Brief History of the Sudan (1956–2011)

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History of the Sudan (1956–1969)

This article details the period of Independent Sudan, January 1, 1956 to May 25, 1969, and from June 1986 to July 9th, 2011, in the history of Sudan. The Azhari government temporarily halted progress toward self-determination for Sudan, hoping to promote unity with Egypt. Although his pro-Egyptian National Unionist Party (NUP) had won a majority in the 1953 parliamentary elections, Ismail al Azhari realized that popular opinion had shifted against union with Egypt. As a result, Azhari, who had been the major spokesman for the “unity of the Nile Valley,” reversed the NUP’s stand and supported Sudanese independence. On December 19, 1955, the Sudanese parliament, under Azhari’s leadership, unanimously adopted a declaration of independence; on January 1, 1956, Sudan became an independent republic. Azhari called for the withdrawal of foreign troops and requested the condominium powers to sponsor a plebiscite in advance of the scheduled date.

Politics of Independence

Sudan achieved independence without the rival political parties having agreed on the form and content of a permanent constitution. Instead, the Constituent Assembly adopted a document known as the Transitional Constitution, which replaced the governor general as head of state with a five-member Supreme Commission that was elected by a parliament composed of an indirectly elected Senate and a popularly elected House of Representatives. The Transitional Constitution also allocated executive power to the prime minister, who was nominated by the House of Representatives and confirmed in office by the Supreme Commission.

Although it achieved independence without conflict, Sudan inherited many problems from the condominium. Chief among these was the status of the civil service. The government placed Sudanese in the administration and provided compensation and pensions for British officers of the Sudan Political Service who left the country; it retained those who could not be replaced, mostly technicians and teachers. Khartoum achieved this transformation quickly and with a minimum of turbulence, although southerners resented the replacement of British administrators in the south with northern Sudanese. To advance their interests, many southern leaders concentrated their efforts in Khartoum, where they hoped to win constitutional concessions. Although determined to resist what they perceived to be Arab imperialism, they were opposed to violence. Most southern representatives supported provincial autonomy and warned that failure to win legal concessions would drive the south to rebellion.

The parliamentary regime introduced plans to expand the country’s education, economic, and transportation sectors. To achieve these goals, Khartoum needed foreign economic and technical assistance, to which the United States made an early commitment. Conversations between the two governments had begun in mid-1957, and the parliament ratified a United States aid agreement in July 1958. Washington hoped this agreement would reduce Sudan’s excessive reliance on a one-crop (cotton) economy and would facilitate the development of the country’s transportation and communications infrastructure.

The prime minister formed a coalition government in February 1956, but he alienated the Khatmiyyah by supporting increasingly secular government policies. In June some Khatmiyyah members who had defected from the NUP established the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) under Mirghani‘s leadership. The Umma and the PDP combined in parliament to bring down the Azhari government. With support from the two parties and backing from the Ansar and the Khatmiyyah, Abdallah Khalil put together a coalition government.

Major issues confronting Khalil’s coalition government included winning agreement on a permanent constitution, stabilizing the south, encouraging economic development, and improving relations with Egypt. Strains within the Umma-PDP coalition hampered the government’s ability to make progress on these matters. The Umma, for example, wanted the proposed constitution to institute a presidential form of government on the assumption that Abd ar Rahman al Mahdi would be elected the first president. Consensus was lacking about the country’s economic future. A poor cotton harvest followed the 1957 bumper cotton crop, which Sudan had been unable to sell at a good price in a glutted market. This downturn depleted Sudan’s reserves and caused unrest over government-imposed economic restrictions. To overcome these problems and finance future development projects, the Umma called for greater reliance on foreign aid. The PDP, however, objected to this strategy because it promoted unacceptable foreign influence in Sudan. The PDP’s philosophy reflected the Arab nationalism espoused by Gamal Abdul Nasser, who had replaced Egyptian leader Naguib in 1954. Despite these policy differences, the Umma-PDP coalition lasted for the remaining year of the parliament’s tenure. Moreover, after the parliament adjourned, the two parties promised to maintain a common front for the 1958 elections.

The electorate gave a plurality in both houses to the Umma and an overall majority to the Umma-PDP coalition. The NUP, however, won nearly one-quarter of the seats, largely from urban centers and from Gezira Scheme agricultural workers. In the south, the vote represented a rejection of the men who had cooperated with the government–voters defeated all three southerners in the preelection cabinet–and a victory for advocates of autonomy within a federal system. Resentment against the government’s taking over mission schools and against the measures used in suppressing the 1955 mutiny contributed to the election of several candidates who had been implicated in the rebellion.

After the new parliament convened, Khalil again formed an Umma-PDP coalition government. Unfortunately, factionalism, corruption, and vote fraud dominated parliamentary deliberations at a time when the country needed decisive action with regard to the proposed constitution and the future of the south. As a result, the Umma-PDP coalition failed to exercise effective leadership.

Another issue that divided the parliament concerned Sudanese-United States relations. In March 1958, Khalil signed a technical assistance agreement with the United States. When he presented the pact to parliament for ratification, he discovered that the NUP wanted to use the issue to defeat the Umma-PDP coalition and that many PDP delegates opposed the agreement. Nevertheless, the Umma, with the support of some PDP and southern delegates, managed to obtain approval of the agreement.

Factionalism and bribery in parliament, coupled with the government’s inability to resolve Sudan’s many social, political, and economic problems, increased popular disillusion with democratic government. Specific complaints included Khartoum’s decision to sell cotton at a price above world market prices. This policy resulted in low sales of cotton, the commodity from which Sudan derived most of its income. Restrictions on imports imposed to take pressure off depleted foreign exchange reserves caused consternation among town dwellers who had become accustomed to buying foreign goods. Moreover, rural northerners also suffered from an embargo that Egypt placed on imports of cattle, camels, and dates from Sudan. Growing popular discontent caused many antigovernment demonstrations in Khartoum. Egypt also criticized Khalil and suggested that it might support a coup against his government. Meanwhile, reports circulated in Khartoum that the Umma and the NUP were near agreement on a new coalition that would exclude the PDP and Khalil.

On November 17, 1958, the day parliament was to convene, a military coup occurred. Khalil, himself a retired army general, planned the preemptive coup in conjunction with leading Umma members and the army’s two senior generals, Ibrahim Abboud and Ahmad Abd al Wahab, who became leaders of the military regime. Abbud immediately pledged to resolve all disputes with Egypt, including the long-standing problem of the status of the Nile River. Abbud abandoned the previous government’s unrealistic policies regarding the sale of cotton. He also appointed a constitutional commission, headed by the chief justice, to draft a permanent constitution. Abbud maintained, however, that political parties only served as vehicles for personal ambitions and that they would not be reestablished when civilian rule was restored.

The Abbud Military Government, 1958-1964

The coup removed political decision making from the control of the civilian politicians. Abbud created the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to rule Sudan. This body contained officers affiliated with the Ansar and the Khatmiyyah. Abbud belonged to the Khatmiyyah, whereas Abd al Wahab was a member of the Ansar. Until Abd al Wahab’s removal in March 1959, the Ansar were the stronger of the two groups in the government.

The regime benefited during its first year in office from successful marketing of the cotton crop. Abbud also profited from the settlement of the Nile waters dispute with Egypt and the improvement of relations between the two countries. Under the military regime, the influence of the Ansar and the Khatmiyyah lessened. The strongest religious leader, Abd ar Rahman al Mahdi, died in early 1959. His son and successor, the elder Sadiq al Mahdi, failed to enjoy the respect accorded his father. When Sadiq died two years later, Ansar religious and political leadership divided between his brother, Imam Al Hadi al Mahdi, and his son, the younger Sadiq al Mahdi.

Despite the Abbud regime’s early successes, opposition elements remained powerful. In 1959 dissident military officers made three attempts to displace the Abbud government and to establish a “popular government.” Although the courts sentenced the leaders of these attempted coups to life imprisonment, discontent in the military continued to hamper the government’s performance. In particular, the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP), which supported the attempted coups, gained a reputation as an effective antigovernment organization. To compound its problems, the Abbud regime lacked dynamism and the ability to stabilize the country. Its failure to place capable civilian advisers in positions of authority, to launch a credible economic and social development program, and to gain the army’s support created an atmosphere that encouraged political turbulence.

Abbud’s southern policy proved to be his undoing. The government suppressed expressions of religious and cultural differences and bolstered attempts to arabize society. In February 1964, for example, Abbud ordered the mass expulsion of foreign missionaries from the south. He then closed parliament to cut off outlets for southern complaints. Southern leaders had renewed in 1963 the armed struggle against the Sudanese government that had continued sporadically since 1955. The rebellion was spearheaded from 1963 by guerrilla forces known as the Anyanya (the name of a poisonous concoction).

Return to Civilian Rule, 1964-1969

Recognizing its inability to quell growing southern discontent, the Abbud regime asked the civilian sector to submit proposals for a solution to the southern problem. However, criticism of government policy quickly went beyond the southern issue and included Abbud’s handling of other problems, such as the economy and education. Government attempts to silence these protests, which were centered in the University of Khartoum, brought a reaction not only from teachers and students but also from Khartoum’s civil servants and trade unionists. The so-called October Revolution of 1964 centered around a general strike that spread throughout the country. Strike leaders identified themselves as the National Front for Professionals. Along with some former politicians, they formed the leftist United National Front (UNF), which made contact with dissident army officers.

After several days of rioting that resulted in many deaths, Abbud dissolved the government and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. UNF leaders and army commanders who planned the transition from military to civilian rule selected a nonpolitical senior civil servant, Sirr Al-Khatim Al-Khalifa, as prime minister to head a transitional government.

The new civilian regime, which operated under the 1956 Transitional Constitution, tried to end political factionalism by establishing a coalition government. There was continued popular hostility to the reappearance of political parties, however, because of their divisiveness during the Abbud regime. Although the new government allowed all parties, including the SCP, to operate, only five of fifteen posts in Khatim’s cabinet went to party politicians. The prime minister gave two positions to nonparty southerners and the remaining eight to members of the National Front for Professionals, which included several communists.

Eventually two political parties emerged to represent the south. The Sudan African National Union (SANU), founded in 1963 and led by William Deng and Saturino Lahure, a Roman Catholic priest, operated among refugee groups and guerrilla forces. The Southern Front, a mass organization led by Stanislaus Payasama that had worked underground during the Abbud regime, functioned openly within the southern provinces. After the collapse of government-sponsored peace conferences in 1965, Deng’s wing of SANU–known locally as SANU-William–and the Southern Front coalesced to take part in the parliamentary elections. SANU remained active in parliament for the next four years as a voice for southern regional autonomy within a unified state. Exiled SANU leaders balked at Deng’s moderate approach and formed the Azania Liberation Front based in Kampala, Uganda.

Anyanya leaders remained aloof from political movements. The guerrillas were fragmented by ethnic and religious differences. Additionally, conflicts surfaced within Anyanya between older leaders who had been in the bush since 1955, and younger, better educated men like Joseph Lagu, a former Sudanese army captain, who eventually became a strong guerrilla leader, largely because of his ability to get arms from Israel.

The government scheduled national elections for March 1965 and announced that the new parliament’s task would be to prepare a new constitution. The deteriorating southern security situation prevented elections from being conducted in that region, however, and the political parties split on the question of whether elections should be held in the north as scheduled or postponed until the whole country could vote. The PDP and SCP, both fearful of losing votes, wanted to postpone the elections, as did southern elements loyal to Khartoum. Their opposition forced the government to resign. The president of the reinstated Supreme Commission, who had replaced Abbud as chief of state, directed that the elections be held wherever possible. The PDP rejected this decision and boycotted the elections.

The 1965 election results were inconclusive. Apart from a low voter turnout, there was a confusing overabundance of candidates on the ballots. As a result, few of those elected won a majority of the votes cast. The Umma captured 75 out of 158 parliamentary seats while its NUP ally took 52 of the remainder. The two parties formed a coalition cabinet in June headed by Umma leader Muhammad Ahmad Mahjub, whereas Azhari, the NUP leader, became the Supreme Commission’s permanent president and chief of state.

The Mahjub government had two goals: progress toward solving the southern problem and the removal of communists from positions of power. The army launched a major offensive to crush the rebellion and in the process augmented its reputation for brutality among the southerners. Many southerners reported government atrocities against civilians, especially at Juba and Wau. Sudanese army troops also burned churches and huts, closed schools, and destroyed crops and cattle. To achieve his second objective, Mahjub succeeded in having parliament approve a decree that abolished the SCP and deprived the eleven communists of their seats.

In October 1965, the Umma-NUP coalition collapsed because of a disagreement over whether Mahjub, as prime minister, or Azhari, as president, should conduct Sudan’s foreign relations. Mahjub continued in office for another eight months but resigned in July 1966 after a parliamentary vote of censure, which resulted in a split in the Umma. The traditional wing led by Mahjub, under the Imam Al Hadi al Mahjub’s spiritual leadership, opposed the party’s majority. The latter group professed loyalty to the Imam’s nephew, the younger Sadiq al Mahdi, who was the Umma’s official leader and who rejected religious sectarianism. Sadiq became prime minister with backing from his own Umma wing and from NUP allies.

The Sadiq al Mahdi government, supported by a sizable parliamentary majority, sought to reduce regional disparities by organizing economic development. Sadiq al Mahdi also planned to use his personal rapport with southern leaders to engineer a peace agreement with the insurgents. He proposed to replace the Supreme Commission with a president and a southern vice president and called for the approval of autonomy for the southern provinces.

The educated elite and segments of the army opposed Sadiq al Mahdi because of his gradualist approach to Sudan’s political, economic, and social problems. Leftist student organizations and the trade unions demanded the creation of a socialist state. Although these elements lacked widespread popular support, they represented an influential portion of educated public opinion. Their resentment of Sadiq increased when he refused to honor a Supreme Court ruling that overturned legislation banning the SCP and ousting communists elected to parliamentary seats. In December 1966, a coup attempt by communists and a small army unit against the government failed. The government subsequently arrested many communists and army personnel.

In March 1967, the government held elections in thirty-six constituencies in pacified southern areas. The Sadiq al Mahdi wing of the Umma won fifteen seats, the federalist SANU ten, and the NUP five. Despite this apparent boost in his support, however, Sadiq’s position in parliament had become tenuous because of concessions he promised to the south in order to bring an end to the civil war. The Umma traditionalist wing opposed Sadiq al Mahdi because of his support for constitutional guarantees of religious freedom and his refusal to declare Sudan an Islamic state. When the traditionalists and the NUP withdrew their support, his government fell. In May 1967, Mahjub became prime minister and head of a coalition government whose cabinet included members of his wing of the Umma, of the NUP, and of the PDP. In December 1967, the PDP and the NUP formed the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) under Azhari’s leadership.

By early 1968, widening divisions in the Umma threatened the survival of the Mahjub government. Sadiq al Mahdi‘s wing held a majority in parliament and could thwart any government action. Mahjub therefore dissolved parliament. However, Sadiq refused to recognize the legitimacy of the prime minister’s action. As a result, two governments functioned in Khartoum–one meeting in the parliament building and the other on its lawn–both of which claimed to represent the legislature’s will. The army commander requested clarification from the Supreme Court regarding which of them had authority to issue orders. The court backed Mahjub’s dissolution; the government scheduled new elections for April.

Although the DUP won 101 of 218 seats, no single party controlled a parliamentary majority. Thirty-six seats went to the Umma traditionalists, thirty to the Sadiq wing, and twenty-five to the two southern parties–SANU and the Southern Front. The SCP secretary general, Abd al Khaliq Mahjub, also won a seat. In a major setback, Sadiq lost his own seat to a traditionalist rival.

Because it lacked a majority, the DUP concluded an alliance with Umma traditionalists, who received the prime ministership for their leader, Muhammad Ahmad Mahjub, and four other cabinet posts. The coalition’s program included plans for government reorganization, closer ties with the Arab world, and renewed economic development efforts, particularly in the southern provinces. The Muhammad Ahmad Mahjub government also accepted military, technical, and economic aid from the Soviet Union. Sadiq al Mahdi’s wing of the Umma formed the small parliamentary opposition. When it refused to participate in efforts to complete the draft constitution, already ten years overdue, the government retaliated by closing the opposition’s newspaper and clamping down on pro-Sadiq demonstrations in Khartoum.

By late 1968, the two Umma wings agreed to support the Ansar chief Imam Al Hadi al Mahdi in the 1969 presidential election. At the same time, the DUP announced that Azhari also would seek the presidency. The communists and other leftists aligned themselves behind the presidential candidacy of former Chief Justice Babiker Awadallah, whom they viewed as an ally because he had ruled against the government when it attempted to outlaw the SCP.

History of Sudan (1986–2011)

In June 1986, Sadiq al Mahdi formed a coalition government with the Umma Party, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the National Islamic Front (NIF), and four southern parties. Unfortunately, however, Sadiq proved to be a weak leader and incapable of governing Sudan. Party factionalism, corruption, personal rivalries, scandals, and political instability characterized the Sadiq regime. After less than a year in office, Sadiq al Mahdi dismissed the government because it had failed to draft a new penal code to replace the sharia, reach an agreement with the IMF, end the civil war in the south, or devise a scheme to attract remittances from Sudanese expatriates. To retain the support of the DUP and the southern political parties, Sadiq formed another ineffective coalition government.

Second coalition

Instead of removing the ministers who had been associated with the failures of the first coalition government, Sadiq al Mahdi retained thirteen of them, of whom eleven kept their previous portfolios. As a result, many Sudanese rejected the second coalition government as being a replica of the first. To make matters worse, Sadiq and DUP leader Muhammad Uthman al Mirghani signed an inadequate memorandum of understanding that fixed the new government’s priorities as affirming the application of the sharia to Muslims, consolidating the Islamic banking system, and changing the national flag and national emblem. Furthermore, the memorandum directed the government to remove former leader Nimeiri‘s name from all institutions and dismiss all officials appointed by Nimeiri to serve in international and regional organizations. As expected, antigovernment elements criticized the memorandum for not mentioning the civil war, famine, or the country’s disintegrating social and economic conditions.

In August 1987, the DUP brought down the government because Sadiq al Mahdi opposed the appointment of a DUP member, Ahmad as Sayid, to the Supreme Commission. For the next nine months, Sadiq and Mirghani failed to agree on the composition of another coalition government. During this period, Sadiq moved closer to the NIF. However, the NIF refused to join a coalition government that included leftist elements. Moreover, Turabi indicated that the formation of a coalition government would depend on numerous factors, the most important of which were the resignation or dismissal of those serving in senior positions in the central and regional governments, the lifting of the state of emergency reimposed in July 1987, and the continuation of the Constituent Assembly.

Third coalition

Because of the endless debate over these issues, it was not until May 15, 1988, that a new coalition government emerged headed by Sadiq al Mahdi. Members of this coalition included the Umma, the DUP, the NIF, and some southern parties. As in the past, however, the coalition quickly disintegrated because of political bickering among its members. Major disagreements included the NIF’s demand that it be given the post of commissioner of Khartoum, the inability to establish criteria for the selection of regional governors, and the NIF’s opposition to the replacement of senior military officers and the chief of staff of the executive branch.

In November 1988, another more explosive political issue emerged when Mirghani and the SPLM signed an agreement in Addis Ababa that included provisions for a cease-fire, the freezing of the sharia, the lifting of the state of emergency, and the abolition of all foreign political and military pacts. The two sides also proposed to convene a constitutional conference to decide Sudan’s political future. The NIF opposed this agreement because of its stand on the sharia. When the government refused to support the agreement, the DUP withdrew from the coalition. Shortly thereafter armed forces commander in chief Lieutenant General Fathi Ahmad Ali presented an ultimatum, signed by 150 senior military officers, to Sadiq al Mahdi demanding that he make the coalition government more representative and that he announce terms for ending the civil war.

End of al Mahdi rule

On March 11, 1989, Sadiq al Mahdi responded to this pressure by dissolving the government. The new coalition had included the Umma, the DUP, and representatives of southern parties and the trade unions. The NIF refused to join the coalition because it was not committed to enforcing the sharia. Sadiq claimed his new government was committed to ending the southern civil war by implementing the November 1988 DUP-SPLM agreement. He also promised to mobilize government resources to bring food relief to famine areas, reduce the government’s international debt, and build a national political consensus.

Sadiq’s inability to live up to these promises eventually caused his downfall. On June 30, 1989, Colonel (later Lieutenant General) Umar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir overthrew Sadiq and established the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation to rule Sudan. Bashir’s commitment to imposing the sharia on the non-Muslim south and to seeking a military victory over the SPLA, however, seemed likely to keep the country divided for the foreseeable future and hamper resolution of the same problems faced by Sadiq al Mahdi. Moreover, the emergence of the NIF as a political force made compromise with the south more unlikely.

The Revolutionary Command Council dissolved itself in October 1993. Its powers were devolved to the President (al Bashir declared himself the President) and the Transitional National Assembly.

Conflict in the south, Darfur conflict and conflict with Chad

The civil war in the south has displaced more than 4 million southerners. Some fled into southern cities, such as Juba; others trekked as far north as Khartoum and even into Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Egypt, and other neighboring countries. These people were unable to grow food or earn money to feed themselves, and malnutrition and starvation became widespread. The lack of investment in the south resulted as well in what international humanitarian organizations call a “lost generation” who lack educational opportunities, access to basic health care services, and little prospects for productive employment in the small and weak economies of the south or the north.

In early 2003 a new rebellion of Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) groups in the western region of Darfur began. The rebels accused the central government of neglecting the Darfur region, although there is uncertainty regarding the objectives of the rebels and whether they merely seek an improved position for Darfur within Sudan or outright secession. Both the government and the rebels have been accused of atrocities in this war, although most of the blame has fallen on Arab militias (Janjaweed) allied with the government. The rebels have alleged that these militias have been engaging in ethnic cleansing in Darfur, and the fighting has displaced hundreds of thousands of people, many of them seeking refuge in neighboring Chad. There are various estimates on the number of human casualties, ranging from under twenty thousand to several hundred thousand dead, from either direct combat or starvation and disease inflicted by the conflict.

In 2004 Chad brokered negotiations in N’Djamena, leading to the April 8 Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement between the Sudanese government, the JEM, and the SLA. However, the conflict continued despite the ceasefire, and the African Union (AU) formed a Ceasefire Commission (CFC) to monitor its observance. In August 2004, the African Union sent 150 Rwandan troops in to protect the ceasefire monitors. It, however, soon became apparent that 150 troops would not be enough, so they were joined by 150 Nigerian troops.

On September 18, 2004 United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 1564 declaring that the government of Sudan had not met its commitments, expressing concern at helicopter attacks and assaults by the Janjaweed militia against villages in Darfur. It welcomed the intention of the African Union to enhance its monitoring mission in Darfur and urged all member states to support such efforts. During 2005 the African Union Mission in Sudan force was increased to about 7,000.

The Chadian-Sudanese conflict officially started on December 23, 2005, when the government of Chad declared a state of war with Sudan and called for the citizens of Chad to mobilize themselves against Rally for Democracy and Liberty (RDL) militants (Chadian rebels backed by the Sudanese government) and Sudanese militiamen who attacked villages and towns in eastern Chad, stealing cattle, murdering citizens, and burning houses.

Peace talks between the southern rebels and the government made substantial progress in 2003 and early 2004, although skirmishes in parts of the south have reportedly continued. The two sides have agreed that, following a final peace treaty, southern Sudan will enjoy autonomy for six years, and after the expiration of that period, the people of southern Sudan will be able to vote in a referendum on independence. Furthermore, oil revenues will be divided equally between the government and rebels during the six-year interim period. The ability or willingness of the government to fulfill these promises has been questioned by some observers, however, and the status of three central and eastern provinces was a point of contention in the negotiations. Some observers wondered whether hard line elements in the north would allow the treaty to proceed.

A final peace treaty was signed on 9 January 2005 in Nairobi. The terms of the peace treaty are as follows:

• The south will have autonomy for six years, followed by a referendum on secession.
• Both sides of the conflict will merge their armed forces into a 39,000-strong force after six years, if the secession referendum should turn out negative.
• Income from oilfields is to be shared evenly between north and south.
• Jobs are to be split according to varying ratios (central administration: 70 to 30, Abyei/Blue Nile State/Nuba mountains: 55 to 45, both in favour of the government).
• Islamic law is to remain in the north, while continued use of the sharia in the south is to be decided by the elected assembly.

On 31 August 2006, the United Nations Security Council approved Resolution 1706 to send a new peacekeeping force of 17,300 to Darfur. In the following months, however, UNMIS was not able to deploy to Darfur due to the Government of the Sudan’s steadfast opposition to a peacekeeping operation undertaken solely by the United Nations. The UN then embarked on an alternative, innovative approach to try to begin stabilize the region through the phased strengthening of AMIS, before transfer of authority to a joint African Union/United Nations peacekeeping operation. Following prolonged and intensive negotiations with the Government of the Sudan and significant international pressure, the Government of the Sudan finally accepted the peacekeeping operation in Darfur.

In 2009 the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for al-Bashir, accusing him of crimes against humanity and war crimes.

In 2009 and 2010 a series of conflicts between rival nomadic tribes in South Kordofan caused a large number of casualties and displaced thousands.

An agreement for the restoration of harmony between Chad and Sudan, signed January 15, 2010, marked the end of a five-year war between them.^[1]

The Sudanese government and the JEM signed a ceasefire agreement ending the Darfur conflict in February, 2010.

In January 2011 referendum on independence for Southern Sudan was held, and the South voted overwhelmingly to secede later that year as the Republic of South Sudan, with its capital at Juba and Kiir Mayardit as its first president. Al-Bashir announced that he accepted the result, but violence soon erupted in the disputed region of Abyei, claimed by both the North and the South.

On June 6, 2011 armed conflict broke out in South Kordofan between the forces of Northern and Southern Sudan, ahead of the scheduled independence of the South on July 9. This followed an agreement for both sides to withdraw from Abyei.On June, 20 the parties agreed to demilitarize the contested area of Abyei where Ethiopian peacekeepers will be deployed.^[2]

On July 9, 2011 South Sudan became an independent country.[3]

THE ADDIS ABABA AGREEMENT of 1972 Between Anya-Anya One and Government of the Sudan

THE ADDIS ABABA AGREEMENT ON THE PROBLEM OF SOUTH SUDAN

Draft Organic Law to organize Regional Self-Government in the Southern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan

In accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan and in realization of the memorable May Revolution Declaration of June 9, 1969, granting the Southern Provinces of the Sudan Regional Self-Government within a united socialist Sudan, and in accordance with the principle of the May Revolution that the Sudanese people participate actively in and supervise the decentralized system of the government of their country, it is hereunder enacted:

 

Article 1.

 

This law shall be called the law for Regional Self-Government in the Southern Provinces. It shall come into force and a date within a period not exceeding thirty days from the date of Addis Ababa Agreement.

Article 2.

 

This law shall be issued as an organic law which cannot be amended except by a three-quarters majority of the People’s National Assembly and confirmed by a two-thirds majority in a referendum held in the three Southern Provinces of the Sudan.

 

                               CHAPTER I: DEFINITIONS

Article 3.

a) ‘Constitution’ refers to the Republican Order No. 5 or any other basic law replacing or amending it.

b) ‘President’ means the president of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan.

c) ‘Southern Provinces of the Sudan’ means the Provinces of Bahr El Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile in accordance with their boundaries as they stood January 1, 1956, and other areas that were culturally and geographically a part of the Southern Complex as may be decided by a referendum.

‘People’s Regional Assembly” refers to the legislative body for the Southern Region of the Sudan.

‘High Executive Council’ refers to t he Executive council appointed by the President on the recommendation of the President of the High Executive Council and such body shall supervise the administration and direct public affairs in the Southern Region of the Sudan.

‘President of the High Executive Council’ refers the person appointed by the President on the recommendation of the People’s Regional Assembly to lead and supervise the executive organs responsible for the administration of the Southern Provinces.

‘People’s National Assembly’ refer to the National Legislative Assembly representing the people of the Sudan in accordance with the constitution.

‘Sudanese’ refers to any Sudanese citizens as defined by the Sudanese Nationality Act 1957 and any amendment thereof.

 

                                                                         

CHAPTER II

 

Article 4. The Provinces of Bahr El Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile as defined in Article 3. (iii) shall constitute a self-governing Region within the Democratic Republic of the Sudan and be known as the Southern Region.

Article 5. The Southern Region shall have legislative and executive organs, the functions and power of which are defined by this law.

Article 6. Arabic shall be official language for the Sudan and English the principle language for the Southern Region without prejudice to the use of any language or languages, which may serve a practical necessity for the efficient and expeditious discharge of executive and administrative functions of the Region.

 

                                                                          CHAPTER III

 

Article 7. Neither the People’s Regional Assembly nor the High Executive Council shall legislate or exercise any powers on matters of national nature which are:

National Defense

External Affairs

Currency and Coinage

Air and Inter-Regional Transport

Communications and Telecommunications

Customs and Foreign Trade except for border trade and certain commodities, which the Regional Government may specify with the approval of the Central Government.

Nationality and Immigration (Emigration)

Planning for Economic and Social Development

Educational Planning

Public-Audit.

 

                                                            CHAPTER IV

 

Article 8. Regional Legislation in the Southern Region is exercised by a People’s Regional Assembly elected by Sudanese Citizens resident in the Southern Region. The constitution and condition of membership of the Assembly shall be determined by law.

Article 9. Members of the People’s Regional Assembly shall be elected by direct secret ballot.

 

Article 10.

For the First Assembly the President may appoint additional members to the People’s Regional Assembly where conditions for elections are not conducive to such elections as stipulated in Article 9, provided that such appointed members shall not exceed one-quarter of the Assembly.

The People’s Regional Assembly shall regulate the conduct of its business in accordance with rules of procedures to be laid down by the said Assembly during it first sitting.

The People’s Regional Assembly shall elect one of its members as a speaker, provided that the first sitting shall be presided over by the Interim President of the High Executive Council.

 

Article 11. The People’s Regional Assembly shall legislate for the preservation of public order, interim security, efficient administration and the development of the Southern Region in cultural, economic and social fields and in particular in the following:

Promotion and utilization of Regional financial resources for the development and administration of the Southern Region.

Organization of the machinery for Regional and Local Administration.

Legislation on traditional law and custom within the framework of National Law.

Establishment, maintenance and administration of prisons and reformatory institutions.

Establishment, maintenance and administration of Public Schools at all levels in accordance with National Plans for education and economic and social development.

Promotion of local languages and cultures.

Town and village planning and the construction of roads in accordance with National Plans and programs

Promotion of trade; establishment of local industries and markets; issue of traders’ licenses and formation of co-operation societies.

Establishment, maintenance and administration of public hospitals.

Administration of environmental health services; maternity care; child welfare; supervision of markets; combat of epidemic diseases; training of medical assistants and rural midwives; establishment of health centers, dispensaries and dressing stations.

Promotion of animal health; control of epidemics and improvement of animal production and trade.

Promotion of tourism

Establishment of zoological gardens, museums, organizations of trade and cultural exhibitions.

Mining and quarrying without prejudice to the right of the Central Government in the event of the discovery of natural gas and minerals.

Recruitment for, organization and administration of Police and Prison services in accordance with the national policy and standards.

Land use in accordance with national laws.

Control and prevention of pests and plant diseases.

Development, utilization, and protection of forests crops and pastures in accordance with national laws.

Promotion and encouragement of self-help programmes.

All other matters delegated by the President or the People’s National Assembly for legislation.

 

Article 12. The People’s National Assembly may call for facts and information concerning the conduct of administration in the Southern Region.

 

Article 13.

The People’s Regional Assembly may, by a three-quarters majority and for specified reasons relating to public interest, request the President of relieve the President or any member of the High Executive Council from office. The President shall accede to such request.

in case of vacancy, relief or resignation of the President of the High Executive Council, the entire body shall be considered as having automatically resigned.

 

Article 14. The People’s Regional Assembly may, by a two-thirds majority, request the President to postpone the coming into force of any law which, in the view of the members, adversely affects the welfare and interests of the citizens of the Southern Region. The President may, if he thinks fit, accede to such request.

 

Article 15.

The People’s Regional Assembly may, by a majority of its members, request the President to withdraw any Bill presented to the People’s National Assembly which in their view affects adversely the welfare, rights or interests of the citizens in the Southern Region, pending communication of the views of the People’s Regional Assembly.

If the President accedes to such request, the People’s Regional Assembly shall present its views within 15 days from the date accession to the request.

The President accedes to such request, The People’s Regional Assembly together with his own observation if he deems necessary.

Article 16. The People’s National Assembly shall communicate all Bills and Acts of the People’s Regional Assembly for their information. The People’s Regional Assembly shall act similarly.

 

                                                   CHAPTER V: THE EXECUTIVE

 

Article 17. The Regional Executive Authority is vested in a High Executive Council which acts on behalf of the President.

Article 18. The High Executive Council shall specify the duties of the various departments in the Southern Region provided that on matters relating to Central Government Agencies it shall act with approval of the President.

Article 19. The President of the High Executive council shall be appointed and relieved of office by the President on the recommendation of the People’s Regional Assembly.

Article 20. The High Executive Council shall be composed of members appointed and relieved of office by the President on the recommendation of the President of the High Executive Council

Article 21. The President of the High Executive Council and its members are responsible to the President and to the People’s Regional Assembly for efficient administration in the Southern Region. They shall take an oath of office before the President.

Article 22. The President and members of the High Executive Council may attend meetings of the People’s Regional Assembly and participate in its deliberations without the right of vote, unless they are also members of the People’s Regional Assembly.

 

CHAPTER VI

 

Article 23. The president shall form time to time regulate the relationship between the high Executive Council and the central ministries.

Article 24. The High Executive Council may initiate laws for the creation of a Regional Public Service. These laws shall specify the terms and conditions of service for the Regional Public Service.

 

                                                                 CHAPTER VII: FINANCE

 

Article 25. The People’s Regional Assembly may levy Regional duties and taxes in addition to National and Local duties and taxes. It may issue legislation and orders to guarantee the collection of all public monies at different levels.

(One) The source of revenue of the Southern Region shall consist of the following:-

Direct and indirect regional taxes.

Contribution from People’s Local Government Councils

Revenue from commercial, industrial and agricultural projects in the Region in accordance with the National Plan.

Funds from the National Treasury for established services.

Funds voted by the people’s National Assembly in accordance with the requirements of the Region.

The Special Development Budget for the South as presented by the People’s Regional Assembly for the acceleration of economic and social advancement of the Southern Region as envisaged in the declaration of June 9, 1968.

 

CHAPTER VIII: OTHER PROVISIONS

 

Article 26. Citizens of the Southern Region shall constitute a sizeable proportion of the People’s Armed Forces in such reasonable numbers as will correspond to the population of the region.

the use of the People’s Armed Forces within the Region and outside the framework of national defense shall be controlled by the President of the advice of the President of the High Executive Council

Temporary arrangements for the composition of units of the People’s Armed Forces in the Southern Region are provided for in the Protocol on Interim Arrangements.

 

Article 27. The President may veto any Bill which he deems contrary to the Provisions of the National Constitution provided the People’s Regional Assembly, after receiving the President’s views, may reintroduce the Bill.

 

Article 28. The President and members of the High Executive Council may initiate laws in the People’s Regional Assembly.

 

Article 29. Any member of the People’s Regional Assembly may initiate any law provided that financial Bills shall not be presented without sufficient notice tot he President of the High Executive Council.

 

Article 30. The People’s Regional Assembly shall strive to consolidate the unity of the Sudan and respect the spirit of the National Constitution.

 

Article 31. All citizens are guaranteed freedom of movement in and out of the Southern Region, provided restriction or prohibition of movement may be imposed on a named citizen solely on grounds of public health and order.

 

Article 32.a) All citizens resident in the Southern Region are guaranteed equal opportunity of education, employment, commerce and the practice of any profession.

No law adversely affect the rights of citizens enumerated in the previous item on the basis of race, tribal origin, religion, place of birth, or sex.

 

Article 33. Juba shall be the Capital of the Southern Region and the seat of the Regional Executive and Legislature.

 

APPENDIX A: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS

 

The following should be guaranteed by the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan.

 

A citizen should not be deprived of his citizenship

Equality of citizens.

a) All citizens, without distinction based on race, national origin, birth, language, sec, economic or social status, should have equal rights and duties before the law.

All persons should be equal before the courts of law and should have the rights to institute legal proceedings in order to remove any injustice or declare any right in an open court without delay prejudicing their interest.

Personal liberty.

a) Penal liability should be personal. Any kind of collective punishment should be prohibited.

The accused should be presumed innocent until proved guilty.

Retrospective penal legislation and punishment should be prohibited.

The right of the accused to defend himself personally or through an agent should be guaranteed.

No person should be arrested, detained or imprisoned except in accordance with the due process of law, and no person should remain in custody or detention for more than twenty-four hours without judicial order.

No accused person should be subjected to inducement, intimidation of torture in order to extract evidence from him whether in his favor or against him or against any other person, and no humiliating punishment should be inflicted on any convicted person.

Freedom of Religion and Conscience.

Every person should enjoy freedom of religious opinion and of conscience and the right to profess them publicly and privately and to establish religious institutions subject to reasonable limitations in favor of morality, health or public order as prescribed by law.

Parents and Guardians should be guaranteed the right to educate their children and those under their care in accordance with the relation of their choice.

Protection of Labor.

i) Forced and compulsory labor of any kind should be prohibited except when ordered for military or civil necessity or pursuant to penal punishment prescribed by law.

ii) The right to equal pay for equal work should be guaranteed.

Freedom of minority to use their languages and develop their culture should be guaranteed.

 

APPENDIX B: DRAFT ORDINANCE ON ITEMS OR REVENUE AND GRANTS-IN-AID FOR THE SOUTHERN REGION

 

Profits accruing to the Central Government as a result of exporting products of the Southern Region.

Business Profit Tax of the Southern Region that are at present in the Central list of the Ministry of Treasury.

Excise Duties on alcoholic beverages and spirits consumed in the Southern Region.

Profits on sugar consumed in Southern Region.

Royalties of forest products of the Southern Region.

Royalties on leaf Tobacco and Cigarettes.

Taxation on property other than that provided in the Rates Ordinance.

Taxes and Rates on Central and Local Government Projects (5 percent of net profits of factories, co-operative societies, agricultural enterprises and cinemas).

Revenue accruing from Central Government activities in the Southern Region provided the Region shall bear maintenance expenses e.g., Post Office revenue, land sales, sale of forms and documents, stamp duties and any other item to e specified from time to time.

Licenses other than those provided for in the People’s Local Government Act, 1971.

Special Development Tax to be paid by Residents in the Southern Region the rate of which should be decided by the People’s Regional Assembly.

Income Tax collected from officials and employees serving in the Southern Region both in the local and national civil services as well as in the Army, Police and Prisons, Judiciary, and Political Establishment.

Corporation Tax on any factory and/or agricultural project established in the Region but not run by the Regional Government (5 percent of the initial cost).

Contribution from the Central Government for the encouragement of construction and development; for every agricultural project, industrial project and trading enterprise (20 percent of the initial cost as assessed by the Central Government).

New Social Service Projects to be established by the Region or any of its Local Government units, and for which funds are allocated, shall receive grants from the National Treasury in the following manner:

Education institution, 20 percent of expenses.

Trunk and through Roads and Bridges, 25 per cent of expenses.

Relief and Social amenities, 15 percent of expenses.

Tourist attraction projects 25 percent of expenses.

Security, 15 percent of expenses.

Grants for Post Secondary and University education within the Sudan, 20 percent of grants, outside the Sudan 30 percent of grants.

Contribution for Research, Scientific Advancement, and Cultural Activities, 25 percent of expenses.

 

AGREEMENT OF THE CEASE-FIRE IN THE SOUTHERN REGION

 

Article 1. This Agreement shall come into force on the date and time specified for the ratification of the Addis Ababa Agreement.

Article 2. There will be an end to all military operations and to all armed actions in the Southern Region from the time of cease-fire.

Article 3. All combat forces shall remain in the area under their control at the time of the cease-fire.

Article 4. Both parties agree to forbid any individual or collective acts of violence.

Any underground activities contrary to public order shall cease.

Article 5. Movements of individual members of both combat forces outside the areas under their control shall be allowed only if these individuals are unarmed and authorized by their respective authorities. The plans for stationing troops from the National Army shall be such as to avoid any contact between them and the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement combat forces.

Article 6. A joint Commission is hereby created for the implementation of all questions related to the cease-fire including repatriation of refugees. The Joint Commission shall include members from all the countries bordering on the Southern Region as well as representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross, World Council of Churches, all Africa Conference of Churches and United Nations High Commissioner for Refuges.

Article 7. The joint Commission shall propose all measures to be undertaken by both parties in dealing with all incidents after a full inquiry on the spot.

Article 8. Each party shall be represented on the Joint Commission by one senior military officer and maximum of five other members.

Article 9. The headquarters of the Joint Commission shall be located in Juba with provincial branches in Juba, Malakal and Wau.

Article 10. The Joint Commission shall appoint local commission in various centers of the Southern Region composed of two members from each party.

 

PROTOCOLS ON INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS

 

CHAPTER 1: INTERIM ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS

 

(Political, Local Government and Civil Service)

 

Article 1. The President of the Democratic Republic of Sudan shall, in consultation with the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (S.S.L.M) and branches of the Sudanese Socialist Union in the Southern Region, appoint the president and members of an Interim High Executive Council.

Article 2. The Interim High Executive Council shall consist of the President and other members with portfolios in:

 

1 Finance and Economic Planning.

2 Education

3 Information, Culture and Tourism

4 Communication and Transport

5 Agriculture, Animal Production and Fisheries.

6 Public Health.

7 Regional Administration (Local Government, Legal Affairs, Police and Prisons).

8 Housing, Public Works and Utilities

9 Natural Resources and Rural Development (Land Use, Rural Water Supply, Forestry and Cooperatives).

10 Public Service and Labor

11 Minerals and Industry, Trade and Supply.

Article 3. The interim High Executive Council shall, in accordance with national laws, establish a Regional Civil Service subject to ratification by the People’s Regional Assembly.

Article 4. The President shall, in consultation with the Interim High Executive Council determine the date for the election to the People’s Regional Assembly, and the Interim High Executive Council shall make arrangements for the setting up of this Assembly.

Article 5. In order to facilitate the placement in and appointment to both central and regional institutions, the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement shall compile and communicate lists of citizens of the Southern Region outside of the Sudan in accordance with details to be supplied by the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform.

Article 6. The Interim High Executive Council and the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform shall undertake to provide necessary financial allocations with effect from the 192\72-73 Budget for such placements and appointments.

Article 7. The Mandate of the Interim High Executive Council shall not exceed a period of 18 months.

  

CHAPTER II: TEMPORARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE COMPOSITION OF UNITS OF THE PEOPLE’S ARMED FORCES IN THE SOUTHERN REGION.

 

Article 1. These arrangements shall remain in force for a period of five years subject to revision by the President of the request of the President of the High Executive Council acting with the consent of the People’s Regional Assembly.

 

Article 2. The People’s Armed Forces in the Southern Region shall consist of a national force called the Southern Command composed of 12,000 officers and men of whom 6,000 shall be citizens from the Region and the other 6,000 from outside the Region.

 

Article 3. The recruitment and integration of citizens from the Southern Region within the aforementioned Forces shall be determined by a Joint Military Commission taking into account the need for initial separate deployment of troops with a view to achieve smooth integration in the national force. The commission shall ensure that this deployment shall be such that an atmosphere of peace and confidence shall prevail in the Southern Region.

 

Article 4. The joint Military Commission shall be composed of three senior military officers from each side. Decision of the Joint Military Commission shall be taken unanimously. In case of disagreement such matters shall be referred to the respective authorities.

CHAPTER III: AMNESTY AND JUDICIAL ARRANGEMENTS

 

Article 1. No action or other legal proceedings whatsoever, civil or criminal, shall be instituted against any person in any court of law for or on account of any act or matter done inside or outside the Sudan as from the 18^th day of August 1995, if such act or matter was done in connection with mutiny, rebellion or sedition in the Southern Region.

 

Article 2. If a civil suit in relation to any acts or matters referred to in Article 1 is instituted before or after the date of ratification of the Addis Ababa Agreement such a suit shall be discharged and made null and void.

 

Article 3. All persons serving terms of imprisonment or held in detention in respect of offences herein before specified in Article 1 shall be discharged of released within 15 days for the date of ratification of the Addis Ababa Agreement.

 

Article 4. The joint Cease-fire Commission shall keep a register of all civilian returnees, which register shall serve to certify that the person therein named are considered indemnified within the meaning of this Agreement provided that the commission may delegate such power to the Sudan in the case of citizens from the Southern Region living abroad and to whom the provisions of this Agreement apply.

 

Article 5. In the case of armed returnees or those belonging to combat forces the Joint Military Commission shall keep a similar register of those persons who shall be treated in the same manner as provided for in Article 4.

Article 6. Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 4 and 5 above a Special Tribunal with ad hoc judicial powers shall be established to examine and decide on those cases which in the estimation of the authorities do not meet the conditions for amnesty specified in Article 1 of this Agreement. The Special Tribunal shall be composed of a President appointed by the President of the Republic and not more than four members named by the Cease-fire Commission.

 

Article 7. Cases referred to in Article 6 shall be brought to the attention of the Special Tribunal by request of the Minister of Justice.

 

Article 8. The Amnesty Provision contained in this Agreement as well as the powers of Special Tribunal shall remain in force until such time as the President after consultation with the commissions referred to in this

 

Article 9. Although resettlement and rehabilitation of refugees and displaced persons is administratively the responsibility of the Regional Government the present conditions in the Southern Region dictate that efforts of the whole nation of the Sudan and International organizations should be pooled to help and rehabilitate persons affected by the conflict. The Relief and Resettlement Commission shall co-ordinate activities and resources of the Organization within the country.

 

Article 10. The first priority shall be the resettlement of displaced persons within the Sudan in the following order:

1 Persons presently residing in overcrowded centers in the Southern Region, and persons desirous to return to their original areas and homes;

 

2 Persons returning from the bush including Anayanya Supporters;

3 Handicapped persons and orphans

 

Article 11. The second priority shall be given to returnees from the neighboring and other countries according to an agreed plan. This plan shall provide for:

1 Adequate reception centers with facilities for shelter, food supplies, medicine and medicaments;

2 Transportation to permanent resettlement villages or places of origin.

3 Materials and equipment.

 

                       Article 12. The Relief and Resettlement Commission shall:

1 Appeal to international organizations and voluntary agencies to continue assistance for students already under their support particularly for students in secondary schools and higher institutions until appropriate arrangements are made for their repartition;

2 Compile adequate information on students and persons in need of financial support from the Sudan Government.

 

Article 13. The Relief and Resettlement Commission shall arrange for the education of all returnees who were attending primary schools.

This agreement is hereby concluded on this twenty-seventh day of the month of February in the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy two, A.D, in this city Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan on the one hand and the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement on the other. It shall come into force on the date and hour fixed for its ratification by the President of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan and the Leader of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement. It shall be ratified by the said by two Leaders in person or through their respective authorized Representatives, in this city, Addis Ababa Ethiopia, at the twelfth hour at noon, on the twelfth day of the month of March, in the year on thousand nine hundred and seventy two, A.D.

In witness whereof, we the Representatives of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan and the Representatives of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement hereby append our signatures in the presence of the Representative of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia and the Representatives of the World Council of Churches, the All Africa Conference of Churches, and the Sudan Council of Churches.

 

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN

 

Abel Alier-Wal Kuai, Vice President and Minister of State for Southern Affairs.

Dr. Mansour Khalid, Minister for foreign Affairs.

Dr. Gaafar Mohammed Ali Bakheit, Minister for Local Government

Major-General Mohammed Al Baghir Ahmed, Minister of Interior.

Abel Rahman Abdalla, Minister of Public Service and Administrative Reform.

Brigadier Mirghani Suleiman

Colonel Kamal Abashar.

 

FOR THE SOUTHERN SUDAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT

 

Ezboni Mondiri Gwonza, Leader of the Delegation.

Dr. Lawrence Wol Wol, Secretary of the Delegation. Mading deGarang, Spokesman of the Delegation.

Colonel Frederick Brian Maggot, Special Military Representative.

Oliver Batali Albino, Member.

Anelo Voga Morjan, Member.

Rev. Paul Puot, Member.

Job Adier de Jok, Member.

 

Witnesses

 

Nabiyelul Kifle, Representative of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia.

Leopolda J. Niilus, Representative of the World Council of Churches.

Kodwo E. Akrah, Representative of the World Council of Churches.

Burgess Carr, General Secretary All Africa Council of Churches.

Samuel Athi Bwogo, Representative of the Sudan Council of Churches.

Attestation

Dr. John Garang’s 1987 Heritage Interview with Arop Madut

(Heritage) – Khartoum, Monday, Nov., 2, 1987, (PAGE 4)

Colonel Dr. John Garang Speaks To Heritage On (War and Peace in the Sudan)–
1.

Last year Heritage interviewed leading personalities at home and abroad. The interview was a part of the paper’s contribution to the present search for peace in the country.
First Heritage interviewed Comrade Mengistu Haile Mariam in Addis Ababa in December last year. Comrade Mengistu generously offered his views on the subject of peace and how it could be achieved. His was followed by Prime Minister Sadiq el Mahdi, who also gave his views about the subject, last April.
Then early last month our Editor Arop Madut who conducted the interviews with the two leaders, flew down to Nairobi where he had the chance to talk to the SPLM/SPLA leader, Col. Dr. John Garang de Mabior. Below is the full text of the interview. The rest will be serialised in the subsequent issues:

Arop Madut:

Q: 1 From what one has learned so far so you were not satisfied with the terms of the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 on the South:: yet you accepted to be absorbed into the Sudan Army. Your brief comment:

DR JOHN GARANG:

A: It is true that I was not satisfied with the terms of the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972. It’s also true that I was absorbed into the Sudan National Army when the agreement was implemented. Not only was I dissatisfied with the Addis Ababa Agreement on the Southern Sudan, I was not satisfied with the objectives and the aims of the Anya Nya as a movement. This was because the Anya Nya at that time stood for the secession of southern Sudan to form a separate sovereign state. Before I joined the Anya Nya Movement, I went to the camp of General Joseph Lagu, the Commander of the Anya Nya to brief me about the objectives of his movement. From his briefings it was clear that his Movement was a separatist movement. I told him point blank that I was opposed to secession movements. I left in disappointment. I decided to go and continue with my graduate studies. After reconsidering my position after six months, I decided to join the Anya Nya Movement despite my disagreement !
with its objectives. These objectives, I thought, could not be changed unless one did participate in the movement itself. So as a matter of principle, I joined the Anya Nya with a view of making fundamental changes in its aims and objectives. I have, needless to say, been on record as early as 1970 about the terms of the unity of the country, which should therefore be on new basis. Our plans to make new changes in the Anya Nya movement were pre-empted by the Addis Ababa Agreement that ended the 17 years war that has been ranging in Southern Sudan since 1955. Our work to transform the Anya Nya Movement from a reactionary to a genuine revolutionary movement was thereby brought to a halt. Meanwhile the agreement was accepted by Southerners because jobs were given. The ruling clique in Khartoum had then realized that what the Janubiin (Southerners) wanted were jobs. So why not give them jobs? Joseph Lagu was therefore taken into the National Army as a Major General, Abel Alier as a Minister and I was absorbed into the Sudan Army.

Q: 2 Can you enlighten us as to why you were opposed to the Addis Ababa Agreement before you could see it operational?
A: We were opposed to the terms of the Addis Agreement because its basic terms and the basis for the Agreement were first to absorb the Anya Nya into the National Army, second to integrate it after absorption and third to destroy it. So you have a process were the main aim was to achieve a cheap victory over the Anya Nya forces. In brief the concrete basis for the Addis Ababa Agreement was to disarm the Anya Nya forces that had proved formidable in the battlefield through peace. All the other coding; vis-à-vis the regional self-government Act, the ministerial posts and all things connected with the local autonomy were only peripheral. The main objective to be exact was to pull out the armed component of the Anya Nya Movement, to neutralise it and finally destroy it.

Q: 3 Since you said all the Anya Nya officers were aware about the harm and the strategic plans of the Sudan govt. in regard to the future of the Movement, why did you accept to be absorbed into the Sudan National Army?
A: We tried to oppose it but our voices were few and we realised that it was not going to be successful and opportune because the masses of the people in the south of Sudan were not prepared to support our move at that time to continue with the war. So we made the analysis of the situation. Late Brigadier Emmanuel Abur, Lewa (Major General) Joseph Kuol Amum – now with us, myself and many young officers, sat down, analysed the situation and decided to oppose the Agreement. After the meeting we circulated a document to that effect. It was sent to all the Anya Nya major camps in Bahr El Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile Provinces. That Document should now be with the Sudan Military Intelligence office in Khartoum. As part of your journalistic research, you can try to find it. However, that document was betrayed by someone we use to call Giant (Saturnino). This man surrendered it to General Joseph Lagu in Juba and one of our officers Kamilo was arrested in Lobone. Gen. Lagu gave this document to the Military Intelligence Branch and I believe it is still in their file in Khartoum. This was we thought, going to be a futile opposition because the South, the springboard of our opposition was not prepared to back us. Many southern people were prepared for jobs than the continuation with the war. The priority was rather who would get what jobs. Who would get PS, who would get a group VII, who would be a director, who would be a Minister. On our side in the Anya Nya Armed Forces, we were struggling for ranks. The atmosphere was therefore not conducive for the continuation with the war. We recognised that people wanted peace not another war. Any popular struggle, naturally must involve the people. So seeing that the people were not ready for the continuation of the war we thought it would be futile to fight on. We thus suspended our activities, and knowing the character of the Agreement we accepted to be absorbed into the national army. Of course we were aware that the contradictions and the conflicts.

Q: 4 Many people have been led to believe that the reasons that led to the rise of the SPLA/M was the division of the South into mini-regions and the subsequent introduction of the Islamic Sharia Laws in 1983. Would you agree with this assessment?
A: I would not agree with this assessment and you would definitely agree with me that it was not the ‘Kokora’ or the division of the South into small regions or the introduction of the Islamic Sharia laws that led to the rise of the SPLA/SPLM. Of course these factors did have some bearing on the said situation. What actually triggered off the rebellion was, not these issues. We went to the bush before the South was divided. Although the discussion about the division of the South had been going on for a long time the South was divided in May while the Sharia Law was introduced in September. To be fair, what triggered off the rebellion was the plan to transfer the absorbed Nya Nya forces to the North and thereby integrating them all over the Sudanese armed forces where they would become individuals there and there thus eventually; through old age, premature pension, death and dismissals, the phenomenon of the Anya Nya force within the Sudanese army would disappear. This, in reality, was the main objective of Addis Ababa. This was why we precisely opposed the terms of the Addis Ababa Agreement. I had predicted it, and was proved right.

Q: 5 Do we understand that you were during your absence from the country in constant touch with those whom you believe would help you launch a revolutionary movement?
A: Definitely we were in frequent contact with each other. We were not only in contacts, we were active. We were even engaged in sabotage activities in places like Wau, Malakal and other places. We were active during the ten years between 1972-1982 planning to launch the Peoples Revolution.

Q: 6 Many people have been made to believe that the war you are waging in the South against the Khartoum govt. has been imposed on you by certain circumstances. Would you agree to this statement?
A: It depends on the connotation of war being imposed on me, or the SPLA. Essentially the war was not imposed on me but on the Sudanese people by certain circumstances. It has not been imposed on me as an individual. As an individual I cannot afford to fight the Sudan Government or the Sudan Army. There should be objective conditions that can make a people angry to force them fight a war.

Q: 7 What I meant by the war being imposed on you is that, you were on annual leave in Bor town when the battalion 105 mutiny took place that you took over when the commander of the rebel garrison Major Kerubino was wounded. In other words many people believe that you did not plan this war, you were just dragged into it.
A: It is not true that the war was imposed on me by the circumstances you have just described. This is what some people say to explain their arguments. It may be the timing to start the movement that might have been imposed on me by the said circumstances. For your information, the Bor incident of May 1983 was not a mutiny by Battalion 105 as it is being claimed in certain quarters. We have been planning to start this movement and Bor was not our primary target. Our plan was to move onto Juba, Capture it and make it our springboard to launch the movement. If the movement had started in Bor it was because Major General Siddiq Al Banna, the then commander of the Southern Command who wanted to pre-empt our move struck first. In reality, our plan to launch the present movement started in February 1983. At that time Comrade Chagai who is now our commander in Bil Pam and who was our runner came to Khartoum in February for consultation concerning our plan. On his arrival, we discussed the possibility and plans for me to come to Malakal in order to coordinate our activities. And because Salva Kiir was an intelligence Officer in Malakal, it was therefore possible for us to coordinate our activities.
After we had discussed our plans, Chagai returned to Malakal. On his arrival to Malakal, Salva Kiir sent an urgent telegram urging me to come to Malakal to attend the sickness of my brother whom he said was extremely sick. He said my presence in Malakal was a must. I took a seven-day leave to attend my brother’s sickness. Of course I did not have a brother in Malakal let alone the fact that he was sick. So I came to Malakal with William Abdalla Chuol, a member of our organization, and who had been living with me for three weeks, in my house at Haj Yousif in Khartoum. After several meetings in Malakal, we decided to send William Abdalla Chuol to Gordon Kong of the Anya Nya Two at Bill Pam so as to put all his forces on full alert for the impending assault on Juba in August 1983. Having coordinated our plans, I went back to Khartoum. Our plan was, that the Anya Nya Two forces were to assemble in Pachala and Waat areas. William Nyuon our present Chief of Staff was to command Waat and Kerubino Kuanyin to command Bor. The operation was to be launched from Bor, with the forces in Pibor Pachala, Akobo and Waat giving support. We thought that if the assault on Juba failed we would have, at least, had some base to continue with the movement. In May, Chagai came back to Khartoum with the information that the situation was deteriorating fast and that the assault on Juba planned for August was not going to be possible. So I took annual leave in order to go to Juba in order to see the exact situation. If the situation, in my assessment was not going to reach August, I would therefore proceed to Kapoeta to make sure that the Battalion 117, one of our strong support units support our move. Of course, in order to attack Juba we would need uprising in our garrisons, which were being transferred to the North. We knew of course that Battalions 117 in Kapoeta and 111 at Rumbek would be ready to join us. As for battalion 110 in Aweil, we could not count very much on it because most of the soldiers from this unit.
On my arrival to Juba I found that the situation was tense. There was the question of money for the soldiers, which was reported to have triggered off the rebellion in Bor, Pibor, Pachala and Akobo. This issue kept the people moving between Bor and Juba in effort to diffuse the situation. In my assessment, the situation had already reached a point where it could no longer be diffused. The attack on Bor was in fact imminent. I had sent my family ahead with instructions to proceed to Bor and that I would follow later. When I reached Juba on the 9th of May I put up with Peter Cirillo, who was Deputy to Siddiq el Banna, Commander of the Southern Command, “of course, when you are planning illegal or under-ground activities it is always best to be close to the Authority. So in Khartoum I was very close to Generals Yousif Ahmed Yousif and Sowar el Dahab. I was also very close to General Abu Kadok, the army top brass. We used to have dinners together. My calculation was that if there were intelligent reports about my activities, their reaction would be ……. “John waled kues wa mamumkin Yamoul Hajat zeeda…” John is a good boy, and it is not possible for him to do things like this. As I said before I put up with Peter Cyrillo the present Governor of Equatoria. I would dress up every morning and go to the office with him.
On the 12th of May, I went to the office of General Siddiq al Banna. On seeing me he said “John when did you come to Juba” “three days ago I replied. “What do you want here and where are you going to? (“Mashi Fi Eijaza syiatak’) I am going on leave sir,” I replied. He said, “Inta fi Eijaza….Inta men ayi mahal?” Are you on leave and where do you come from?” “From Bor,” I answered. I could see his face suddenly changed. John if I were you, I would not go to Bor. Why sir, I am an officer on leave and Bor is my home. I have officially been given leave by the General Headquarters, Khartoum. Moreover I have my agriculture project in Bor which I intend to organise”. I explained. He said, “If I were you John, I would not go to Bor. To be frank with you John, General Al Banna continued. Those of Kerubino have rebelled and as far as the Sudanese Army is concerned, Bor, Pachala and Pibor are no longer part of the Sudanese Army… They are rebels. If you go there and if they don’t kill you it means that you are with them.” I am very happy with your advice Sir. But what you have told me has made it very necessary for me to go to Bor. “Why”? He asked. “I have sent my family to Bor four days ago. My family came ahead of me and are in Bo,” I replied. So, with your permission, Sir, If I leave tomorrow for Bor, go and collect my family and come back the following day, will that be acceptable to you Sir? If you stick to that programme, if you go tomorrow and come back the next day, there will be no problem.

So, I said “thank you very much syiatak. You are really a senior officer. This is an advice a senior officer like you can give to his junior officers.” “But syiatak.” I continued. “I am happy because I am a senior officer in the Sudanese Army. I am also the Deputy Director of the Military Research Unit. If there is something of that nature, I should have not been given my leave in the first place. In the second place, I should have been briefed in Khartoum. I don’t blame you anyway but those of Khartoum who gave me leave without briefing me and allowed me to go to Bor where there are military operations. This is unbecoming. But nevertheless you have saved the situation ‘Syiatak’. That is why it is always necessary to have a good commander. You have briefed me about the situation in Bor. I will go to collect my family tomorrow. Thank you syiatak”. I gave him a salute and left the office.
Siddiq Al Banna might have been a big fool. He knew the exact situation. As a veteran soldier, he should have not allowed me to go to Bor. However, I left for Bor the following day. It was on the 13th of May when I reached Bor. On the 14th Salva Kiir Mayardit, one of our co-ordinators in Malakal sent us an urgent message. The message stated that Bor would be attacked within the next 48 hours. That the Buffalo-planes were transporting troops to Akobo. That troops were being massed in Akobo in order to attack Pibor and Pachala. That Bor would be attacked from Juba. From this message, we knew that the attack was coming and made preparations for it. We made the home of Dr. Lueth as an assembly place for discussing war plans. There was a Sudan Army company under a major at Langbar, north of Bor and the Battalion 105 at Malual-chaal south of Bor under Kerubino.
So we made a brief meeting about how to proceed with the war. I told Kerubino that since I was on leave I would go to Langbar to tie down the company there. I told him that if we were attacked from the rear at Langbar and attacked from Juba would be a disaster since it would dislodge us altogether.
So on May 14, I went to Langbar as planned, to be around as a senior officer. Abel Alier was there. And in order to make friends with the Commander at Langbar, we used to play cards with him and other officers. So on the morning of May 16, at 5 am the attack came from Juba as expected. I then sent Kerubino to command the troops of Battalion 105 and went to Langbar to save the situation from being attacked from the rear. At one time the Radio communication set of the attacking forces from Juba went off the air. So the commander of Langbar was ordered to send a force to Bor to see what was going on there. He gave me the message and asked me what he could do.
As a senior officer, I said, I advise that you do nothing. Because, I continued, “You are a company and if you send a platoon you would be left with only two platoons, and if the rebels come here they will over-run your camp. Moreover you have Sayed Abel Alier here. You have the white men of the Jonglei Projects and those of the De groot here. These are your responsibilities. What had happen to the Radio we do not know. But it could be some technical fault”. I assured him. “So let us sit and wait for two to three hours. There may come an answer from Juba informing us that they are on the air again”. So he listened to my advice and did not send any force. After three hours the reply came asking him not to send any force because the Radio set was on the air again. That was one occasion.
The second occasion, was when Kerubino was shot in the arm and was taken to Bor Hospital. The commander of Langbar received another message from the attacking forces that Kerubino was shot. The message ordered him to prepare a force to go to the Hospital. He gave me the message. I told him not to go to the Hospital because, I said, the people in Juba might not know what might be going on in Bor theatre of operations. I told him that Kerubino might have not come to the Hospital alone, may be with more than a company being aware that you have only a company here. He might have come with two companies. If he has a company you need three companies to attack him because the rebels are in a better position. They are better prepared and ready to repulse an attack on them than we are”. So I asked him to leave anything to me. I told him that I would diffuse the situation because I had been the commander of Battalion 105 before. I told him that, as their former commander, most of the rebels knew me and that they would not harm me if I go to them. I told him that I would go to the Hospital and if Kerubino was wounded and in the Hospital, if he was there, I would come back and give him the answer. I assured him that I would come back to decide what kind of action to take. He was happy!!!
So I went to the Hospital. We took Kerubino and sent him across the river. I then returned to Langbar and told the Company Commander that Kerubino was taken to the Hospital and that he should send the message to Juba that Kerubino was brought to the Hospital, treated and had been taken away by the rebels. He immediately sent the message. So from what I have just told you, you could see that the claim that the war was imposed on me by circumstances is not true. We have been planning since 1970s to launch this movement.

Heritage, Khartoum. Monday 9, Nov., 1987, pp4.

Q: 8 Can you brief us as to what at the onset led to the split in the SPLM, which gave birth to the Anya Nya II organization? What actually went wrog? How are you trying to resolve it?
A: This is another great misunderstanding that there was a split in the SPLM/SPLA movement that gave birth to Anya Nya Two organization. This is not true. These are two different organizations with totally different aims and objectives. Anya Nya Two started as a result of the Akobo mutiny in 1975 led by Lt. Vincent Kwany, in which Colonel Abel Chol was killed. The Akobo mutineers then organized themselves into Anya Nya Two whose aim was to revive the Anya Nya One Movement disbanded in 1972 following the Addis Ababa Agreement. The Anya Nya Two at that time was supported by Libya and Bil Pam was their guerrilla camp before we came.
When I was at the General Headquarters in Khartoum, we used to be briefed about Bil Pam. The reports we had is that Gordon Koang had 7,000 strong, that Yagoub Ismail was with several thousand men at arms and Abdalla Zakaria had many thousands…. So you can see the Anya Nya Two was already an existing movement before the birth of the SPLA. There is no question, therefore, of the split in the SPLM that gave birth to the rise of the Anya Nya Two Movement. In short, the Anya Nya Two Movement was formed eight years before the SPLA came into existence. The objective of the Anya Nya Two from the onset of its inception was again for the separation of the Southern Sudan from the rest of the country.
So when we came in 1983 we organized the SPLM/SPLA. The Anya Nya Two meanwhile continued as an independent movement. Our objective was therefore to influence the Anya Nya Two and to have them join us. The Anya Nya Two, on the other hand, was trying to influence us to join them. Thus at the start (1983), we had two movements with different objectives.
While the SPLM was for the unity of the Sudan, the Anya Nya two was for the separation of the Southern Sudan. Our immediate task after we formed the SPLM/SPLA was to try to regroup the scattered fighting forces that we found, politicise them, win their confidence and make them organic to the SPLA. It is worth to note here that the Anya Nya Two was not only confined to Upper Nile. It was stronger in Bahr El Ghazal.
So we succeeded in getting the whole of the Anya Nya Two of Bahr El Ghazal and thereby incorporated it into the SPLA. Most of the Anya Nya Two in Upper Nile were also incorporated into the SPLA. Some of them are now holding high ranks in the SPLA. Major John Kulang who is an alternate member of the SPLA/SPLM Military High Command was a member of the Anya Nya Two organization when he joined us.
So in reality, it was Anya Nya Two that was split; some of them the majority I should say, joined us while the rest remained with Gordon Koang and continued to maintain their separate identity. Some of the politicians who came with us following the Bor incident notably Samuel Gai Tut, Akuot Atem and Gabriel Gany who essentially opted for separatism joined Anya Nya Two and managed to take over its leadership. These politicians had assumed that since the Nuer nationality was at the Ethiopian Sudanese border, they would keep away anybody coming to join us. This strategy led, sadly to say, to the deaths of many people who were coming from Bahr El Ghazal in Fangak.
So it was our failure to win all of the Anya Nya Two that led to the continuation of the Anya Nya Two as a movement. The failure of the Anya Nya Two, on the other hand to get us into their movement, let to the existence of two movements.
Later on Anya Nya Two, which was a genuine movement fighting for the separation of Southern Sudan, was transformed into a government militia. The brainchild of this tribal militia was Daniel Koat Matthews, the then Governor of Upper Nile. We have now in our file the copy of the letter addressed to His Excellency President Nimeiri.
The content of that letter was aimed at the destruction of the SPLM/SPLA by organising tribal militias. The Anya Nya Two was thus superseded by the SPLM, so to speak. From thence on the Anya Nya Two through Daniel Koat Mathew’s agitation, became a government militia just like the Murahelin forces of Southern Kordofan, like the Mundari militia, like the Ismail Konyi Militia and like the Fertit militia of Western Bahr El Ghazal. It therefore became the aim of the SPLA movement never to allow or give free hand to these militiamen to divert the people’s revolution. The policy of organising tribal militias needless to say, was started by Nimeiri and Daniel Koat, continued by Sowar El Dahab and is being promoted by Sadiq El Mahdi, It is therefore the aim of the SPLM do deny Sadiq El Mahdi or whoever is in Khartoum to continue to use these militias. We shall try and struggle to influence them. We have more and better arguments for them to join us than for them to join the Sudanese Army. The militias are beginning now to realise that, they have been deceived by the government for quite a long time. Good example is that Gordon Koang at one time was promised that he would be appointed the commander of the Southern Command and the Anya Nya Two the Government of the Southern Sudan (HEC) if his movement could succeed to defeat the SPLM/SPLA. But then as the governments in Khartoum came and went these promises were not honoured, Gordon Koang did not become the commander of the Southern Command with the rank of Major General as promised nor did the Anya Nya Two become the regional Government in Juba. At the end the Anya Nya Two started to realise that they were being taken for a rough ride. We have explained to them these things from time to time. They have at last realised these false promises, which are now crucial to the present ongoing reconciliation process. As I have said before these are politicians who take advantage of the name of Anya Nya Two in order to make money in Khartoum, Nairobi or other place

Q: 9 What about the claim that the quarrel between the SPLA and the Anya Nya II started in Addis Ababa when you arrived there in 1983. It was alleged that you held election as to who should have been the chairman of the movement. The report had it that Akuot Atem was elected the first chairman of the SPLM, that Samuel Gai Tut was to be the commander in chief and you the chief of staff. It was alleged that the split came as a result of leadership as well as ideological differences. What is your brief comment on these allegations?
A: This is not true. There were no elections held and there would have not been any elections since we did not have constituencies to hold some sort of election. A simple explanation is that the SPLA was formed in side the Sudan, and by the soldiers who defected from the Sudanese Army. Whereas, the Anya Nya Two was a movement that was already in existence by the time we formed the SPLM/SPLA.
The question which arose at the time we arrived there was whether the new comers that where pouring out of the country were going to identify themselves with the SPLA or with Anya Nya Two. Of course it was a matter of choice and those of Akuot Atem, Samuel Gai Tut and Gabriel Gany decided to join Anya Nya Two. In fact everyone was free to join any of the two Movements without any quarrel. The quarrel only erupted, when the Anya Nya Two was transformed into a government militia by Daniel Koat. Otherwise there were no conflicts between the two organisations before the transformation of Anya Nya Two from a genuine secessionist Movement to a government militia.

Q: 10 It is now four years since you launched SPLA movement. Looking back today, would you say the objectives for which it was launched are being realised?
A: Looking at the four years of our struggle, I would say, yes, the objectives are being realised. The Primary objective is of course the unity of the Sudan, which should be on new basis. We are trying to build a new Sudan free of religious and racial discrimination, a Sudan that is free from the two families rule. We want to build a new Sudan devoid of all kinds of sectarianism. In the past our people used to talk about north and the southern conflict. Now I am glad to say, the Sudanese are no longer talking about the solution of the so called problem of the Southern Sudan but that of the Sudan as a whole.

Q: 11 The Prime Minister Sadiq el Mahdi has been quoted as saying that your forces have been meeting tremendous difficulties in the battle fields against the strong Sudanese army. That they are being pushed back every time they try to take to offensive. What is the situation in the battlefields?
A: That might be Sadiq’s wish that the SPLA forces are suffering in the battle fields. But facts are there for anybody to see.
The true picture about the situation is that when we met with Sadiq in July last year it was clear that he was going to launch a massive military offensive against the SPLA having achieved the type of peace he wanted. This was obvious from his face. I even told him, Mr. Prime Minister don’t go and do what I see in your eyes. Don’t go and launch a military offensive against the SPLA. Don’t try this because you will not be able to defeat the SPLA. I told him further that if he wanted to defeat it, he should go and recruit six hundred thousand new recruits. Then he would be able to attack us. But I cautioned him that if he recruited six hundred thousand he would definitely recruit them from the south, the east and the west of Sudan. These are the areas of recruitment into the Sudanese Army.
Mr. Prime Minister, I assure you that six hundred thousand this would be good for the SPLA. Because, you will recruit them, train them, arm them and then deploy them against us. When you deeply deploy them against us one third of these recruits will defect to us”. I warned the Prime Minister. This is how the SPLA was formed and this is how it thrives. Two hundred thousand out of the six hundred thousand will surely join us. I wanted to warn him, that in order for a conventional army to fight these two who would then be guerrillas, you need a ratio of one to ten. To fight the two hundred thousand of your own creation which will defect to us in addition to the existing SPLA forces, you need another army of Two ‘Million’. This will go on indefinitely. So Mr. Prime Minister don’t attempt to do this”. I concluded.
He did not listen to my advice. In stead he went and launched a massive military operation against us. He was even quoted as boasting that he would celebrate the 1987 Intafadha (April Uprising) in Buma our Headquarters. So, we took the Prime Minister’s challenge very seriously, took all the necessary measures and effectively repulsed his offensive. We did not only repulse the massive military offensive but the Prime Minister did not celebrate the Al Intifadha in Buma. In stead we captured the strategic town of Pibor which is not very far from Buma and which we still hold. We also captured another strategic town of Jekou, which we are still holding. Most recently we captured Mayom in Bentiu area, which we also are holding. We have now extended the war to Western Equatoria Province where we were not there before. Major James Wani Igga Alternate member of the SPLA/SPLM Political-Military High Command is now on the Zairian border. We have also extended the war to Southern Kordofan and Major Yousif Kuwa Mekki Alternate member of the SPLA/SPLM is the Zonal Commander there. We have also extended the war to Southern Blue Nile.
So, to come to your question, the Prime Minister’s massive military offensive has effectively been halted. On the contrary, the SPLA is on the move. The situation on the ground is therefore very favourable to the SPLM/SPLA. That the SPLA is on the move is not a claim by us, but a truth. We have more than 200 prisoners of war and they are in our POW camps. Lt. Colonel Salim Saed former commander of Jekou himself talked over Radio SPLA. It was very clear from Colonel Salim’s speech, as a man who had been in a trench for a long time, and who knows the heat of the battle, that the situation is in our favour. He is, in fact, a better authority to speak the truth about what is going on in War Zone One, than Sadiq. The army in the South knows better how the war is going on there, not Sadiq who has never been in a trench. On my part, I spent eight hours in a trench during the capture of Jekou. I am therefore in a better position to know what is actually going on in the South. Prime Minister Sadiq has never been to the war theatre. He is either not being well briefed by his commanders or he deliberately ignores the facts.

Q: 12 Certain quarters inside and outside the Sudan do claim that foreign hands are behind the SPLA successes in the battlefields against the Sudanese army. They point accusing fingers at Ethiopia, USSR, Cuba, GDR, as being on the top of the lists. What is your reaction to these accusations?
A: This is a complete nonsense. We have never had a single foreigner fighting on our side in the battles we have been engaged in ever since the war started in 1983: and we will not in the future accept any foreigners to fight on our side. This is a Sudanese war and therefore a purely internal affairs. It originated within the Sudanese body-politic. It is a known fact that the first soldiers of the SPLA were from battalion 105 and 104, and does not need any expert explanation. So, there are no foreign personnel in our army. The charge that there are foreigners helping us are just mere malicious propaganda. However, all the Sudanese public is all aware that there are no foreigners in our forces.
Before we launched the SPLM/SPLA, I was a Colonel in the Sudanese Army not in the Ethiopian, GDR, or Cuban Army, I was in Khartoum and many officers, like Kerubino Kwanyin, William Nyuon, Arok Thon, Daniel Awet, Bona Baang and many others were in the Sudanese Army. Other officers were in the Sudanese civil service or other sectors of Sudanese life. Dr. Lam Akol and Dr. Riek Machar were lecturers at the University of Khartoum. James Wani Igga was working in Juba. Kuol Manyang was the Director of the Multi-Purpose Training Centre in Juba. John Kulang was in the Sudanese Army. These officers are members in the SPLA/SPLM Political-Military High Command.
There is absolutely no foreigners fighting on our side. On the contrary, it is Sadiq Al Mahdi who used foreigners. He invaded the Sudan in 1976 with murtazagha (mercenaries). The murtazagha forces were crushed simply because they were foreigners or at least there were foreign elements in that force. The Sudanese Army took it as a challenge that foreigners were invading the Sudan. Where as we have been able to maintain our ground, made gains and consolidate our positions for the last four years. If we did not base our movement on the Sudanese people we would have been dislodged a long time ago.

Q: 13 In regards to logistics, where do you get your arms and ammunitions?
A: When we launched the movement in 1983, we started with the arms and ammunitions of Battalion 104/105. In 1984 we got a windfall of armaments and ammunitions from Libya. A lot of people say we got our arms and ammunitions from Ethiopia. This is not true. Others think that we get our arms from the Soviet Union. This is also not true. The only foreign country that helped us was Libya. I was in Tripoli for eleven days in April 1984. At that time we had mutual hostility against Nimeiri. “An enemy of your enemy is your friend!” So goes the saying. We reached a good understanding with Ghaddafi and so he gave us lots of arms and ammunitions including anti-aircraft missiles. We knew of course that this would be a temporary support because once Nimeiri was overthrown this support would come to an end. So, we stockpiled a lot of arms and ammunitions. Having received these arms we became very strong and began over running enemy camps, making many ambushes and virtually annihilating military convoys and taking all their arms. The annihilation of Sudanese Para-troopers between Bor and Juba in 1985 is a case in point. The armaments we got when our forces captured Pibor enabled us to arm two battalions.
To sum up, our initial sources of armaments were battalions 104/105. We had a foreign source of armaments, which was Libya. Now all our arms procurement comes from the Sudanese Army. We are getting more arms and ammunitions overrun army garrison after army garrison. We are indeed making ambushes and are getting lots of armaments daily.

Heritage, Khartoum, Monday, Nov., 16, 1987, pp4.

Q 14. On the ongoing war, the SPLM leadership is being accused of using food relief as a weapon aimed at attempting to win public support to your side? What is your brief comment?
A. Definitely, I don’t agree with this accusation. For how can we use food relief as a weapon? And what is the argument in support of this accusation?

Q: 15 The argument in support of this accusation is that when the international relief agencies wanted to airlift food to the famine-stricken Southern Sudan in the middle of 1986 through “Operation Rainbow,” the SPLA threatened to shoot down any plane that would fly over the areas you control; thus making it difficult for the food to reach the people that needed it. This is the charge.
A: When I was fighting in Kapoeta, Mike Wooldrige of the BBC came to me and told me that Sadiq El Mahdi had agreed that the international relief organisations could work with the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (SRRA) the humanitarian Branch of the SPLM, provided that, he added, the SPLM allow food convoys by air and by land to go to the government control towns. My answer was in the affirmative. We agreed that the SRRA, the international relief organisations and the Sudan Government Relief Agency to sit down and provide modalities, ways and means whereby food could reach the targeted populations in the towns and in the countryside, provided that the food was not used either by the Sudanese Army or by the SPLA soldiers. This would mean that the operations be monitored by the three parties concerned.
So, Mr Bradley of the “Operation Rainbow” came and asked whether we were serious. As an element of goodwill he requested us to allow a few flights so that the process was seen to be working. So, we allowed few flights. Then, he went to the Sudan Government side and requested that it allowed a few flights to the SPLM control areas to distribute some food there. The Sudan Government rejected the request. We turned down Mr. Bradley’s request because we believed that the Sudan Government’s intention was to send the relief aid to the towns under its control while the majority of the people living in the countryside and who were badly in need of the relief were left without help. We therefore interpreted the Sudan Government’s rejection of Mr. Bradley’s proposal as hostile, for if it was not, Sadiq El Mahdi would have accepted it.
So we said that any aircraft which would attempt to come to the Southern Sudan would be considered as hostile. This was however another area of misunderstanding in regard to the ‘Operation Rainbow’. This misunderstanding was a result of agitation from Khartoum.
As regards to the allegation that we were the ones who refused the “Operation Rainbow” to fly food to the hunger stricken in War Zone One, I would say that this is not true. It was not us who refused the said Operation. It was Sadiq El Mahdi who frustrated the efforts of the International Relief Agencies to airlift food to the hungry people in the south after publicly he had been on the record that he would accept the International Relief Organisations to work with us. However, our side of goodwill was implemented while the Sudan Government side of goodwill was not. We were not in anyway obliged to accept food to be taken to the towns under Sudan Government control. Our move to prevent food to be taken to the towns was justified because we were getting reliable reports that, this food was being used by the Sudan Government Army.
If the Sudan Government side had agreed and allowed the Relief Agencies to work on both sides to the conflict, the next stage would have been to develop a mechanism whereby the three sides, namely the SPLA, the Sudan Government and the International Community would monitor how food was to be used on both sides to the conflict.
In brief, the Khartoum authorities completely refused the monitoring process. They were interviewed by the BBC, and they flatly said they would not accept the monitoring of food distribution.

Q: 16 What do you propose to be done in this connection while the war goes on?
A: Now that there is drought in the south, the most affected areas by the war, it extremely becomes very necessary to get food to the needy. In this connection, we would hold to the same formula that the SRRA, our humanitarian wing; the International Community and the Sudan Government humanitarian wing to sit down and device ways and means to get food to the affected areas both in the towns and in the countryside and to monitor its distribution so that it is not used either, by the Sudan Government troops or by the SPLA forces.
The three parties namely the SPLA, the Sudan Government and the International Community can form a committee to monitor the transport and distribution of this food. We can assign our own personnel to the government control towns if the Sudan Govt. guarantees to their security. We would also give security to the Sudan Govt. personnel who would be monitoring food distribution in the areas under our control. This, is in our opinion, would be a way out of this misunderstanding.
On my part as a leader of the SPLM, I will have no opposition to the formation of this committee. Rather, I bless and encourage it because there is going to be famine this year. Our people are going to suffer and they will die if nothing is done urgently.
At this juncture, I appeal to the concerned relief agencies to reactivate the relief operations to the areas affected by the droughts.

Q: 17 The SPLA/SPLM pledge that it is fighting to liberate the whole Sudan is being ridiculed by some individuals both from the north and the south. The northerners say to liberate the Sudan from who? The southerners on the other hand say, they do not want to shed their blood to liberate the Arab portion of Sudan. What would you tell these compatriots?
A: This question to liberate the Sudan from who has for a long time been asked by the people who are interested in perpetuating differences between the north and south of the Sudan that have been imposed by certain circumstances and promoted by their clique regimes in Khartoum. In fact, when these compatriots say to liberate the Sudan from who; the answer they expect is from the Arabs. This is the context of their agitation. What I would tell these compatriots is that I had been on record and I am saying this again that when we in the SPLM speak about the liberation of the Sudan, we use it in a broader sense.

As far as the SPLM philosophy is concerned the question that arises is not to liberate the Sudan from who but to liberate it from what? In my speech to the people of my village sometimes back, I demonstrated this point very clearly. I told them that during the dry season the women of the village have to walk 15 miles to get water from a well. If we reduce that distance from 15 miles to one mile or zero mile, if we locate the well in the village you will have essentially liberated these women from walking 15 miles. This is what we mean to liberate a person from what not from Who? I explained to them. Looking at it in this context, we mean to liberate the people from neglect. In our Sudanese situation, the whole countryside has completely been neglected by those that have been in power in Khartoum since independence.
The successive regimes in Khartoum have been putting all our foreign reserves on air coolers, on refrigerators, on television-sets, on good cars and all kinds of comfort. Whereas, our foreign reserves should have been spent on things like bore wells in the villages, haffirs and life-saving drugs for rural people just to mention but a few. This is what when we refer to the term ‘liberation from what’.
Another good example to demonstrate the misinterpretation of the term liberation is that before Nimeiri was overthrown, Sadiq’s wife was quoted in one of her talks with our people in London as saying….. “Ya jama’a , izza intum ta shill al ‘L’ da” If you can take away this ‘Letter L’ so as to read The Sudan Peoples’ Movement, we shall all join this Movement. But to say, “The Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement…. To liberate the Sudan from who?” She asked.
This is the context in which the agitators in Khartoum would like to use the word liberation so as to distort it to mean a small thing that would mean the liberation of Sudan from the people. This is not how we use it. We in the SPLM use it in the sense that we want to liberate the Sudan from circumstances: the circumstances of oppression, of exploitation, of neglect which the majority of Sudanese find themselves in not only in the south, but all over the country, including Khartoum the capital of the whole country.
If for instance the tens of thousands of our people living in the carton huts in Khartoum are resettled in some decent places, if we make shelters at least for these people, we will have liberated them from these carton houses. This is our concept of the liberation. To come to the point the term Liberation is being ridiculed from that perspective by the people from the north because they want to associate it with racism.
On the other hand, some people from Southern Sudan ridicule the term by saying…. “Why should Southern Sudanese shed their blood in liberating the whole of the Sudan!”?
“Here again, this comes through sheer ignorance as to what the term liberation is all about or they deliberately want to distort it with the aim of ridiculing the Movement. These are the same southerners who claim that they would join the SPLA if it was fighting for the liberation of the southern Sudan. They insist that they would join the SPLA/SPLM if we change our manifesto to speak about the liberation of the south. This is rubbish.
Okay, let us speak about those who want to liberate the south. If they are going to liberate the south what method are they going to use? If they are going to liberate the south through fighting, then they need not to be told that the liberation of the south and of the whole Sudan involves fighting.
So, we invite those who want to liberate the south to come. Let them come. Nimule is still under the Army of Khartoum. Let them start fighting the Sudan army from there. When they reach what in their calculation, is the end of southern Sudan, let them stop. We will have a territorial army. We will have a home guard. We will deploy them on the Zairian border, on the Ugandan border, on the Kenyan border and on the Ethiopian border. In the meantime, the rest of us who would want to continue up to Khartoum and to Wadi Halfa will continue.
Secondly and most fundamentally, I would like to say that both the southerners and the northerners who make these ridicules do not completely understand the dynamics of how the liberation is going to take place. Those who make these ridicules from the north think that a southern army will eventually march into the north. The southerners who think that southerners should not shed their blood in order to liberate the whole Sudan think that a southern army will march to the north. This is not how we see things as happening. We see things as happening through the process of northerners themselves being involved in the struggle.
Now our forces are in southern Kordofan. We have lots and lots of recruits from southern Kordofan. The force that is in southern Kordofan, half of it is composed of the citizens of the area. So the process of liberating the whole country will involve the northerners in the fighting. They will not be standing in the dark watching the liberation going on. This is of course a very mechanical way of looking at a social reality. In deed as the war engulfs the whole country it will mean the involvement of all the people in the liberation.
To be specific the people of southern Kordofan are already involved and their own son Major Yousif Kuwa Mekki is their commander in southern Kordofan. The same is happening in southern Blue Nile. We have Malik Agar. He is the son of the area and he is fighting there. So, there is no question, you see, of southerners going to shed their blood while the northerners just fold their hands and wait for their liberation to take place. That is not how it will work.
There is no question of northerners thinking that a southern Sudanese army is going to invade their part of the country. This is a complete misunderstanding of reality, either innocently or deliberately construed in order to distort our objectives and ridicule them for political purposes.

Q: 18 Some Sudanese describe the SPLA/SPLM as a regional movement. What have you done so as to give it a national character?
A: In the first place, SPLM is not a regional movement. It is true, it started from a certain region which happens to be the southern Sudan. But this does not make it regional. It will be regional if its objectives are regional. So, we have regional parties like the southern Sudan Political Association (SSPA) for example. By their own definition of the objectives the members of SSPA have made themselves regional. There is also the General Union of the Nubas (GUN). By their definition, its members have made their organisation regional. So by our definition, we are not a regional organisation.
If you look at the other parties which claim to be national e.g. the Umma Party, You will find that what makes the Umma Party national is its claim, otherwise one can say that it is a regional party. The Umma Party is a movement that was started and is still based on the Ansar. There is therefore nothing one can say is national about the Ansar sect. I do not know how many the Ansars are. They may be three million compared to 22 million, the entire population of the Sudan according to the 1983 census. The Ansar sect is a regional organisation if the definition I stated above is applied to them. But because of their claim to the national rights, the Ansar Sect is a national organisation according to the definition of its objectives. The same thing can be applied to the DUP, which is based on the Katimmiyia Sect. So, there is nothing really that can make these parties national. They can as well be termed as regional like the SPLM if it were a regional organisation.
So one can say that the SPLM started at a certain time and at a certain place; but what is important is that the inner core that is its objectives, which are, needless to say, national.
In regard to the other part of question as to what we have done to give it a national character, I would say that, firstly by definition of its objectives and secondly its consistency with the definition of these objectives, which have gone beyond the region from which it started. As we have pointed out before, we are now in Southern Kordofan. So you can no longer talk about the SPLM being a southern Movement because we are already entrenched in southern Kordofan and southern Blue Nile and hopefully we will soon be in other areas.
We do admit people from all parts of the country and we have been doing this. At present, we have people not only from the Nuba Mountains and the Southern Blue Nile but also individuals from other places in the northern Sudan. There are people from Shendi, who are in our Movement. A regional party would not admit people from that region. A national party admits people from any part of the country. SPLM is therefore a national Movement.

Q: 19 In an interview with this paper last April, the Premier Sadiq El Mahdi warned that southerners and especially the Dinkas, would be exterminated by the northerners who are being turned military by the continuation of the war. And in order to save them from being wiped out, he advised that the SPLA/M must end the war in favour of peaceful settlement. What is your response to this suggestion?
A: If the Prime Minister has made this statement, then one would say that it is very unfortunate because he is not speaking as a national leader. By making such a statement, the Prime Minister is perhaps thinking about certain tribes in a certain perspective as not being a part of his constituency. By making such a statement, he is telling these tribes “look, if you are giving me trouble, I am going to kill you”. This is not the talk of a Prime Minister, but of a leader of a small place like Khartoum. This statement is very unfortunate for Premier Sadiq because it makes him very small indeed. This is not a responsible statement. It was just an idle talk. It wouldn’t worry the Sudanese people as a whole. This is because, here is a portion of the country that somebody who claims to be the Prime Minister for the whole country, consciously programmes the extermination of people he claims to lead. No wonder, events like the Dhain massacre, and the massacre in Wau go to support such threats. In fact, one would say the Prime Minister is not only expressing threats but is actually doing it, if he is not attempting to do it. It is upon the Sudanese people to take necessary measures in order to rid the Sudan of this cancer. If the Prime Minister is talking about exterminating this or that tribe, then he needs not be reminded that nobody is going to be exterminated while lying down. Because if it comes to extermination, it will no longer be the Dinkas to fight against such mad ideas but the rest of the Sudanese people will struggle against the implementation of such ideas. The Sudanese people needless to say, the Dinkas included have the will and stand to do this.

Q: 20 Some Sudanese are saying that the war you are waging in the south is hindering development and progress in the whole country and particularly in the north. They go as far as suggesting that it would be better for the two parts of the Sudan to form two separate states in order to accelerate rapid development. What is your brief comment on this statement?
A: It is true the war is hindering development in our country. The question one should ask before answering this question is the development for Who? The Sudanese people have not benefited from whatever development there was. We are fighting first for a new Sudan in which all the Sudanese people all nationalities will be one people. Having achieved this objective, we will surely benefit from that development. So the development that we are hindering or which is being hindered by the war could mean development for the small clique in Khartoum. We are happy that the Chevron Oil Company operations have been stopped because the development that might have been made as a result of the oil revenue would have not benefited the Sudanese people. It would have only benefited the Nimeiri system thereby prolonging his dictatorial rule. If the oil had been prospected and refined under Nimeiri’s rule, he would have not been overthrown. The same thing can be said about the Jonglei Canal.
So, to answer your question, I would say, yes, development is being hindered in order to achieve higher objectives, which we strongly believe will result into faster development for the benefit of all.
Development is in fact being hindered because of the war and we are going to continue to hinder it until higher goals are achieved.

Q: 21 What about the assertion that it would be better for the south to separate so as to accelerate socio-economic development in the northern Sudan?
A: Separation of any part of the Sudan is not in our objectives. We are fighting for a united new Sudan and will fight against anybody who wants to dismember the Sudan, be they southerners or northerners.
I am aware that there are some people in Khartoum who say that (al harab bigha ghali) the war has become very expensive and that it would be better to give the south independence or let the south go. This is ridiculous because nobody has the right to give independence to anybody in this country. Giving independence is not like a cup of tea, one can give to someone and say, have it, it is yours. No, it does not work like that. “Bene wa benak” (between me and you who has the power in his hands in Khartoum to give the south independence? It is my conviction that nobody has this right and I don’t think that the talk about giving the south independence is a serious matter. It might be a mere propaganda being played up by certain individuals who want Sadiq El Mahdi to unite what they call the Arab north against the so called, African south.
Even if the southerners want to secede, I can assure you that nobody will in this country give them the chance to take such a step. In brief secession is not in our objectives and we, in the SPLM, will fight any ideas or actions aimed at dismembering the Sudan.

Q: 22 Reports coming out of the Southern Sudan indication that towns are being razed to the ground and much property being destroyed. Who is doing this destruction?
A: When there is fighting, things get destroyed on both sides. The aim of the war in fact is to make the other side non-combatant. You simply make him non-combatant by disarming him. If things get destroyed, it is because the destructions are the effects of the war.

Q: 23 It is almost three years now and the people have been talking about convening of the national constitutional conference. There are indications that suggest that it may or may not take place soon. What in your view are the obstacles impeding the progress towards the conference?
A: The main obstacle hindering the convening of the constitutional conference is, what I would call entrenched sectarianism in Khartoum. In fact, Sadiq El Mahdi and his group do not want to go to the National Constitutional Conference. When Nimeiri was overthrown, the SPLM and the Sudanese political forces in the country were in dialogue among themselves. These dialogue culminated in the Koka Dam Declaration. The Umma Party was a signatory to the Koka Dam Declaration. Instead of implementing it, Sadiq El Mahdi began to say that the two parties, the DUP and NIF, are not a party to the Koka Dam Declaration.
Instead of working with the rest of the political forces in order to convince the other two parties, from the alliance, Sadiq took an awkward position and began to assert that the DUP and NIF are not a part to the Koka Dam Declaration and that it would not only be implemented but not honoured.
It is our view that if the Prime Minister is serious about holding of the National Constitutional Conference, it should have been his responsibility and all of us who were involved in the Koka Dam, to convince the DUP and NIF to join the Alliance. This is an indication that the Umma Party and Sadiq in particular is not interested in the convening of the Constitutional Conference. Despite this he himself appears to be interested in the conference. The second indication is that as soon as Sadiq came to power in 1986 he began to talk about a national committee instead of implementing the Koka Dam Declaration. In fact there was no need to have another national committee since a 12 men liaison committee formed by the Koka Dam Assembly from among the members of the parties and political forces who attended the meeting, including the SPLM, was already in existence. Our reaction to the call by the Prime Minister for a national committee was that there was no need to have another committee when we already have a format forum for discussing the national issues.
So, when we shot down the plane over Malakal, the Prime Minister took the advantage of the incident and declared the SPLA as a terrorist organisation with which he will never talk. He even forbade other political forces from contacting us. This was very unfortunate because these actions were actions of somebody who is not interested in the convening of the national constitutional conference and the peaceful settlement of our problems. It is true we shot down a plane. In a war situation things get shot. People get shot. Tanks get shot and planes get shot. In our situation, we had given warnings that we would shoot down any aircraft flying over the airspace under our control because Khartoum was using civilian aircrafts to ferry military equipment to its besieged garrisons in the south. However, despite this warning, a plane was sent. Be that as it was, one would say that, what we shot down was the plane. But what Sadiq shot down was the whole peace process. If we are criminals then Sadiq is more a criminal than us.
So, that was about the Koka Dam. The other problem, which impeded the process toward the constitutional conference was the Prime Minster’s attitude towards the said conference. Sadiq El Mahdi has been putting obstacles after obstacles so that the National Constitutional Conference does not take place under the terms of Koka Dam Declaration. So, he terminated the peace talks. Other incidences, including the seven Bishops’ peace Mission to Addis. Of course, when a person close to you dies, there is a period of mourning and then after that life is to continue normally. So, when Sadiq was mourning the plane the funeral could not go on indefinitely. So, the Bishops came to break the stalemate of not talking to one another about the peace process and I believe they had the blessing of the Prime Minister. We met the Bishops, discussed with them, and we assured them about our willingness and eagerness to talk peace. After we talked with them we issued a joint communiqué!
After they returned home Sadiq did not see it necessary to meet the Bishops in order to brief him about their peace mission.
The third indication to show the Prime Minister’s reluctance to the holding of the constitutional conference is the declaration of the state of emergency. So we have now triple emergencies: The first state of emergency was declared by Nimeiri; when Sowar El Dahab came he imposed his state of emergency without first repealing the one imposed by Nimeiri; when Sadiq came, he too declared his own. These, to my mind, are obstacles impeding the constitutional conference. In order to have conducive atmosphere for peace talks the state of emergency should be lifted at least in the north where there is no war. If the state of emergency is not lifted what is the use of talking about the Sudan as being an example of democracy.
The fourth indication is that recently the National Alliance gave a memorandum to the Prime Minister, Sadiq El Mahdi on the peace process. But he criticised the Alliance for not condemning the SPLA. When one is engaged in the search for peace, and is determined to hold dialogues with the parties concerned there is no sense in insisting that the other party to the conflict be condemned. In fact there are many things that can be condemned about Khartoum, e.g. the barbaric incidences like the Dhain Massacre and the Wau killing of many innocent civilians.
The fifth indication to prove that the Khartoum Government is not interested in the present search for peace is that, when the African Parties came to meet us about the peace process, we agreed and issued a joint communiqué calling for the convening of the national constitutional conference. Instead of blessing the African Parties’ peace initiative, the Prime Minister went on record to condemn those who took part in the delegation. He condemns the Addis Ababa Peace Forum, the Kampala Quest for Peace and the Nairobi Search For Peace Communiqués, before these parties could return to Khartoum. He even threatened that he would dismiss the Ministers from the Council of the South who took part in these conferences before they could explain their position. He wants to dismiss the people who came to prepare the ground for the national peace conference. This again is an indication for lack of seriousness on the part of the Prime Minister in regard to, the holding of the national constitutional conference. I understand from some of the African Parties’ members that when they moved in the Parliament sometime back, the idea of forming a parliamentary committee to explore ways and means of bringing about peace in our country and to re-initiate contacts with the SPLM, the motion was defeated by the Prime Minister’s own Party.
The last point is my talk with him. I told him when we were parting that “Mr. Prime Minister, if I were you, I would, on arrival at Khartoum Airport, announce that I am implementing the Koka Dam Declaration. “If you do this, Mr. Prime Minister, I assure you I will declare a cease-fire the following day.” This was a challenge to him and I expected him, as a statesman, if he is one, to take it up seriously. I told him not to worry about what the DUP and NIF would think or do. I also told him to scrap the Islamic Sharia because it was not enacted by any Act of Parliament but by a mad dictator called Nimeiri. I told him not to stick to state of emergency and Sharia because they were not his responsibility. I told him that whatever the DUP and NIF opposition were, their voices were being drowned by those Sudanese, who have been suffering and who want peace. I also told him that I knew what he was going to do despite my advice. He asked me how I knew it? I told him that I was reading his mind because he was sectarian in thinking. “You are going to intensify the war with the hope that you will defeat SPLA. Or at least bring it to manageable size and then hold your version of the National Constitutional Conference.
So to sum up my answer to your question, I would say that the above facts are the main obstacles impeding the convening of the constitutional conference because the Prime Minister wants to convene it when it suits him and when he is the initiator of such a conference.
So, when the Parliamentary group want to initiate the peace talks, he says no, when the Church leaders want to initiate the talks he says no; if the SPLM wants to initiate peace talks he says no, and when we want to hold the conference through the Koka Dam Declaration, he says no… Instead he declared the state of emergency. The blame is therefore on the Prime Minister, who wants to hold the constitutional conference when it best suits him but not when it best suits the Sudanese people.

Q: 24 The recent peace offensive which resulted in the Addis Ababa peace forum, the Kampala quest for peace, and the Nairobi search for peace communiques is being seen in certain quarters as an attempt by the SPLM leadership to rally the Africa countries behind the SPLA so as to enable it fight against the Arab north? Do you agree with this sort of speculation?
A: The Addis Ababa Peace Forum, the Kampala Quest For Peace and the Nairobi Search For Peace meetings were in fact aimed at attempt to re-initiate the peace talks which were brought to a halt following the last Malakal plane incident in order to keep the ball of peace rolling despite the Prime Minister’s opposition. Our view in this regard is that if the Prime Minister and his party do not want to talk peace with us, we can talk with many other Sudanese political parties who are willing to talk with us. So, we have started to talk with African parties and will be in contact with those political forces that are ready and willing to join the peace talks we have already started. I do not therefore agree with the speculations that the recent peace offensive aimed at attempt to rally African countries to support us in the war we are fighting. These countries are poor and would be senseless to involve them in our own conflict. Moreover, they have their own problems. However,!
we have never sought any military assistance or any other support from these countries. We simply went to Addis, to Kampala and Nairobi purely to search for peace.

Q: 25 There have been some talks about the SPLA reconciliation with the Anya Nya II, are there attempts to do the same with other militias, that all Sudanese concentrated their efforts in the ongoing search for peace with less friction and quarrels?
A: Besides reconciling with Anya Nya Two, we want to come to terms with all the peace loving Sudanese including those who are opposed to our cause. In the light of this we are trying to reconcile with all the militias that have been unleashed against us and against the innocent and helpless Sudanese. We are trying to reconcile with them because we want to show them that fighting the SPLA on the side of the Sudanese Government is not in their interest nor is it in the interest of all the Sudanese people in general. The Messeryia, the Baggara Arabs of the Southern Kordofan and Darfur for example have for centuries been co-existing with the Dinka sharing pastures and the water of River Kiir (Bahr El Arab). There had been, of course, conflicts between the Dinka and the Messeryia over the pastures and water of River Kiir throughout the history of their co-existence but they were able to device successful ways and means of how to contain those conflicts. But the introduction!
of the Murahelin forces of the tribal militia by Nimeiri, promoted by Sowar El Dahab and fully implemented by Sadiq El Mahdi, has complicated the matters in the area, as this has injected a political element into what were essentially traditional conflicts. In our view the introduction of tribal militias to fight the SPLA on behalf of the Government is not in the interest of the tribes that are being involved in the conflict that is not theirs. We have been trying telling these government sponsored Messeryia militias that while they are fighting the SPLA their godfathers are sitting in Khartoum peacefully not being affected by the war. We told them that the Prime Minister and those who support them do not have cattle that will die in case there is no water and pastures. We do hope that these compatriots, who have been misled into believing that they can defeat the SPLA on behalf of the national army, will refrain from being used by the Khartoum politicians and to resume their normal traditional life.
So to answer your question, I am glad to say that efforts are being made to contact all the militia men in order to reach a peaceful settlement with them. In fact we have already started contact with the Messeryia Murahelin forces so as to come to terms with them. We are also looking forward to organise meetings with all the tribes that share the water of River Kiir. Similarly, we are talking with the Mundari Militia men and have gone a long way into making full settlement with them. The good news is that most of the Mundari Militia men have already joined the SPLA. The Ismail Konyi Militia had already been incorporated into the SPLA except for about 150 who had run to Malakal together with Ismail himself when Pibor fell into the hands of SPLA. In fact after the fall of Pibor we went on a political campaign in Murle villages and managed to win over 1,000 Konyi’s Militia men who are now part of the SPLA forces. In regard to the Fertit Militia we are exerting efforts to bring peace between them and the Jur-Luo on one hand and between them and the Dinka on the other hand. I am glad to inform you that we have succeeded to restore peace between the Murle and the Anyuak between the Nuer and the Dinka Bor and between the Dinka and Toposa who have been fighting one another for many years. These efforts to reconcile the tribes have been going on, are going on and will continue to go on until complete peace and stability is established all over the region.

Q: 26 Since you launched the SPLAM you have not visited any Arab country. You did not even ask either for military or humanitarian assistance. If what I have said is correct, will you not agree with the people who think that you are fighting for the liberation of the Africans of the Sudan from Arab domination?
A: As I have said some where in this discourse, there are people who insist and take pride in trying to play up the differences between the peoples of African stock and the peoples of Arab origins, in this country, the differences which were essentially imposed by certain circumstances. Those who try to play up these differences want to perpetuate them for their political gains. If these were not their intentions, they would not continue to ignore the fact that we are not fighting for the Africans only in the Sudan. We have been on records since we launched the Revolution that we are fighting for the whole Sudan. If there are some compatriots who still doubt our intention to fight for the whole country, I would tell them that time has come for them to recognise this fact and begin to approach us from that perspective, and sooner they do this the better it will be for the interest of the peace and the stability of our people.
It is indisputable that it was Libya, which gave us our only foreign assistance. As regard to the allegation that I have never visited any Arab countries, I can say that this is not true. I was in Tripoli for eleven days in 1984. Moreover the first country that gave us our only foreign assistance was Libya. I was also in Aden for six days at the same time when the Sudanese Minister of Defence Osman Abdalla was visiting the Democratic Republic of Yemen. I sent a delegation to Egypt and was met by President Hosni Mubarak. Egypt was therefore the third country we had contacted. We did also had contact with Jordan. They wrote to us one time and we replied them. So, you can see that we are in contact with Arab countries. The allegation is therefore not true. We are not fighting for the Africans in the Sudan.

Q: 27 Officials of the Sudan govt. strongly believe that you are not going to win this war because your constituency, the Southern Sudan is not behind you as was the case with AnyaNya movement. They also believe that the continuation with the war is just an adventure on your part. What will you say about this assertion?
A: That we have a support, a popular support in the Southern Sudan is not just a claim, but a fact that does not need lecturing to people about it. In fact who does not know that we have the support in the South? If there are some people who say that we do not have support in the South it is not because they believe in what they are saying but do not intend to admit the reality of the situation. We do have support in the South otherwise people would have not been joining the SPLA in their thousands. The fact that tens of thousands of people are joining us daily is a simple indication that we do have and continue to enjoy a popular support in the Southern Sudan. An out-standing indication to support our claim that we have a popular support is that we out-lived Nimeiri’s regime; we had out-lived Sowar El Dahab; we had out-lived Sadiq one, Sadiq two and we will definitely out-live Sadiq three. As a matter of facts, those who think and believe that we do not have a popula!
r support are either not following the events that are taking place in the war theatre or want to mislead the public opinion away from us in order to buy time… In short, I would like to affirm to you that we do have a popular support in the South.
What I would like to underline or correct at this juncture is that our constituency is not the Southern Sudan our constituency is the Sudan as a whole and we have never been vague about it. We have been saying it over and again that we are not fighting because of the so-called problem of the Southern Sudan but for the creation of a new Sudan; a Sudan that is free of exploitation, oppression and abuse of human rights; a Sudan where every body is equal before the law, a Sudan where all citizens do enjoy equal rights; a Sudan that does not chop off the limbs of citizens who commit crimes as a matter of survival. The whole Sudan is therefore our constituency. The fact that we happened to have started the Sudan Peoples Revolution in the South of the country, does not deny us our pledge to liberate the Sudan from circumstances of exploitation and oppression. That the South is a starting point where the people’s revolution was launched is important. But all the same our constituency remains the whole Sudan. The proof is that we are gaining more and more support as the war moves northwards; and are convinced that we will in the end win the support of the rest of the regions of the Sudan.

Q: 28 THE SPLM APPEAL TO THE WORKERS, PEASANTS, SOLDIERS AND INTELECTUALS HAVE MADE MANY PEOPLE THINK THAT YOUR MOVEMENT IS MARXIST-LENINIST ORIENTED AND THAT YOUR CLAIM THAT YOU ARE A NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT IS JUST A MERE CAMOUFLAGE. WHAT IS YOUR REACTION TO THIS ARGUMENT?

A: When the SPLM addresses itself to the Sudanese people, it is appealing to the majority of the Sudanese and the majority of the workers, peasants, soldiers and intellectuals. This is the spectrum of the Sudanese people. Those who are left out of the spectrum, may be, are the two families namely the Mahdi and the Mirghani families and their supporters who have been exploiting the Sudanese people for the last thirty-one years. So, you can see the appeal itself cannot make us Marxist or Leninist, as many people would like to describe us. As you have rightly said before, our appeal is primarily to the exploited and the down trodden members of our public, the peasants, the workers, the soldiers and the intellectuals. Those who prefer to call us communist do not seem to understand what communism is all about. Essentially, communism in its classical sense socialises Capital. In Southern Sudan for instance, there is no capital to be socialise. Even if our movement wants to go Marxist-Leninist, it cannot, because the conditions just are not there now as there is no capital to socialise in the Southern Sudan. Frankly speaking our immediate problem is not what ideology should be adopted in the Sudan. Our main concern is the creation of a new Sudanese nation. We must build a nation before we concern ourselves with other matters. In fact, the political power in Khartoum since 1956 has been in the hands of the two family parties; (the Umma, DUP) and the National Islamic Front with its confusionist tactic of using religion as its constituency. The Khartoum regimes had for a long time exploited and neglected the majority of the Sudanese, the peasants and the workers just to mention a few. They do not effectively participate in the government of their country. The economic development on the other hand is being geared toward the interest of these two families and their parties without considering the interests of the majority of the Sudanese
people.
The SPLM is not therefore fighting in order to import a foreign ideology into the Sudan. Rather, we are fighting for a new system that will speed up economic development and equitable distribution of our vast national and natural resources, which had for a long time been neglected. Indeed our resources are quite vast. We have a potential Agricultural land of about 20 million acres. Less than 15 millions of this land, are under cultivation.
We have vast oil and minerals resources; we have enough water and fish resources in addition to potential hydro-electric power. At this juncture, I would like to state we are going to spare no efforts to rid the Sudan of a system based on sectarianism, on racism, on religion, on family and to establish a national democratic government that is well equipped to accelerate the development of these resources for the benefit of our people and within a united Sudan. These are our objectives.
To come back to your question, I would say that we are in a process of a nation formation. We are going to rejuvenate the Sudan and make it a nation that is proud of itself, a Sudan that is not just a mere bridge between the Arab and the African worlds as it has been described. This in our view will be a very dirty bridge. Of course, when people walk on a bridge, it is bound to be dirty. So we do not want the two family-parties to continue to walk on the Sudanese people be they Arabs or African. In short, we want to build a nation that will be proud of itself, that will make its rightful contribution both in African and the Arab world and in the world at large. This is the objective we want to achieve.

Q: 29 FROM WHAT YOU HAVE JUST SAID, IT DOES SEEM THAT YOUR MOVEMENT HAS AN IDEOLOGY BUT YOU WANT TO DEFER IT TO SOME LATER STAGE OF YOUR STRUGGLE. DON’T YOU THINK THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR YOU TO COME UP WITH A DEFINITE IDEOLOGY SO THAT THE SUDANESE PEOPLE CAN BE ABLE TO JUDGE WHETHER YOUR MOVEMENT IS A LIBERAL, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC OR MARXIST? WHAT IS YOUR FEAR?

A: We are not deferring our ideology as you have said, for some later stage of our struggle. We have been saying it and are on record about the type of system we want to establish in the Sudan. But if some people fail to recognise it, it may be because they do not want to recognise what we have been saying about what we want. We have said it many times, in our literature and some of my speeches that we want to form a new Sudan, and of course the formation of new Sudan itself must have basis. At present the basis for the new Sudan are being created, and this is something you Sudanese intellectuals must look into, find out the factors that bring us together and to build on it. In fact our history did not begin with the British colonialism, or the Turkish intrusion into our country; nor did it start with the coming of Islam or the rise of the Mahdia. It did not either begin at the 1947 Juba Conference or in 1955 when a garrison in Torit revolted. We believe that the hi!
story of the Sudanese people dates back to many thousand years. We have, therefore, been here all along. When some people talk about the ancient Egyptian civilisation, ancient Egypt or the Pharonic Egypt, one should answer the question as to who were these people and where they went… This is us, we got displaced. We got pushed down and down. We must rise up a proud nation that can look after itself.

Q: 30 ASSUMING THAT YOU HAVE SUCCEDED TO FORM A NEW SUDAN WITH YOU AS ITS LEADER, WHAT IN YOUR OPINION, WOULD BE THE BEST SYSTEM UNDER WHICH THE NEW COUNTRY WILL BE GOVERNED?

A: Obviously, Sudan is a vast country, the big great country, I would say, in Africa. As such it cannot be ruled exclusively from the centre. The power must of course be devolved to the regions. You may call them regions or federal states. This is however just semantic. What is important in this regard, is the content of the devolution of power to the people for the purpose of administration and economic development in the regions or states; the intention of which is, of course, to take the government to the grassroots: the grassroots to effectively to participate in the development of the country and they in turn benefit from this development. So, the structure of the rule or the power structure, must be decentralised, with of course, the central government in the national capital in Khartoum or some other place, that can be selected as the capital of the whole country.

Q: 31 IN REGARD TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, WHAT TYPE WOULD YOU RECOMMEND, THE CENTRALISED ECONOMY OR THE OPEN MARKET ECONOMY?

A: You know there are certain things that can best be done by individuals and there are others, which must be done collectively. Like wise there are many projects that can best be managed by the central government others by the regional or local governments. Given our vast mineral and other natural resources, there is no way that an individual can for instance, develop and run a hydro-electric plant. A project of this kind can best be managed by a central government or regional governments. In the same way heavy industries can be run by central government. The establishment of schools and hospitals can be carried out by the central authority, as well as by regional authorities. Private schools and clinics, can be opened by individuals. Co-operative societies are areas in which groups of persons can be involved for the benefit of the people. So, you see you can have private enterprises run by individuals, you can have co-operative societies run by a group of people, !
you can have regional corporations but you must have central government institutions.
So, if you look at all these things, you cannot make a clear cut answer as to say, at the present moment, what type of economic order or development one can predict will be best for our country. Once we have succeeded to achieve our objectives, our experts will have to sit down and sort out the best ways of accelerating the economic development in our country.

Q: 32 CAN YOU ENLIGHTEN US AS TO HOW YOU ADMINISTER THE TOWNS AND AREAS UNDER YOUR CONTROL?

A: We administer the liberated towns and areas through committees. There are village committees, town committees and district committees. We will have provincial committees when we move to the cities. These committees are responsible for the administration of the villages, towns and the areas under our control. When we liberate a District we have to set up an administrative machinery to over see public as well as inter-personnel matters. We also have District Councils, which have various functions such as education, veterinary, agriculture, judiciary and medical services. All these services are supervised by an administrator. Besides we have District Councils and the District Political-Military High Command. A District Council is composed of members elected by the village committees. The District Council is headed by an Administrator. The present Administrator of Pibor for example, is Mr. Clement Katinya, a former administrator in Malakal. He replaced Mr. Ater Dak who has been transferred to the Headquarters. We give some military training in our military and political schools. They participate in battles before they are posted to run the liberated areas. All the administrative structure is under an Area Commander who heads the District Military-Political High Command. The District High Command is the policy making body as well as the executive organ in a District. The District Administrator is a member of the District High Command. The political officer, the intelligence officer and the members of the District councils are also members of this policy making body. In summery, it is through this process that we run the administration in the liberated areas.

Q: 33 DO YOU INTEND TO ESTABLISH A GOVERNMENT ONCE YOU HAVE LARGER AREAS UNDER YOUR CONTROL?

A: Well, it depends on what you mean by a government. What I have described above is a form of government. Of course, we don’t call it a government. We call it a provisional administration. In other words we do not have a government in a sense that this is a ministry of education, a ministry of health or a ministry for agriculture. We just set up an administration from the grassroots to provide services and other development activities. Coming from the base, we are essentially establishing an administration as we go along with the liberation of the whole country. But we do not have a government in the sense you might have conceived in your mind or in the conventional sense. We are not therefore going to declare that we have a government.

Q: 34 JUDGING FROM THE EVENTS THAT HAVE BEEN TAKING PLACE IN OUR COUNTRY DURING THE LAST FOUR YEARS, ONE WOULD BE BOUND TO CONCLUDE THAT THE WAR YOU ARE WAGING AGAINST THE SUDAN GOVERNMENT MAY, IF IT IS NOT BROUGHT TO A SPEEDY END, LEAD THE SUDAN INTO A LEBANESE-LIKE SITUATION. WHAT IN YOUR VIEW CAN BE DONE IN ORDER TO AVOID THE LEBANESE EXPERIENCE?

A: It will be very unfortunate if we go in for a Lebanese-like situation in which all factions in the country are fighting one another indiscriminately. I am sure nobody among the peace-loving Sudanese would like to see us follow the Lebanese experience where the warring factions do not differentiate friends from enemies. However, we cannot dismiss the fact that we have some bad elements in our society who would like to Lebanise the Sudan. These people are there and will do all kinds of things to instigate and promote sectarian ideas and actions that will push us into a Lebanese-like situation. Of course, we would not allow this to happen.
To answer your question…what can be done to avoid Lebanising the Sudan, my only advice is that first, all Sudanese political forces and the Sudanese people at large must fight against any attempt to Lebanise our country. We must also fight against attempts to implement them. In our view the only way to avoid any disastrous approach to Sudanese problem, is to hasten the process of dialogue and to restore peace in our country as soon as possible. The restoration of peace is of vital importance if we are to concentrate all our efforts on the development of our human and natural resources. This will, of course, demand that the current war be brought to a speedy end. We should not have a cause for quarrel because we are a large country with huge untapped resources enough for all of us.
The second thing that must be done if we are to avoid disastrous approach to our problems is for the Sudanese to get rid of sectarianism, racial and religious discriminations as well as the system based on a family rule. These factors must be eradicated immediately because they have bled our country for the last thirty-one years of its political independence. Regrettably, Sudan has not known peace since it obtained its political independence. There was the 17 years old war, there was the nine years of uneasy peace, then came the Anya Nya Two war. It is now going to be five years since the SPLA started the present war. Finally, the Sudanese people must realise that we have been at war with one another precisely because while some of us are trying to establish a multi-nationality and multi-religious society, there are others who are trying to create a mono-nationality and mono-religious nation. In our view we must get rid of these factors because they have been responsible for the three-decade-old instability in our country. Indeed, thirty-one years of instability is a long period in the history of a nation. We must therefore draw useful lessons from our immediate history to recognise the fact that the above factors cannot advance our cause. On the contrary they are responsible for our continued disunity. These factors left unresolved will never make us build a united and proud nation. In order to avoid the Lebanese experience, we must create a conducive atmosphere for the building of a new Sudan; a Sudan that is free of all forms of discriminations; a Sudan of equality and justice; a Sudan that is a home for all of us.

JUBA DECLARATION Between the SPLM/A and the SSDF, January 2006

JUBA DECLARATION ON UNITY AND INTERGRATION BETWEEN THE SUDAN PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY (SPLA) AND THE SOUTH SUDAN DEFENCE FORCES (SSDF)

January 8th 2006

PREAMBLE

The SPLA and SSDF having met in Juba between the 6th and 8th January, 2006 and fully aware of the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) regarding the status of the Other Armed Groups (OAG’s).

Committed to upholding and defending the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and its full implementation;

Motivated by their desire for peace, reconciliation and unity among the people of Southern Sudan;

Determined to end all forms of conflict and hostilities among themselves, so as to usher a new era of hope, stability and sustainable development in Southern Sudan;

Further determined to build trust and confidence among themselves and to avoid past mistakes that have led to divisions and internecine conflict between themselves and among the people of Southern Sudan in general;

Cognizant of the fact that the SPLM led Government has already included members of the SSDF in the institutions of Government of National Unity, the Government of Southern Sudan and the Governments of the States to ensure SSDF participation;

Acknowledging that the people of Southern Sudan have one indivisible destiny;

Inspired by the struggle and the immense sacrifices and suffering of our people in defence of their land, freedom, dignity, culture identity and common history; and

Remembering our fallen heroes, heroines and martyrs who paid the ultimate price for the freedom of our people and to ensure that these sacrifices are not in vain;

Do hereby make the following Declaration to be known as the Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration:

Complete and unconditional unity between the SPLA and SSDF.
Agree to immediately integrate their two forces to form one unified, non partisan Army under the name of SPLA as stipulated in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
Immediate and total cessation of all forms of hostilities and to ensure that all their forces and persons under their control observe and comply with this declaration.
Guarantee freedom of movement of people, goods and services in all areas in Southern Sudan.
Declaration of general amnesty covering any criminal acts committed during the past period of hostilities between the two forces.
Appeal to any armed persons or groups outside the two forces to join the process of unity and reconciliation in order to promote peace, stability and development throughout Southern Sudan.
The unified Movement shall mobilize the people of Southern Sudan behind this agreement and to support its implementation.

IMPLEMENTATION

In implementation of this declaration the two parties agree to form the following committees:

1. High Political Committee

There shall be a High Political Committee to oversee the overall implementation of this unity agreement. It shall be established by the Chairman of the SPLM and C- in – C of SPLA in consultation with Major- General Paulino Matip Nhial, Chief of Staff of the SSDF.

2. Military Technical Committee

There shall be established a Military Technical Committee consisting of equal numbers to implement the terms of this declaration. It shall be established by the Chairman of the SPLM and C- in – C of SPLA in consultation with Major General Paulino Matip Nhial, Chief of Staff of the SSDF. The Joint Military Technical Committee shall report to the High Political Committee and handle inter alia the following issues:

¨ Integration of SSDF into the SPLA and its command structures and all its component units including the Joint Integration Units.
¨ Harmonisation of ranks and deployment of forces and to report to the principals.
¨ Handle issues of demobilisation and downsizing of forces in accordance with the provisions of the CPA.
¨ Report to the High Political Committee on all matters relating to this Unity Declaration.

3. Administrative and Civil Service Committee

This committee shall deal with the integration of non military personnel of SSDF into the Civil Service of the Government of Southern Sudan and the Governments of the States.

v Call on the National Congress Party and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF)

The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) calls upon its partner the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) to support this agreement which has been guided by the provision of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement regarding the status of the Other Armed Groups (OAG’s). The decision by the SSDF to be integrated into the SPLA is a legitimate decision which will consolidate peace and security in Southern Sudan and the Sudan at large. The two parties signatory to the agreement call on all other Sudanese political forces to support this declaration.

v Appeal to the International Community

The two parties also appeal to the international community to support this agreement as it will consolidate peace in the Sudan and bring about lasting peace among the people of Southern Sudan.

Signed by:

H.E Lt. General Salva Kiir Mayardit
1st Vice President of the Republic of Sudan,
President of the Government of South Sudan and Chairman of the SPLM
Commander- in-Chief of SPLA.

and

Major General Paulino Matip Nhial
Chief of Staff of Southern Sudan
Defence Force (SSDF)

Witnessed by

Mr. Aaron R. Tuikong S.S.
Chief Executive,
Moi Africa Institute (MAIN)

Minutes of the Historical SPLM Meeting in Rumbek, 2004

CONFIDENTIAL REPORT

On the Joint meeting of the SPLM/A leadership Council, General Military Command Council, Heads of Commissions, SPLM Secretariats, SPLM County Secretaries, Civil Society & Community Leaders.

RUMBEK 29TH OF NOVEMBER TO 1ST OF DECEMBER 2004

DAY 1 Opening Prayer: Rev. Clement Janda
Introduction: Cdr. Dr. Riek Machar
Briefing: Cdr. Salva Kiir Mayardit

Introduction

Cdr. Dr. Riek Machar Thanked Cdr. Mark Nyipuoch, Cdr. Dr. John Garang and the other participants and announced the beginning of the meeting, which had been ordered by the Chairman. The first part of the meeting comprised of the leadership council, the Secretariats, and the members of the General Staff. The second part was composed of the members of IGAD team, and the Commissioners and Secretaries of the SPLM.

In the opening of the meeting the Chairman Cdr. Dr. John Garang, thanked members of the SPLM/A national leadership Council and welcomed all the participants who traveled to Rumbek. ‘I thank you in the name of the Almighty God. To begin with I wrote two messages:

One on 14/11/004 (No. 001/11/004) to address the following accusations/rumours;
• That there was a meeting held in Nairobi under the Chairmanship of myself where Cdr. Salva Kiir would be replaced by the Chairman with Cdr. Nhial Deng.
• That I went to Kampala and met with Cdr. Pieng and ordered him to arrest Cdr. Salva Kiir Mayardit.
• That Cdr. Malual Majok went to Ramciel to collect forces to go and arrest Cdr. Salva Kiir Mayardit at Yei.

They are all lies and a big propaganda initiative.

The second message was on 23/11/04 calling for this meeting which we are now convening today and where I want to make a general briefing about the signing of peace next month in which each and every one should be informed accordingly.

Cdr. Machar then welcomed Cdr. Salva Kiir Mayardit to brief the national leadership meeting where he welcomed the Chairman and C-in-C and the national leadership. ‘I confirm the two messages read to you by the Chairman are all true. The rumours came from Nairobi and around the leadership of the SPLM/A. The second message I got was through Cdr. Pagan Amum who was visiting the liberated areas with friends from friendly countries. I requested Cdr. Mabior Kuer to ask the HQs why I am not talking directly to the Chairman. I spoke to the Chairman when he was in Kampala and he told me that I should meet him in Yirol, which I didn’t reply to in the light of the rumours.

The rumours implied that I will be arrested at Ramciel where the Chairman was, so I decided not to go. When I received that rumour, I called the security personnel in Yei and discussed the issue in length with them. I also informed them to find out where the sources of the rumours from Nairobi were coming from, which they did.

After I spoke with the Chairman, I also met Cdr. Pieng in Yei for the whole day and he was advising me to join the Chairman in Yirol, which I refused. After that I met Cdr. Kuol Manyang and Cdr. Deng Alor. They came from Nairobi with information that I should go to Nairobi for reconciliation between the two of us. I considered the word reconciliation as something very serious, and therefore decided to tell them that I will not go to Nairobi. The HQs of the Chairman complained that they were calling me and that if I recognized their number, I would switch off the telephone. That is not true; I never received any call from them and switch off my telephone.

I assure you that the allegation that I am against peace is not true. I am really for peace so that the International Community could rescue our suffering people. People of Bahr El Ghazal have suffered too much from repeated famine and from the Arab militias – and for these reasons I am the first to embrace peace to relief them from suffering. Peace efforts such as the Wunlit Peace Conference have up to date ceased hostilities between Western Upper Nile and Bahr El Ghazal; and that is good. So I need peace. There are those who want to create confusion in the Movement and fabricate such things. I don’t have personal problem with the Chairman.

If we are National Leaders, which I don’t believe we are because we have no cohesion within our leadership structure, let us be sincere with ourselves. After meetings are concluded, we run to foreign countries. There is no code of conduct to guide the Movement’s structures. When the Chairman leaves for abroad, no directives are left and no one is left to act on his behalf. I don’t know with whom the Movement is left with; or does he carry it in his own brief case?

The Chairman killed the national Executive Council (NEC) by creating the leadership Council. But there is no provision in the Convention for a ‘Leadership Council’. Does he want to revive the Political Military High Command? The Leadership Council creates a situation where all are directly reporting to the Chairman – including SPLM County Secretaries. When I mentioned these facts, they should not be construed to be my personal or family problems. Those around the Chairman don’t tell him the opinion of the public. The Chairman is everything, from a finance officer to one at the lowest level.

Corruption, as a result of the lack of structures, has created a lack of accountability which has reached a proportion that will be difficult to eradicate.

In fact, there are many outstanding administrative problems that require our attention. These include the infrequent converting of conferences at the leadership level, causing an absence in the SPLA/M chain of command and making others to directly communicate with the Chairman without following the right procedures. This should be corrected. If the responsibility of Governors goes directly to the Chairman, what will be the work of Cdr. Daniel Awet? I hope Cdr. Daniel Awet will address all those things. The Chairman should not make appointments of SPLM County Secretaries; it is the work of the Governors.

The other issue I would like Comrade Chairman to address is how the CANS structures are now operating, e.g., take the absence of the SPLM Regional Secretary for Bahr El Gazal from his area of responsibility while there has been sporadic tribal feuds within the region – and which has resulted into sectional conflict. The Chairman most of the time send Cdr. Deng Alor on foreign missions which were supposed to be the work of Cdr. Nhial Deng.

There are several other administrative issues that require correction. We are three Deputies without functions. The Chairman is responsible for all systems including the Army General Headquarters. Our HQs. started in Yei, then Rumbek, then new Cush and now Ramciel. When are we going to establish our HQs? The deputies of the General Staff are the ones commanding the forces; they should stay in the General Headquarters instead of commanding. Yet the Chairman is the one who dismantled the General Headquarters. Comrade Chairman, the establishment of the General headquarters hasn’t been fulfilled and this I have been requesting ever since Yei was liberated. Branch officers such as the Director of Military Intelligence and his deputy are now in your Headquarters, though they are supposed to remain at the General Headquarters. The Chairman concentrates on his headquarters forgetting the rest of the army. It is only his headquarters, which has military uniforms, boots and other supplies.

Our present situation requires us to be organized and prepared. If peace is signed, the question is; what have we done in training our military cadres so that they meet the standard of their counterparts in the integrated army. There are rumours that the Chairman had already selected by name those Commanders who would command the Joint Integrated Army. What about the rest of the army and who will pay them? The Chairman seems to have taken the Movement as his own property. As we leave Rumbek after this meeting, I would like to see that all our administrative issues be addressed and implemented following this meeting’s resolutions.

I would also want Comrade Chairman to give me full powers of the Chief of the General Staff (COGS) to enable me expedite the regrouping and reorganization of the SPLA, and if Comrade Chairman sees that I am not able to do that job, then he can appoint another person to do it.

The Chairman is to be 1st Vice-President of the Sudan and the head of the Government of Southern Sudan, but he is not talking to Southerners. The North is organizing southern militias so that we fight among ourselves. We must unite our own ranks and not just unity with the north. On a personal basis, I don’t have any problems with the Chairman but our working relationship is bad and leaves a lot to be desired.

I would also like to say something about rampant corruption in the Movement. At the moment some members of the Movement have formed private companies, bought houses and have huge bank accounts in foreign countries. I wonder what kind of system are we going to establish in South Sudan considering ourselves indulged in this respect.

2nd Session

 Response from the Chairman. I give the floor to the national leadership to comment on what had been said by Cdr. Salva Kiir, I don’t want this to be a debate between Cdr. Salva Kiir and I.

 Edward Lino thanked the Chairman and said we are really in need of resolving the problems within the SPLM/A. The people of Abyei are accused of being Dr. John’s supporters and as such, are victimized for that. Cdr. Pieng made an intervention that Cdr. Edward was not addressing the issues.

 Cdr. Elijah Malok stated he really supported what Cdr. Salva Kiir said, and recommended that a collective leadership be created. Here in Bahr El Ghazal Cdr. Deng Alor has been away for too long and these are known facts; the leadership council should address and resolve these outstanding issues and go back on the right track. Let us form committees to reorganize the army, since all the units are here. I don’t believe what Cdr. Mayardit said about the people being victimized. Structures are to be recognized right way as a government so let us reorganize them and work in the right way as a government.

 Dr. Justin Yac. I will go with the suggestion of Cdr. Pieng that the Chairman response to the issues raised by Cdr. Salva Kiir.

 Cdr./Dr. John Garang I will give my contribution to what has been raised; that firstly we need to dispose of rumours. In the whole of South Sudan, there is a general concern from the citizens, and in Yei, the officers and citizens believe there is a danger facing the Movement. We have to clear the danger and give our people assurances.

Cdr. Salva Kiir and I have been together in the movement for 22 years, and have been close friends, and we will continue that way. 22 years of friendship can’t be thrown away by rumours; Cdr. Salva will be with me now until the end of the interim period and beyond, and I will cite what was said when I visited Malual Kon and the “Luak” of the family of Cdr. Salva where I entered the house to show comradeship and a long cherished friendship. At a meeting while visiting there we were told, “You are the two orphans” left because the original members of the High Command died, both of us will carry on to bring peace.

I cited what happened at New Site recently when the Chiefs a ceremony where a bull was sacrificed to show how we are united. At the spiritual performance, one traditional leader said that 4 things will happen:-
1. The bull will urinate.
2. The bull will fall down.
3. The bull will face the North.
4. The bull will die without being slaughtered.

And all the four happened.

The allegation that I was going to dismiss Cdr. Salva and arrest him was not only a lie, but it did not even occur in my mind. I was preoccupied with the peace process and not trying to create a crisis. Before UN Security Council Meeting, I received a telephone call from President Bush who said that he now had those who will work with him during the next four years and that I am one of them. President Bush said, “John don’t let us down. We want peace before the end of the year”.

The allegation that I will be replacing Cdr. Salva was a bad lie. If Cdr. Salva was dismissed and replaced with Cdr. Nhial Deng Nhial, it would mean that I would have dismissed all those senior to Cdr. Nhial which includes Cdr. Riek, Cdr. James, Cdr. Daniel Awet, Cdr. Lual Diing, etc. – which would be bad for the Movement. So this allegation is a lie. The crisis only has the support of our enemies who want a crisis in the Movement. This situation was created by our enemies because they do not want to sign the peace agreement.

The Chairman pointed out that the GOS has never been happy with the protocols, specially the Machakos protocol, because of the self-determination clause. The GOS and their supporters don’t accept the security arrangement and the Wealth Sharing Agreement, which gives the South of Sudan 51%. The Khartoum Government wants to reject the agreement being signed or at least delay it. By delaying in signing, Khartoum will gain $2.5 billion from the oil revenues, which we must prevent by all means possible. Khartoum was unhappy with the Power Sharing and 3 areas protocols. Neither I nor Cdr. Salva had any interest in delaying the peace agreement. I have nothing to gain by dismissing Cdr. Salva.

Finally I have never had any thought of dismissing Cdr. Salva. And it should be considered a lie. This rumour has caused commotion everywhere in Southern Sudan, Khartoum and the Diaspora – so I will assure our people everywhere and send a strong message to Khartoum Government that they will not divide the SPLM/A.

Cdr. Salva and I are innocent of the situation, and four of our leaders will appear in a press conference telling the whole world about our unity and that there is no problem among SPLM/A members. Secondly, I want to assure you of my confidence in Cdr. Salva Kiir Mayardit. My relationship with Cdr. Salva goes back to 1983 – Cdr. Chagai Atem, Kerubino and many others were close to me. I still have personal relationship with Cdr. Salva and I trust and have confidence in him. This is needed now than ever before. I want Cdr. Salva to be around me during the interim period, and beyond.

The Government of Sudan called upon all the Newspapers to stop making allegations against the Movement. So let us put that issue to rest.

Secondly, Cdr. Salva said that I brought all the officers around me, leaving him alone in vacuum. What I can say is that is not true.

On internal reforms, I agree that reforms are necessary. We are all behind them. We have been making reforms since 1983, e.g., the Zonal Command, Political High Command, NLC, NEC, etc.. these structures can be changed but the objective remains the same. Our imperfect structures have brought us to the present day. Let us not throw away these structures now, otherwise we will throw ourselves away.

The Chairman urged the meeting to introduce changes slowly. He said he is for change but slow change. The Chairman reiterated that all SPLM/A members will be protected; he assured all members that no one will be left out. On the issue of new comers who are said to be taking over the Movement, he said we should accept all southerners new or old because there are more southerners than members of the SPLM/A who must be accommodated; but no newcomer will displace anyone who has been with us for years.

On the appointment of Governors; all Governors will be appointed from their respective areas, e.g. in Lakes the Governor here will come from Lakes. As for States, people of each State will form their governments with no marginalization within States.

As for the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS), there will be representation based on the states, fairness and justice. Similarly at the Central Government, there will be State representation. All Governments, whether GOSS or State Governments will be based on modern standardized structures.

The army will be organized based on modern standards. The SPLM will be reorganized democratically. There will be a mult-party system. There will be no need for coup d’etat anymore, so for example my friend Dr. Riek Machar will not need to make a coup because he can form his own party if he is discontented with SPLM.

The issue now is how to achieve a Comprehensive Peace Agreement. After that, the 2nd national Convention will be convened as soon as possible after the peace agreement is signed. The NIF Government is not happy having to sign the agreement on or before 31st December 2004. The Government is not happy with the UN Security Council Resolution1574. The NIF want to create an armed group loyal to them. They also want to create a political group from among southerners to be used by them. We must stop such a move that will create enemies among Southerners to fight among themselves.

South-to-South dialogue must be organized properly, but the leadership has refused outside mediation. I told the European groups about our stand on this. The Power Sharing protocol states that the SPLM will form the Government in the South. The protocol give 15% to non-SPLM/A members and 15% to members of other parties. There will be discussions therefore with Southern parties.

On Civil Society, we need to dialogue with them including the Churches. On top of that, lawyers and other concerned members will write a constitution for Southern Sudan. There will be a constitution for states and the rule of law will be established.

Finally, regarding our vision and strategies; we must continue with our programmes because we are succeeding in the process. I reject the view that there are some of us who are unionists and others separatists within the SPLM/A. There are no such differences among our people. We are all for the unity of Southern people, and the Movement will carry out the referendum. As for members of the Khartoum National Government who have mutinied, there is a group calling themselves SPLM/A members. I told them that we want peace and we don’t want you to be SPLM/A now. I told the group to organize their own independent Movement, and not be associated with SPLM/A.

On the structures the only way to resolve it is through the national Convention, which should be convened as soon as possible.

3rd Session

 Cdr. Deng Monydit. Greeted everyone and praised the leaders for coming together. He stated his appreciation of the response given by the leadership; ‘I want to say I am happy to discuss what was about to be stolen from us, and it is not the concern of those in London. This struggle is not the private property of anybody. Whoever says the Movement is his property is wrong, for the movement is for all.

 Cdr. Garang Mobil. I thank the leaders. Since 1997 I decided to stay in my house because I did not believe that our problems should be solved by violence. Facts must be stated now in order to solve them once and for all. On the ‘orphans’ there six (6) members who died and only two (2) are left. The question I want to discuss today, is that there is a problem but the Chairman keeps saying there are no problems, only a ‘gap’ between him and Cdr. Salva. He will not accept there are problems in the New Sudan. But if the problem is not solved, there will be no peace. I also want to say that the movement is in the hands of a few and many are alienated. National resources must be shared by all, no matter how small it is. The structures are controlled by a few minority groups, and this must be sorted out now in Rumbek. This minority group is the problem; hand picking people must stop now because it is creating problems.

 Cdr. Agassio Akol. There is a problem because many people avoid Cdr. Salva as Deputy Chairman and Chief of the General Staff. The Governors and their deputies bypass Salva and correspond directly with the Chairman of the Movement, which I consider to be outside proper procedure. Cdr. Salva said that in his talks, he raised specific issues which he needed answers on. The Chairman must have failed to answer these issues, otherwise, the talks would have ended. Cdr. Salva said he did not blame anyone but the Chairman. He wanted the Chairman to tell him whether he was wrong or not. For example Cdr. Salva questioned the legitimacy of the leadership Council, as he considered it to be illegal.

The National Convention is unlikely to come soon to solve the problems of our structures; the convention has no importance for now. For Cdr. Salva, structures cannot be done by a Convention. So who is going to organize the army? {Cdr. Mark Nyipuoc intervened by saying a press conference should be made.}

 Cdr. Taban Deng Gai. I want to express my appreciation and happiness for this meeting. It is good to discuss issues of this nature, which appear to divide our movement. I want to congratulate the leaders for agreeing to come to attend the meeting. I want to congratulate Dr. Riek, Ayendit and others for the mediation. If we had such mediation in 1991, there would have been no problems that year, and the coup d’etat would not have taken place. This meeting is on internal issues. Those in Khartoum are happy to see the SPLM/A destroyed by Southern interests. But we are now victorious for we have stopped that disaster. As for our system, there are institutions but not functioning ones. The Leadership Council will not take us anywhere. The era of the Political Military High Command is gone. We must have a modern system of government created by the following committees:
1. Committee for the Army;
2. Committee for the Government;
3. Committee for the Judiciary; and
4. The Parliament.

 Justice Ambrose Riny. I greet the Leadership and SPLA officers. In 1994 the Convention created institutions. When I talked about the independence of the Judiciary, many officers reacted against it. It was the intervention of the Chairman who permitted the Committee to complete its work. There have been difficulties and roadblocks by those who did not want a system. There have been difficulties in implementing the resolutions. In 2004, the leadership Council was set up to replace the NLC and NEC. The Leadership Council has no legal base to exist. The Chairman dissolved legally instituted organs of the movement as contained in the national convention of 1994, but unilaterally established illegal institutions which are not supported by any legal provisions of the convention thereof.

I want to say that a lot has been done by a few. Most of the things done are imperfect, but they have served us. I appreciate what has been done on South-South dialogue under the SPLM/A Secretary General. The Chairman was supposed to establish a constitutional committee to draft our constitution. We must come together in a place where all departments are residing; there should be one center for the government of SPLM/A to stop all these rumours.

I would like to point out that many members of the movement have lost their ability to sit in an office. I want to point out an incident where a commander told me that what Dr. John or Cdr. Kuol Manyang say ‘up there’ does not work in the South. What kind of a system is this, if it is not respected by its officers? There is no system respected in this movement. I suggest that a committee be formed to organize the army and a conference to inform the world and our supporters that there is no problem from within.

 Mama Kezia. I thank both leaders for coming together to discuss all the issues. I was happy with the 1st Vice-Chairman for saying everything in his heart. The rumours outside are bad. Both leaders say it was only a misunderstanding. I appreciate what is happening and I call upon Rev. Clement Janda to bless our conclusion. I agree with the 1st Vice-Chairman that there is something wrong with our system. After the death of the Chairman of my commission, no one has been appointed, and therefore there is no one to report to. For me it took three (3) years to see the leader of the movement. There isn’t a good system. But I think that from now on there will be a system in place.

 Cdr. Pieng. Greetings. I will be saying something different; that I have not been happy with our meetings that end without resolutions. I am a revolutionary soldier. I have both military and political interest and if anybody things I don’t have both, he is lying. I am not happy with the response of the Chairman; there are problems to be addressed, and these problems must be solved now.

The Chairman has not committed mistakes; for me, they are unintended mistakes, for the Chairman could not create problems for himself. I mentioned that during the time of Kerubino there were problems. There were rumours that the Chairman was going to throw away his SPLM/A cadres and replace them with people who have not been in the movement since its inception. There must be committees to reorganize the movement; I agree with Cdr. Elijah Malok’s call for a system and committees. When the Chairman goes away on a visit, he never leaves anyone to act where officers should report to.

 Cdr. David. Greetings. I blame the Chief of the General Staff for having failed to do anything until now. But nothing is too late; I suggest that the army be organized now. First create a General Command for the SPLA, for there is no army without a General Staff.

 Cdr. Oyai Deng. I want to add my voice of being happy to participate in this meeting. When the movement started, you were seven (7) and now you are only two (2) remaining. Some said that you conspired against those who died and now you are conspiring against yourselves. I am shocked to hear Cdr. Salva talk here only about Bahr El Ghazal and not the South in general give he is a leader for all. I strongly agree with Cdr. Salva that when the Chairman goes away, he locks the South in his bag. This is wrong. Cdr. Salva has the right to question anything wrong. There is a problem that must be solved by taking the right decisions.

 Cdr. Gier Chuang. I understand what is happening; I didn’t believe that Dr. John will sit near Cdr. Salva again today. I am happy to see this conference. Many people have died due to internal differences and I refer to what had happened in the 1991 crisis. There must be resolutions for all issues, which bring about conflicts; there must be committees established, specially for the SPLA. I also pointed out that during the December 2003 meeting in New Site, there were no representatives from the army. What is a government without an army.

 Cdr. James Oath. I greet the gathering. When the movement started you were seven (7) and now you are only two (2) – five died having problems with you (Dr. John). Why do you have problems with your colleagues? The leadership has disabled the movement, so why keep it? Why is there a GMC, because it has never met until now? There is no SPLA ready to fight, and for me there is no army to order. If I am ordered to arrest Cdr. Salva, I do not have an army to arrest anyone. Even the Chief of Staff cannot order me to do anything because there is no army. There is no chance to meet the C-in-C – it will take long time to meet him. This is not good, therefore a committee must be formed now to sort everything out.

 Cdr. Oboto Mamur. Greetings. The Chairman always had problems with his colleagues. Now you are two (2) and you are turning against yourselves. Chairman you have been lying throughout since 1983. A Chairman should trust his deputies because there is a big problem here. I ask the Chairman whether he has mandated us to judge him? And if so, we will pass our judgment on him now. We don’t want to talk for the sake of talking. There must be a committee to follow up on all the resolutions agreed on here. And I add, the convention will not solve our problems.

 Cdr. George J. Deng. This meeting is a good opportunity to talk today in front of other commanders. The reply by Cdr. John to Cdr. Salva is not convincing at all. My suggestion is that a committee must be formed to organize things right away. There is no longer any army. Therefore a committee has to be formed for the agreement to succeed. I view the SPLA as my home; if the leaders want to go then it is up to them.

 Cdr. Malong Awan. Everyone is waiting for the outcome of this dispute. Both leaders therefore should solve their differences. If they don’t solve their differences then they should remain inside this room until the crisis is over. Nor should we blame our enemies for the rumours came from ourselves – we should not blame outsiders. For example Ayen Maguat went to talk to Cdr. Salva. Many from Yei volunteered to go to talk to Cdr. Salva. She complained that Cdr. Wani Igga was in Yei but failed to talk to Cdr. Salva. Instead he went to his village. This was not good leadership and I disagree with Cdr. Wani Igga’s position.

Session 4.

 Cdr. Santo Ayang. I thank the communities of Bahr El Ghazal, Bor and the committees that went to Yei. Without them things would have got out of hand. The Chairman must tell us the truth about the source of these rumours. All that was circulated was not rumour, and no one was bribed by the enemy. You tell the world that you brought peace to Sudan, but the reality is that peace was brought about by those who fought for it and died. Those around you only please you and do not tell you the truth. I support the formation of committees suggested by Taban Deng Gai.

 Cdr. Ayuen Jongror. The conflict is within the leadership. When conflict arises, it must be resolved immediately. The two of you must be in one place and not in Nairobi and Yei. The style of your leadership is causing lots of problems. The GMC Secretariat was supposed to be formed, but since then, nothing has happened. The GMC should meet to discuss the issues of the army and structures of the Movement must be formed before the convention.

 Cdr. Elias Wai. There is fire so we need it not to burn further. Cdr. Salva is not convinced. All are not convinced with the reaction of the Chairman towards issues raised by Cdr. Salva Kiir. The Chairman is placing his relatives in key positions including Elijah Malok, too old, for example, to hold the position of Governor of the Central Bank. Note, there might be popular uprising one day and the army will join the public.

 Cdr. Jadalla. We are here to solve our problems. Committees should be formed to investigate the rumours. You think you are the founder of this movement, and as such, that you can do what you want without consulting people? The public is not ready for more problems.

 Cdr. Patrick Aitang. We are talking about rumours, but what do we do next? The letter alleged to have been written by Equatorians caused serious tensions. Thanks to Cdr. Salva for salvaging the situation. The ball is now in the court of the Chairman and he should come out with the facts leading up to this dispute. The Chairman should be bold and form the necessary structures.

 Cdr. Kitchener. The Chairman and Salva should work together until the end of the liberation struggle. We need leadership to lead us.

 Cdr. Ayual Makol. To achieve our objective, we must be united. If the two leaders of the Movement only agree to disagree, then it will lead to internal warfare. Form a committee to investigate the rumours

 Cdr. Dominic Dim. I agree that the Leadership Council should be abolished and the commissions replaced by the NEC. The Chairman has locked the NEC in his boxes. Dr. John’s response to Cdr. Salva was neither good nor sufficient. For me, there is still a problem as people still remain suspicious of the Chairman’s intentions. I reiterate that if the problem in question is not resolved, there will be a bigger problem in the Movement. I suggest that the Chairman be clear on resolving this conflict. We should remember how General Swar El Dahab was forced to take over during the crisis at that time. Cdr. Salva was asked by many people to take over, but he refused to do so. I support the formation of committees to restructure the movement and provide us with collective leadership.

 Cdr. Bior Ajang. I thank the previous speakers. Cdr. Salva has the right to blame the Leadership Council. The rumours are no longer rumours, but facts as said by Cdr. Salva. There is a problem and that problem should be solved now. I support the formation of committees. What transpired in Yei was the product of two rumours; 1) the arrest of Salva Kiir, and 2) the dismissal of Cdr. Salva Kiir.

Cdr. Salva Kiir gave us the chance and invited us to meet. I thank the bodyguards of Salva for handling the situation very wisely. Dr. John has no powers to dismiss Cdr. Salva because the national Convention elected both of them. I emphasize that rumours do not only originate from Nairobi. Yei is also a source. I support formation of committees.

 Cdr. Ismail. We should combat the rumours. It is very unusual for a Deputy Chairman not to have easy access to the Chairman. However, forming committees is another way of avoiding the problem. The explanation of the Chairman hasn’t convinced most of the people nor answered what was raised by Cdr. Salva.

 Cdr. Dau Akec Deng. I thank the 1st Vice-Chairman for his stand.

 Lt. Col. Mathiang Rok. This meeting has saved the lives of many people in the South. I would like to quote from Francis Mading’s book; “things that are not said divide people”. The Leadership Council has taken the powers of the NLC. People still doubt the Chairman’s comments were satisfactory. There are many ‘huddles’ in the system, e.g. the Leadership Council has taken up the role of the National Convention. Our main concern is how the structures will be made functional. We are here to bring peace and harmony among ourselves. If there is anything, which is not clear, it should be said now!

 Cdr. Chagai Atem. These rumours started in 1994 and I was the chief negotiator between the two. Now they are caught red handed again.

 Father George Kinga. I greet and thank the leaders. The four leaders are great and must be respected. The issues are institutional ones. I also support the formation of committees.

 Mr. Pascal Babindi. I am happy to have the chance of addressing this important and historic meeting. The restructuring we decided on at the Gorok NLC meeting pushed us ahead. I am confident that the reforms that shall soon be made will also push us ahead.

 Cdr. Achol Marial. A committee should be formed to investigate into where those rumours originated from. I appeal to the leadership to mobilize resources prior to the formation of ministries.

 Dr. Komanyangi. The formation of committees shall lead to a final solution to all our problems. I suggest that we give ourselves time for these deliberations to continue for one more day so that all issues are exhausted.

 Cdr. Simon Kun Pouch. The speakers have not talked on how to combat corruption. The formation of a committee to work out functions for our structures is not really a priority because they already exist, we need only to share power and prepare job descriptions for all the institutions of the movement.

 Cdr. James Kok Ruea. A preparatory committee for the Convention should be formed within the shortest time possible. We should work on the structures that will make the Movement function during the interim period as follows: 1) 1st Vice Chairman to chair the GMC, 2) 2nd Vice Chairman to chair the committee for the interim period and 3) 3rd Vice Chairman to chair the committee for National Convention.

 Mr. Muhammad Marjan. I believe that the world is looking forward to knowing what our movement will be like once peace is signed and we emerge as a government.

 Cdr. Michael Makuei Lueth. There is no need to form a committee to investigate the rumours, which were circulating, unless Cdr. Salva insists that they have never been rumours. I call upon both the Chairman and Cdr. Salva to build confidence between themselves. I assure the Chairman that as we are entering a new era, and if we remain in an unprepared manner, we will eventually be finished. The immediate establishment of our structures is necessary. The distribution of powers is also necessary. The army must be organized. There is also the importance of speeding up South-South dialogue before we enter the forthcoming era. The other issue is corruption. I am saying that the leadership is not committed to fighting corruption. I am against the suggestion that there should be a committee for the army’s reorganization. It is for the COGS, his deputies, and the directors to sit at the GHQs and issue orders according to the plans they set. The national Liberation members sh!
ould not blame the Chairman alone. In Gorok, the NLC gave the Chairman a blank cheque to restructure the movement, and that was when things started to go wrong.

DAY 2

Session 1

Opening remarks by the Master of ceremony after prayers noted that the present meeting has come out in the internet; and a warning was given to those who might have done so.

 Mr. Kosti Manibe. I want to add my voice to those who have already spoken. I express my appreciation to those concerned for having resorted to peace negotiations and to end the conflict through dialogue. I am happy that the 1991 disaster has been avoided. I acknowledge the existence of gaps in the system and I call upon the leaders to address the communication needs. I stress the need for media to send accurate messages to our people, enemies, etc.. The Movement should have a capacity for communication to deal with the media when required. I point out that a lot has been achieved – 90% of the objectives have been achieved. There are structures, but a lot of work requires to be done

The JAM’s programme on capacity building should be followed. Functions will be set out. On policy issues, I suggest that a lot remains to be done to build confidence in our system and institutions. I suggest that there is a need to form a small committee to look into the minutes of this meeting and to identify the crucial issues that needs resolutions as soon as possible. Such information should be disseminated.

 Cdr. John Luke. I am happy that the rumours have been resolved. The rumours of the dismissal of Cdr. Salva has been on air for a long time. There were other rumours that Cdr. James Wani was going to be replaced by Cdr. Pagan. Some responsible people in the Leadership Council have been quoted as saying that Cdr. Salva, with support from Bona Malual, will make a coup. There has been a problem among members of Leadership Council who have been complaining a lot. There is no system, especially in the office of the Chairman, which is treated as a private entity. The office of a leader must be well organized and staffed properly to do its work.

On the responsibility of leadership, Cdr. Dr. John should not be blamed alone because there are others. The dissolution of the Leadership Council will not mean that a normal system will be established. No proper changes will take place, even if the Leadership Council is dissolved. If Dr. Garang dissolves the Leadership Council, he will appoint the same people in the L.C. There is no need to make changes now until peace is signed. The formation process f or the government needs wide consultation; people should wait for a month until peace is signed.

The Chairman is being accused for not implementing decisions. In the army, if you need structures, I see Cdr. Salva as a political figure; so a pure army officer should be appointed as Chief of Staff and Cdr. Salva should be given a Commission. This way, the army should be run by an army officer who is not a politician.

Why is the leadership avoiding South-South dialogue? The Chairman refused to accept dialogue, but claims it after others implemented it. It was Cdr. Salva who supported the Wunlit Peace Conference – but the Chairman was against it. At the recent conference in Nairobi organized by the Kenyan Minister for Planning, the SPLM/A failed to attend because the Chairman had refused to let the SPLM attend. Cdr. James Wani is weak and the Chairman uses him to kill things related to South-South dialogue. The NLC is dead and I suggest that an emergency convention be organized immediately.

 Cdr. Marc Nyipouch. Cdr. Marc stated that the rumour that madam Nyandeng was arrested with 3.5 is libel and defamation. He continued to cite the case of General Lagu during the Regional Government. On the issue of Governor Deng Alor, Cdr. Marc said that Cdr. Deng collects money from abroad, banks it with the Chairman’s or his (Deng’s)
bank account, and that is why Deng Alor was taken away from the region – just to do that. Something Nhial has failed to do but what Deng is able to do. Deng should either be a Governor of Bahr el Ghazal or be replaced.

 Mr. Arthur Akuien. I am being called the Finance Secretary but without any finance. I want to point out that the rumours have been destructive and that the leadership style encourages such rumours. I want to say that the Chairman does not delegate powers to his deputies. The Chairman is responsible for creating this crisis in the movement.

On the structures, there are structures. But the Chairman after appointing someone to a position does not work with him, but he will appoint someone else to do the work, which is wrong. The Chairman creates all these problems within the system, and this is why he is being blamed. I also point out when a senior person tries to discipline a junior, the Chairman always fails to solve the problem among the staff and instead interferes. The leadership style of the Chairman’s work is bad and cannot be corrected. The Chairman has not been doing well in his job and he may be forced to leave his office before six years.

 Dr. Justin Yac. The Chairman is good for external contacts but within his own institutions he is not good. The Chairman is good in talking but poor in doing things. The Cdrs. Condemned him the day before and I quote Cdr. Salva who said that “Dr. John does not forget and does not forgive”, and who ever quarreled him ended up dead.

Many people know the Chairman’s abilities and weaknesses for the last twenty-two years. The Chairman can impress people when he talks, but lacks action. The commanders the day before gave the Chairman grade F because he failed to adequately answer the issues raised by Cdr. Salva. The Chairman should not think that he is always right; rather he must admit his mistakes. The Chairman must work with a team and not be a leader of the NLC and Chairman of SPLM. Leadership must be collective.

The officers the other day faced the Chairman with hard facts, but we have not been telling the Chairman the truth. We are also to blame. The Chairman should respond to issues of structures to avoid the recurrence of this problem. The Chairman can listen and write on issues, but he always discards them. The Chairman has been everything ever since the movement started. I call upon the Chairman to work with people and not alone. The Chairman should know that he has been wrong because some of the members have not been telling him the truth. Some leaders should be blamed for not doing their part, for many have not been doing things properly. I repeat what Cdr. Salva said that Dr. John does not forget and forgive. So I want to say that those without guns are vulnerable. The Cdrs. Are secure because they have guns to protect themselves from the Chairman, but I ask, who is going to protect those of us without guns?

I call upon Dr. John to listen to all the demands and that he (the Chairman) should make changes and suitable structures. I also suggest that the Rumbek meeting should come up with resolutions that we support the finalization of the peace agreement now, all should be committed to the peace process.

On the issue of dissolution of the leadership council, there is no difference so no changes are necessary. I urge the Chairman to work closely with his aids. We have sat here because we are part and parcel of the executive and leadership as well. Mr. Chairman, I urge you to treat us equally and remove doubts that there are people you prefer.

 Cdr. Elijah Malok. I propose the formation of three (3) committees, and that they remain here in Rumbek to start their work as we may have problems with resources and the committees should finish before December 31st.

 Cdr. John Koang Nyuon. I thank the Chairman and his 1st Deputy to have responded positively to our wish to sit, as we are doing now to discuss and resolve issues that create misunderstandings. Rumours always create problems. The availability of Thuraya telephones in abundance is really a problem as some of their users can verbally reveal our secrets for the sake of money or any other reason. The reaction by some officers is appreciated, as they only want the resolution of our outstanding problems.

I suggest the formation of regional committees to organize our army within the coming month since you mentioned that peace is likely to be signed by the end of December. I see this as the immediate priority other than the rest we are now discussing – as other structures already exist. To organize the army is not so difficult.

A clarification was made by 1st Vice Chairman Cdr. Salva Kiir Mayardit: “What brought us here to meet is the question of the rumours, which have been circulating. As the Chairman read in his messages, we haven’t reached a conclusion, as we have not known from where they emanate. When I went to greet the Chairman it was immediately announced that Cdr. Salva has met with Dr. John and their differences are resolved. The question is how does this news go out? I believe that they are not from my part. The rumours came from Nairobi not from Yei”.

 Cdr. Abdelaziz Adam Alhilu. The structures formed during the 1st national convention exist, the only thing is that they are not effective due to meager resources. The lack of adequate resources is the main problem that affects their functioning. Instability is also a factor. A system normally operates when the enemy is inactive.

The establishment of structures at present when peace is not yet signed will also put us in difficulties, so it is important to wait for a conducive atmosphere. I agree with the suggestion for the 2nd national convention to take place as soon as possible. I don’t agree with those who say committees should be formed to organize the army. I see it fit that local committees shoulder such responsibilities provided that resources are made available.

 Cdr. Daniel Awet Akot. This is a good opportunity for one to air out what had been said before, As Dr. John and Cdr. Salva put it, that they don’t have personal or political problems – then that is appreciated.

 Cdr. Ayuen Alier. If the style of leadership is changed, things will automatically change for the better. The whole issue is our general problem not only the Chairman and his deputies. Our top leaders restricted travel to Nairobi with their officers, but that cannot work. Every-body gets there on his own. There is a necessity that capacity building starts now. Cdr. Ayuen made the additional observation, that the lack of self- confidence is always the cause of our problems, and as for rumours, which have been confusing, I assure you that those who have self-confidence cannot be affected by rumours.

The suggestion by Cdr. Elijah Malok that committees be formed and start their work here in Rumbek is supported by me. The delegation for the peace talks should be the only ones to go: let us support peace because it is the requirement for now. Mr. Chairman I end by thanking both of you for having cooled your nerves. Come together to discuss so that we can resolve whatever problems are facing us.

 Cdr. Kuol Manyang. I think this meeting is historical and as we enter a new era, we are going to be more united after this meeting. You differ with someone and you reconcile. Differences are natural. A person can easily make a problem between him and another. We have to unite and this is how you can overcome rumours, which confuses the people. Like the recent situation, I was informed through unofficial channels that Cdr. Salva had been removed. I called Cdr. Deng Alor and we were joined by Cdr. Awet and we went to Cdr. Salva and told him that what is being alleged is a lie, and that there was no meeting held concerning this. We then moved to Nairobi where we communicated this issue to Dr. John Garang and that was when this meeting was planned and Cdr. James Kok and Cdr. Nhial were asked to organize transportation to this end.

So I thank both Cdr./Dr. John Garang and Cdr. Salva Kiir for having attended this meeting and permitting us to discuss and come up with decisions that promotes unity and harmony. Differences between Cdr. Salva and Dr. John existed from a long time ago, as Cdr. Chagai mentioned, but there was no decisive steps taken to resolve them until today.

As for structures, they are there. The only problem is how to maintain and have them effectively function due to a lack of resources. Our structures have to be operationalized. But the matter is not a question of dissolving other bodies such as the Leadership Council, NLC and so on. I don’t have any objection with the formation of committees, but I only say that reorganization of the army must be the responsibility of COGS and his Deputies. I urge both of you, the Chairman and Cdr. Salva to open a new page in order for us to go forward.

 Cdr. Nhial. People should be judged by what they have contributed to the Movement. We should sincerely address our issues. I am absolutely prepared for the proposal to dissolve the Leadership Council and we all see what scenario we can take.

To have structures and institutions you need to have three things; 1) the structure itself, 2) resources, and 3) the people, because its people who run the structures. The resources and the personnel go together. Without having prepared for this, it is now one of the serious problems we face as we enter the forthcoming era.

 CDr. Malik Agar. The current issue of the differences between the Chairman and his deputy is surprising in that I was aware of this even ten years ago. Whenever it is about to be addressed, each of them says there is ‘no problem’. The big problem is trust among yourselves. This needs to be rebuilt and you will be the ones to arrive at sound solutions to the existing problems.

Comrade Chairman, as we enter the new era, we shall be competing with other parties. Let us start with the effective establishment of our structures and draw up our programmes. We need a system. I have worked as a Governor for ten (10) years; yet, I could have committed many mistakes during that time. Has the Chairman any day called me to tell me that I have made a mistake? There is no system here.

The issue of reorganizing the army is a burning issue as most of the soldiers are now in an unorganized form and this will work against us. As monitors will verify, we don’t have the army. The distribution of powers is the vital issue to avoid future misunderstandings.

Cdr. Pagan Amum Okech. Comrade Chairman, I will focus on the crucial issue, but before that, I want to tell you this. We are here to discuss the rumours that have been circulating and which almost created a very serious development within the movement’s liberated areas, in Khartoum and among the Diaspora. My advice is to the Southerners who have fought for the last twenty two (22) years. I am first going to concentrate on the recent rumours. Cdr. Gier happened to ring me asking me whether I came across information from Yei that the leadership have met and decided to remove him from the second position. I advised Cdr. Gier not to believe that because it is a rumour, and if it spreads, it will create confusion. He then heeded my advice. Again Cdr. Deng Alor phoned to me on the same issue, but I also told him that these are rumours and Cdr. Salva should not believe such rumours. There had been meetings in Khartoum and there was a public statement made by Uncle Bona Malual and r!
etired General Joseph Lagu. If the enemy succeeds in dividing us, it may lead to our failure and peace may not be achieved.

This time is very critical Cdr. Salva and Cdr. Chairman; if we say we will remain here to deal with the rumours only, I think we will be here up to the coming year. I advise both of you to put aside these rumours. Even though we did not defeat the enemy, what we had achieved will make the enemy coincide with what we tell them. At this crucial moment we must think thoroughly of what we should do to enable us go forward. This is my appeal to both of you Cdr. Salva and Cdr. Chairman. There is another rumour now that I want to take the place of Cdr. James Wani Igga. I assure you Cdr. Wani that there is nothing like this at all.

The establishment and building of structures at this particular time is vital. Our priority is now to finalize the peace talks. The Chairman and his deputies must go to Nairobi so that we are not considered intransigent because the process can easily be derailed. Concerning the reorganization of the COGS and his deputies, we can do that unless the problem of resources hinders us.

 Cdr. James Wani Igga. I congratulate the Chairman for calling this important meeting. I also congratulate Cdr. Salva for having attended this meeting. This paves a way for a solution to our problems. I thank both of you for your patriotic stand since the beginning of the struggle – both of you have collectively worked to protect this movement from upheavals. I consider you as the central pillars of this Movement. Let me come to the main topics, which are the SPLM/A’s major problems. Solving a problem is like bringing pus out from somebody’s gull. Problem No. 1, we are not working as a team, which results in disgruntlement.

No. 2, we have the structures formed in the 1994 Convention which were only the NEC & NLC, but by 1998, people became fed up of those structures. I appeal that we keep these structures but make necessary changes. I would like to underline something connected with structure. In 1998 we came out with a constitution named the SPLM constitution. This was not passed by the NLC because they were expecting a state constitution. But we had agreed to use that constitution, and there are structures there. In one of the L.C. meetings we had revised the constitution and even the manifesto. Up to now, we had passed four (4) documents. The SPLM constitution. The SPLM manifesto. The 3rd document is the SPLM policy on dialogue and it concerns how we go about South-South dialogue. Our main constraint in starting South-South dialogue is the lack of money. Documents No. 4, is the SPLM policy on the transformation of Sudan. All these documents are there ready. Comrade Chairman, our constraint i!
n the political Affairs Commission is lack of facilities, but we have really tried our best. As for the army reorganization, if we become surprised by the signing of the peace deal, I think it will be difficult to regroup our army simply because we don’t have resources. Once peace is signed, there is going to be the establishment of standard national structures. Structures are our No. 2 problems, including the official management of office institutions.

Cdr. Wani listed other problems:
No. 3: The existence of a Kitchen Cabinet is deplorable and creates doubts and mistrust.

No. 4: The geographical imbalances found in the movement. If this is not addressed, we will never be in harmony.
No. 5: Poor chain of command.
No. 6: Spread of rumours.

Let’s come to the question of rumours. When rumours were developing I was in Nairobi and I went to Kampala. When I reached Kaya, I was being asked what had happened. I was then told that you are coming from Nairobi and that you met and decided to replace Cdr. Salva with Cdr. Nhial. I told that that this is just rumours and I believe that Cdr. Salva will not believe this. He will immediately throw it out the window.

Problem 7: Lack of implementation of resolutions and the lack of a follow up body. Our resolutions always die on the paper.
Problem 8: Corruption which remains rampant in the Movement. Corruption must be fought for example, some years back the Chairman in a meeting informed us that Cdr. Deng Alor brought some money from Nigeria, but how that money was spent had never been explained to us again. I ask the question where is the transparency and accountability we talked about?

Problem 9: Lack of cooperation, accompanied by sabotage. Some work for the
downfall of others without any accountability.

Problem 10: Neglect of the army and its welfare.
Problem 11: Absence of job description, which cause confusion.
Problem 12: Nepotism. It should be fought.

There are two examples to illustrate the issue of nepotism. One is the removal of Aleu Anyeny from his position and his replacement by the Chairman with an officer from his home village. Another is the appointment of Dr. Lual Deng as an advisor to the Chairman. We all heard this in a meeting in which the Chairman announced Lual’s appointment without any official procedures followed. When I talk about regional imbalances, all I need to say is that no Equatorian was even allowed to be a signatory of the six protocols. We are making history and this history should involve all the people of New Sudan. The protocols are only signed by individuals from Bahr el Ghazal, Upper Nile, Nuba Mountains and Funj!

Problem 13: Neglect in the chain of command, which has led to indiscipline.

Cdr. Wani proposed a way forward. I suggest that an investigation committee be appointed by the Chairman to find out the origination of these rumours. Let’s avoid ‘Kitchen Cabinets’ and combat corruption. We need a mechanism to be adopted to fight corruption. Let’s respect the chain of command. Let’s avoid any regional misbalancing. Job descriptions must be effected. South-South dialogue advanced. The convening of the second National convention requires additional money. The reaction of the Chairman to all the listed problems is necessary. As a sign of true reconciliation, they need to warmly greet themselves in front of us here, then follow that up with a joint statement. A traditional ceremony should be carried out by some of the elders here. We take what had happened like a normal wave when in a canoe. Let us reconcile so that we defeat our common enemy.

 Cdr. Riek Machar. I was struggling whether to speak or not because of the nature of the issues being raised. When we met as a Leadership Council, there were divergent views. Before that I met Aleu Anyieny and he told me that if you are going to talk to Cdr. Salva, don’t talk about the problems being personal. These problems are administrative. Serious rumours have also been circulating in London when I was there. They talked about a ‘change of the guards’ and the removal and replacement of Cdr. Salva by Cdr. Nhial. I appealed to the participants in that meeting that we should unite since we are entering peace, because if there is a split, the enemy may dishonour the agreement we had already signed. In any case, suppose we sign the peace, the SPLA will be a national army whereas the SPLM will be competing with other political parties. The SPLA must retain an independent national character.

Concerning the structures, I have participated in a workshop on the formation of structures at all levels including the transformation of the SPLM into a political party. These are all being worked out. We are only behind in our military preparations. This doesn’t need a committee to do that. The COGS, his deputies, directors, and local commanders can do that. The army is the most important element to protect the gains of the struggle and as such we need to organize it and take care of them and their families. We all have to participate in calling them to report to their units or camps where they should regroup and organize. Our chiefs are important institutions that can effectively participate in this endeavor.

Another problem we will face is the returnees, which are estimated to be up to 4 million residing in exile for almost fifteen years. They have acquired different attitudes, culture and perspectives. Not only are they in the north, but we have a good number of our people living in various western countries. We will be confronted by all these groups with a series of problems of cultural differences and we must be prepared to integrate these two groups into our civil life and norms.

I believe that unless something happens in Khartoum, the war is over. Unless the enemy causes us to split, the war is over. This requires us to expedite the reorganization of the army. I do not agree with Mathiang Rok about his suggestion that committees be formed to discuss the six (6) signed protocols. In addition, we should be privileged that the UN SG visited Africa to discuss the issue of peace in Sudan – The first time it happened was during the decolonization of Africa – making the achievement of peace highly likely this year.

As for South-South dialogue, we can start now. We should be prepared to negotiate with whatever party is ready to dialogue. If we wait until the government is formed, they will be the ones to undermine the GOSS. We must achieve consensus. Let us not delay south-south dialogue. The lack of dialogue can be a source of disunity, but if we handle it properly, it can also be a source of unity and this will allow the people to rally behind the leadership. There is a need to call the NLC as soon as possible to deliberate on the agreement. What I mean is the current NLC. The next convention, which needs to be convened as soon as possible, will elect a new NLC and who will be charged with the responsibility of working on a national constitutional government of south Sudan, etc.. From now, we have agreed that the judiciary be independent.

Session 5

 Cdr. Salva Kiir Mayardit. Greetings to the Chairman and Madame de Mabior and others in this meeting. We apologize for not allowing you to attend the first meeting, which lasted for two days. The second meeting is composed of SPLM Counties Secretaries, civil society, women groups, the youth, etc.. The decision was deliberate and we did not want the meeting to be talking shop.

I have no more to say. The issue which brought us here have been raised and you all have given your concerns. Let us take the line of peace to be the priority. In the absence of peace we must be prepared for war. There had been many Security Council resolutions of the same nature passed like this of Sudan, but have not been implemented, such as the PLO, Western Sahara, etc..

I thank those who have exerted efforts to travel from their various locations to Yei where they met me on the situation. As I told you, there were no personal problems, they are administrative given my profession, and I know that rumours are dangerous. Rumours must be treated as rumours, but there is no smoke without fire. I don’t agree with Cdr. Wani that these rumours were created by the enemy. There are people among us who are more dangerous than the enemy. I must warn the Chairman that Nimeiri was made to be unpopular by his security organs. Those who are misleading you and giving you false security information about others will suffer with you together or leave with you. The government, which is going to be led by you must include all. Without unity, the agreement will be a source of our disunity. We are not organized in all aspects, and as such will be exploited by other political parties that are more organized. The lack in our structures and political guidance will l!
ead us to a very serious political defeat. Mr. Chairman, you have talked about people eating the boat while we are in the middle of the river. Let me add this; the issue is not eating the boat in the middle of the river. The issue is that there are a few who have already crossed to the other side of the river and when the remaining ones asked them to bring the boat, they refused to return the boat. This is the problem

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Minutes of Historical SPLM Meeting in Rumbek 2004.

SPLM/A Founders

Minutes of Historical SPLM Meeting in Rumbek 2004.

At the end of 2004, while the Sudanese people were closely following Naivasha peace talks with a lot of expectations for freedom and democratic transformation, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) was plagued with rumors and accusations of conspiracy.

To put an end to this acute crisis, an extraordinary meeting was convened to dissipate rumors and misunderstanding related to the removal of the deputy chairman of the SPLM, Salva Kiir Mayadrit and his replacement by the young Nhial Deng Nhial.
The importance of this meeting stems from the fact that it safeguarded the unity of the SPLM at a critical stage and paved the way for signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on January 9, 2005.The following is the full text of the minutes of the three-day meeting which took place in Rumbek from November 29 to December 1, 2004; one month before the signing of the CPA.

CONFIDENTIAL REPORT ON THE RUMBEK MEETING 2004

On the Joint meeting of the SPLM/A leadership Council, General Military Command Council, Heads of Commissions, SPLM Secretariats, SPLM County Secretaries, Civil Society & Community Leaders.

RUMBEK 29TH OF NOVEMBER TO 1ST OF DECEMBER 2004
DAY 1: Opening Prayer: Rev. Clement Janda
Introduction: Cdr. Dr. Riek Machar
Briefing: Cdr. Salva Kiir Mayardit

Introduction.

Cdr. Dr. Riek Machar Thanked Cdr. Mark Nyipuoch, Cdr. Dr. John Garang and the other participants and announced the beginning of the meeting, which had been ordered by the Chairman. The first part of the meeting comprised of the leadership council, the Secretariats, and the members of the General Staff. The second part was composed of the members of IGAD team, and the Commissioners and Secretaries of the SPLM.

In the opening of the meeting the Chairman Cdr. Dr. John Garang, thanked members of the SPLM/A national leadership Council and welcomed all the participants who traveled to Rumbek. ‘I thank you in the name of the Almighty God. To begin with I wrote two messages:

One on 14/11/004 (No. 001/11/004) to address the following accusations/rumours; • That there was a meeting held in Nairobi under the Chairmanship of myself where Cdr. Salva Kiir would be replaced by the Chairman with Cdr. Nhial Deng.
• That I went to Kampala and met with Cdr. Pieng and ordered him to arrest Cdr. Salva Kiir Mayardit.
• That Cdr. Malual Majok went to Ramciel to collect forces to go and arrest Cdr. Salva Kiir Mayardit at Yei.They are all lies and a big propaganda initiative.
The second message was on 23/11/04 calling for this meeting which we are now convening today and where I want to make a general briefing about the signing of peace next month in which each and every one should be informed accordingly.

Cdr. Machar then welcomed Cdr. Salva Kiir Mayardit to brief the national leadership meeting where he welcomed the Chairman and C-in-C and the national leadership. ‘I confirm the two messages read to you by the Chairman are all true. The rumours came from Nairobi and around the leadership of the SPLM/A. The second message I got was through Cdr. Pagan Amum who was visiting the liberated areas with friends from friendly countries. I requested Cdr. Mabior Kuer to ask the HQs why I am not talking directly to the Chairman. I spoke to the Chairman when he was in Kampala and he told me that I should meet him in Yirol, which I didn’t reply to in the light of the rumours.The rumours implied that I will be arrested at Ramciel where the Chairman was, so I decided not to go. When I received that rumour, I called the security personnel in Yei and discussed the issue in length with them. I also informed them to find out where the sources of the rumours from Nairobi were coming from, which they did.

After I spoke with the Chairman, I also met Cdr. Pieng in Yei for the whole day and he was advising me to join the Chairman in Yirol, which I refused. After that I met Cdr. Kuol Manyang and Cdr. Deng Alor. They came from Nairobi with information that I should go to Nairobi for reconciliation between the two of us. I considered the word reconciliation as something very serious, and therefore decided to tell them that I will not go to Nairobi. The HQs of the Chairman complained that they were calling me and that if I recognized their number, I would switch off the telephone. That is not true; I never received any call from them and switch off my telephone.

I assure you that the allegation that I am against peace is not true. I am really for peace so that the International Community could rescue our suffering people. People of Bahr El Ghazal have suffered too much from repeated famine and from the Arab militias – and for these reasons I am the first to embrace peace to relief them from suffering. Peace efforts such as the Wunlit Peace Conference have up to date ceased hostilities between Western Upper Nile and Bahr El Ghazal; and that is good. So I need peace. There are those who want to create confusion in the Movement and fabricate such things. I don’t have personal problem with the Chairman.

If we are National Leaders, which I don’t believe we are because we have no cohesion within our leadership structure, let us be sincere with ourselves. After meetings are concluded, we run to foreign countries. There is no code of conduct to guide the Movement’s structures. When the Chairman leaves for abroad, no directives are left and no one is left to act on his behalf. I don’t know with whom the Movement is left with; or does he carry it in his own brief case?

The Chairman killed the national Executive Council (NEC) by creating the leadership Council. But there is no provision in the Convention for a ‘Leadership Council’. Does he want to revive the Political Military High Command? The Leadership Council creates a situation where all are directly reporting to the Chairman – including SPLM County Secretaries. When I mentioned these facts, they should not be construed to be my personal or family problems. Those around the Chairman don’t tell him the opinion of the public. The Chairman is everything, from a finance officer to one at the lowest level.Corruption, as a result of the lack of structures, has created a lack of accountability, which has reached a proportion that will be difficult to eradicate.

In fact, there are many outstanding administrative problems that require our attention. These include the infrequent converting of conferences at the leadership level, causing an absence in the SPLA/M chain of command and making others to directly communicate with the Chairman without following the right procedures. This should be corrected. If the responsibility of Governors goes directly to the Chairman, what will be the work of Cdr. Daniel Awet? I hope Cdr. Daniel Awet will address all those things. The Chairman should not make appointments of SPLM County Secretaries; it is the work of the Governors.

The other issue I would like Comrade Chairman to address is how the CANS structures are now operating, e.g., take the absence of the SPLM Regional Secretary for Bahr El Gazal from his area of responsibility while there has been sporadic tribal feuds within the region – and which has resulted into sectional conflict. The Chairman most of the time send Cdr. Deng Alor on foreign missions which were supposed to be the work of Cdr. Nhial Deng.There are several other administrative issues that require correction. We are three Deputies without functions. The Chairman is responsible for all systems including the Army General Headquarters. Our HQs. started in Yei, then Rumbek, then new Cush and now Ramciel. When are we going to establish our HQs? The deputies of the General Staff are the ones commanding the forces; they should stay in the General Headquarters instead of commanding. Yet the Chairman is the one who dismantled the General Headquarters. Comrade Chairman, the establishment of the General headquarters hasn’t been fulfilled and this I have been requesting ever since Yei was liberated. Branch officers such as the Director of Military Intelligence and his deputy are now in your Headquarters, though they are supposed to remain at the General Headquarters. The Chairman concentrates on his headquarters forgetting the rest of the army. It is only his headquarters, which has military uniforms, boots and other supplies.

Our present situation requires us to be organized and prepared. If peace is signed, the question is; what have we done in training our military cadres so that they meet the standard of their counterparts in the integrated army. There are rumours that the Chairman had already selected by name those Commanders who would command the Joint Integrated Army. What about the rest of the army and who will pay them? The Chairman seems to have taken the Movement as his own property. As we leave Rumbek after this meeting, I would like to see that all our administrative issues be addressed and implemented following this meeting’s resolutions.

I would also want Comrade Chairman to give me full powers of the Chief of the General Staff (COGS) to enable me expedite the regrouping and reorganization of the SPLA, and if Comrade Chairman sees that I am not able to do that job, then he can appoint another person to do it.The Chairman is to be 1st Vice-President of the Sudan and the head of the Government of Southern Sudan, but he is not talking to Southerners. The North is organizing southern militias so that we fight among ourselves. We must unite our own ranks and not just unity with the north. On a personal basis, I don’t have any problems with the Chairman but our working relationship is bad and leaves a lot to be desired.

I would also like to say something about rampant corruption in the Movement. At the moment some members of the Movement have formed private companies, bought houses and have huge bank accounts in foreign countries. I wonder what kind of system are we going to establish in South Sudan considering ourselves indulged in this respect.

2nd Session

Response from the Chairman. I give the floor to the national leadership to comment on what had been said by Cdr. Salva Kiir, I don’t want this to be a debate between Cdr. Salva Kiir and I.

Edward Lino thanked the Chairman and said we are really in need of resolving the problems within the SPLM/A. The people of Abyei are accused of being Dr. John’s supporters and as such, are victimized for that.

Cdr. Pieng made an intervention that Cdr. Edward was not addressing the issues.

Cdr. Elijah Malok stated he really supported what Cdr. Salva Kiir said, and recommended that a collective leadership be created. Here in Bahr El Ghazal Cdr. Deng Alor has been away for too long and these are known facts; the leadership council should address and resolve these outstanding issues and go back on the right track. Let us form committees to reorganize the army, since all the units are here. I don’t believe what Cdr. Mayardit said about the people being victimized. Structures are to be recognized right way as a government so let us reorganize them and work in the right way as a government.Dr. Justin Yac. I will go with the suggestion of Cdr. Pieng that the Chairman response to the issues raised by Cdr. Salva Kiir.

Cdr./Dr. John Garang I will give my contribution to what has been raised; that firstly we need to dispose of rumours. In the whole of South Sudan, there is a general concern from the citizens, and in Yei, the officers and citizens believe there is a danger facing the Movement. We have to clear the danger and give our people assurances.

Cdr. Salva Kiir and I have been together in the movement for 22 years, and have been close friends, and we will continue that way. 22 years of friendship can’t be thrown away by rumours; Cdr. Salva will be with me now until the end of the interim period and beyond, and I will cite what was said when I visited Malual Kon and the “Luak” of the family of Cdr. Salva where I entered the house to show comradeship and a long cherished friendship. At a meeting while visiting there we were told, “You are the two orphans” left because the original members of the High Command died, both of us will carry on to bring peace.I cited what happened at New Site recently when the Chiefs a ceremony where a bull was sacrificed to show how we are united. At the spiritual performance, one traditional leader said that 4 things will happen: –
1. The bull will urinate.
2. The bull will fall down.
3. The bull will face the North.
4. The bull will die without being slaughtered.
And all the four happened.The allegation that I was going to dismiss Cdr. Salva and arrest him was not only a lie, but it did not even occur in my mind. I was preoccupied with the peace process and not trying to create a crisis. Before UN Security Council Meeting, I received a telephone call from President Bush who said that he now had those who will work with him during the next four years and that I am one of them. President Bush said, “John don’t let us down. We want peace before the end of the year”.

The allegation that I will be replacing Cdr. Salva was a bad lie. If Cdr. Salva was dismissed and replaced with Cdr. Nhial Deng Nhial, it would mean that I would have dismissed all those senior to Cdr. Nhial which includes Cdr. Riek, Cdr. James, Cdr. Daniel Awet, Cdr. Lual Diing, etc. – which would be bad for the Movement. So this allegation is a lie. The crisis only has the support of our enemies who want a crisis in the Movement. This situation was created by our enemies because they do not want to sign the peace agreement.The Chairman pointed out that the GOS has never been happy with the protocols, specially the Machakos protocol, because of the self-determination clause. The GOS and their supporters don’t accept the security arrangement and the Wealth Sharing Agreement, which gives the South of Sudan 51%. The Khartoum Government wants to reject the agreement being signed or at least delay it. By delaying in signing, Khartoum will gain $2.5 billion from the oil revenues, which we must prevent by all means possible. Khartoum was unhappy with the Power Sharing and 3 areas protocols. Neither I nor Cdr. Salva had any interest in delaying the peace agreement. I have nothing to gain by dismissing Cdr. Salva.Finally I have never had any thought of dismissing Cdr. Salva. And it should be considered a lie. This rumour has caused commotion everywhere in Southern Sudan, Khartoum and the Diaspora – so I will assure our people everywhere and send a strong message to Khartoum Government that they will not divide the SPLM/A.

Cdr. Salva and I are innocent of the situation, and four of our leaders will appear in a press conference telling the whole world about our unity and that there is no problem among SPLM/A members. Secondly, I want to assure you of my confidence in Cdr. Salva Kiir Mayardit. My relationship with Cdr. Salva goes back to 1983 – Cdr. Chagai Atem, Kerubino and many others were close to me. I still have personal relationship with Cdr. Salva and I trust and have confidence in him. This is needed now than ever before. I want Cdr. Salva to be around me during the interim period, and beyond.
The Government of Sudan called upon all the Newspapers to stop making allegations against the Movement. So let us put that issue to rest.

Secondly, Cdr. Salva said that I brought all the officers around me, leaving him alone in vacuum. What I can say is that is not true.

On internal reforms, I agree that reforms are necessary. We are all behind them. We have been making reforms since 1983, e.g., the Zonal Command, Political High Command, NLC, NEC, etc.. these structures can be changed but the objective remains the same. Our imperfect structures have brought us to the present day. Let us not throw away these structures now, otherwise we will throw ourselves away.

The Chairman urged the meeting to introduce changes slowly. He said he is for change but slow change. The Chairman reiterated that all SPLM/A members will be protected; he assured all members that no one will be left out. On the issue of new comers who are said to be taking over the Movement, he said we should accept all southerners new or old because there are more southerners than members of the SPLM/A who must be accommodated; but no newcomer will displace anyone who has been with us for years.

On the appointment of Governors; all Governors will be appointed from their respective areas, e.g. in Lakes the Governor here will come from Lakes. As for States, people of each State will form their governments with no marginalization within States.

As for the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS), there will be representation based on the states, fairness and justice. Similarly at the Central Government, there will be State representation. All Governments, whether GOSS or State Governments will be based on modern standardized structures.The army will be organized based on modern standards. The SPLM will be reorganized democratically. There will be a mult-party system. There will be no need for coup d’etat anymore, so for example my friend Dr. Riek Machar will not need to make a coup because he can form his own party if he is discontented with SPLM.

The issue now is how to achieve a Comprehensive Peace Agreement. After that, the 2nd national Convention will be convened as soon as possible after the peace agreement is signed. The NIF Government is not happy having to sign the agreement on or before 31st December 2004. The Government is not happy with the UN Security Council Resolution1574. The NIF want to create an armed group loyal to them. They also want to create a political group from among southerners to be used by them. We must stop such a move that will create enemies among Southerners to fight among themselves.
South-to-South dialogue must be organized properly, but the leadership has refused outside mediation. I told the European groups about our stand on this. The Power Sharing protocol states that the SPLM will form the Government in the South. The protocol give 15% to non-SPLM/A members and 15% to members of other parties. There will be discussions therefore with Southern parties.On Civil Society, we need to dialogue with them including the Churches. On top of that, lawyers and other concerned members will write a constitution for Southern Sudan. There will be a constitution for states and the rule of law will be established.

Finally, regarding our vision and strategies; we must continue with our programmes because we are succeeding in the process. I reject the view that there are some of us who are unionists and others separatists within the SPLM/A. There are no such differences among our people. We are all for the unity of Southern people, and the Movement will carry out the referendum. As for members of the Khartoum National Government who have mutinied, there is a group calling themselves SPLM/A members. I told them that we want peace and we don’t want you to be SPLM/A now. I told the group to organize their own independent Movement, and not be associated with SPLM/A.

On the structures the only way to resolve it is through the national Convention, which should be convened as soon as possible.

3rd Session

Cdr. Deng Monydit. Greeted everyone and praised the leaders for coming together. He stated his appreciation of the response given by the leadership; ‘I want to say I am happy to discuss what was about to be stolen from us, and it is not the concern of those in London. This struggle is not the private property of anybody. Whoever says the Movement is his property is wrong, for the movement is for all.

Cdr. Garang Mobil. I thank the leaders. Since 1997 I decided to stay in my house because I did not believe that our problems should be solved by violence. Facts must be stated now in order to solve them once and for all. On the ‘orphans’ there six (6) members who died and only two (2) are left. The question I want to discuss today, is that there is a problem but the Chairman keeps saying there are no problems, only a ‘gap’ between him and Cdr. Salva. He will not accept there are problems in the New Sudan. But if the problem is not solved, there will be no peace. I also want to say that the movement is in the hands of a few and many are alienated. National resources must be shared by all, no matter how small it is. The structures are controlled by a few minority groups, and this must be sorted out now in Rumbek. This minority group is the problem; hand picking people must stop now because it is creating problems.

Cdr. Agassio Akol. There is a problem because many people avoid Cdr. Salva as Deputy Chairman and Chief of the General Staff. The Governors and their deputies bypass Salva and correspond directly with the Chairman of the Movement, which I consider to be outside proper procedure. Cdr. Salva said that in his talks, he raised specific issues which he needed answers on. The Chairman must have failed to answer these issues, otherwise, the talks would have ended. Cdr. Salva said he did not blame anyone but the Chairman. He wanted the Chairman to tell him whether he was wrong or not. For example Cdr. Salva questioned the legitimacy of the leadership Council, as he considered it to be illegal.The National Convention is unlikely to come soon to solve the problems of our structures; the convention has no importance for now. For Cdr. Salva, structures cannot be done by a Convention. So who is going to organize the army?

Cdr. Mark Nyipuoc intervened by saying a press conference should be made.

Cdr. Taban Deng Gai. I want to express my appreciation and happiness for this meeting. It is good to discuss issues of this nature, which appear to divide our movement. I want to congratulate the leaders for agreeing to come to attend the meeting. I want to congratulate Dr. Riek, Ayendit and others for the mediation. If we had such mediation in 1991, there would have been no problems that year, and the coup d’etat would not have taken place. This meeting is on internal issues. Those in Khartoum are happy to see the SPLM/A destroyed by Southern interests. But we are now victorious for we have stopped that disaster. As for our system, there are institutions but not functioning ones. The Leadership Council will not take us anywhere. The era of the Political Military High Command is gone. We must have a modern system of government created by the following committees:
1. Committee for the Army;
2. Committee for the Government;
3. Committee for the Judiciary; and
4. The Parliament.

Justice Ambrose Riny. I greet the Leadership and SPLA officers. In 1994 the Convention created institutions. When I talked about the independence of the Judiciary, many officers reacted against it. It was the intervention of the Chairman who permitted the Committee to complete its work. There have been difficulties and roadblocks by those who did not want a system. There have been difficulties in implementing the resolutions. In 2004, the leadership Council was set up to replace the NLC and NEC. The Leadership Council has no legal base to exist. The Chairman dissolved legally instituted organs of the movement as contained in the national convention of 1994, but unilaterally established illegal institutions which are not supported by any legal provisions of the convention thereof.

I want to say that a lot has been done by a few. Most of the things done are imperfect, but they have served us. I appreciate what has been done on South-South dialogue under the SPLM/A Secretary General. The Chairman was supposed to establish a constitutional committee to draft our constitution. We must come together in a place where all departments are residing; there should be one center for the government of SPLM/A to stop all these rumours.I would like to point out that many members of the movement have lost their ability to sit in an office. I want to point out an incident where a commander told me that what Dr. John or Cdr. Kuol Manyang say ‘up there’ does not work in the South. What kind of a system is this, if it is not respected by its officers? There is no system respected in this movement. I suggest that a committee be formed to organize the army and a conference to inform the world and our supporters that there is no problem from within.

Mama Kezia. I thank both leaders for coming together to discuss all the issues. I was happy with the 1st Vice-Chairman for saying everything in his heart. The rumours outside are bad. Both leaders say it was only a misunderstanding. I appreciate what is happening and I call upon Rev. Clement Janda to bless our conclusion. I agree with the 1st Vice-Chairman that there is something wrong with our system. After the death of the Chairman of my commission, no one has been appointed, and therefore there is no one to report to. For me it took three (3) years to see the leader of the movement. There isn’t a good system. But I think that from now on there will be a system in place.

Cdr. Pieng. Greetings. I will be saying something different; that I have not been happy with our meetings that end without resolutions. I am a revolutionary soldier. I have both military and political interest and if anybody things I don’t have both, he is lying. I am not happy with the response of the Chairman; there are problems to be addressed, and these problems must be solved now.The Chairman has not committed mistakes; for me, they are unintended mistakes, for the Chairman could not create problems for himself. I mentioned that during the time of Kerubino there were problems. There were rumours that the Chairman was going to throw away his SPLM/A cadres and replace them with people who have not been in the movement since its inception. There must be committees to reorganize the movement; I agree with Cdr. Elijah Malok’s call for a system and committees. When the Chairman goes away on a visit, he never leaves anyone to act where officers should report to.

Cdr. David. Greetings. I blame the Chief of the General Staff for having failed to do anything until now. But nothing is too late; I suggest that the army be organized now. First create a General Command for the SPLA, for there is no army without a General Staff.

Cdr. Oyai Deng. I want to add my voice of being happy to participate in this meeting. When the movement started, you were seven (7) and now you are only two (2) remaining. Some said that you conspired against those who died and now you are conspiring against yourselves. I am shocked to hear Cdr. Salva talk here only about Bahr El Ghazal and not the South in general give he is a leader for all. I strongly agree with Cdr. Salva that when the Chairman goes away, he locks the South in his bag. This is wrong. Cdr. Salva has the right to question anything wrong. There is a problem that must be solved by taking the right decisions.

Cdr. Gier Chuang. I understand what is happening; I didn’t believe that Dr. John will sit near Cdr. Salva again today. I am happy to see this conference. Many people have died due to internal differences and I refer to what had happened in the 1991 crisis. There must be resolutions for all issues, which bring about conflicts; there must be committees established, especially for the SPLA. I also pointed out that during the December 2003 meeting in New Site, there were no representatives from the army. What is a government without an army.

Cdr. James Oath. I greet the gathering. When the movement started you were seven (7) and now you are only two (2) – five died having problems with you (Dr. John). Why do you have problems with your colleagues? The leadership has disabled the movement, so why keep it? Why is there a GMC, because it has never met until now? There is no SPLA ready to fight, and for me there is no army to order. If I am ordered to arrest Cdr. Salva, I do not have an army to arrest anyone. Even the Chief of Staff cannot order me to do anything because there is no army. There is no chance to meet the C-in-C – it will take long time to meet him. This is not good, therefore a committee must be formed now to sort everything out.

Cdr. Oboto Mamur. Greetings. The Chairman always had problems with his colleagues. Now you are two (2) and you are turning against yourselves. Chairman you have been lying throughout since 1983. A Chairman should trust his deputies because there is a big problem here. I ask the Chairman whether he has mandated us to judge him? And if so, we will pass our judgment on him now. We don’t want to talk for the sake of talking. There must be a committee to follow up on all the resolutions agreed on here. And I add, the convention will not solve our problems.

Cdr. George J. Deng. This meeting is a good opportunity to talk today in front of other commanders. The reply by Cdr. John to Cdr. Salva is not convincing at all. My suggestion is that a committee must be formed to organize things right away. There is no longer any army. Therefore a committee has to be formed for the agreement to succeed. I view the SPLA as my home; if the leaders want to go then it is up to them.

Cdr. Malong Awan. Everyone is waiting for the outcome of this dispute. Both leaders therefore should solve their differences. If they don’t solve their differences then they should remain inside this room until the crisis is over. Nor should we blame our enemies for the rumours came from ourselves – we should not blame outsiders. For example Ayen Maguat went to talk to Cdr. Salva. Many from Yei volunteered to go to talk to Cdr. Salva. She complained that Cdr. Wani Igga was in Yei but failed to talk to Cdr. Salva. Instead he went to his village. This was not good leadership and I disagree with Cdr. Wani Igga’s position.

Session 4.

Cdr. Santo Ayang. I thank the communities of Bahr El Ghazal, Bor and the committees that went to Yei. Without them things would have got out of hand. The Chairman must tell us the truth about the source of these rumours. All that was circulated was not rumour, and no one was bribed by the enemy. You tell the world that you brought peace to Sudan, but the reality is that peace was brought about by those who fought for it and died. Those around you only please you and do not tell you the truth. I support the formation of committees suggested by Taban Deng Gai.

Cdr. Ayuen Jongror. The conflict is within the leadership. When conflict arises, it must be resolved immediately. The two of you must be in one place and not in Nairobi and Yei. The style of your leadership is causing lots of problems. The GMC Secretariat was supposed to be formed, but since then, nothing has happened. The GMC should meet to discuss the issues of the army and structures of the Movement must be formed before the convention.

Cdr. Elias Wai. There is fire so we need it not to burn further. Cdr. Salva is not convinced. All are not convinced with the reaction of the Chairman towards issues raised by Cdr. Salva Kiir. The Chairman is placing his relatives in key positions including Elijah Malok, too old, for example, to hold the position of Governor of the Central Bank. Note, there might be popular uprising one day and the army will join the public.

Cdr. Jadalla. We are here to solve our problems. Committees should be formed to investigate the rumours. You think you are the founder of this movement, and as such, that you can do what you want without consulting people? The public is not ready for more problems.

Cdr. Patrick Aitang. We are talking about rumours, but what do we do next? The letter alleged to have been written by Equatorians caused serious tensions. Thanks to Cdr. Salva for salvaging the situation. The ball is now in the court of the Chairman and he should come out with the facts leading up to this dispute. The Chairman should be bold and form the necessary structures.

Cdr. Kitchener. The Chairman and Salva should work together until the end of the liberation struggle. We need leadership to lead us. Cdr. Ayual Makol. To achieve our objective, we must be united. If the two leaders of the Movement only agree to disagree, then it will lead to internal warfare. Form a committee to investigate the rumours

Cdr. Dominic Dim. I agree that the Leadership Council should be abolished and the commissions replaced by the NEC. The Chairman has locked the NEC in his boxes. Dr. John’s response to Cdr. Salva was neither good nor sufficient. For me, there is still a problem as people still remain suspicious of the Chairman’s intentions. I reiterate that if the problem in question is not resolved, there will be a bigger problem in the Movement. I suggest that the Chairman be clear on resolving this conflict. We should remember how General Swar El Dahab was forced to take over during the crisis at that time. Cdr. Salva was asked by many people to take over, but he refused to do so. I support the formation of committees to restructure the movement and provide us with collective leadership.

Cdr. Bior Ajang. I thank the previous speakers. Cdr. Salva has the right to blame the Leadership Council. The rumours are no longer rumours, but facts as said by Cdr. Salva. There is a problem and that problem should be solved now. I support the formation of committees. What transpired in Yei was the product of two rumours; 1) the arrest of Salva Kiir, and 2) the dismissal of Cdr. Salva Kiir. Cdr. Salva Kiir gave us the chance and invited us to meet. I thank the bodyguards of Salva for handling the situation very wisely. Dr. John has no powers to dismiss Cdr. Salva because the national Convention elected both of them. I emphasize that rumours do not only originate from Nairobi. Yei is also a source. I support formation of committees.

Cdr. Ismail. We should combat the rumours. It is very unusual for a Deputy Chairman not to have easy access to the Chairman. However, forming committees is another way of avoiding the problem. The explanation of the Chairman hasn’t convinced most of the people nor answered what was raised by Cdr. Salva.

Cdr. Dau Akec Deng. I thank the 1st Vice-Chairman for his stand.

Lt. Col. Mathiang Rok. This meeting has saved the lives of many people in the South. I would like to quote from Francis Mading’s book; “things that are not said divide people”. The Leadership Council has taken the powers of the NLC. People still doubt the Chairman’s comments were satisfactory. There are many ‘huddles’ in the system, e.g. the Leadership Council has taken up the role of the National Convention. Our main concern is how the structures will be made functional. We are here to bring peace and harmony among ourselves. If there is anything, which is not clear, it should be said now!

Cdr. Chagai Atem. These rumours started in 1994 and I was the chief negotiator between the two. Now they are caught red handed again.

Father George Kinga. I greet and thank the leaders. The four leaders are great and must be respected. The issues are institutional ones. I also support the formation of committees.

Mr. Pascal Babindi. I am happy to have the chance of addressing this important and historic meeting. The restructuring we decided on at the Gorok NLC meeting pushed us ahead. I am confident that the reforms that shall soon be made will also push us ahead.

Cdr. Achol Marial. A committee should be formed to investigate into where those rumours originated. I appeal to the leadership to mobilize resources prior to the formation of ministries.

Dr. Komanyangi. The formation of committees shall lead to a final solution to all our problems. I suggest that we give ourselves time for these deliberations to continue for one more day so that all issues are exhausted.

Cdr. Simon Kun Pouch. The speakers have not talked on how to combat corruption. The formation of a committee to work out functions for our structures is not really a priority because they already exist, we need only to share power and prepare job descriptions for all the institutions of the movement.

Cdr. James Kok Ruea. A preparatory committee for the Convention should be formed within the shortest time possible. We should work on the structures that will make the Movement function during the interim period as follows: 1) 1st Vice Chairman to chair the GMC, 2) 2nd Vice Chairman to chair the committee for the interim period and 3) 3rd Vice Chairman to chair the committee for National Convention.

Mr. Muhammad Marjan. I believe that the world is looking forward to knowing what our movement will be like once peace is signed and we emerge as a government.

Cdr. Michael Makuei Lueth. There is no need to form a committee to investigate the rumours, which were circulating, unless Cdr. Salva insists that they have never been rumours. I call upon both the Chairman and Cdr. Salva to build confidence between themselves. I assure the Chairman that as we are entering a new era, and if we remain in an unprepared manner, we will eventually be finished. The immediate establishment of our structures is necessary. The distribution of powers is also necessary. The army must be organized. There is also the importance of speeding up South-South dialogue before we enter the forthcoming era. The other issue is corruption. I am saying that the leadership is not committed to fighting corruption. I am against the suggestion that there should be a committee for the army’s reorganization. It is for the COGS, his deputies, and the directors to sit at the GHQs and issue orders according to the plans they set. The national Liberation members should not blame the Chairman alone. In Gorok, the NLC gave the Chairman a blank cheque to restructure the movement, and that was when things started to go wrong.

DAY 2

Session 1

Opening remarks by the Master of ceremony after prayers noted that the present meeting has come out in the internet; and a warning was given to those who might have done so.

Mr. Kosti Manibe. I want to add my voice to those who have already spoken. I express my appreciation to those concerned for having resorted to peace negotiations and to end the conflict through dialogue. I am happy that the 1991 disaster has been avoided. I acknowledge the existence of gaps in the system and I call upon the leaders to address the communication needs. I stress the need for media to send accurate messages to our people, enemies, etc.. The Movement should have a capacity for communication to deal with the media when required. I point out that a lot has been achieved – 90% of the objectives have been achieved. There are structures, but a lot of work requires to be done.

The JAM’s programme on capacity building should be followed. Functions will be set out. On policy issues, I suggest that a lot remains to be done to build confidence in our system and institutions. I suggest that there is a need to form a small committee to look into the minutes of this meeting and to identify the crucial issues that needs resolutions as soon as possible. Such information should be disseminated.

Cdr. John Luke. I am happy that the rumours have been resolved. The rumours of the dismissal of Cdr. Salva has been on air for a long time. There were other rumours that Cdr. James Wani was going to be replaced by Cdr. Pagan. Some responsible people in the Leadership Council have been quoted as saying that Cdr. Salva, with support from Bona Malual, will make a coup. There has been a problem among members of Leadership Council who have been complaining a lot. There is no system, especially in the office of the Chairman, which is treated as a private entity. The office of a leader must be well organized and staffed properly to do its work.

On the responsibility of leadership, Cdr. Dr. John should not be blamed alone because there are others. The dissolution of the Leadership Council will not mean that a normal system will be established. No proper changes will take place, even if the Leadership Council is dissolved. If Dr. Garang dissolves the Leadership Council, he will appoint the same people in the L.C. There is no need to make changes now until peace is signed. The formation process f or the government needs wide consultation; people should wait for a month until peace is signed.The Chairman is being accused for not implementing decisions. In the army, if you need structures, I see Cdr. Salva as a political figure; so a pure army officer should be appointed as Chief of Staff and Cdr. Salva should be given a Commission. This way, the army should be run by an army officer who is not a politician.

Why is the leadership avoiding South-South dialogue? The Chairman refused to accept dialogue, but claims it after others implemented it. It was Cdr. Salva who supported the Wunlit Peace Conference – but the Chairman was against it. At the recent conference in Nairobi organized by the Kenyan Minister for Planning, the SPLM/A failed to attend because the Chairman had refused to let the SPLM attend. Cdr. James Wani is weak and the Chairman uses him to kill things related to South-South dialogue. The NLC is dead and I suggest that an emergency convention be organized immediately.

Cdr. Marc Nyipouch. Cdr. Marc stated that the rumour that madam Nyandeng was arrested with 3.5 is libel and defamation. He continued to cite the case of General Lagu during the Regional Government. On the issue of Governor Deng Alor, Cdr. Marc said that Cdr. Deng collects money from abroad, banks it with the Chairman’s or his (Deng’s) bank account, and that is why Deng Alor was taken away from the region – just to do that. Something Nhial has failed to do but what Deng is able to do. Deng should either be a Governor of Bahr el Ghazal or be replaced.

Mr. Arthur Akuien. I am being called the Finance Secretary but without any finance. I want to point out that the rumours have been destructive and that the leadership style encourages such rumours. I want to say that the Chairman does not delegate powers to his deputies. The Chairman is responsible for creating this crisis in the movement.
On the structures, there are structures. But the Chairman after appointing someone to a position does not work with him, but he will appoint someone else to do the work, which is wrong. The Chairman creates all these problems within the system, and this is why he is being blamed. I also point out when a senior person tries to discipline a junior, the Chairman always fails to solve the problem among the staff and instead interferes. The leadership style of the Chairman’s work is bad and cannot be corrected. The Chairman has not been doing well in his job and he may be forced to leave his office before six years.

Dr. Justin Yac. The Chairman is good for external contacts but within his own institutions he is not good. The Chairman is good in talking but poor in doing things. The Cdrs. Condemned him the day before and I quote Cdr. Salva who said that “Dr. John does not forget and does not forgive”, and who ever quarreled him ended up dead.
Many people know the Chairman’s abilities and weaknesses for the last twenty-two years. The Chairman can impress people when he talks, but lacks action. The commanders the day before gave the Chairman grade F because he failed to adequately answer the issues raised by Cdr. Salva. The Chairman should not think that he is always right; rather he must admit his mistakes. The Chairman must work with a team and not be a leader of the NLC and Chairman of SPLM. Leadership must be collective.

The officers the other day faced the Chairman with hard facts, but we have not been telling the Chairman the truth. We are also to blame. The Chairman should respond to issues of structures to avoid the recurrence of this problem. The Chairman can listen and write on issues, but he always discards them. The Chairman has been everything ever since the movement started. I call upon the Chairman to work with people and not alone. The Chairman should know that he has been wrong because some of the members have not been telling him the truth. Some leaders should be blamed for not doing their part, for many have not been doing things properly. I repeat what Cdr. Salva said that Dr. John does not forget and forgive. So I want to say that those without guns are vulnerable. The Cdrs. Are secure because they have guns to protect themselves from the Chairman, but I ask, who is going to protect those of us without guns?

I call upon Dr. John to listen to all the demands and that he (the Chairman) should make changes and suitable structures. I also suggest that the Rumbek meeting should come up with resolutions that we support the finalization of the peace agreement now, all should be committed to the peace process.

On the issue of dissolution of the leadership council, there is no difference so no changes are necessary. I urge the Chairman to work closely with his aids. We have sat here because we are part and parcel of the executive and leadership as well. Mr. Chairman, I urge you to treat us equally and remove doubts that there are people you prefer.

Cdr. Elijah Malok. I propose the formation of three (3) committees, and that they remain here in Rumbek to start their work as we may have problems with resources and the committees should finish before December 31st.

Cdr. John Koang Nyuon. I thank the Chairman and his 1st Deputy to have responded positively to our wish to sit, as we are doing now to discuss and resolve issues that create misunderstandings. Rumours always create problems. The availability of Thuraya telephones in abundance is really a problem as some of their users can verbally reveal our secrets for the sake of money or any other reason. The reaction by some officers is appreciated, as they only want the resolution of our outstanding problems.

I suggest the formation of regional committees to organize our army within the coming month since you mentioned that peace is likely to be signed by the end of December. I see this as the immediate priority other than the rest we are now discussing – as other structures already exist. To organize the army is not so difficult.

A clarification was made by 1st Vice Chairman Cdr. Salva Kiir Mayardit: “What brought us here to meet is the question of the rumours, which have been circulating. As the Chairman read in his messages, we haven’t reached a conclusion, as we have not known from where they emanate. When I went to greet the Chairman it was immediately announced that Cdr. Salva has met with Dr. John and their differences are resolved. The question is how does this news go out? I believe that they are not from my part. The rumours came from Nairobi not from Yei”.

Cdr. Abdelaziz Adam Alhilu. The structures formed during the 1st national convention exist, the only thing is that they are not effective due to meager resources. The lack of adequate resources is the main problem that affects their functioning. Instability is also a factor. A system normally operates when the enemy is inactive.

The establishment of structures at present when peace is not yet signed will also put us in difficulties, so it is important to wait for a conducive atmosphere. I agree with the suggestion for the 2nd national convention to take place as soon as possible. I don’t agree with those who say committees should be formed to organize the army. I see it fit that local committees shoulder such responsibilities provided that resources are made available.

Cdr. Daniel Awet Akot. This is a good opportunity for one to air out what had been said before, As Dr. John and Cdr. Salva put it, that they don’t have personal or political problems – then that is appreciated.

Cdr. Ayuen Alier. If the style of leadership is changed, things will automatically change for the better. The whole issue is our general problem not only the Chairman and his deputies. Our top leaders restricted travel to Nairobi with their officers, but that cannot work. Every-body gets there on his own. There is a necessity that capacity building starts now. Cdr. Ayuen made the additional observation, that the lack of self- confidence is always the cause of our problems, and as for rumours, which have been confusing, I assure you that those who have self-confidence cannot be affected by rumours.The suggestion by Cdr. Elijah Malok that committees be formed and start their work here in Rumbek is supported by me. The delegation for the peace talks should be the only ones to go: let us support peace because it is the requirement for now. Mr. Chairman I end by thanking both of you for having cooled your nerves. Come together to discuss so that we can resolve whatever problems are facing us.

Cdr. Kuol Manyang. I think this meeting is historical and as we enter a new era, we are going to be more united after this meeting. You differ with someone and you reconcile. Differences are natural. A person can easily make a problem between him and another. We have to unite and this is how you can overcome rumours, which confuses the people. Like the recent situation, I was informed through unofficial channels that Cdr. Salva had been removed. I called Cdr. Deng Alor and we were joined by Cdr. Awet and we went to Cdr. Salva and told him that what is being alleged is a lie, and that there was no meeting held concerning this. We then moved to Nairobi where we communicated this issue to Dr. John Garang and that was when this meeting was planned and Cdr. James Kok and Cdr. Nhial were asked to organize transportation to this end.
So I thank both Cdr./Dr. John Garang and Cdr. Salva Kiir for having attended this meeting and permitting us to discuss and come up with decisions that promotes unity and harmony. Differences between Cdr. Salva and Dr. John existed from a long time ago, as Cdr. Chagai mentioned, but there was no decisive steps taken to resolve them until today.As for structures, they are there. The only problem is how to maintain and have them effectively function due to a lack of resources. Our structures have to be operationalized. But the matter is not a question of dissolving other bodies such as the Leadership Council, NLC and so on. I don’t have any objection with the formation of committees, but I only say that reorganization of the army must be the responsibility of COGS and his Deputies. I urge both of you, the Chairman and Cdr. Salva to open a new page in order for us to go forward.

Cdr. Nhial. People should be judged by what they have contributed to the Movement. We should sincerely address our issues. I am absolutely prepared for the proposal to dissolve the Leadership Council and we all see what scenario we can take.

To have structures and institutions you need to have three things; 1) the structure itself, 2) resources, and 3) the people, because its people who run the structures. The resources and the personnel go together. Without having prepared for this, it is now one of the serious problems we face as we enter the forthcoming era.

Cdr. Malik Agar. The current issue of the differences between the Chairman and his deputy is surprising in that I was aware of this even ten years ago. Whenever it is about to be addressed, each of them says there is ‘no problem’. The big problem is trust among yourselves. This needs to be rebuilt and you will be the ones to arrive at sound solutions to the existing problems.Comrade Chairman, as we enter the new era, we shall be competing with other parties. Let us start with the effective establishment of our structures and draw up our programmes. We need a system. I have worked as a Governor for ten (10) years; yet, I could have committed many mistakes during that time. Has the Chairman any day called me to tell me that I have made a mistake? There is no system here.

The issue of reorganizing the army is a burning issue as most of the soldiers are now in an unorganized form and this will work against us. As monitors will verify, we don’t have the army. The distribution of powers is the vital issue to avoid future misunderstandings.

Cdr. Pagan Amum Okech. Comrade Chairman, I will focus on the crucial issue, but before that, I want to tell you this. We are here to discuss the rumours that have been circulating and which almost created a very serious development within the movement’s liberated areas, in Khartoum and among the Diaspora. My advice is to the Southerners who have fought for the last twenty two (22) years. I am first going to concentrate on the recent rumours. Cdr. Gier happened to ring me asking me whether I came across information from Yei that the leadership have met and decided to remove him from the second position. I advised Cdr. Gier not to believe that because it is a rumour, and if it spreads, it will create confusion. He then heeded my advice. Again Cdr. Deng Alor phoned to me on the same issue, but I also told him that these are rumours and Cdr. Salva should not believe such rumours. There had been meetings in Khartoum and there was a public statement made by Uncle Bona Malual and retired General Joseph Lagu. If the enemy succeeds in dividing us, it may lead to our failure and peace may not be achieved.This time is very critical Cdr. Salva and Cdr. Chairman; if we say we will remain here to deal with the rumours only, I think we will be here up to the coming year. I advise both of you to put aside these rumours. Even though we did not defeat the enemy, what we had achieved will make the enemy coincide with what we tell them. At this crucial moment we must think thoroughly of what we should do to enable us go forward. This is my appeal to both of you Cdr. Salva and Cdr. Chairman. There is another rumour now that I want to take the place of Cdr. James Wani Igga. I assure you Cdr. Wani that there is nothing like this at all.The establishment and building of structures at this particular time is vital. Our priority is now to finalize the peace talks. The Chairman and his deputies must go to Nairobi so that we are not considered intransigent because the process can easily be derailed. Concerning the reorganization of the COGS and his deputies, we can do that unless the problem of resources hinders us.

Cdr. James Wani Igga. I congratulate the Chairman for calling this important meeting. I also congratulate Cdr. Salva for having attended this meeting. This paves a way for a solution to our problems. I thank both of you for your patriotic stand since the beginning of the struggle – both of you have collectively worked to protect this movement from upheavals. I consider you as the central pillars of this Movement. Let me come to the main topics, which are the SPLM/A’s major problems. Solving a problem is like bringing pus out from somebody’s gull. Problem No. 1, we are not working as a team, which results in disgruntlement.No. 2, we have the structures formed in the 1994 Convention which were only the NEC & NLC, but by 1998, people became fed up of those structures. I appeal that we keep these structures but make necessary changes. I would like to underline something connected with structure. In 1998 we came out with a constitution named the SPLM constitution. This was not passed by the NLC because they were expecting a state constitution. But we had agreed to use that constitution, and there are structures there. In one of the L.C. meetings we had revised the constitution and even the manifesto. Up to now, we had passed four (4) documents. The SPLM constitution. The SPLM manifesto. The 3rd document is the SPLM policy on dialogue and it concerns how we go about South-South dialogue. Our main constraint in starting South-South dialogue is the lack of money. Documents No. 4, is the SPLM policy on the transformation of Sudan. All these documents are there ready. Comrade Chairman, our constraint in the political Affairs Commission is lack of facilities, but we have really tried our best. As for the army reorganization, if we become surprised by the signing of the peace deal, I think it will be difficult to regroup our army simply because we don’t have resources. Once peace is signed, there is going to be the establishment of standard national structures. Structures are our No. 2 problems, including the official management of office institutions.

Cdr. Wani listed other problems:
No. 3: The existence of a Kitchen Cabinet is deplorable and creates doubts and mistrust.
No. 4: The geographical imbalances found in the movement. If this is not addressed, we will never be in harmony.
No. 5: Poor chain of command.
No. 6: Spread of rumours.

Let’s come to the question of rumours. When rumours were developing I was in Nairobi and I went to Kampala. When I reached Kaya, I was being asked what had happened. I was then told that you are coming from Nairobi and that you met and decided to replace Cdr. Salva with Cdr. Nhial. I told that that this is just rumours and I believe that Cdr. Salva will not believe this. He will immediately throw it out the window.

Problem 7: Lack of implementation of resolutions and the lack of a follow up body. Our resolutions always die on the paper.
Problem 8: Corruption which remains rampant in the Movement. Corruption must be fought for example, some years back the Chairman in a meeting informed us that Cdr. Deng Alor brought some money from Nigeria, but how that money was spent had never been explained to us again. I ask the question where is the transparency and accountability we talked about?
Problem 9: Lack of cooperation, accompanied by sabotage. Some work for the downfall of others without any accountability.
Problem 10: Neglect of the army and its welfare.
Problem 11: Absence of job description, which cause confusion.
Problem 12: Nepotism. It should be fought.

There are two examples to illustrate the issue of nepotism. One is the removal of Aleu Anyeny from his position and his replacement by the Chairman with an officer from his home village. Another is the appointment of Dr. Lual Deng as an advisor to the Chairman. We all heard this in a meeting in which the Chairman announced Lual’s appointment without any official procedures followed. When I talk about regional imbalances, all I need to say is that no Equatorian was even allowed to be a signatory of the six protocols. We are making history and this history should involve all the people of New Sudan. The protocols are only signed by individuals from Bahr el Ghazal, Upper Nile, Nuba Mountains and Funj!
Problem 13: Neglect in the chain of command, which has led to indiscipline.

Cdr. Wani proposed a way forward. I suggest that an investigation committee be appointed by the Chairman to find out the origination of these rumours. Let’s avoid ‘Kitchen Cabinets’ and combat corruption. We need a mechanism to be adopted to fight corruption. Let’s respect the chain of command. Let’s avoid any regional misbalancing. Job descriptions must be effected. South-South dialogue advanced. The convening of the second National convention requires additional money. The reaction of the Chairman to all the listed problems is necessary. As a sign of true reconciliation, they need to warmly greet themselves in front of us here, then follow that up with a joint statement. A traditional ceremony should be carried out by some of the elders here. We take what had happened like a normal wave when in a canoe. Let us reconcile so that we defeat our common enemy.

Cdr. Riek Machar. I was struggling whether to speak or not because of the nature of the issues being raised. When we met as a Leadership Council, there were divergent views. Before that I met Aleu Anyieny and he told me that if you are going to talk to Cdr. Salva, don’t talk about the problems being personal. These problems are administrative. Serious rumours have also been circulating in London when I was there. They talked about a ‘change of the guards’ and the removal and replacement of Cdr. Salva by Cdr. Nhial. I appealed to the participants in that meeting that we should unite since we are entering peace, because if there is a split, the enemy may dishonour the agreement we had already signed. In any case, suppose we sign the peace, the SPLA will be a national army whereas the SPLM will be competing with other political parties. The SPLA must retain an independent national character.

Concerning the structures, I have participated in a workshop on the formation of structures at all levels including the transformation of the SPLM into a political party. These are all being worked out. We are only behind in our military preparations. This doesn’t need a committee to do that. The COGS, his deputies, directors, and local commanders can do that. The army is the most important element to protect the gains of the struggle and as such we need to organize it and take care of them and their families. We all have to participate in calling them to report to their units or camps where they should regroup and organize. Our chiefs are important institutions that can effectively participate in this endeavor.

Another problem we will face is the returnees, which are estimated to be up to 4 million residing in exile for almost fifteen years. They have acquired different attitudes, culture and perspectives. Not only are they in the north, but we have a good number of our people living in various western countries. We will be confronted by all these groups with a series of problems of cultural differences and we must be prepared to integrate these two groups into our civil life and norms.
I believe that unless something happens in Khartoum, the war is over. Unless the enemy causes us to split, the war is over. This requires us to expedite the reorganization of the army. I do not agree with Mathiang Rok about his suggestion that committees be formed to discuss the six (6) signed protocols. In addition, we should be privileged that the UN SG visited Africa to discuss the issue of peace in Sudan – The first time it happened was during the decolonization of Africa – making the achievement of peace highly likely this year.As for South-South dialogue, we can start now. We should be prepared to negotiate with whatever party is ready to dialogue. If we wait until the government is formed, they will be the ones to undermine the GOSS. We must achieve consensus. Let us not delay south-south dialogue. The lack of dialogue can be a source of disunity, but if we handle it properly, it can also be a source of unity and this will allow the people to rally behind the leadership. There is a need to call the NLC as soon as possible to deliberate on the agreement. What I mean is the current NLC. The next convention, which needs to be convened as soon as possible, will elect a new NLC and who will be charged with the responsibility of working on a national constitutional government of south Sudan, etc.. From now, we have agreed that the judiciary be independent.Session 5Cdr. Salva Kiir Mayardit. Greetings to the Chairman and Madame de Mabior and others in this meeting. We apologize for not allowing you to attend the first meeting, which lasted for two days. The second meeting is composed of SPLM Counties Secretaries, civil society, women groups, the youth, etc.. The decision was deliberate and we did not want the meeting to be talking shop.I have no more to say. The issue which brought us here have been raised and you all have given your concerns. Let us take the line of peace to be the priority. In the absence of peace we must be prepared for war. There had been many Security Council resolutions of the same nature passed like this of Sudan, but have not been implemented, such as the PLO, Western Sahara, etc..I thank those who have exerted efforts to travel from their various locations to Yei where they met me on the situation. As I told you, there were no personal problems, they are administrative given my profession, and I know that rumours are dangerous. Rumours must be treated as rumours, but there is no smoke without fire. I don’t agree with Cdr. Wani that these rumours were created by the enemy. There are people among us who are more dangerous than the enemy. I must warn the Chairman that Nimeiri was made to be unpopular by his security organs.

Those who are misleading you and giving you false security information about others will suffer with you together or leave with you. The government, which is going to be led by you must include all. Without unity, the agreement will be a source of our disunity. We are not organized in all aspects, and as such will be exploited by other political parties that are more organized. The lack in our structures and political guidance will lead us to a very serious political defeat.

Mr. Chairman, you have talked about people eating the boat while we are in the middle of the river. Let me add this; the issue is not eating the boat in the middle of the river. The issue is that there are a few who have already crossed to the other side of the river and when the remaining ones asked them to bring the boat, they refused to return the boat. This is the problem.

DR. JOHN GARANG SPEECH – RUMBEK NOV. 2004

Chairman’s Speech to Rumbek Combined Consultative Meeting

(November 28 – 30, 2004)

1. 1.     Opening greetings and Minute of Silence

 

1. 2.     Main Rumours to Dispel: (suddenness and intensity of the rumours)

• Rumours started with story of Chairman’s wife arrested by UK Police …
• That Chairman said it is Cdr. Salva Kiir that wrote the letter by Equatorians.
• That Cdr. Salva Kiir is being dismissed and replaced by Cdr. Nhial Deng.
• That Cdr. Salva Kiir is being arrested, by so and so and forces being moved …
• The story that Cdr. Salva is marginalized and his work given to others. This feeling might have developed when Cdr. Salva no longer went for the peace talks and therefore I increasingly worked with Cdr. Nhial and Cdr. Pagan. But we all know how I took over the IGAD talks, as this was during the Officers Conference here in Rumbek. I was reluctant to go to Naivasha as you will recall and people pleaded with me including the Officers Conference.  After that both of us could not be in the talks, and indeed since then Comrade Salva has been doing most of the work in the field as you can see from the very few messages I write.
• There are many other rumours, but these three are the serious ones around which other issues and rumours are built.
• Affirm that all these are false [expound convincingly at length].

ü  We have 22 years of togetherness with Cdr. Salva in the SPLM/A, he has been my right hand man even when others were senior to him and up to now and he will continue to be my right hand man into peace and during the interim period … 22 years of togetherness and comradeship cannot be blown away by rumours.

ü  Akon story of June 2003 that out of 7 founding members, we are the only two remaining orphans of former PMHC and that we shall take people across the river.

ü   New Site ritual sacrifices by spiritual leaders last July cannot just be forgotten.

ü  My main preoccupation is to conclude and sign peace by 31/12/2004 as demanded by the UNSC, and there is only one month left, why would I create problems by arresting Cdr. Salva and replacing him with Cdr. Nhial?

ü  It is practically and politically not possible to leapfrog Cdr. Nhial to No.2 as alleged by the rumour mongers, for what are the practical and political implications?

ü  As predicted in our 1983 Manifesto it is the NIF regime [Islamic Fundamentalism] that wants to divide us, block the peace agreement and hijack the Movement, and this must not be allowed.  The fact that both of us, Cdr. Salva Kiir and I are here shows the maturity of our Movement and of our people … As the saying goes the NIF hyena has barked and so it will not eat us again.

ü  I want to end this part by assuring you that Cdr. Salva and I are a Leadership package decreed by 1994 NC, and only a NC can dismiss either of us, and so that I intend to dismiss Cdr. Salva cannot be possibly true, I want you to dismiss this malicious lie.  Cdr. Salva and I are two sides of one coin and so that coin can never be divided; the SPLM/A will never be divided; we are not shakable and the Movement and the coming peace are in safe hands; we will take the people across.

1. 3.     NIF and Outsiders Meddling in the Affairs of the SPLM/A

 

• How did these rumours start and who is behind them, the rumours must definitely have been created by someone or some people, and for what purpose? 
• In my view there were two situations: (a) Situation (A) is that of Cdr. Salva, our 1st Vice Chairman and COGS that we know and that I have known for the last 21 years, and (b) Situation (B) is that created by rumours.  These rumours were not created by Cdr. Salva Kiir, they were created by the NIF regime either directly in some cases or through some of our people who need money, and the purpose is clear; it is to block the peace so that it is not signed by 31/12/2004 as demanded by UNSC Res. 1574.  Situation (A) of Cdr. Salva and situation (B) of the NIF are incompatible and were pulling in different and opposite directions. This is why the situation in Yei did not explode.  At end the Cdr. Salva’s situation took the upper hand and won. And in this context I want to commend Cdr. Salva Kiir for controlling the situation; I commend the officers in Yei; the community leaders that were in Yei or came to Yei; others who went to Yei including members of the SPLM-LC, and finally the role played by Cdr. Pieng and Cdr. Malong in their shuttles.
• Why does the NIF regime want to block peace?  Because they don’t like the six protocols we have signed; they don’t want the 31/12/2004 deadline and they are looking for excuses not to meet this deadline [Narrate the background as to how the UNSC came to Nairobi, the telephone call of President Bush, etc.].
• The SPLM/A is the struggle and property of the people of New Sudan (South and three areas and rest of Sudan), and they have paid tremendous sacrifices over the last 22 years and in previous struggles.
• We must honour the struggle and sacrifices of our people by taking the struggle to its logical and final conclusion to achieve the cardinal objectives of the SPLM/A, i.e., New Sudan and the right of self-determination.   These can only be achieved through conclusion and signing of the peace agreement by 31/12/2004 as demanded by the UNSC, and we must not allow the NIF or any situation to delay or disrupt this process.  Across Southern Sudan and New Sudan and the rest of Sudan people want peace; that is the general cry.  If the NIF regime does not hear this and we in the SPLM will deliver this peace.

1. 4.     Loss of trust and confidence between Chairman and his 1st Vice Chairman

• The main talk here is that the Chairman does not share issues with Cdr. Salva, does not consult him often, is not as intimate as before, there are others around the Chairman that pull him away from Cdr. Salva, etc …
• Assurances that this is not true and that the Chairman has every confidence in Cdr. Salva [Relate incidences, e.g., at Malual Gahoth, when Tiger’s plane crushed, at his village and Akon, sending him to South Africa and what I told him; I do send Comrade Salva on diplomatic mission – Egypt, Libya and Algeria and several times to Ethiopia in recent times, etc.
• Trust and confidence are intangibles that are built over time.  From my side I have not lost that trust and confidence that I have had in Cdr. Salva since 1983, but if there is doubt as there obviously is given the recent developments in Yei then I want to tell you categorically here that I will work hard to repair that perceived damage.
• Trust and confidence are even more important now then at any other time before, because unlike in the past we shall not be alone in the post conflict era; there will be other political forces in both South and North and we will compete with some of these parties.  It is our cohesiveness and solidity as a political organization that will enable us to deliver both the New Sudan and the exercise of the right of self-determination and development in general.  This requires the social capital called trust and confidence within the leadership of the SPLM, among the cadres and among the rank-and-file.

1. 5.     Regarding Problems within the Movement and Internal Reforms.

• Internal reforms necessary and I have talked about this on many occasions.
• Internal reforms should not be related to or confused with problems created by the current rumours, since these rumours are baseless
• I am aware there is general concern among the officer corps and rank-and-file that now that peace is coming the SPLM Leadership, and specifically Dr. John, will abandon the cadres of the Movement and embrace outsiders or new comers instead [Dispel this and give convincing explanations why this is impossible to be entertained by the Leadership or by Dr. John in particular]. Include programs of education and development in the next period and how our cadres fit in.
• The coming peace agreement will impose new structures and there shall be full decentralization to the States and Counties. This coupled with fairness of distribution of jobs at the level of GOSS and GONU will bring justice to all our people of New Sudan. In general peace will bring us responsibilities in the following: (a) SPLM, (b) SPLA, (c) GOSS, (d) NUBA MTS GOVT, (e) SBN GOVT, (f) ABYEI AEC, (g) GONU, (h) STATE GOVTS IN REST OF NORTH, (i) SPLA National Reserve, and (j) above all a robust, strong and rapidly growing economy to provide jobs & services to our people who have suffered so much.
• Finally, we must hold our 2nd National Convention as soon as time will allow; we already have the resources to do it, and I here directing the full Convention Organizing Committee to sit immediately and plan and expedite preparations to ensure that the 2nd National Convention is held before the end of March 2005.

1. 6.     Regarding the Peace Process and Prospects

• Background to the UNSC Nairobi meeting and SC Resolution (sent to all units) and SPLM-GOS MOU.
• Negotiations by the Technical Committees started on 26/11/2004, and Ali Osman Taha and I will arrive in Nairobi on 5/12/2004 to finish the process.

ü  Outstanding Issues in Ceasefire and Implementation Modalities Annexes – The Committee of Cdr. Nhial will brief you in detail, but in summary …

ü  Guidance from this consultative conference and from the Leadership Council regarding outstanding issues to complete and sign by 31/12/2004.

• NIF displeasure and ways of resisting ending the war by 31/12/2004 as demanded by UNSC Resolution 1574, or if they are forced to sign the CPA then they will use the same ways to frustrate implementation. This is not a secret, as the Internet and Khartoum newspapers are full of GOS disquiet and plans of how to destroy the Agreement.  NIF will use the following, and they are actually very advanced in using them: –

ü  GOS-Militias (OAGs) and this is why negotiations are difficult, as the NIF does not want to let go of these militias.  The aim and hope is to create an alternative armed Movement loyal to the NIF in the South.

ü  Use of their Coordinating Council reinforced by disgruntled Southern politicians.  The aim and hope is to create an alternative political force in the South that subservient to the NIF.

ü  The NIF has actually already announced that they will implement the Wealth Sharing Protocol as from 1/1/2005 whether there is an agreement signed with the SPLM/A, or not; they have even said that they will implement it without the SPLM/A.

ü  The NIF aims and hopes to combine the two subservient groups (the OAGs and the political militias) to block signing of the CPA or to frustrate implementation, and to turn the six Protocols into their so-called “Peace from within” and to use the developed situation to fight and eliminate the SPLM/A.  This is the meaning of what Beshir announced. The NIF aims and hopes that Southerners will fight over the 50% of oil revenues in the Wealth Sharing Protocol instead of fighting the NIF regime.

ü  It is generally accepted by Southerners, New Sudanists and Sudanese in general as well as by the Region and international community that no political force other than the SPLM/A can successfully maneuver out of the situation and implement the six Protocols.  The SPLM/A has the vision, the record of struggle and sacrifice (social capital) and the commitment.

ü  We will not shy away from multi-party politics and we will challenge the NCP politically and democratically in the North if they continue to make mistakes by sponsoring south-south conflict.

ü  We shall also compete with and defeat all the fake political parties in the South, and let me assure you that we welcome democracy, political pluralism and elections both in the South and North.

1. Finally Regarding the Vision, Objectives and Strategies of the SPLM/A

• We must continue with the objective of New Sudan and the exercise of the right of self-determination.  This vision and strategy is what has reached us this far, and it is what will see us through to final victory.
• The objective of New Sudan and the right of self-determination are not contradictory; as a matter of fact one cannot achieve the exercise of the right of self-determination except through the method of New Sudan.
• Those who criticize the New Sudan as being in conflict with the right of self-determination and Southern Sudanese independence fail to tell people their method for achieving the right of self-determination of Southern Sudanese independence.  They end up being either AOGs or political militias to be used or manipulated by the NIF.  Our method has worked and is working and that is why the NIF regime is always angry with us and not with the self-appointed saviours of Southern Sudan, since such convoluted salvation is through the enemy.

Rumbek (Day 2)

Day 2 in Rumbek

1. A.    Concerning Rumours as the Main Problem

1. Somebody yesterday quoted Dr. Francis Deng that “what is left unsaid is what divides”.  Let us be sincere about this issue.  The main problem confronting us was not that of structures of the Movement.  Ayendit and her delegation did not travel to Yei because of structures; they went to Yei because of rumours surrounding the dismissal and arrest of Cdr. Salva Kiir and a possible split in the Movement as a result of this.  It is the same with the three communities in Yei and all those who traveled to Yei (Kuol Manyang and Deng Alor, Riek Machar’s group and others concerned).  They went to Yei because of the situation created by rumours.  People in the liberated areas including our soldiers are concerned and are waiting for good news as to whether there is a split in the Movement or not.  This is the same for our people in the Diaspora as well as our adversary.

1. This is the issue I was addressing yesterday in my statement and that is probably why some of you, especially the GMC members, felt that my response was not sufficient.  I did not address the issue of structures sufficiently because, although it is a problem, it is not what caused the situation in Yei. The connection between the commotion that occurred in Yei would be logical only if the rumours were created so that the issue of structures in the Movement are addressed.  Of course you all know here that this is not the case. I think Cdr. Santo Ayang and others pointed this out yesterday in their own way.

1. The first problem that we need to dispose of therefore is that of the commotion that was created in Yei as a result of the rumours surrounding the dismissal, replacement and arrest of Cdr. Salva Kiir.  Let us not put this under the rug by letting it be overshadowed by the issue of structures.  Let us satisfy ourselves that these rumours were not true and dismiss them sincerely.  I believe that from my part I addressed this issue of rumours and the associated commotion or misunderstanding sufficiently yesterday and I was sincere about. Some people have asked yesterday for a committee to establish the facts. This is okay, but there would be no need for this if we are all satisfied that there was no such a thing, and in that case what we would need to address is how to address such rumours in the future so that they do not cause similar situations as almost happened in Yei, because the enemy will continue to devise more stratagems to divide us.  Some people like Kosti Manibe talked about some of the remedies to avoid creation of such situations in the future.

1. As I said yesterday, our people everywhere are concerned about the rumours and commotion created in Yei.  If we are satisfied, as I believe we all are, that this problem of rumours about the dismissal, replacement and arrest of Cdr. Salva Kiir and the resulting commotion in Yei has been resolved then it is important and urgent that we move among our people and units to assure them that there was not such a thing, because that is what people are waiting to hear. Let us also tell our Diaspora and the international community, and this can best be done by holding an international press conference either here in Rumbek or in Nairobi with the four of us.
2. B.    The Second Problem:  Trust and Confidence.

 

1. The second issue I talked about yesterday was trust and confidence between me and Cdr. Salva Kiir. I considered this to be the second important issue after the rumours, because as some one put it, existence of a confidence gap provided fertile soil for the rumours to germinate. I talked at length about our long relationship since the Sudanese army and since 1983 and as recently as my visit to Akon in May 2003 and the sacrifice that was made at the Chiefs Conference in New Site, and so on.

1. I think I addressed this issue sufficiently yesterday, except may be for one issue that of personal contact.  When I first came from the long trip abroad, I informed Cdr. Salva that I had arrived back and that I was visiting the Region (Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya).  Cdr. Salva wrote to me welcoming me and informing all units that Comrade Chairman had returned back and is resuming his normal duties – a clear indication that he was acting in my absence, and so again it is not true that Cdr. Salva Kiir does not act in my absence, this is automatic; when the head leaves the deputy acts and there is normally no message sent to all units or departments every time the head leaves.

1. On the issue of telephone contacts, we had a similar impression as Cdr. Salva.  One of my HQ officers, Major Amat Malual, had difficulty going through to the telephone of Cdr. Salva Kiir.  I was actually forced to go through Cdr. Malong Awan – I asked Cdr. Malong Awan twice to tell Cdr. Salva Kiir that I wanted to talk to him by phone and that I was not going through to him.  I was finally able to talk on the phone by arrangement with Cdr. Oyay Deng Ajak. Obviously we need to improve our communications, including having a hotline as someone suggested.

1. The issues of a Kitchen Cabinet and some people having bought houses abroad are issues that better communications will solve because I obviously don’t have them.  The rents of the four of us here are being paid for by a friendly Government and I don’t believe any of the four of us has a house anywhere, although there are such rumours.  For those who might have houses they will talk for themselves.

1. There are other issues of concern that were raise by Cdr. Salva on the question of trust and confidence that I should have addressed and touched on this morning by Dr. Justin Yac.  One is that Dr. John does not forgive those who have quarreled with him.  First I want to say that I do not consider that there has been a quarrel between me and Cdr. Salva.  The commotion in Yei was not caused by a quarrel between the two of us, but by rumours which we are now sorting out.  Secondly, it is not true that I do not forgive people. The five members of the first leadership who died were not because I did not forgive them. William Nyuon had come back to the Movement under complete reconciliation, we know how he died. The same thing for Kerubino.  Joseph Oduho also did not die on our side.  Arok Thon died in a plane crush on the Government side.  It is Majier whose circumstances of death are not clear.  But in the peace talks we made it clear that we are for a South African type truth and reconciliation commission.  As to those of Dr. Riek Machar we are already together as you can see him sitting near me. If anything I am criticized for too much reconciliation and too much forgiveness by even some of you in this hall.  So that I do not forgive is untrue.  I am very forgiving and will continue to be.

1. The second issue that Cdr. Salva raised was guarantees for those who went public on the Internet and who appeared to support the rumours and commotion in Yei.  Again, I want to say that whereas there are those abroad who are writing all sorts of things, this really should not affect us here in the Movement.  We are one and there is no issue of victimization of anybody, as we have understood and satisfied each other regarding the last events in Yei.  These are the assurances we were giving yesterday, and I want to repeat that the issue of victimization of any sort does not arise at all; it will never happen and all those in this hall and Almighty God above are my witnesses.  So, to use Dr. Justin’s story, the concerns of Aguek Atem have no basis at all.  Let us unite more than at any other time before and move forward together.

1.  I do not have much else to add on the issue of trust and confidence, except to say that trust and confidence are a form of social capital that people build over time – It is personal and there is very little you here can do about it.  However, from my part I want to assure you that I will work tirelessly to invest in trust and confidence between me and Cdr. Salva.

1. Regarding the Issue of Structures of the Movement

1. I agree that I did not address it sufficiently yesterday because I did not think it was the main problem.  It is not what caused the commotion or near-explosive situation in Yei.  This is not to say that the issue of structures is not a problem.

1. The issue of structures is not new.  Second there is no argument that our structures are perfect, and there is nobody who is refusing that we reform our structures.  It is therefore a misrepresentation of the situation for anybody to suggest that the chairman did not reply the points of Cdr. Salva because the points regarding structures are not his. These are our collective problem and our collective responsibility. The issue of suitable structures for a liberation struggle is not easy and all of us have experimented with several structures since 1983. It was not the Chairman alone, but all of us collectively in the Leadership, whether this is the PMHC, the NLC/NEC or the SPLM-LC.  We used unorthodox means because of the unorthodox situation we are in.  Even the position of the COGS that somebody talked about before as being held by the Deputy Chairman is not the traditional organizational form.  This issue came up in the 1994 NC and my guidance was that let us not be catholic about this issue and that remains my position till today.

1. The structures that we adopted at various times were dictated by changing situations and all of us participated in those changes and in the evolution of those structures.  Of course I am aware that often the credit goes to all and the blame goes to one in person, the Leader of any organization. In 1999 for example we all participated in the resolution passed by the NLC to restructure the Movement; this was not my decision alone. We were simply trying to solve pressing problems to survive.  The SPLM-LC was actually a compromise as some officers were calling for a return to military rule.

1. Concerning assignments, these have sometimes been dictated by situations, like when Cdr. Salva Kiir was assigned as a Front Commander for BGR while he was Deputy Chairman and COGS.  This was to solve a particular situation in the Region. This is the same for other similar unorthodox assignments to solve similar situations.  These measures may now look wrong in hindsight, but this is how we got to where we are.

1. Also the problem of a SPLA GHQ has always been with us. The GHQ has actually been there and is there now in Yei, but there are problems that we know which are associated with its functioning.  We need to solve these problems so that the GHQ functions normally.  The D/COGS at times had field assignments but this happens in many guerrilla situations and does not prevent the functioning of guerrilla GHQ.  We can have them at the GHQ and still we would have the same problems as we have in their absence.  Cdr. Peter Wal Athiu has since returned to GHQ and there is no noticeable improvement.  Now as move towards the peace agreement, we need to complete GHQ establishment and have the COGS and his deputies and other staffs in one place to organize the GHQ and the army.

1. In the SPLA Act, that has been signed into law, the COGS has wide ranging powers which are organic to that office, the issue is using them and improving on the job description.

1. Finally, the issue of structures in the transition was actually addressed by a large group of more than 150 cadres, and we discussed the issue of transition in the SPLM-LC.  The result was presented to me in a document entitled (______). I made some corrections and it is now under printing and will be presented by the Economic Commission to the LC.

1. In it proposals of Transition Teams and Committees or Clusters as the document calls them has been made.  [Read some parts] – funding under the CBTF is also under way as the Economic commission is mobilizing resources.  The proposals of Cdr. Taban Deng and others are actually in this document, where we have three clusters:

(a)   SPLM(b)  SPLA and(c)   CANS

1. These can be immediately formed and start working to effect the transition leading into Interim Period and formation of the GOSS.  Each of them would be under each of the three Vice-Chairmen and all supervised by the Chairman, and all working in one place as a collective leadership (SPLM-LC and Executive) managing the transition.  This is a good document in my view.  The only thing that might need reconsideration in the document is ISCOORT, so that it simply becomes a Secretariat of the SPLM-LC facilitating its work. What we may add is expediting of holding of the NC.

10.  Closing morale paragraph.

JUBA CONFERENCE 1947

 EP/SCR/1.A.5/1 Juba, 21st June 1947
Deputy Governor,
Bahr El Ghazal Area, Wau
All District Commissioners /STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL/

1. I send you herewith a record of the Conference held at Juba on the 12th and 13th June 1947 to consider the recommendations of the Report of the Sudan Administration Conference.

2. The nature of this Conference is explained by the Civil Secretary at the opening of the second day’s discussion (page 12 of the record). It is no way a continuation of the Administration Conference, but as stated in my remarks in the penultimate paragraph, was called at my request by the Civil Secretary in order that he should gauge Southern reactions to and feelings about the recommendations, before the Report was considered by the Central Government.

3. The record is not being published nor is it being communicated to the press, nor are copies being given to all who were present. It is a confidential document summarizing the discussions; primarily an side memoir to the Chairman and not” agreed minutes”, since members have not been shown the record before compilation.

4. Full use can, or should, be made of it in discussion with British and Sudanese Staff who may read it but it should not be distributed.

5. The reasons are important; the main consideration is that the Sudan, though a vast country in area, is small in wealth and population, and if the Sudan is ever really to become self-governing and self-dependent it must not be divided up into small weak units. Those who prepared the report believe that the sooner Southern and Northern Sudanese come together and work together, the sooner they will begin to coalesce and cooperate in the advancement of their country. This belief is sincerely and genuinely held by many Northern Sudanese, and they hope that by including Southern Sudanese in
the future Assembly, the process of unification will be hastened. I am confident that their recommendations are based on the very highest motives, and think they do not seek opportunities of exploiting backward tribes in the South.

6. The Conference in Khartoum did not include Southern representatives, but I invited the Governors to attend in order that they should know what was The Juba Conference June 1947 being proposed, and should be able to inform the Conference of conditions and feelings in the South. This they did.

7. Now that the report of the Conference has been submitted to the Sudan Government and action on it is expected, I have summoned this meeting here of men both from the North and the South, in order to consider the unification of the two parts of the country. I should like to explain to you present Government policy in regard to the South. The policy was defined in 1945 as follows:-

“It is only economic and educational development that these peoples can be equipped to stand up for themselves in the future, whether their lot be eventually cast with the Northern Sudan or with East Africa, or partly with each”.

Since 1945 there have been development both economically and educationally in the South, and it has begun to be clear, I think, that the Southern Sudan, by its history and by the accidents of geography, river transport and so on, must turn more to the North rather than to Uganda or the Congo, and I believe that our policy regarding these areas should be restated as follows:-

“The policy of the Sudan Government regarding the Southern Sudan is to act upon the facts that the peoples of Southern Sudan are distinctly African and Negroid, but that geography and economics combine (so far as can be foreseen at the present time) to render them inextricably bound for future development to the Middle East and Arabs of the Northern Sudan and therefore to ensure that they shall be educational and economic developments be equipped to take their places in the future as socially and economically the equals of their partners of the Northern Sudan in the Sudan of the future”.

“If this is to be the Government’s policy regarding the Southern Sudan I should like the views of this meeting one or two points of immediate importance.

You have all received copies of a Memorandum giving the terms of reference of this meeting and I think have already had opportunity to discuss them and form your opinions”.
(Sdg)
B.V. Marwood
GOVERNOR OF EQUATORIA
The Juba Conference June 1947 3
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUBA CONFERENCE ON THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOUTHERN SUDAN – JUNE 1947.
The following were present:
J.W. Robertson, Esq., M.B.E. Civil Secretary, Chairman
F.D. Kingdon Esq. Governor Upper Nile
B.V. Marwood Rsq. Governor Equatoria
G.H. Barter Esq. Director of Establishment
M.F.A. Keen Esq. Assistant Civil Secretary (Councils)
T.R.H. Owen Esq. Deputy Governor Bahr El Ghazal
Mohd Saleh Eff. Shingeiti
Ibrahim Eff Badri
Kamyangi Ababa
Sgt. Major Philomon Majok
Clement Mboro
Hassan Fertak
James Tambura
Chief Cir Rehan
Chief Gir Kiro
Pastor Anderea Apaya
Chief Ukuma Bazin
Edward Adhok
Buth Diu
Chief Lolik Lado
Chief Lappanya
Father Guido Akou
Ciricio Iro
Chief Tete
Chief Luath Ajak
Hassan Eff. Ahmed Osman
Dr. Habib Abdalla
Sheikh Serur Mohd. Ramli

The meeting opened at 9.30 a.m. on Thursday 12th June. The Chairman in his opening speech said:-
“Gentlemen,
I should first of all like to say how glad I am to see you all here today, and on behalf of us who are visitors I wish to thank the Governor, Mr. Marwood, and the other residents in Juba, who have welcomed us so hospitably and generously. The origin of this meeting lies in the recent developments of administration and policy in the Northern Sudan. Last year, the The Juba Conference June 1947.

Governor-General, Sir Hubert Huddloston, set up a Conference in the North to seek ways and means of associating the Sudanese more closely with the government of their country. As you know, there has been in the Northern Sudan for the last three years, an Advisory Council, and one of the recommendations made by the Conferenence is to develop the Advisory Council into a more authoritative and responsible body, with the power of making laws and to some extent, of controlling the work of the administration. The Advisory Council has not had power to concern itself with the two Southern Provinces of Equatoria and the Upper Nile and there are therefore no Southern Sudanese on the Advisory Council. The report of the Conference however, which has just been published, recommends that the Southern Sudan should send representatives to the new Assembly which it is proposed should be set up, and in paragraphs 12 and 13 of this report you will find its recommendations and the reasons for them.
MEMORANDUM
The Sudan Administration Conference in paragraphs 12 and 13 of its report dealing with the future closer association of the Sudanese with the Central Government has made certain recommendations about the Southern Sudan. In order to study the implications of these recommendations about which I shall have to advise His Excellency the Governor-General, I have decided to hold a meeting in the Southern Sudan at which I wish to discuss the proposals with Southern Sudanese and with officials, who have Southern
experience, both British and Sudanese. I have therefore arranged for a meeting to be held at Juba on 11.6.47 at which I hope representatives from Equatoria and the Upper Nile Provinces will attend. The terms of reference of the meeting will be:-

(1) to consider the recommendations of the Sudan Administration Conference about the Southern Sudan.,

(2) to discuss the advisability of the Southern Sudanese being represented in the proposed Assembly and if it is decided to be advisable to decide how such representation can best be obtained in the present circumstances; and whether the representation proposed by the Sudan Administration Conference is suitable;

(3) to discuss whether safeguards can be introduced into the forthcoming legislation setting up the new Assembly, to ensure that the Southern Sudan with its difference in race, tradition, language, customs and outlook is not hindered in its social and political advancement;

(4) to discuss whether or not an Advisory Council for the Southern Sudan should be set up to deal with Southern affairs from which representatives might be appointed to sit on the assembly, as representatives of the Southern Sudan;

(5) to consider the recommendations of the Sudan Administration Conference in paragraph 13 of their report which deals with matters not strictly relevant to the political development of the Sudan, which the Conference recommended as essential if the unification of the Sudanese peoples is to be achieved.

Chief Ukuma Bazia then laid before the meeting a set of written answers to the points raised in the Civil Secretary’s Memorandum:-
MINUTES IF THE PRELIMINARY MEETING OF THE MEMBERS REFERING TO CIVIL SECRETARY’S MEMORANDUM.

(2) No, but to send people who will sit and merely study.

(3) To leave the matter of race tradition; language customs and outlook die by itself, through education and civilisation. More safeguards to be added.

(4) We agree to set up our Advisory Council in the South but in link with the North. Before passing laws for the whole Sudan the Legislative Council in the North should consult the Advisory Council here until such time when the South will be capable to send representatives to voice for itself. Since we consented in para 2 we also welcome people from the North to attend our meetings and advise us. People to be sent should be of legal respect.
(5) Permits to trade order 1928 to be cancelled on the following conditions:-

(1) Only the people with good capitals should be admitted,

(2) That these capitalists should build their shops in red bricks and corrugated iron sheets in places permitted by this Council,

(3) That Southern Sudanese should be encouraged to trade and the only way of doing this is by employing agents from the South,

(a) One educational policy to be adopted for North and South. The teaching of language should be in bush schools. English and Arabic in Elementary to Higher Schools.
( The improvement of communications between the two parts, encouragement of transfers, the unification of the system of establishment should be the same and should be started NOW.

Mohamed Saleh Eff. Shingeiti referring to answer number 2 asked if the Southerners could explain why the South should be unable to send representatives to the Central Lehislative Assembly just as the other outlying tribes and areas of the North, for instance the Beja, the Kababish etc. If Southerners were going to attend the Assembly why should they not take part in it, and speak for their own people? Since the more distant tribes of the Northern Sudan were to be represented in the proposed assembly why should not the South?

Kumyangi Ababa replied that Southerners were like recruits compared with old soldiers and the Southerners wanted more training before they could take part in an assembly with Northerners. The other tribes which the last speaker mentioned had already had some experience in the Advisory Council which Southerners had not had. They did not wish to close the door to Southern representation in the Legislative Assembly but the time was not yet ripe.

The Chairman referred the meeting to the basic question as to whether they considered that the South was essentially to be one with the North.

James Tembura said that education had not advanced far enough in the South to allow for full representations.

Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti returned to the point that many of the Northern tribes were as backward as anyone in the South and had not previously had Councils of their own. We suggested that there should Province Councils in each of the Southern Provinces which should send representatives.

Chief Ukuma Bazia asked why the South had not been included in the Advisory Council.

Mr. Kingdon said that Sir Douglas Newbold had answered that question at the time when the Advisory Council was first started. He said Southerners had not reached a standard of education which would enable them to represent their compatriots in such a Council.

Chief Ukuma Bazia asked if, when Sir Douglas Newbold gave this explanation, the Northern Sudanese were satisfied with it.

Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti replied emphatically that the Northern Sudanese were not satisfied.

Sgt. Major Philemon stated that the Southerners were like children in their relations with the grown up Northerners and that, as children must drink milk before they eat kisra, so the Southerners must first study self-government before participating in governing.

Chief Cir Rehan said that the South was distinct from the North. If he went to the North, would the Northerners listen to his words as the representative of the Southern peoples?

Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti said they would.

Chief Cir Rehan replied that the Southerners should go on learning under their British Administrators and in due course they would acquire understanding. He could not see that at the present time, Northerners could understand the needs of Southerners.

Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti said that he was understanding them now and that if they came to the North then the Northerners and the Southerners would have the opportunity of understanding each other even better.

Chieg Cir Rehan was still dissatisfied and said that the Southerners must have training in Councils before they could represent their people.

Dr. Habid Abdalla remarked that in his opinion all the Southerners present were labouring under the misconception that all Northerners have great training and experience in matters of government. The difference between Northerners and Southerners was much less than they though, in fact it was negligible. The Southerners should not be afraid of being at disadvantage vis a vis the Northerners in matters of self-government.

Sgt. Major Philemon admitted that was in fact what he was afraid of, he could not see why the Northerners should not simply invite them North to enable them first of all to observe the procedure. He added that the Southerners could not ignore pas history.

Hassan Fertak replying to Judge Shingeiti said that everything had to have a beginning. The North had its Advisory Council for four years and was now ready for the next steps, a Legislative Assembly. They were like pupils who had been through class 1 and now were going into class II. The South had not yet been through class I and it would be absurd to put them straight into class II.
Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti explained that members of the Advisory Council had not all been at the same stage, some were advanced than others and the less advanced has learnt a lot from the more advanced.

Hassan Fertak pointed out that the less advanced had any rate many contacts and much in common with the more advanced members.

Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti drew attention to the fact that the Conference in which they were engaged was very similar to a meeting of the Advisory Council, and if Southerners could speak for themselves in this Conference why should they not do so in a Legislative Assembly?.

Mr. Marwood stressed the difference between an Advisory Council and a Legislative Assembly which would have powers to make laws and would have some control over the administration. Judge Shingeiti had not yet given any convincing reason why the first step of an Advisory Council which had been found necessary in the North should not be equally necessary in the South.

Sheik Serur Mohd. Ramli wished to return to the basic point of whether the Sudan was to be a single united nation. Before details of representation were discussed it was necessary to have that point settled.

Mr. Marwood nominated a speaker to reply but objection was taken to this by Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti who said that if anybody wanted to speak they should do so without prompting from the Governor.

The Chairman asked whether anybody present had any objections to the Unity of the Sudan.

Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti complained that this was outside the meeting’s terms of reference but the Civil Secretary refused to admit this. The Civil Secretary again addressed the meeting and said that if nobody spoke on this subject then they would assume agreement on the principle of the Unity of the Sudan.

Chief Lapponya stated that the principle of unity could only be decided later when the Southerners were grown up, by which time they would be in a position to decide whether to join the North or go to the Belgian Congo or Uganda.

The Chairman explained that people could not get up and go where they like just like that.

Mr. Owen addressed the Northern Sudanese and explained that they were still suffering from the sins of Zubeir Pasha and the slavers. “The sins of the Fathers shall be vested upon their children even unto the third and fourth generation”. He said that the South had not forgotten the days of oppression even if the North had done so, and even today the Southerners view was dominated by fear and suspicion. He concluded that the Southerners would never willingly join the North until the latter should prove by their
acts, not merely by their words, that they had undergone a change of heart.

Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti stressed that Northerners had no desire to dominate the South. They maintained that the country as one and the policy of this country was made in Khartoum, so the Northerners wanted the Southerners to join with them in the formation of policy for a whole country.

Mr. Owen had referred to the slave trade which they could not but be feld bound to point out that the British had in their time been the biggest slave traders in history. The West Indies were populated by Africans who had been enslaved in the past by the British but with the growth of public opinion the British had come to realise the evils of the slave trade. What had happened in England had now happened in the Northern Sudan where it was fully realised that slavery was barbaric and harmful. It had happened that, under this Government, slaves had been introduced into the Sudan from Abyssinia. He had himself been a Sub-Mamur in the White Nile at that time and had personally taken part in the freeing of these slaves. This trade had been discovered by the vigilance of Sudanese Officials. Northerners had no evil intentions towards the South. If they had they would not have been prepared to put up the money for the Zande Scheme.

Chief Lapponya said that when British and Northerners had first come to their country in 1914, the Northerners had despised and insulted Southerners. Southerners were also envious of the Northerners because they were paid at higher rates.

Chief Gir Kiro admitted that the Sudan was a single country, but said that this was the first time they had ever taken part in a conference of this kind how could they be expected to send representatives to an assembly in Khartoum? The Northerners were their elder brothers and were inviting them to swim across the river with the Northerners.

Chief Cir Rehan said that he and Chief Gir Kiro were answerable to their people and must speak for them. At the Gogrial and Tonj Councils their people had said they had no objection to live as brothers with the Northerners but they wanted to wait and learn before joining them. That is what he and Chief Gir Kiro were saying now.

Mohd Saleh Eff. Shingeiti said that the Southerners could best learn in the course of the work they would do in the Province and District Councils.

The Chairman summed up at this point and said that so far the discussion boiled down to two facts. Firstly, that most Southerners present (Shingeiti Eff. “All of them” were agreed that the Sudan was one country. Secondly, that the Southerners were not yet advanced enough to take part in the Legislative Assembly but would in their opinion be able to participate after a period of educational training in Southern Councils. The meeting then adjourned for 15 minutes.

The Chairman referred to note 2 of the Minutes of the Preliminary
Meeting. If it was proposed to send people to the Legislative Assembly as
learners, how many would they wish to send and how would they be chosen.
The Administration Conference had recommended that there should be 13
representatives from the South.

Chief Ukuma Bazia said that this point had not been discussed as they did not know if the suggestion would be accepted. They would certainly wish to select them themselves rather than that they should be appointed by the Government.

Siricio Iro said that they would wish at first to send a large number probably more than the 15 suggested.

Mr. Kingdon asked what language or languages would be used in the Legislative Assembly?. If there were too many it would cause serious delay in the proceedings.

Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti said that the proceedings would be in English and Arabic, but there would be no difficulty in having them translated into the language of any member who did not understand either of these.

Mr. Kingdon pointed out that the absence of a large number of the leading personalities for prolonged periods would cause a serious delay in the advance of local government.

Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti said that the government of the people must be represented and that the foundation of Representative Government lay in the Town, Rural District, and Province Councils. Thus he considered that in the South there should be Town Councils in places like Juba, and Wau. Rural Councils in the Districts, and a Province Council formed from the leaders of the Town and Rural Councils. This he considered could be achieved in one year in the South. Some three or four of the Southern representatives of the Legislative Assembly could be chosen from the Province Council. The Province Governor could nominate others, being guided only by the interests of the
Province. In due course these nominated members to the Legislative Assembly would be replaced by members selected or elected from the Province Council, which in the normal course of its deliberations would automatically effect the necessary training and education of its members. All this had already taken place in the North, and he saw no reason why the same should not happen in the South.

Clement Mboro asked what would happen if the Legislative Assembly were to meet bore these Province Councils are set up?

The Chairmnan pointed out that if was hoped that the Legislative Assembly would be set up fairly soon, but there might be some delay.

Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti presumed that Governors would nominate representatives in that case, but emphasised that Southern representation was essential or the North would have everything its own way.

Clement Mboro though that considerably more than 13 should be sent from the South, even though they did not take part in the debates, in order to study the art of government.

Mohd Saleh Eff. Shingeiti pointed out that the places to learn the art of government was in Local Government.

Clement Mboro pleaded for patience till the Southerners were sufficiently advanced to play their part in the Assembly.

Mohd Saleh Eff. Shingeiti said that the North could not wait until the South caught up. If Southerners could take part in an Advisory Council they could take part in a Legislative Assembly.

Clement Mboro again stressed the essential difference between an Advisory Council and a Legislative Assembly. The number of representatives to be sent to the North should be more than 13. When asked by the Chairman to explain his reasons for this, he said it would form a wider field for selection when the time came to appoint the 13 members to the Legislative Assembly proper.

Mr. Owen asked Clement Mboro if these Southerners would go to the North to study the Legislative Assembly only, or would they have to report back to a Southern Advisory Council.

Clement Mboro said they would have to report back to the Southern Advisory Council.

Mohd Saleh Eff. Shingeiti protested that the Conference was useless as long as Southern Members present came with fixed ideas which they had conceived before the Conference began.

The Chairman replied that the Conference was quite open and that what was taking place now was an elucidation of the Southerner’s reasons for the various decisions they had come to.

Mohd Saleh Eff. Shingeiti repeated that the Southerner’s ideas had already been fixed and that therefore the Conference was fruitless.

The Chairman summed up the previous discussion as follows: Firstly, that the Southerners were agreed to send a number of representatives to the North in order to observe the process of Government, to broaden their minds, and to report back to the Southern Advisory Council. Secondly, that no fixed numbers had been agreed upon but that more than 13 should go. He went on to ask how these representatives were to be selected.

Clement Mboro replied that the Government should begin now with Local Councils which in due course would be able to send representatives, but in the mean time the Government should nominate representatives.
Dr. Habib Abdulla deprecated the separatist tendency that would be fostered by any proposals to treat the Southern Sudan on a different footing from the North.

Father Guido Akou said that the North wanted immediate Southern representation in an Assembly which would legislate for the whole Sudan. Southerners were afraid of this because they felt that through lack of understanding, their representatives might agree to laws which would prove harmful.

Edward Adhok considered that there was no-one from Upper Nile capable of representing his people in such an Assembly. The Shilluk Council had not been a success so far owing to lack of experience of members. He himself did not feel qualified to represent his own people or take the responsibility of committing them to laws which, owing to a lack of understanding on his part, might not be for the benefit of his peoples.

Ibrahim Eff. Bedri said that when a man thinks he is backward it is difficult to persuade him that he is not, and that the Northern Sudanese must appreciate this difficulty.

Chief Lolik Lado regretted that he was not ready for these discussions as he had not been able to consult his people before coming to Juba. He said however, that a girl who has been asked to marry a young man usually wants time to hear reports of that young man from other people before consenting likewise before coming to any fixed decisions about their relations with the Northerners. The ancestors of the Northern Sudanese were not peace-loving and domesticated like cows. The younger generation claim that they mean no harm, but time would show what they would in fact do. He agreed to unification with the North but insisted on the Southerner’s need for protection and for further time to consider the matter in conference with the elders of the people. An immediate decision could not be taken now.

Sheikh Sorur Mohd Ramli thought that Southerners need have nor fear laws which interfered with their customs for they could be administered with discretion. He quoted the law against pharaonic circumcision which had been passed by the Sudan Government at the request of the Advisory Council. This law was only enforced on the express direction of the Governor who took into account all the circumstances. Any laws passed by the Legislative Assembly which ran counter to Southern customs could doubtless make similar provision.

Chief Tete said that Northerners still despised and frequently insulted Southerners. A child must be brought up gradually and Southerners must learn to walk before they try to run.

The Chairman then referred to para 3 of the Memorandum and the minute of the preliminary meeting, and asked what safeguards the Southerners had in mind.

Chief Ukuma Bazia instanced the customs of his people to draw their teeth and feared that Northerners who think this a barbarous custom might try to stop it by law.

Dr. Habib Abdalla said that the best safeguard that Southerners should (be) members of the Legislative Assembly.

Chief Buth Diu said that Northerners claim to have no desire to dominate the South, but this was not enough and there must be safeguards. There should be no settlement by Northerners on land in the South without permission. Secondly there must be no interference from the North in Local Government in the South. Thirdly there should be a law to prevent a Northerner calling a Southerner a slave.

Mohd Saleh Eff. Shingeiti pointed out that such an insult was in fact punishable under the Penal Code.

James Tembura said, on the subject of safeguards, that they must ensure that Northerners who have children by Southerner women must not desert them when they go back to the North.

Mohd Saleh Eff. Shingeiti replied that this was to the Government’s fault since the government bids these wives and children to go North.

James Tembura in reply to a question by the Chairman assented that he was referring to cases where Northerners were properly married to Southern women by local custom and by Moslem law.

Dr. Habib Abdulla thought that the reason for these cases of desertion were to be found in the variety of laws governing marriage in the Sudan, and that this could be rectified by future legislation.

The Chairman thought that further discussion on this point would not be profitable as it had little to do with the safeguards they were at present discussing.

Mr. Marwood said that one sort of safeguards he had in mind was that laws affecting local customs could only be enforced at the discretion of the Governor.

The Chairman then referred to the suggestion to set up an Advisory Council for the Southern Sudan, and the Minute from the Preliminary Meeting on this point. In particular he asked what was meant by the expression “people of legal respect”.

Clement Mboro said that they had intended by this phrase men who had experience of Local Government and of the working of Councils and people who know and sympathises with Southerners.

Mohd Saleh Eff. Shingeiti asked how long such Advisory Council would last?

Clement Mboro thought that it would be like the Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan and last a few years only, but that it might possibly be necessary to keep it in existence after Southern representatives had taken their places in the Legislative Assembly.

Hassan Eff. Ahmed Osman felt that this would mean separation of North and
South.

The Chairman deplored the tendency to regard any suggestion that Southern problems should be treated in a different manner from those in the North as a conspiracy to divide North from the South.

Dr. Habib Abdulla thought that there would be some delay in setting up the Legislative Assembly and that if in the mean while real progress should be made with the advancement of Local Government and Local Councils, Southerners might feel that a suitable form of representation could be worked out by them in which they could have confidence.

Hassan Fertak thought that a Southern Advisory Council would have the merit of providing a reserve of potential representatives to the Legislative Assembly.

The Chairman pointed out in reply that this could equally well be done by Province Councils once they started.

Shiekh Serur Mohd Ramli considered that the differences between North and South would no longer present any difficulty once Local Governments developed in the South.
The meeting then adjourned until 9.30 a.m. on 13th June 1947.
******************************

The Conference reopened at 9.30 a.m. on Friday the 13th June 1947.

The Chairman explained that the nature of the Conference was exploratory and that no decisions were being taken. They were all there to learn each other’s ideas. The decisions, if any would be taken later by the Central Government. He deplored the mutual suspicion which aconed to exist between Northerners and Southerners. The Northerners on the one hand were suspecting the Southerners of wanting to separate from the North (and the Government of desiring this separation). The Southerners on the other hand were suspecting that the Northerners wished to dominate them. It was essential to get away
from these suspicions so that they would all talk together. Summing up the discussion of the day before the Chairman said that the following conclusions had been arrived at: –
Firstly that the Southerners want a Unified Sudan; Secondly, that they want to participate in the proposed Legislative Assembly, but that, Thirdly, they were not sufficiently advanced to do so immediately, Fourthly, it was important to hasten the establishment and the development of Local Government in the South, Fifthly, that at first Southerners should attend the Legislative Assembly as observers. These should be more than the 13 eventual members.

Questions were asked about safeguards but they had been misunderstood.
Southern spokesman had referred to these specific hurts they wished to be
defended from rather than the general method to be adopted to protect them
from these hurts.

The Chairman referred to para 4 the Southerners answers to the questions put in his Memorandum. Some reference had been made to it the day before, but the discussion had not been complete. He personally thought that a Southern Advisory Council was unnecessary, and that Province Councils would be adequate. In Province Councils there would be great opportunity for more people to meet and discuss and thereby learn the art of Government. He also thought that this would be more agreeable to the people of the North. The Chairman invited comments on this subject.

Dr. Habib Abdullah referred to the differences of opinion and suspicions between the North and South which had been mentioned by the Chairman, and asked permission to go over the ground of yesterday’s debate to bring out certain important points. There were certain essential things, which must be agreed before other matters could be discussed. Secondly, there was no reason why laws made for the Sudan as a whole should be harmful to one part of it. There were two kinds of laws. Laws which protected person and
property which were welcome to everybody, and laws relating to taxation etc. which nobody liked. Reference had frequently been made to political Backwardness of Southerners in the Sudan each with its own customs and conditions. They were all of the same economic standard for they were all poor and in need of economic advance.
Religion might differ, but each had his own. There was no reason to say that any one section was more backward than another. It was true that some Southerners went naked, but some Northerners never wash. No one wished to upset the Government. The Government wished to teach the Sudanese to govern themselves and told them they could not learn to do so without taking responsibility. Finally he wished to know why the Southern members had asked for an Advisory Council for the South.

The Chairman pointed out this had been answered the previous day when the Southerners had said that the North had practiced in Advisory Council for four years that a baby had to drink milk before it could eat kisra. This appeared to be a full answer to the question. The point now before the meeting was whether there should not be Province Councils instead of a single Advisory Council.

Siricio Iro thought that Province Councils would be a good thing and that Southern Members to the Legislative Assembly could later be drawn from these Councils. There was no wonder or mystery about these Councils, it was a matter of common sense and the Councils would be comparable to the present Chief’s Courts. The experience gained in these Councils would assist the Southerners in their deliberation with the Northerners.

Kamuyengi Ababa referred to the difference between Northern and Southern rates of pay for work, which was, in effect, the same, and to the reasons given for this by his District Commissioner, that is to say, lack of education in the South, and lower rates of taxation in the South. He referred to the higher standard of housing enjoyed by Northern Officials, and concluded that although they were the sons of one father it seemed to
him that father was treating his brother better than himself.

Clement Mboro stated that since the Conference of the day before he had fundamentally changed his mind and now considered that the best way in which the Southerners could protect themselves would be to go to Khartoum now to legislate together with the Northerners. Any Councils formed in the South would be defenseless before the Legislative Assembly. An Advisory Council was advisory only and its advice could easily be rejected by the Legislative Assembly or similar body. It was best for the Southerners to go and legislate now in spite of their backwardness, since the Southerners
could speak for themselves in the present Conference, there was no reason why they could not speak for themselves in a Legislative Assembly. If any law was proposed which was not agreeable to the South they could stand up and object. The Southerners must defend themselves and speak and think for themselves.

Mr. Owen asked Clement Mboro what his safeguard would be if in spite of the Southern objections in the Legislative Assembly a law was passed which was against the interests of the Southerners?

Clement Mboro replied that the Government would protect them.

Mohd Saleh Eff. Shingeiti protested against Mr. Owen’s question. His protest was over-ruled.

Clement Mboro went on to say that if the Government could not protect them there must be rules and legislations in the Legislative Assembly which would do so. Mean time, the Government must press on without delay with the Establishment of Province, District, and Town Councils in the South.

Chief Cir Rehan in their country they had originally been given courts, and when they had learnt to use them the Government had set up a Council of about 40 men with three for the chest. They had found this very different from the Court work and had it not been for the help of the D.C. they could not have made it work at all. They had found this Conference different again. When they discussed amongst themselves the first day they took five hours to reach their decisions. He was certain that Northerners would have
completed the business in one hour (laughter). What they had said yesterday was not their own opinion only but that of their people. They had agreed to join the North in a Government for the whole Sudan only if they were given time. Was he to go back and tell his people that the Northerners insisted on their coming in at once or not at all? He did not feel that is showed a brotherly feeling to try and force them.

James Tembura said that he agreed emphatically with what Clement Mboro had said with regard to immediate representation in the Legislative Assembly.

The Chairman asked him why he had changed his mind since the previous day.

James Tembura replied that Judge Shingeiti had said that if they did not
do so they would have no say in the future Government of the Sudan, and he had thought this over very carefully the previous night after considering what had been said during the day.

Chief Tete said he wanted to study in the South until he was clever enough to go to the North. One could not begin to do work which one did not understand.

Sgt. Major Philermon Majok said that they were speaking on behalf of their people and that they, as spokesmen, could see more clearly than the people. He thought that if the Southerners adopted a “go slow” policy now they would never reach the required level. The Southerners could speak their mind in a Legislative Assembly just as a Chief could speak to Chief’s Court or as a Major Court Member could speak to D.C. presiding. In a Legislative Assembly there would be somebody to defend them and guide them. In spite of his statement the day before he now thought that there was no danger in sending Southerners to the North to join in the Legislative Assembly as soon as it was formed.

Chief Lolik Lado said that the day before they had spoken for their people and could not change their words today. The Southerners wanted to send representatives to the North but so far they had found nobody to send. The Government would later select the right people to go to speak on their behalf.

Chief Lapponya thought that if representatives were to be sent to a Legislative Assembly they should have had previous experience in the Councils of their own. It was impossible to send untrained recruits into battle. When the Governor thought they were sufficiently trained he would send them into the firing line.

Hassan Fertak said that they were all, or nearly all, agreed that the Sudan was one country and that was the most important decision that had to be made. They were also agreed that Province Councils should be formed. He wanted to know when the Legislative Assembly was like to be set up.

The Chairman said they hoped it would be very soon, but he could not say exactly when.

Hassan Fertak could see no reason why their representatives should not, for the time being, watch the proceedings in order to learn, without being full voting members.

The Chairman said that there seemed to have been a change of mind among some of the Southern members, but that discussion had been a useful one. He would now like to return to the question he asked at the beginning of the session. Did they wish to have one Advisory Council for the South or a Province Council for each Province? From what had been said, it appeared that they favoured Province Councils, and that these Councils should send representatives to the Legislative Assembly. There was some difference of
opinion whether these representatives should be full voting members from the start, or whether they should at first watch the proceedings until they had some experience of procedure.
Buth Diu thought that the Southerners should send representatives to the North not only to study, but to participate in legislation, finance, and administration. He referred to para 2 of the Civil Secretary’s Memorandum, and thought that the best way of representing the South would be to send people who had been attached to outstations for three or four years, and also those who had served a long time with the Government. The Government
should appoint the best representatives, four representatives from Upper Nile Province were enough. Of the 10 members to be nominated by the Governor-General, 2 could be from Upper Nile Province. An Advisory Council for the South would be the first step towards separation. It was much better to have Province Councils. Laws made by the Legislative Assembly should not be enforced without the consent of the Governor or the Governor-General.

The Chairman explained that in any case according to the report of the Administration Conference all laws made by the Legislative Assembly would be referred to the Governor-General for his comments.

Chief Luoth Ajak agreed with Buth Diu.

The meeting adjourned for 15 minutes.
When the Conference reopened the Chairman referred the Members to para 5 of his Memorandum, and said that some of the subject matter therein had already been discussed by the Southerners at their own meeting held prior to the opening of the present Conference. With regard to Permits to Trade the Southerners had expressed their opinion in their para 5, sub para 1, 2 & 3. The Council referred to in para 5, sub para 2 was presumably a Local Council, District or Province.

Shiekh Serur Mohd Ramli said that if the conditions stipulated by the Southerners were necessary it would be a matter for the Local Council to decide

The Chairman asked whether the conditions laid down by the Southerners had reference to Northern traders only or to all non-Southern traders.

Chief Ukuma Bazia and others explained that they referred to all non-Southern traders.

Mohd Saleh Eff. Shingeiti explained that the licensing authority would probably be the Local Council who would have to attach what conditions they liked to the licence. It was not necessary to define these conditions now. If the Local Councils were given adequate power the conditions attached, to traders licences could safely be left to them.

The Chairman asked Mohd Saleh Eff. Shingeiti if he was speaking on behalf of the Legal Secretary or for himself only.

Mohd Saleh Eff. Shingeiti said that he was speaking for himself only.

The Chairman explained that his reason for asking that question was that the Legal Secretary adhered firmly to the view that licences should be bought over the Merkaz Counter and that there should be no restrictions.

Mr. Marwood pointed out that the Local Government Authorities were not, in law, the issuing authority for Trader’s Licences. If Judge Shingeiti’s proposal to hand over this authority to Local Government’s and to enable them to impose what conditions they liked were adopted, it would presumably apply in the North as well as in the South.

Mohd Saleh Eff. Shingeiti said that in the North there were no restrictions (apart from certain temporary restrictions resulting from the war) attached to the issue of traders licences. It was open to the Conference, however, to recommend that Local Authorities be empowered to make such restrictions.

The Chairman explained that in the South there were two licences which a non-Southern trader had to take out. One was the ordinary trader’s licence without restrictions, and the other a special licence under the Permits to Trade Order. The reason for this was that in the past many Gallaba with little ´capital and a tendency to exploit the unsophisticated came to the South and the Permits Order was brought in to protect the tribesmen from this type of traders. If the Permits to Trader Order was cancelled, how was the South to be protected from a possible influx of such people?.

Chief Buth Diu said that at the preliminary meeting they had decided to recommend that the Permits to Trade Order be cancelled under certain conditions. The reason for this was that the Sudan Administration Conference had fell strongly that the Permits to Trade Order was a hindrance to the unification of the South. The majority at the meeting were against the cancellation of this Order, but the minority had persuaded the majority to agree, provided certain conditions were laid down.

Chief Leuith Ajak emphasied the fear of the Southerners that a crowd of hungry Gallaba would invade the South and swamp them and cheat the people.

James Tembura said that the feeling at the preliminary meeting was that rich traders from the North and elsewhere should be restricted to the big towns, leaving the bush shops for Southerners who wished to learn shop-keeping.

Mr. Owen asked James Tembura if he thought there were enough Southerners who wanted to open bush shops, as in his experience there were disappointingly few who wished to do so.

James Tembura replied that he thought that there were enough.

Chief Lolik Lado was sure that many Southerners wanted to open shops.

Chief Tete agreed and added that many ex-soldiers wanted to open shops
with their gratuities.
The Chairman thought that what the Southerners wanted was a safeguard that Northerners should not come and open shops in the villages, but that village shops should reserved for Southerners. He asked Mohd Saleh Eff. Shingeiti if the Legal Secretary would agree to that.

Mohd Saleh Eff. Shingeiti thought the he would.

The Chairman thought there was little difference between this and the old permits to Trade Order.

Hassan Eff Ahmed Osman thought that the difference lay in this: that although Local Authorities should have power to refuse a licence disappointed applicants would still have the right of appeal against their decision.

Mr. Marwood thought that present legislation in the Sudan was deficient. A permit to trade was merely a piece of financial machinery, but there was no Ordinance governing the proper conduct or trade in the Sudan. Some legislation was necessary to ensure the proper conduct of trade, and this legislation should apply to the whole of the Sudan. The proposed Legislative Assembly might consider this in due course.

Clement Mboro expllained that what the Southerners had intended was that adequate opportunity should be left to the Southerner to become a trader.

Mohd Saleh Eff Shingeiti explained Mr. Marwood’s point that before conditions could be attached to the issue or a trader’s licence a law must be enacted to that affect.

The Chairman said this seemed to imply a permit to Trade Order for the whole Sudan in fact (laughter).

Chief Ukuma Bazia though that 1928 Order should stand until they heard that the Legislative Assembly had to say about it.

Hassan Eff Ahmed Osman thought that there was no basic difference of opinion between Northerners and Southerners with regard to the need for protecting villagers against adventurers of whatever nationality.

The Chairman considered that was what the Permits to Trade Order was, in effect, doing at present. There was a good deal of muddled thinking about this Order in the North.

Mohd Saleh Eff Shingeiti agreed that this may be so, but explained that the Northerners considered that the Permit to Trade Order was being applied in such a way as to hinder economic development in the South. The best remedy lay in ensuring that disappointed applicants should have right of appeal to a Court of Justice.

Mr. Marwood thought there was a common misconception that his office was full of rejected applications from people outside the Province. In the past three or four months only one or two had come in. In one of these cases he had asked the trader where he wanted to trade, and what capital he had to build shops and buy lorries for transport etc. He awaited his reply. The permits to Trade Order had been interpreted exactly as this meeting would have like it to be interpreted. Small traders with a capital of only Ls10 or
so were not wanted. Responsible traders with capital are wanted. The last thing he wanted to do was to hinder economic development.

The Chairman summed up and thought they were all agreed that it was necessary to improve trade and that merchants with capital were wanted to improve and develop the country, and that people should be protected against adventurers and exploiters. He thought that the Southerners wanted to stress that there should be enough places left in the villages to give Southerners the opportunity to set up as traders and in due course build up bigger businesses of their own. When they returned to Khartoum they would consider the recommendation of this meeting.

The next point for discussion was the question of unification of educational policy in the North and South, and the teaching of Arabic.

Mr. Owen asked for a clarification of the phrase “one educational policy”.

Mr. Kingdon thought that the reply to this question by the preliminary meeting of the Southerners in their minute 5 (a) was self contradictory.

Hassan Eff Ahmed Osman thought that this meant merely that the curricula in Northern and Southern Schools should be the same. He did not find any contradiction in the recommendation that education in bush Schools should be in vernacular and that English and Arabic should be taught in Elementary and Higher Schools.

James Tembura said that the Southerners felt strongly that a boy should first learn to read and write in his own language and could later go on to other languages.

Mohd Saleh Eff Shingeiti felt that it should be left to the educationalist to say if a boy could learn two foreign languages in the elementary stage.

The Chairman pointed out that the essential difference in practice between North and South was that in the North a boy learnt in Arabic to the end of the elementary and did not start to learn a foreign language before then. The meeting felt that Arabic should be taught as soon as the boy was able to learn it, but that is should be left to the educationalist to say when this stage was reached.

Pastor Anderea Apaia asked if the introduction of Arabic would apply to Mission Schools.

The Chairman thought that this was the general opinion of the meeting.

Dr. Habib Abdalla thought that Southerners were still thinking of education in terms of
preparation for government service, an idea still held by many Northerners, and he though that the reasons Southerners were so anxious for the same education as the Northerners was to strengthen their claim to receive the same rates of pay as the Northerners.

The Chairman referred to the great shortage of teachers in the North and doubted if Northerners would be prepared to restrict their educational expansion to send Arabic teachers to the South.

Mohd Saleh Eff Shingeiti felt that the available teachers should be equally distributed between North and South, and even more generously to the South to help them catch up. If the Northerners were not willing to do this they should not claim that the Sudan was a single country.

Buth Diu thought that there must be no delay in the introduction of Arabic to Schools to enable them to catch up with the North.

Chief Lolik Lado thought that there might be some difficulties caused by introduction of Arabic. He had found that Catholics and Protestants did not readily co-operate, and he feared that this would be a new complication.

Pastor Anderea Apaya said that both English and Arabic were difficult languages and doubted if boys at the elementary stage could assimilate both. He was not against the introduction of Arabic, and in fact welcomed it, but doubted if it was feasible at that stage.

The Chairman felt that it must be left to the Director of Education to say at what stage a pupil could start learning a second foreign language.

Father Guido Akou asked for an explanation of the phrase “single education policy”.

Mohd Saleh Eff Shingeiti thought that it meant firstly that the standards of equivalent schools should be roughly equal, and secondly that a boy leaving a Southern Intermediate School should be able to go straight to a Northern Secondary School. In addition pupils of both parts of the country should have a similarity of outlook.

Father Guido Akou asked if this unification of policy was to be implemented at once.

The Chairman thought that there was a misunderstanding in the use of this phrase, in that the bush schools corresponded to Sub-Grade Schools in the North, Elementary Schools in both are as were in the same footing, and so were Intermediate Schools and from this point of view educational policy was in fact the same in North and South.

Mr. Marwood said that for the last ten years the education Department had been exercising more and more supervision in Mission Schools and the Inspector had devoted much time and energy to working with the Mission Schools authorities to ensure that curricula and standards should approach those of the North as closely and quickly as possible.

Hassan Eff Ahmed Osman was grateful to Mr. Marwood for dispelling much of the misunderstanding which existed on the question of unified education. He thought it not irrelevant to request that the sending of Southern boys to Uganda should be discontinued. The medium of instruction in the North is English in Higher and Secondary education, and Arabic was studied only as a subject. Southern boys should therefore go North for Higher and Secondary education.

The Chairman said that the sending of boys to Uganda had been a temporary expedient since the Schools in the North were too full to take them. In due course there would be a Secondary School for the South and Southerners would go to Gordon College for Higher education.

The Chairman then raised the question of improvement of communications. The meeting was generally in favour of an improvement of communications between North South.
The Chairman went to consider the question of the transfer of officials, and thought that this could be best discussed in a small committee with the Director of Establishment as it did not concern all the Members present.

Mr. Marwood thought that the Chiefs were concerned in so far as the proposed Local Council would require eduacted staff and must find money to pay this staff. In the Northg he believed that at present most Local Councils employed seconded government officials on government rates of pay, but that the time will come the Council would employ staff independently of the government. In the South the Local Councils would have to decide how much they could afford to pay for their staff, and choose between a highly paid government official and local boy requiring lesser remuneration.

The Chairman wanted to know what the Southerners meant by the term “encouragement of transfers”. A transfer was a transfer and brooked no discussion. He referred to instances where some Northerners had attempted to evade service in the South on medical grounds.

Mohd Saleh Eff Shingeiti admitted that much instances had occurred, but said that most Northerners who came South wanted to stay on there.

Buth Diu thought that Northerners were unwilling to come South not only because they were afraid of loosing their children through malaria, but also because they were afraid of lions. He suggested that better housing would remove this unwillingness. The Southerners on the other hand were unwilling to go North because of the extensive use of Arabic in offices.

Clement Mboro referred to paras 5, Sub para ( of the minute of the Southerners preliminary meeting, and he said he wished to stress how strongly they adhered to the unification of the system of establishment. This must be decided in this Conference. And not in separate committee. Refusal to unify establishments was in his opinion the greatest obstacle in the way of a unified Sudan.

The Chairman considered that it was (not?) easy to discuss such an intricate matter at this Conference. He noted the Southerners view. But thought a small committee was best fitted to consider the matter in detail.

Mohd Saleh Eff Shingeiti asked if they could not agree on the broad lines.

The Chairman replied that the Southern members present were already agreed on the broad lines. The Chairman in the closing the Conference thanked the members for coming and felt that the deliberations has been of considerable value to Southerners, to Northerners, and to the Government. He could not promise that every suggestion would be carried out, nor when it would be carried out, but he thanked them for their advise and recommendations which were of definite value.

Mr. Marwood said that this was the first opportunity that Southerners had had to come together from all over the Southern Provinces to discuss these things. He himself had felt, after the report of the Sudan Administration Conference, that it was essential that Northern Sudanese and members of the Central Government should hear from their own lips what Southerners felt about these proposals. He was very grateful to the Civil Secretary and the other members who had come from the North for affording them this
opportunity.

Mohd Saleh Eff Shingeiti on behalf of the Northern Sudanese Members thanked the Civil Secretary and the two Governors. The Civil Secretary as Chairman had given everyone complete freedom to speak his mind. This was an essential feature of such Conference. He thanked Mr. Marwood for giving them this opportunity to meet the Southerners and hear their point of view. He had been much impressed with what the Southerners had said and the way they had said it, and wished them every success in their Local Councils so that they would be able to send representatives to take a full part in the Government of the Sudan.

Israeli companies discover South Sudan

July 22nd, 2011 at 3:03 pm

Ofer Petersburg, Israel Business

Just days after independence declaration, Israeli businesspeople seeking economic cooperation with world’s newest country in fields of security, infrastructure, medicine and agriculture.

Just days after South Sudan declared independence, Israeli companies are already storming the world’s newest nation – and receiving a warm welcome.

An Israeli businessman has even managed to schedule a meeting with the new trade minister. “I haven’t seen such openness anywhere else in the world,” he says. According to Attorney Adi Braunstein, the legal advisor of the Israeli-Arab Friendship Association, Israel’s military and moral support to the South Sudan rebels throughout the years is now expressed in economic cooperation.

This cooperation, he says, will lead to deals worth hundreds of millions of dollars, the payment of which will be guaranteed by the international community.

The required fields of cooperation include security, agriculture, medicine and even the capital market, as the South Sudan government is looking to establish a stock exchange in the new country.

The foundation for the ties with South Sudan was laid by former rebel leader John Garang, who was hospitalized in Israel in the past following an eye injury in one of the incidents involving the Sudan army.

Israeli defense experts have already contacted the country’s officials in a bid to train police and army officers, and a company from Ramat Hasharon has been asked to put forward a quotation for fortifying the convoy of the new South Sudan president.

Vacation packages in works too

The Solel Boneh Overseas company is looking into paving roads and building infrastructure. The Sarel company, which supplies medication and medical equipment to hospitals, is also examining the new market in order to train a governmental medical system in South Sudan.

Superlock, which specialized in the development, production and marketing of security doors, has given its franchiser in Nigeria permission to open an office in the South Sudan capital of Juba.

Eli Kimchi, CEO of Fujicom Israel, which markets computers and electronic goods, is in negotiations towards opening a sales office in Juba with the aim of creating a series of produces for the residents of South Sudan.

A dairy farm in the Golan Heights has been asked for advice on cattle herds for milk production.

Tourism is also on the agenda: Aharon Efroni, Jewish-Arab institute at Beit Berl College, has begun preparing vacation packages to South Sudan. Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations Ron Prosor congratulated South Sudan on its independence recently, saying that “the State of Israel and the people of Israel salute your courage and wish you peace and prosperity on your new journey. Israel will stand beside you and extend its hand in cooperation with your new nation.”

South Sudan’s Vice President Riek Machar said in response that he valued the cooperation with Israel and would work to strengthen ties with the Jewish state in the coming years.

ONCE A CATTLE FIELD NOW A BATTLE FIELD

By Ajak Dau Thuc.

This great country
of no contrary,
once a cattle field
is now a battle field !
Ruled by traitors
and torturers.
war lovers
and evils lovers.
Devils worshippers
and own’s stomach worshippers.
Naughty
and unruly.
Why they made it infertile?
Land such a fertile !
Turning these big farms
into swamps !
Full of reeds
of odd breeds.
The beautiful houses and huts are scorched,
as everythings was scorned.
Should pillaging be the solution?
or rapping be the resolution?
This historical country,once a human resource center,
is now a humilation center!
This religious country,once a church’s base,
is now a slaughtering house !
Down in her soil,is full of swords,
rusted guns,
used and unused bullets.
Again,down in her soil is full of numerous skulls !
This great country,once the oldest,
now the oddest!
This great country,the [South] Sudan.

Is a Well-Lived Life Worth Anything?

By Umair Haque (Harvard Business Review)

How would you define a good life? It’s a bafflingly tough question. An even tougher one: does the economy we have today value such a life? Does it help us create one?

Here’s what I see when I look not just at the surface, but deep inside the heart of the economy today:

Instead of an “energy industry,” I see a resource addiction that saps money and preserves self-destructive expectations. I see, instead of food and education “industries,” an obesity epidemic and a debt-driven education crisis. Instead of a pharmaceutical industry, I see a new set of mental and physical discontents, like rates of suspiciously normally “abnormal” mental illnesses and drugs whose lists of “side effects” are longer than the Magna Carta. Instead of a “media industry,” I see news that actually misinforms instead of enlightening — rusting the beams of democracy — and entertainment that merely titillates.

In short, I see an outcomes gap: a yawning chasm the size of the Grand Canyon between what our economy produces and what you might call a meaningfully well-lived life, what the ancient Greeks called eudaimonia.

The economy we have today will let you chow down on a supersize McBurger, check derivative prices on your latest smartphone, and drive your giant SUV down the block to buy a McMansion on hypercredit. It’s a vision of the good life that I call (a tiny gnat standing on the shoulders of the great Amartya Sen) hedonic opulence. And it’s a conception built in and for the industrial age: about having more. Now consider a different vision: maybe crafting a fine meal, to be accompanied by local, award-winning microbrewed beer your friends have brought over, and then walking back to the studio where you’re designing a building whose goal is nothing less than rivaling the Sagrada Familia. That’s an alternate vision, one I call eudaimonic prosperity, and it’s about living meaningfully well. Its purpose is not merely passive, slack-jawed “consuming” but living: doing, achieving, fulfilling, becoming, inspiring, transcending, creating, accomplishing — all the stuff that matters the most. See the difference? Opulence is Donald Trump. Eudaimonia is the Declaration of Independence.

Yesterday, pundits and talking heads believed this crisis was just a garden-variety, workaday crash. Today, people like Tyler Cowen and I have called it a Great Stagnation. But here’s what I believe it might just be called tomorrow, when the history books have been written, and the debates concluded: a Eudaimonic Revolution. A sweeping, historic transformation in what we imagine a good life to be, and how, why, where, and when we pursue it.

Though it harks back to antiquity, eudaimonia’s a smarter, sharper, wiser, wholer, well, richer conception of prosperity. And deep down, while it might be hard to admit, I’d bet we all know that our current habits are leaving us — have left us — not merely financially and fiscally broken, but, if not intellectually, physically, emotionally, relationally, and spiritually empty, then, well, probably at least just a little bit unhealthy. Eudaimonic prosperity, in contrast, is about mastering a new set of habits: igniting the art of living meaningfully well. An active conception of prosperity, it’s concerned not with what one has, but what one is capable of. Here’s how I’d contrast Eudaimonia with its belching, wheezing industrial age predecessor:

Living, (working, and playing) not just having. Where the pursuit of opulence is predicated on having more, bigger, cheaper, eudaimonia is a more nuanced, complex conception of a good life: it’s about whether or not the pursuit of mere stuff actually translates into living, working, and playing meaningfully better in human terms.

Better, not just more. The key word is “better” — and where opulence asks, “Did you get the latest car, yacht, gold-plated razor — or are you just a loser?” eudaimonia asks, “Did any of that stuff make you meaningfully better — smarter, fitter, grittier, more empathic, wiser? Or are you just (yawn) a pawn in the tired, predictable game called ‘the pursuit of diminishing returns to hyperconsumption’: the game that’s rigged by hedge-fund bots against you?”

Becoming, not just being. If eudaimonia’s about living, working, and playing better, not just having more, well, Houston, we have a problem. Economic “growth” as you and I know it is probably fundamentally inadequate to tell us much about it, because how we measure growth is just about stuff. But measures of “happiness” don’t cut it either, because eudaimonia is more complicated than that. The multiplication of eudaimonia can be gauged neither by “GDP,” then, nor by tracking self-reported happiness, nor by basic, simple measures of basic human development, like the HDI — but rather, by understanding whether or not people are becoming their better, wholer, grittier, wiser, fundamentally more accomplished selves. Those real-world measures and tools largely haven’t been invented yet.

Creating and building, not just trading and raiding. The pursuit of eudaimonia most definitely can’t amount to much in economies where those who trade accomplishment and raid societies earn thousands, millions, or billions of times as much as the creators and the builders of those societies — because the result must be an enduring undersupply of the stuff of deep significance, beauty, and meaning. Eudaimonia is constructive in the sense that it’s ignited by those creators and builders — and it always has been.

Depth, not just immediacy. The pursuit of eudaimonia demands depth like Trump needs a better haircut: that is to say, seriously. What does it mean to work, play, and live meaningfully better? It’s not an easy question to answer, and I’m not offering you any easy, pat answers. Rather, the pursuit of eudaimonia itself demands time, space, and room to reflect on questions of gravity and depth, preferably together: deliberatively, associatively, consensually.

Eudaimonia isn’t asceticism, a world where we’re all monks, and the Stuff Police jails you if you buy that 3D TV: plenty of stuff can be eudaimonic. But where opulence is about having stuff that’s envied, desired, and coveted less for what it is than the jumbo-sized, couldn’t miss it if you tried logo, and what it says to people you’re trying probably a little too hard to impress, eudaimonia’s about stuff that’s loved, treasured, adored — because it adds up to living well.

Who are the progenitors of eudaimonia, its spiritual and intellectual forefathers, pioneers, and champions? Richard Florida’s path-breaking idea of creative capital is deeply eudaimonic — because creative capital intensive outputs (like great art, books, gyms, and meals) are expressions of living better. Jane Jacobs, the Galileo of urban economics, whose last book Dark Age Ahead might be said to have been a lament for the loss of eudaimonia, and a warning of the fatality of opulence. Gary Hamel, whose Future of Management is about creating the capacity to live better. And many, many more — from Adam Smith, whose Theory of Moral Sentiments was, in many ways, a challenge to the emergent opulence of the mercantile age, to Roger Martin’s latest book, Fixing the Game. which argues that market performance has superseded meaning and authenticity, to radical innovators like OpenIDEO, Common, and the Acumen Fund, not to mention plodding giants learning to get just a little bit more enlightened, like Nike, Pepsi, and Google.

The recipe for opulence is one of humanity’s great achievements, but the pursuit of opulence probably isn’t one of tomorrow’s great challenges — nor is it one of tomorrow’s imperatives. The recipe for opulence has been more or less pinned down: liberalize, privatize, and insert brow-beating economists staring slack-jawed at poorer countries and exclaiming “If only those poor saps would follow the instructions on the box!!” But the paradox is that even if they did, the world probably can’t afford it: China already consumes about 40% of the world’s copper, and 50% of its cement, iron ore, and coal — but even so, it’s achieved only 10 percent of American levels of opulence (at least as measured by per capita GDP). And even if it were magically able to close that yawning gap, there’s no formula for cleaning up the messes that emerge after the dish of hedonic opulence has been cooked — everything from climate change, to pollution, to inequality that would make Midas blush, to regulatory capture, to fracturing polities, to polarizing societies, and more. Hence, I’d suggest (and unless you’re an investment banker or a zombie overlord, you probably don’t need much convincing): at this point, stuck in a so-called recovery that keeps stalling like a G6 in the vast, howling heart of Jupiter’s Great Red Spot, it might be time to take the quantum leap to a smarter, sharper, wiser, and wholer conception of what a good life means.

I believe the quantum leap from opulence to eudaimonia is going to be the biggest, most significant economic shift of the next decade, and perhaps beyond: of our lifetimes. We’re not just on the cusp of, but smack in the middle of nothing less than a series of revolutions, aimed squarely at the trembling status quo (financial, political, social): new values, mindsets, and behaviors, fundamentally redesigned political, social, economic, and financial institutions; nothing less than reweaving the warp and weft of not just the way we live–but why we live, work, and play.

So if you take away one point from my mini-manifesto, let it be this:

We are the creators of the future. Because we are the inheritors of a tradition not just older — but more humanistic, constructive, nuanced, dynamic, and perhaps just a little bit wiser — than we know. A good life today? It’s been vacantly reduced to the frenzied sport of buying “consumer goods” — more, bigger, faster, cheaper, now. But the foundational idea that ignited the art of human organization in the first place just might have been eudaimonia — and today’s opulence is just its clumsy, hurried streetside caricature, empty of depth, shorn of meaning, bereft of the essence of what make us human, void of the hunger to create a better world for humanity. Somewhere along the way, sometime on the journey — perhaps for the best of reasons — we lost it. Let’s get it back.

Poem about ‘South Sudan’ independence

By Stephen Partington–East African Newspaper.

Happy Birthday, South Sudan,
Our planet’s newest State.
I hope full Independence will
Be worth the lengthy wait.

You’ve sung the anthem, raised the flag
And sworn a thousand oaths.
The party over, now it’s time
To meet ten million hopes!

Your neighbour’s still belligerent
And may well want your oil,
Forgetting that the South is now
Foreign, sovereign soil.

And rebels in your fledgling State
Are making martial sounds,
And on your southern borders
There is famine, loss and drought.

Your president’s a warrior;
A hero, yet beware,
He’s penned a Constitution
That puts power in his Chair.

So, great good luck, and cheers all round,
And welcome to the club
Of Independent Nation States:
But know, the road’s still rough.

Stephen Partington
stepartington@yahoo.co.uk

Dancing in the streets of Juba, hoping liberators don’t turn into oppressors

By FREDERICK GOLOOBA-MUTEBI , East African Newspaper (Uganda)

Late last week I heard a self-confessed pan-Africanist mourn the break-up of Old Sudan. It was, the old romantic said, against the spirit of pan-Africanism.

I found his moaning more than a little amusing. It is not the sort of conversation the vast majority of South Sudanese would have had time for at that particular moment as they sang, blew whistles and horns, and danced in the streets of their capital, Juba, and held parties in all the parts of the world where they are to be found.

As for me, as far as I was concerned, the event had not come quickly enough. For one thing, it had created two countries that are likely to be more peaceful and stable as separate entities than they were as the “one nation” old-style pan-Africanists and the like pretended it was.

As the new country exploded into scenes of jubilation and as some of those who were doing the dancing made statements on radio about how good it was finally to be independent, a whiff of déjà vu swept over me.

I do not wish to be a kill-joy and spoil their fun or undermine their sense of achievement. However, the evolution of independent Africa from a collection of European colonies to a continent of self-determining states and the whispering already doing the rounds about how the SPLM has managed the South so far, do not provide rock-solid grounds for being unreservedly optimistic about the new country’s future.
All men and women of goodwill, especially in the Great Lakes neighbourhood, should wish the South Sudanese good luck as they embark on their journey of Independence. However, it is also prudent to be a little guarded.

Let’s face it: Independence for many Africans has, at least in some aspects of their lives, at times tasted as bad as, often worse, than colonial subjugation.

That is because there is a great difference between being oppressed by people who may be foreign or whom you may see as such and who would have acquired power without your consent, and suffering misrule by your own “brothers and sisters” who have come to power with your consent or connivance.

What makes the latter especially painful is that you had been made to believe that, once they took over the government, they would treat you with decency, respect, and consideration, and that they would neither deprive you of your rights nor even steal from you.

It is hardly farfetched to imagine or argue that independent South Sudan could become yet another “normal African country” where Independence leaves a bitter taste in the mouths of those who expected good government, prosperity and the good life, only to end up mired in poverty and general misrule.

South Sudanese must watch out for one particularly serious problem: The sense of entitlement so characteristic of African liberation movements.

In Uganda, we call it the “twatera embundu” or “twalwana” (we fought) syndrome. Having acquired power through the barrel of the gun, former insurgents come to regard power as theirs by right and any challenge as bordering on treason.

Now it would be nice if they balanced the desire to cling on to power for ages with a sense of responsibility that would make them aspire to wield power wisely and justly, in the interest of the greatest majority of their compatriots. They rarely evolve in that direction.

The tendency is to degenerate into old-style, exclusionary autocracies oiled by corruption and patronage. And therein lies the greatest threat to a country emerging out of conflict: A possible return to instability.

Uganda’s NRM is hardly the worst example of a one-time liberation movement that seems to have kicked its once cherished ideals into the long grass. But it serves as a salutary reminder of how easily they acquire the worst attributes of one-party or dominant-party, big-man dictatorships.

Experts may already be talking up the urgency with which South Sudan ought to become a democracy. However, becoming an electoral democracy defined by regular and competitive, possibly rigged elections, is not the most important or urgent step.

Whatever one may want to criticise them for, Museveni’s National Resistance Movement and the Kagame-led Rwanda Patriotic Front offer one important lesson in how to create and maintain much-needed stability over the short and medium term in post-war environments: Consensus among significant elites about how to proceed is key.

The challenge, though, is how to preserve it and avoid defection and sliding back into chaos. Good luck, South Sudan.