signed in 2005 that ended one of the bloodiest civil wars in world history. Border issues and oil continue to haunt the peace deal, however.

Sudan was accused Friday of blocking oil shipments out of South Sudan.