Dr. John Garang De Mabior,
Chairman SPLM and C-in-C SPLA22 December 1999Dear brotherAs far back as 1964, the Umma Party leadership recognised the politico-cultural and economic aspect of Sudan’s national crisis as reflected in the civil war. It was an uphill task to convert Northern political opinion on the matter.
Since then, you are ware, I am sure, Umma had, within Northern opinion pioneered all the new ideas which formed the nexus of understanding between the old and the new thinking, namely, the recognition of cultural plurality, the founding of constitutional rights upon citizenship, the endorsement of universal Human Rights to form an integral part of the country’s future
constitution, the move to make peace agreements between the borderline tribes to deprive the NIF regime from lining them up in their Holy War, the initiative to secure SPLM membership of NDA, and the introduction of SPLM to Arab opinion in the face of mutual suspicions.
Right from the inception of our decision to co-operate in the interests of peace, democracy and a restructured Sudan, we have had an honourable relationship in terms of the agreements we have reached, and the means to realise our resolutions in the satisfaction of the legitimate aspirations of the Peoples of Sudan.
Recently, we have failed to see eye to eye on certain matters:
à 1 We insisted on an IGAD update to broaden it to involve uncatered for aspects. You were not equally enthusiastic for this revision.
à 2 We encouraged the Joint Egyptian-Libyan initiative as a necessary means to rectify the IGAD drawbacks and to compliment it. Initially you have welcomed the joint initiative and then had second thoughts about it. The IGAD revision, which you suggested as a substitute, was so unfair that our rejection of it should have caused no surprise.
à 3 Towards the end of 1998 we became increasingly anxious about the possibility of international resolutions being implemented over the heads of the Sudanese peoples, and the creeping Balkanisation of the Sudan. You may not have similar anxieties. However, our discussions with important players in the international community left us in no doubt that the SPLM/A is regarded along with the government as responsible for Human Rights abuses, and perpetuation of the war. The feared Balkanisation of Sudan is not viewed in North/South terms but would be a pervasive retrogressive phenomenon. You are not the cause of these anxieties but one of its expected victims. However, the most important two causes of disparity in our views are the Pace of search for a Comprehensive Political Agreement in Sudan, and the margin of party activity within the NDA umbrella.
1. Starting from May 1998 and the events, which led to the Horn of Africa war and the Great Lakes war, we in Umma have seen our geopolitical region in for a new political map with all kinds of unexpected alliances. That heralded as far as we analysed, the diminishing of our hitherto considerable, military and logistical space.
2. Beginning with 1997, we detected a change of political language in Khartoum which manifested itself in the regime’s belated acceptance of the DOP of IGAD, the acceptance of citizenship as the basis of constitutional rights, the endorsement of some Asmara 1995 resolutions, particularly the principle of self-determination for the South, and the appointment of a
“National” constitutional commission charged with drafting a constitution guaranteeing political plurality. Widening margins for internal dissident political activity, diminishing military spring boards, anxiety about misguided internationalist agendas, and the possibility of creeping
Balkanisation, have persuaded us to move very fast indeed in the search for a Comprehensive Political Agreement made possible by new circumstances. The internal and external events which we saw coming and so expected were a complete surprise to most of our NDA allies. This accounts for the different speeds and explains some of the consequent suspicions.
3. You were in the NDA, but not of the NDA. You maintained a relative organisational and political distance. We tried to lift the NDA from its No body Does Anything lethargy.
In March 1997 we suggested a ten-point crash program to accompany the military accomplishments, and suggested a task force to implement it. The crash program was accepted, but the task force rejected. Consequently Nobody Did Anything. In February 1998 the Umma party’s fourth external conference criticised the NDA structures and total inactivity. We wrote an elaborate memorandum outlining past achievements and present disabilities. We suggested a reform program to rehabilitate its structures, to broaden the organisation and to activate it. To no avail.
After several unsuccessful attempts to reform and activate the NDA, we decided to free ourselves from the NDA deadwood, to pursue our party activity abiding by the reference resolutions.
After this practice became a well-known NDA tradition, we sought to legalise it by proposing a resolution in June 1999 to that effect.
We declared that we shall meet anyone in pursuit of the Comprehensive Political Agreement. The last NDA Leadership Council in Cairo called for the formulation of a position paper. The Umma party presented a position paper based on all previous reference resolutions.
Our Djibouti meeting with Albashir was expected to be an ordinary meeting exchanging views about how to activate the Egyptian Libyan initiative, and balancing the Geneva meeting with Alturabi, and providing an opportunity for us to explain the necessity for the confidence building measures. Instead of such a simple exchange we found that Albashir was ready for a further deal.
He was prepared to sign on a summary of our position paper. Small wonder we accepted. Those who considered the accord on its merits appreciated it. We were not surprised by the negative reaction of the Cairo rally because we know exactly how “staged” it was. Although we noticed that after your last Washington visit your views about IGAD update and the Joint Initiative
rallied to the USA position on the matter, we were shocked by the vehemence of your negative reaction to Djibouti.
Your Kampala 8th December 1999 speech was a scathing, unfair, and distorted attack on a party which represents majority opinion in the Sudan, and in terms of our direct experience had the greatest input, amongst Northern parties, in the making of new policies towards the causes of the
marginalized Sudanese groups. It contained a political language, which represents a complete adoption of the political rhetoric of some Northern “lost cause” elites who would dearly like to recruit SPLA to fight for their lost causes for which they have neither the will to fight, nor the masses to struggle. You know how much for the sake of larger considerations we have
tolerated your digressions.
à 1 On more than one occasion you presented the Government of Sudan (GOS) with a plan to establish two Confederate States, to divide central power between SPLM/SPLA and the NIF regime. You mapped new boundaries for the two states. A position in direct contravention of the Asmara resolutions and all previous NDA agreements.
à 2 You were party to an NDA resolution in March 1998 to represent the NDA In the IGAD process and to enlarge it in other ways. It was always assumed that it was the Khartoum regime, which disapproved of IGAD update. It emerged that the SPLM/A disapproves of NDA participation in IGAD and when you suggested NDA involvement you simply repeated the unacceptable non-paper of Mr. Johntson’s delegation.
à 3 You publicly endorsed the Egyptian-Libyan Initiative and the SPLM/A signed the Tripoli Declaration of August 1999. Later in the year you revised your position and came close to rejecting the Joint Initiative all together. So by the standards of abiding by the reference resolutions of NDA, the SPLM/A track record is very poor. A similar scrutiny of Umma activities,
particularly the Djibouti accord will vindicate Umma’s position as consistent with NDA reference resolutions.
à 4 The SPLA’s record on Human Rights, in the eyes of many neutral observers has blunted if not altogether arrested the opposition campaign against the Human Rights record of the NIF regime. The 55th session of the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1999, the US state Department report of Human Rights abuses in 1998, the NGO’s operating in Sudan particularly the big four who
addressed their observations to the UN Secretary General in November 1998, the American based Human Rights Watch in December 1999, and numerous articles in the US press have equated SPLA abuse of Human Rights to that of the NIF.
However, much we resent the unfairness and vehemence of your attack on Umma, and uphold the correctness of our position, we will not allow reaction to derail our strategic drive for Just Peace, Democratisation, Regional Stability and the restoration of Sudan’s status in the Community of the Nations.
1. The NIF Islamicist Agenda has failed to vitalise the economy. Failed to win the civil war failed to uproot the opposition, failed to expand regionally, and failed to establish a viable state and society, which could be presented as an Islamic model.
2. On the other hand, the armed resistance, the political opposition, the regional response, and the reaction of the international community have isolated, and all but besieged the Khartoum regime.
3. Under pressure from the steadfastness of the resistance, the regime’s own failures, and the pressure of its internal schism it changed direction allowing a greater margin of freedom inside the country. It changed its regional address towards good neighbourliness. It changed its international agenda. Small wonder that our NIF “intransigence dividend” receded. Our room
for military pressure and diplomatic isolation contracted. However, the opportunity for political action multiplied, and the possibility of that action leading to a political resolution of Sudan’s conflicts or failing that providing a springboard for a greater political pressure has become very
real.
4. In the circumstances, to expect our regional neighbours to maintain their previous position towards the Sudanese opposition unchanged is wishful thinking. Apart from their positive response to the regime’s changed diplomatic language, their own national agendas have drastically been altered by internal security priorities, and the requirements of the Horn of
Africa, and the Great Lakes regional wars. They are honourable neighbours who know that we have a just cause. Therefore it is reasonable to expect them to link their normalisation with Sudan with the resolution of Sudan’s internal conflicts.
5. Our monitor of the internal political situation, the regional position, and the developments within the regime indicates that it is possible to clinch a Peace Agreement, a program for Democratic Transformation, and all the items in our Asmara agenda. All that remains is to decide upon the mechanism to reach it, the measures to ensure compliance and the transition
arrangements.
This is a viable scenario, which could clinch a political agreement to realise the legitimate aspirations of the peoples of Sudan, and if the regime fails to deliver, create the political dynamic for an irresistible political pressure.
There are two possible alternative scenarios to this:
A. An eradicationalist scenario to mount a successful challenge to the regime and uproot it. Although this fulfils the dreams of many who have suffered so much at the hands of this regime, the means to do so are not available. All that can be realised is to create a continuous condition of
instability in Sudan, which could disintegrate state, and society and “Somalize” the country.
B. Perpetuate the war related Humanitarian tragedy in Sudan and so create conditions for possible international Intervention. Intervention, if and when it comes, will not aim at a comprehensive resolution of conflicts in Sudan. It will simply apply a Kosovo or an East Timor pattern. It is a recipe for a very dangerous national and international polarisation. Such polarisation could very well act as a conduit for a revitalised Islmicist come back in league with Islamicist protest and reaction world-wide. High handed foreign initiatives are counter productive. They simply allow the regime to portray its position as an anti-Neocolonial struggle as well as a defence of Islam and National Sovereignty.
Both scenarios are enigmatic and totally abhorrent form a patriotic point of views.
6- The developments inside the Sudan especially after 12 December 1999 could lead to one of the four following developments:
a. Alturabi succeeds in restoring the status quo ante.
b. Albashir’s success tempts him to develop a full-blown military dictatorship.
c. The two sides resort to force in a massive way, and in the circumstances, expediting the deterioration towards Somalization.
d. Further tragedies making foreign intervention inevitable.
The four possibilities are catastrophic to the Sudan and can only be averted by an opposition strategy that is viable, realistic, and relevant.
Umma’s own reading of the situation, plus National consultations and discussions with our neighbours, and with members of the International Community argues for the following program:
1st To convene a national All Party Conference to discuss and resolve all national conflicts and usher into a Comprehensive Political Agreement.
2nd The National Conference to be guided by a Declaration of Principles for a Comprehensive Political Agreement (DOPCA).
3rd The mediation mechanism for the conference should decide its time, place, membership, agenda, and through consultations with the parties to conflict issue the DOPCA. It should consist of a two plus five representing our North African and Horn of Africa neighbours, backed up by an extended IPF.
4th Until the conference reaches agreement, the country should be governed by a Transition Constitution. The Transition Constitution should be drafted by a technical committee from the following sources:
a) The Constitution drafted by the National Commission.
The IGAD DOP.
c) The Asmara 1995 resolutions.
d) The Nation’s Call.
1st The Transition Constitution to be enacted by a summit of the country’s political leadership acting as a Constituent body.
2nd The appointment of a National Transition Government to govern the country until it holds the plebiscite and the general National Elections as required by the Comprehensive Political Agreement by the All party National Conference.
Finally, please accept our best regards.
Al-Sadig Al-Mahdi,
Umma Party President
This Daughter of the South Will Not Come Cheap
These days, the most coveted bride from the South is none other than the heavyweight, bold-headed and grey-bearded, Dr. Col. John Garang de Mabior,the long-dreaded enemy of Khartoum-based regimes. Long infamously known in the capital as “the rebel” and “the terrorist”, She (of the capital ‘S’) is now being respectfully addressed as “the leader of the SPLM/SPLA”, the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army, by the largely government-controlled media in Khartoum. And from left, right and centre they are already falling head over heels for her body – no, I mean the booty they expect She brings!
Suitors come from all sorts of backgrounds, achievements, muddles and shapes: some have loads of degrees from some of world’s best-known universities. One is weighed down by military medals, mostly awarded by himself to himself. At least two of them are religious fanatics and close former friends of internationally re-known terrorists like Osama Bin Laden; others are nominally so.
But all of them have plenty of cash – loads of it! Three of them are hardened political jailbirds and hard nuts to crack. The fourth one has been their common jailer, who now can’t very well trust any of his former prisoners as a mate or partner in peaceful days to come. They are all probably on the elderly side of middle-aged.
The leading contender for the hand of the Daughter of the South has long been the Oxford-educated Mandukuru, a seemingly civilized and gentle fellow, yet an extremely dangerous and unreliable individual in his historically recorded dealings with the South. This atrocity-ridden character is called Mr. Sadiq el Mahadi, a grandson of the Sudanese Mahadi, at one time an ineffectual, twice-failed, Prime Minister of the Sudan. He is the long-time leader of the Umma Party and he thinks himself the natural suitor for our warrior daughter.
But when he was Prime Minister in the late 80s, Sadiq made half-hearted attempts to capture the heart of the Black Daughter of the Soil; but She of the capital S had an honest agenda that Sadiq saw as undermining his own barely concealed blurred vision for the Sudan that sees Islam as having “a holy mission in Africa and the Southern Sudan is the beginning of that mission” (SM Oct. 6-19 2003, Sudan’s Media War of Visions). “The failure of Islam in Southern Sudan,” he said, “would be the failure of the Sudanese Muslims to the international Islamic cause.”
He then went on to arm a hoard of ill educated, genocide-minded, Arab tribes of Southern Kordofan and Darfur to accomplish this mission. Their repeated and devastating raids into Bhar el Gazal and Upper Nile, even long after Sadiq was deposed, accomplished nothing but a lasting bitterness in those regions. Ask any surviving child or mother of these regions about the Marahaleen and you will hear all about Sadiq’s bloody handiwork.
When during the Koka Dam peace talks in 1986, and later in other marriage talks, Sadiq pretended to be working for a fair and peaceful Sudan, the Daughter of the Soil kept remarking that “Others,” meaning the 61% of non-Sudanese Arabs, “get frustrated as they fail to see how they could become Arabs when their Creator thought otherwise.” If there is anything Sadiq fears and detests most, it is a Southerner who appears to outwit him; so he abandoned the idea of marrying our daughter. Good riddance!
The second long-time pretender is a rounded figure, a kindly fellow who looks just like anyone’s granddad. His name is Mohammed Uthman al-Mirghani, who leads a similarly aged.
Source: Gurtong.org Archive
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