Archive for July 29, 2011


By Alan Boswell

McClatchy Newspapers

JUBA, South Sudan — Nearly a month after its breakup with South Sudan, the government of Sudan has seen none of the benefits that it thought would flow from its agreement to end decades of civil war. Instead, the breakup has thrown President Omar al Bashir’s regime into disarray.

Far from reaping peace and development for overseeing the partition of his country, Bashir now controls a smaller, weaker version of Sudan besieged by a uniting rebel front and a collapsing economy.

The U.S. government hasn’t lifted sanctions imposed on Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism, one of the promises that allowed both the Bush and Obama administrations to broker and then shepherd the peace agreement that led to South Sudan’s independence.

Making matters worse, Sudan’s finance minister estimates that the country faces a 36 percent future drop in revenues because of the loss of South Sudan’s oilfields.

With the walls seemingly crumbling around them, the Sudanese military is taking an increasingly prominent role in decision-making, shunting aside civilian politicians that it blames for the country’s slide.

Bashir, who took power in a military coup in 1989, is still in power, and there has been no official change in his regime makeup. But his diverse governing coalition — composed of Islamists, the military, politicians and businessmen — is severely strained.

Increasingly, whether by force or volition, Bashir seems to be marching to the military’s tune.

Western and African diplomats — one of whom described recent developments as a “military coup” — fear such a power bid will only lead to more chaos and instability in the troubled north African nation.

One African official, who requested anonymity because of the sensitivity of the situation, said that military leaders now sit in on his meetings with Bashir and even brief the participants beforehand on what the president will say — as if dictating Bashir’s talking points.

A Western diplomat, who wasn’t authorized to be quoted on the subject, said that military leaders now are supervising discussions that used to be held only with civilian political officials. The military also is accompanying ruling party officials in ongoing negotiations with South Sudan over disputed borders and other issues.

“I don’t see that there is an internal coup per se at the moment, but there is absolutely no doubt that the army is disenfranchised and they are not happy,” said Fouad Hikmat, a Sudan analyst for the International Crisis Group, a research agency.

“The situation is very tense. Very tense,” Hikmat said.

The internal troubles intensified about a month before South Sudan formally seceded on July 9. Bashir miscalculated in attempting to forcibly disarm a rebel group in Sudan’s South Kordofan state that was aligned with South Sudan’s guerrilla movement-turned-ruling party, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, or SPLM.

Bashir underestimated the rebels’ strength and the campaign in the Nuba Mountains quickly disintegrated into a bloodbath. As the SPLM-aligned rebels resisted and eventually gained ground, Sudanese forces and pro-government Arab militias expanded their campaign and began attacking and bombing Nuba civilians, who are ethnically African.

Reeling from the unexpected losses, and facing Western denunciations for atrocities against the Nuba, Bashir’s National Congress Party signed a deal in late June to recognize the northern chapter of the SPLM — which is now structurally separate from its sister party that governs South Sudan — as a legitimate political party.

The deal angered the military and Islamist hardliners in Sudan’s capital, Khartoum, who criticized it as capitulation. Bashir soon denounced the agreement himself, a turn of events that many observers found especially confounding since the accord was negotiated by the regime’s resident hardliner, Nafie Ali Nafie, Bashir’s party deputy.

Ever since, it has been unclear who is really in charge.

Andrew Natsios, a Georgetown University professor, says a soft military coup wouldn’t surprise him — since the same thing almost happened when he served as special envoy to Sudan under President George W. Bush in the late 2000s.

In early 2007, Natsios said, Bashir’s party was facing growing international pressure over the humanitarian crisis in the western Darfur region. A group of senior generals urged Bashir to stage an internal coup of sorts, purging the party’s leadership and putting the generals in charge of the government.

“While Bashir rejected the advice then, he may have taken it now,” Natsios said.

A military takeover in Sudan would likely take a different route than the revolutions this year in nearby Egypt and Tunisia, which were prompted by popular uprisings rather than ruling party disintegration.

Analysts say that the Sudanese military and civilian leadership has two options: agree to political reforms and share political power, or hunker down in siege mode and try to contain the armed threats.

So far, the latter approach seems ascendant.

As the regime falters, the nation’s many far-flung rebel groups are moving to consolidate.

The strongest rebel group in Darfur, the Justice and Equality Movement, has begun fighting alongside the SPLM rebels in the Nuba Mountains in what opposition forces hope could be the beginning of a wider rebel alliance. That could bind anti-government forces stretching from Sudan’s western border with Chad, through the southern states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile, all the way to the eastern border with Eritrea.

Talks are already under way over a “grand coalition” that would encompass the armed rebels and Khartoum’s weak political opposition. One source involved in the talks, who didn’t want to be named because of the confidential nature of the discussions, said that the various groups are already dividing up leadership positions in a potential new alliance.

It’s unclear how durable such an alliance would prove, given the vast geographical distance and the diverse set of ideologies and egos involved. But it’s clear that anti-Bashir forces all are smelling blood.

Malik Agar, chair of the SPLM’s northern wing and governor of Blue Nile state, said that it was “quite natural” for the various movements to coordinate their efforts. But he said that Bashir could still avert more war.

“We are still at the (negotiating) table,” Agar said. “When they come back to the table, they will find us there.”

(Boswell is a McClatchy special correspondent. His reporting from Sudan is supported in part by Humanity United, a California-based foundation that focuses on human rights issues.)

Child of war, South Sudan is born; now the struggle begins

Southern Sudan Preps for IndependenceSouth Sudanese celebrate in the streets of Juba, the new capital, after the Republic of South | Alan Boswell / MCT

South Sudan flag
By Alan Boswell | McClatchy Newspapers

JUBA, South Sudan — Thousand of people flooded into the streets of this unlikely riverside boomtown early Saturday to celebrate the birth of the world’s newest nation, the Republic of South Sudan — a land of searing poverty, windfall petrodollars and violent strife.

A crescendo of celebratory car horns rose in anticipation until they broke at midnight when joyous mayhem flooded into the streets to mark what may be one of the most grueling climbs to statehood that any nation has endured: a 50-year civil war that cost more than 2 million lives, tore families apart and sent hundreds of thousands into a diaspora around the world.

“I’m so proud,” said Lado Patia, a sweating 20-year-old male who grew up in Australia and never stepped foot in his homeland until 3 months ago. “It’s unexplainable, a beautiful thing.”

Violence is still endemic. More than 100,000 refugees have fled fighting in the Abyei region that both Sudan and South Sudan contest, and the past month has seen a harsh campaign by the Arab-led Sudanese government against African South Sudan sympathizers in the isolated Nuba mountains.

Internal clashes in South Sudan have killed more than 1,800 South Sudanese this year.

But, remarkably, after the weekend’s ceremonies and festivities are over, South Sudan’s greatest challenge may be the one that still lies ahead: building a nation almost from scratch.

Since the 2005 peace deal between Sudan and the former rebels who now lead South Sudan set independence in motion, roughly $12 billion in oil revenue and $10 billion in foreign aid has poured into this war-torn land. But flying overhead its sprawling savannas and swamps, almost no permanent structures or roads can be seen, leaving one to wonder where all the money has gone.

South Sudan, most of which is low-lying floodplain, still has no finished paved highway. Much of the population remains isolated and unreachable during the six-month rainy season. Adult illiteracy rates may be as high as 90 percent, and child and maternal mortality rates rank it as the worst in the world. Safe drinking water is a rare commodity.

And the government, composed largely of inexperienced former rebels, is likely years away from offering any substantial services on the ground.

All of which means, for the foreseeable years ahead, South Sudan is going to be propped up on foreign life support, dependent on a massive multilateral nation-building project to prevent humanitarian catastrophe or a regionally destabilizing political implosion.

“It’s going to have to be a big international effort,” said U.S. special envoy to Sudan Princeton Lyman. “This is not going to happen overnight. This is going to be a long, tough struggle.”

The U.S. is going to focus heavily on building up an agricultural sector in South Sudan, said Lyman. Others, he said, will lead the way on health services, infrastructure or education initiatives. Everyone plans on pitching in with “capacity building,” a popular term here among aid workers to denote training officials on how to do their jobs.

The multibillion-dollar test run conducted so far is an indication of how great and many the challenges are.

The South Sudan government contests the notion that the country is starting from zero, and indeed many of the worst-case scenarios have not come true.

The government under Salva Kiir — who assumed power after the death of the movement’s founder, John Garang — defied skeptics by guiding the nation through a successful referendum for independence.

“Looking at how far they have come, it is not a small accomplishment,” said Sara Pantuliano, head of the Humanitarian Policy Group at Britain’s Overseas Development Institute.

Yet, that same government’s record is exactly what concerns some.

“The task of building a new nation requires political skill, competent and accountable government, inclusive decision making, strategic planning, adequate resources, and a compelling national vision that its citizens can buy into,” wrote Richard Downie, deputy director of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a bipartisan nonprofit based in Washington. “South Sudan lacks nearly all of these prerequisites,”

The influx of aid money so far has carried an equally dubious record. A half-billion-dollar multi-donor pool fund has received especially heavy criticism for its difficulties simply disbursing the money for projects at all.

“The donors have tried, but they just haven’t succeeded,” said Pantuliano. “One can only hope that the lessons will finally be applied.”

Some of their most egregious mistakes have been focusing development in Juba at the expense of everywhere else, under-funding road construction and security support, and instituting cumbersome procedures that stalled actual help, according to Pantuliano.

Others say the aid itself is a problem.

A government propped up by aid risks being “only accountable to foreign donors, not its own people,” William Easterly, an economics professor at New York University and author of “The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good,” wrote in an email.

The donor community itself, the skeptics point out, is less accountable to those they are trying to assist — poor South Sudanese — than to their own governments and people back home, who have little knowledge of what is going on in places far away that they little understand.

Another hazard is that aid can promote dependency and allow a nation to forego costly investments in its own people. In South Sudan, there’s concern the government will spend more money on its military, which with other security services already soaks up nearly half of the official budget.

Still, as the newest nation’s citizens flooded into the streets chanting victory slogans in celebration, there were many who expressed hope for the future.

“The South Sudanese have surprised a lot of people getting this far,” said Isaac Boyd, the head of programming in South Sudan for U.S.-based Catholic Relief Services. “I wouldn’t be surprised if they pull another rabbit out of the hat.”

(Boswell is a McClatchy special correspondent. His reporting is supported in part by Humanity United, a California-based foundation that focuses on human rights issues.)

 


Haile Menkerios

29 July 2011 –

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon today appointed Haile Menkerios, the former head of the UN Mission in Sudan, to the newly created position of Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan.Mr. Menkerios, a South African who served as the Secretary-General’s special representative and head of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) from March 2010 until earlier this month, will “continue to assist the parties reach a negotiated settlement to residual Comprehensive Peace Agreement and post-secession issues,” according to a press statement.The UNMIS mandate expired on 9 July when South Sudan became independent from Sudan. The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, signed by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Government of Sudan, ended the long-running north-south civil war in Sudan and set the path to eventual independence for the south.

Mr. Menkerios joined the UN in 2002 and became Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs in 2007. He was Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) from 2005 to 2007.

In his new post Mr. Menkerios will be based in New York with frequent travel to Sudan and South Sudan.


TEL AVIV (Reuters) – It took a two week-long cottage cheese rebellion to get Israelis to question the power of the country’s tycoons.

Angry about high prices, consumers boycotted the beloved dairy product last month. As containers of cheese piled up on supermarket shelves, the country’s richest people became the focus of the sort of media attention normally given to politics and homeland security.

Newspapers and television stations, which civic groups have long criticized for ignoring the massive concentration of corporate power in a small group of Israeli business groups and families, made the boycott a top story for days.

“I woke up this morning smeared in cottage cheese,” Muzi Wertheim, a business magnate who controls one of the country’s largest dairy producers, said during a speech at a Tel Aviv university at the peak of the protest.

Cottage cheese might be just the beginning. Last October the Israeli government set up a committee to explore the level of competition in the economy. The committee is expected to present its findings in several weeks.

The Bank of Israel already says the country has one of the highest concentrations of corporate power in the developed world. A scathing parliamentary report from June last year found that 10 large business groups control 30 percent of the market value of public companies, while 16 control half the money in the entire country.

That’s far more than in western economies such as the UK, Spain or Germany. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, which last year admitted Israel as a member, said Israel’s level of corporate concentration is problematic.

If the government committee agrees with those assessments it could recommend breaking up the biggest oligopolies and opening Israel’s market to new competition and investment, both foreign and local. Though nothing has been decided, change looks increasingly likely.

“These large business groups may have helped Israel’s economy when it was younger, but it’s now a developed market, and it will be hard to keep up the current rate of growth in this situation,” said one official familiar with the deliberations. “The committee members are aware of this. Breaking them up will help competition and growth.”

Such a move would have huge implications for tycoons such as Wertheim, whose dairy business is just one part of an empire that includes the country’s fourth-largest bank, Coca Cola bottling company and a primary share in one of its largest real estate firms. Like many of Israel’s other magnates Wertheim also owns a large stake in a popular media organization.

A number of the larger holding companies have fought back, arguing to the commission, Reuters has learned, that regulations are already so strict that they have forced Israel Inc. to invest abroad rather than locally.

In a rare public comment Nochi Dankner, chairman and controlling shareholder of IDB Holding which owns everything from a mobile phone operator to an insurance firm, told Reuters that Israel’s “robust financial system” was a result of “clever and strict” regulation.

“I cannot find any rationale to shake it,” Dankner said in his emailed comments. “The most important mission of the regulation is to keep and augment the stability, beyond any other consideration. Separation of financial holdings and real holdings definitely rocks the financial system, not stabilizes it.”

ISRAEL’S PYRAMIDS

Concentration in Hebrew is often called “hon v’shilton”, which means “fortune and governance”, but refers more to the close relationship between the two.

“We see the ‘fortune’ walking through the halls of parliament,” parliamentary speaker Reuben Rivlin said in a radio interview last month. “‘Fortune’ is more and more taking control of the judgment of the people sent by the public to safeguard the state of Israel and its interests.”

One of the problems, according to the OECD, is that Israel’s big business houses exert control through “cascading ownerships, pyramidal structures and cross-holdings”.

In a pyramid structure, a holding company controls a subsidiary, which then controls its own subsidiaries, and so on until the top of the pyramid can technically control a company at the bottom with less than 10 percent of the capital.

Dankner’s IDB is a classic pyramid, though he and his partners have stakes of at least 30 percent in all of the company’s major holdings. At the top sits IDB Holding which controls IDB Development which in turn controls several other holding companies. Consumers may not know it but they come into contact with the bottom of the pyramid when they do something as simple as walking into a shopping mall. They might visit Super-Sol, Israel’s largest supermarket chain, shop at Golf and Co., one of the biggest fashion and homeware chains, or buy a mobile phone from Cellcom, Israel’s largest mobile operator.

After that, they might visit an Internet cafe and go online using one of Israel’s top Internet providers Netvision, or stop by a branch of travel agency Diesenhaus to book a flight on Israir. The floor they walk on is likely to be built with cement from Nesher, Israel’s only cement producer.

Every one of those companies and products are ultimately controlled by IDB.

And IDB is not the only such company. The Delek Group, controlled by billionaire Yitzhak Tshuva, boasts an impressive array of assets from several giant natural gas fields to automotive, cable TV, biochemical and insurance companies.

Israel’s richest family, the Ofers, control through their holding firm Israel Corp the world’s sixth-largest potash firm, Israel’s largest shipping company and oil refinery. They are also the biggest investor in the Better Place electric car venture.

Israel’s richest woman, Shari Arison, through the Arison group controls the country’s second largest bank and largest construction company, which is in talks to buy geothermal energy producer Ormat Industries.

Besides IDB’s Dankner, none of these groups agreed to talk to Reuters.

“PEOPLE MAKE MISTAKES”

Last year’s parliamentary report pointed out that most of Israel’s banks are also controlled by such groups, offering the conglomerates access to easy credit, often at the expense of smaller businesses. This is a recipe for risky decision-making, the Bank of Israel said in its 2009 annual report, and because it is difficult to regulate these powerful groups with their complex structures, they pose a systemic risk.

A survey by the Calcalist financial news website showed that 10 of the biggest tycoons will have to pay back bondholders 24 billion shekels ($6.9 billion) in the next two years, raising concern that they may not be able to meet all of their obligations.

“People make mistakes, and if you don’t create a distribution of power and you allow one person to make mistakes for all of us, the likelihood is that when a mistake occurs it will be huge and very costly,” said Daniel Doron, founder of the Israel Center for Social and Economic Progress (ICSEP).

That could now change. According to one source with knowledge of the competition committee’s deliberations, the committee is likely to take aim at both the pyramid structures as well as the close links between financial institutions — banks and insurance companies — and “real” businesses such as supermarkets or refineries.

INDEPENDENT MEDIA?

Israel is well known for its raucous free press. Its newspapers and news broadcasts swing freely and mercilessly at politicians, and no one, not even the prime minister, is spared. But in the past decade newspapers and television news channels have become a popular investment for the country’s business elite, despite, or perhaps because of, the media industry’s financial woes.

Most Israeli media companies are now controlled on some level by one of the large business houses. Has that stifled debate about the concentration of power in the Israeli economy?

In a rare interview last September, Dankner dismissed the issue as part of the “populist agenda”. Asked by newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth whether he, as head of one of Israel’s largest holding companies, had too much power, Dankner replied: “Unequivocally no. There are dozens of other people in Israel with more power.”

Nine months later, Dankner bought one of Israel’s largest-circulating newspapers, Maariv. To assuage concerns about potential conflicts of interest in coverage, he wrote a letter to the paper’s staff urging them to, “please maintain your integrity, professionalism, independence and freedom of expression — including critical coverage of the IDB group, its subsidiaries and its managers, including myself.”

Just a few weeks after that, Russian oil tycoon Leonid Nevzlin bought a 20 percent stake in Haaretz, another leading newspaper. The two new media magnates joined Eliezer Fishman, who made his fortune in real estate and runs the financial newspaper Globes, and American casino mogul Sheldon Adelson, who founded the popular, free daily Yisrael Hayom.

Some of Israel’s main television stations are also controlled in one form or other by the business elite. Yossi Maimon, primary shareholder of energy companies Ampal and Merhav, is chairman of Channel 10 television. Its main competitor Channel 2 is partly owned by dairy king Wertheim, the Tshuva family, and the Ofers. Israel’s Russian-language TV station is run by billionaire Lev Leviev, owner of holding company Africa Israel Investments.

While it is not unusual in other parts of the world for media companies to be part of much bigger conglomerates, critics in Israel say the tremendous influence wielded by a handful of business groups has weakened the country’s media in recent years.

“Israel needs today, more than ever, an independent, professional press that will protect the free market and meritocracy, and will not bow to the interests of a handful of groups,” said Guy Rolnik, founder and editor in chief of TheMarker, one of Israel’s most influential financial newspapers, and a leading critic of the concentration of economic power. “Without an independent press, Israel will become a sad version of the crony-capitalism that we see in many lagging countries in the world.”

Well-known Israeli reporter Micky Rosenthal said he faced intimidation and harassment while working on a 2008 documentary “The Shakshuka System” that investigated the connection between money, governance and media in Israel.

“The commercial television stations, which are controlled by the business magnates, refused to broadcast the movie,” the filmmakers wrote on their website. The documentary was eventually aired on a less popular state-run channel.

The major newspapers and television stations all argue that their news operations are unaffected by corporate stakeholders, old or new. Maariv said its editorial staff is “independent and enjoys total journalistic freedom”. Haaretz, Channel 2 and Channel 10 offered similar comments.

PUSH BACK

Not every Israeli company is part of a pyramid or conglomerate, of course. Pharmaceutical giant Teva, Israel’s most actively traded company, has no controlling shareholder and is not connected to any holding company. Much of Israel’s fast-growing high-tech and biotech sectors are backed by foreign and Israeli venture capital rather than local tycoons.

And some see benefits in Israel’s top-heavy economy. Colin Mayer, a professor at Said Business School at the University of Oxford, says that a concentration of power in a few holding companies can lead to poor corporate governance. But he also believes that such groups emphasize long-term goals and encourage economic stability, in contrast to the focus on short-term gains in places such as the United States and Britain.

For their part, Israel’s big holding companies argue that regulations already discourage investment in the country and hope any reform is minimal.

Dankner told Reuters that the government should “look abroad” before it breaks up Israel’s holding companies. “There is no such separation in Europe, and also the U.S. leading business groups — such as Berkshire Hathaway and GE — hold financial and real holdings side by side,” he said.

The government has hinted that it will take such facts into account. Finance Minister Yuval Steinitz told Reuters earlier this month that while the government wants to increase competition, “we have to be very careful, very calculated, in order not to cause any damage in this process. Not every proposal that seems rational at the outset is really positive.”

If there is a move to break up some companies, there could be opportunities for foreign investors wary of the complex structure of holding companies, according to Deutsche Bank analyst Richard Gussow.

And if not, expect more consumer boycotts. In late June, aware that public opinion was moving against them, Israel’s three big dairy companies simultaneously dropped the price of cottage cheese. But rather than appease consumers, the move fueled public distrust that the prices had been bloated.

A popular public advocacy group called the Civic Action Forum is now running a campaign against concentration in the economy. It’s slogan: “It’s not the cheese, it’s the system!”

($1=3.47 shekels)

(Additional reporting by Dan Williams; Edited by Simon Robinson and Michael Williams)

(Created by Simon Robinson)

Previous GOSS leadership

Posted: July 29, 2011 by PaanLuel Wël Media Ltd. in History
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The Presidency and Presidential Advisors

The Presidency

  • First Vice President of the Republic of Sudan, President of the Government of Southern Sudan, Chairman of SPLM & Commander in Chief of SPLA
    H.E. General Salva Kiir Mayardit
  • Vice President of the Government of Southern Sudan
    H.E. Dr. Riak Machar Teny

Presidential Advisors

  • Food Security and Development
    Michael Hassan Maily 
  • SPLA Affairs
    Let. Gen. Salva Mathouk Gangdit
  • Gender & Human Rights
    Madam Rebecca De-mabior
  • Diplomacy
    Mr. Alfred Ladu Gore
  • Legal Affairs
    Vacant
  • Federal and Decentralization
    Andrew Malek Dadut
  • Religious
    Fr. George Kinga
  • Humanitarian Affairs
    Maj.General Albino Akol Akol

The Cabinet

  1. Mr. Kosti Manibe Ngai – Minister of Cabinet Affairs
  2. Mr. Pagan Amum – Minister of Peace and CPA Implementation
  3. Nhial Deng Nhial – Minister of SPLA and Veteran Affairs
  4. Deng Alor Kuol – Minister of Regional Cooperation
  5. Dr. Cirino Hiteng Ofuho – Minister in the office of the President
  6. John Luk Jok – Minister of Legal Affairs and Constitutional Development
  7. Gier Chuang Aloung – Minister of Internal Affairs
  8. Michael Makuei Lueth – Minister of Parliamentary Affairs
  9. David Deng Athorbei – Minister of Finance and Economic Planning
  10. General Oyai Deng Ajak – Minister of Investment
  11. Mrs. Awut Deng Acuil – Minister of Labour and Public Service
  12. Dr. Barnaba Marial Benjamin – Minister of Information
  13. Dr. Luke Tombekana Monoja – Minister of Health
  14. Dr. Samson Lukare Kwaje – Minister of Agriculture and Forestry
  15. Mr. Anthony Lino Makana – Minister of Roads and Transport
  16. Dr. Michael Milli Hussein – Minister of Education
  17. Mr. Stephen Dhieu – Minister of Commerce and Industry
  18. Minister of Environment (NCP to nominate their person)
  19. Mrs. Jema Nunu Kumba – Minister of Housing and Physical Planning
  20. Mr. Madut Biar Yel – Minister of Communication and Postal Services
  21. Mr. Garang Diing Akuong – Minister of Energy and Mining
  22. Mrs. Agnes Kwaje Lasuba – Minister of Gender, Child and Social Welfare
  23. Dr. Anne Itto Leonardo – Minister of Cooperatives and Rural Development
  24. Mr. James Kok Ruea – Minister of Humanitarian Affairs and Disasters Management
  25. Mr. Paul Mayom Akec – Minister of Irrigation and Water Resources
  26. Mr. Joseph Ukel – Minister of Higher Education, Research, Science and Technology
  27. Minister of Welfare and Tourism (NCP to nominate their person)
  28. Mrs. Nyalok Tiong Gatluak – Minister of Animal Resources and Fisheries
  29. Ms. Mary Jervas Yak – Minister of Human Resources Development
  30. Mr. Makuac Teny Yok – Minister of Youth, Sports and Recreation
  31. Mr. Gabriel Changson Chang – Minister of Culture and Heritage
  32. Dr. Priscilla Nyanyang – Minister without Portfolio

The SPLA Military

First Vice President of the Republic of Sudan
President of the Government of Southern Sudan
&
Commander in Chief, SPLA
H.E. General Salva Kiir Mayardit

Minister of SPLA Affairs
Lt.Gen. Nhail Deng Nhail

Deputy Commander in Chief
General Paulino Matp Nhail

Chief of General Staff
Lt. Gen. James Hoth Mai

Deputy Chief of Staff
For Operation
Lt. Gen. Obote Mamur

Deputy Chief of Staff
For Administration
Lt. Gen. Paing Deng Majok

Deputy Chief of Staff
For Logistics
Lt. Gen. Biar Atem Ajang

Deputy Chief of Staff
For Political/ Moral Orientation
Lt. Gen. George Athor Deng

Deputy Chief of Staff
For Training
Lt. Gen. Ayuen Aliar

Undersecretary
Lt. Gen. Bior Ajang Dut

 

Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly

  • The Speaker of the SSLA Assembly
    Hon. Lt.Gen. James Wani Igga
  • The Deputy of the SSLA Assembly
    Hon. Lawrence Lual Lual Akuei
  • Chairperson of the Security & Public Order Committee
    Hon. Daniel Deng Monydit
  • Chairperson of the Public Accounts Committee
    Hon. Dr. Jimmy Wongo
  • Chairperson of the Members Committee
    Hon. Joseph Bol Chan
  • Chairperson for Development, Economic & Finance Committee
    Hon. Prof. Barri A. Wanji
  • Chairperson for Information & Culture Committee
    Hon. Peter Bashir Gbandi
  • Chairperson for the Regional & International Cooperation Committee
    Vacant
  • Chairperson for Energy Industry & Mining Committee
    Hon. William Wuor Dador
  • Chairperson for Gender, Social Welfare, Youth & Sports
    Hon. Abuk Payiti Ayik
  • Chairperson for Peace and Reconciliation Committee
    Hon. Mary Nyaulang Ret
  • Chairperson for Services & Physical Infrastructure Committee
    Hon. Kom Kom Geng
  • Chairperson for Legislation and Legal Affairs Committee
    Hon. Deng Arop Kuol
  • Chairperson for Education, Research, Science & Technology
    Hon. Nartisio Loluke Manir
  • Chairperson for Public Service & Administration Committee
    Hon. Angelo Gwang Ding
  • Chairperson for Human Rights & Humanitarian Affairs Committee
    Hon. Margaret Peter Abudi
  • Chairperson for Land, Natural Resource & Environment Committee
    Hon. Gabriel Matur Malek

Independent Commissions

  • Anti-Corruption Commission
    Dr. Pauline Riak
  • Audit Chamber
    Vacant
  • Center for Census, Statistics and Evaluation
    Isaiah Chol Aruai
  • Civil Service Commission
    Deng Chuol Malang
  • Demining Authority
    Jarkuc Barrac
  • Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration
    Mr. Deng Deng
  • Employees Justic Chamber
    Elizabeth Manoah
  • Fiscal, Financial, Allocation and Monitoring
    Gabriel Mathiang Rok
  • HIV AIDS Commission
    Dr. Bellario Ahoy Ngong
  • Human Rights Commission
    Joyce Kwaje
  • Land Commission
    Robert Lado Loki
  • Peace Commission
  • Public Greivance Chamber
    Dr. Acheir Deng Akol
  • Reconstruction and Development Fund
    Dr. David Nailo Mayo
  • Relief & Rehabilitation
    Simon Kun Puoch
  • War Disabled, Widows & Orphans
    Deng Dau Deng

State Governments

    • Central Equatoria State

      Capital: Juba
      Governor: Maj. Gen. Clement Wani Konga

    • Eastern Equatoria State

Capital: Torit
Governor: Mr. Aloysius Emor Ojetuk

  • Western Equatoria State

Capital: Yambio
Governor: Jemma Nuuu Kumba

    • Northern Bahr El Ghazal State

Capital: Aweil
Governor: Lt.Gen Paul Malong Awan 

    • Western Bahr El Ghazal State

      Capital: Wau
      Governor: Lt. Gen. Mark Nypouch Ubang

    • Jonglei State

Capital: Bor
Governor: Lt.Gen Kuol Manyang Juuk

  • Lakes State

    Capital: Rumbek
    Governor: Lt. Gen Daniel Awet Akot

  • Upper Nile State

    Capital: Malakal
    Governor: Major Gen. Galouk Deng Garang

  • Unity State

    Capital: Bentiu
    Governor: Mr. Taban Deng Gai

  • Warrap State

    Capital: Kuajok
    Governor: Mr. Tor Deng Mawien



A Young Tibetan Lama Prepares for a Greater Role

Posted: July 29, 2011 by PaanLuel Wël Media Ltd. in Socio-Cultural
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Librado Romero/The New York Times

Ogyen Trinley Dorje, 26, the man deemed to be the 17th reincarnation of the Karmapa, one of the most revered figures in Tibetan Buddhism, recently visited a monastery in Woodstock, N.Y.

By 
Published: July 28, 201

WOODSTOCK, N.Y. — At the age of 7, he was deemed to be the 17th reincarnation of the Karmapa — one of the most revered figures in Tibetan Buddhism — and whisked from the yak-hair tent of his nomad family in the Himalayas to be groomed in a monastery for leadership.

Now 26, his mere appearance on the stage alongside the Dalai Lama at a major ceremony in Washington this month sent a flutter of excitement through the Tibetans in the crowd. Here was more evidence to them that the Dalai Lama had taken the young Karmapa under his wing, serving as teacher and father figure in India, where both live in exile, because China claims sovereignty over Tibet.

The Karmapa and the Dalai Lama lead different Tibetan Buddhist lineages and are not equals; the Dalai Lama, who is 76, is the pre-eminent spiritual leader of Tibet. And yet, many Tibetans are looking to the Karmapa to assume the mantle of the Dalai Lama when the elder lama dies, to take on the role as shepherd of the Tibetan people and lead them home from exile.

The succession talk appears to be burdensome for the young Karmapa, a solid 6-footer with a serene gaze whose name is Ogyen Trinley Dorje. Asked about his future during an interview at the mountainside monastery here that is his North American seat, the Karmapa said that the Dalai Lama had made it clear that his hopes for the future of Tibet rested with its young leaders.

“In that regard, His Holiness has been very kind to me, and has served as a mentor and guides me greatly,” the Karmapa said in Tibetan, translated by an American lama. “But I’m only one of many.”

Then, breaking into English, he added, “I don’t need more pressure.” The Karmapa smiled, and then grew serious and added in Tibetan: “I don’t think I can do any more. It’s hard enough just to be the Karmapa.”

His Holiness the Karmapa, has just come through a trying time. Earlier this year, he was investigated by the Indian police who found more than $1 million in foreign currency in his residence, including more than $166,000 from China.

The Karmapa and his aides insisted that the money had been donated by devotees who flocked to India from around the world to see him. Although there is a rival who also claims the title, the Karmapa is regarded by the Dalai Lama and most Tibetans as the leader of the 900-year-old Karma Kagyu lineage, one of the four main schools in Tibetan Buddhism, with hundreds of monasteries and dharma centers in more than 60 countries.

The Karmapa’s aides said they planned to use the money to buy land for a monastery in India. But the Indian media fanned rumors that he was a Chinese spy.

To Tibetans and to scholars of Tibetan Buddhism, the notion is absurd. The Karmapa fled Tibet when he was 14, climbing out a window of his monastery to a waiting car, avoiding military checkpoints and riding a horse through the Nepalese outback to reach India. The escape was reminiscent of the Dalai Lama’s dash over the icy passes of the Himalayas in 1959.

But the rumors about the 17th Karmapa persisted in part because the Chinese government has recognized him as the legitimate leader of the Kagyu tradition, and avoided denouncing him even after his flight to India. That is in marked contrast to the Chinese denunciations of the Dalai Lama as a “splittist.”

This puts the Karmapa in a singular position, said Robert J. Barnett, director of the Modern Tibetan Studies Program at Columbia University.

“The Karmapa is perfectly placed to be someone who could broker a solution in the future,” Mr. Barnett said. “This is one of the rather rare issues where exiles and those in Tibet are in agreement. They have very wide respect for the Karmapa.”

The rival Karmapa, Trinley Thaye Dorje, has the backing of one senior lama in the Kagyu tradition and some followers in the West (who managed to secure the rights to the Web address karmapa.org). But Mr. Barnett likened the rivalry to the “birther controversy” involving President Obama. “For most people, this is a settled issue,” he said.

Tenzin Chonyi, president of the Woodstock monastery (called Karma Triyana Dharmachakra), was an aide to the 16th Karmapa, and as a child fled Tibet with him in 1959. He said the 17th Karmapa was identified by a group of lamas who were entrusted with the task of finding the child who they believe is the reincarnation of the previous Karmapa.

“This Karmapa was found based on the previous Karmapa’s instruction,” Mr. Chonyi said. “So we have no doubt.”

In response to the Indian police investigation, Tibetans turned out by the thousands to demonstrate their support for the Karmapa. The Tibetan government in exile sent delegations to New Delhi. The Indian police quickly cleared him.

Several months later, the Indian government gave him permission to travel to the United States, permission it had denied since his first trip to the United States in 2008.

Asked whether the suspicions had damaged relations between India and the Tibetans in exile there, the Karmapa took the long view.

“The connection between India and the Tibetan people is thousands of years old,” he said. “It is a spiritual connection and a cultural connection and is one of great affection. After all, the spiritual path of Buddhism, the spiritual path pursued by the majority of Tibetans, came from India to Tibet.”

He added, “This connection is one that has lasted generation after generation, and so I don’t think that this connection is in any danger.”

On his last trip to the United States, the Karmapa steered clear of politics. But this time, he did not mince words when asked about Tibet. He said Tibet was “in an emergency” that had only grown worse since the Chinese crackdown on the Tibetan demonstrations in 2008.

“The government of China has continued to be extremely restrictive,” by limiting the activities of monasteries and the number of monks, he said.

“The building of infrastructure — roads, trains, airports and so on — and the large immigration of people from central China into Tibet threaten the survival of Tibetan culture and the ecosystem,” he said.

“It is a very good sign,” he said, that President Obama met with the Dalai Lama this month.

The Karmapa will speak at Hunter College in New York City on Friday night. He said he would talk about compassion — not politics — which his devotees say is really the calling of a reincarnate lama.

“You could say he’s in his 20s, and he’s 900 years old at the same time,” said Lama Kathy Wesley, a longtime American convert to Tibetan Buddhism and a board member at the Woodstock monastery. “The wisdom mind of the first Karmapa is said to continue in him.”

U.S. Continues Aiding South Sudan

Posted: July 29, 2011 by PaanLuel Wël Media Ltd. in World
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Significant human development challenges loom, not the least of which is building an adequate health care system.

Photo: REUTERS
A woman carries a South Sudan flag as she arrives at the John Garang Mouselium for the Independence Day celebrations in the capital Juba July 9, 2011.

The United States is working with a number of international actors to help the country meet these challenges, providing what officials call four “pillars” of assistance to South Sudan.

South Sudan became an independent nation on July 9 amid ongoing internal conflict and after decades of civil war. The Independence Day celebration was filled with much excitement and hope for the future. The challenge of developing the country continues, however, and many obstacles lie ahead.

Beyond the work needed to organize a new government that can provide the security and services needed by the South Sudanese people, significant human development challenges loom, not the least of which is building an adequate health care system.

Donald Steinberg is Deputy Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development.

“In South Sudan it is still a very difficult situation. You have endemic respiratory diseases, endemic viruses, a very high prevalence of malaria, as well. We are also seeing a number of problems with malnutrition… This is probably the area where there is the greatest individual need.”

South Sudan must also find ways to accommodate millions of “returnees,” people returning to the South from the North, into the existing infrastructure and social order. Steinberg said that there are a number of towns where the returning population is actually higher than the existing population. But the returnees also present a unique development opportunity, as they bring with them a variety of skills and an eagerness to contribute to their country.

The United States is working with a number of international actors to help the country meet these challenges, providing what officials call four “pillars” of assistance to South Sudan:

The first is developing the agricultural sector and recognizing the key role it must play in generating employment and food security. Another is helping develop the skills and talents needed to run essential government agencies, such as the health, education and finance ministries. The third is developing the private sector to create the best possible environment for trade and investment in South Sudan. And lastly, creating an international framework that will support coordinated foreign engagement.

The international community has shown great willingness to assist in South Sudan’s development. The United States offers its support to South Sudan as it strives to meet human development challenges and build a more peaceful and prosperous future for its people.


 

Fri, 29 Jul 2011 

 

JUBA, 29 July 2011– Renowned South Sudanese author, scholar and advocate for international peace Dr. Francis Deng has urged his compatriots to recognize and manage their diversity so as to build a strong and vibrant state.
Dr. Deng who is the Special Adviser to the UN Secretary General on the Prevention of Genocide made this call yesterday evening when he delivered a public lecture on the challenges of identity and nationhood.
He said that diversity is a global phenomenon which successful nations have endeavoured to manage so as to promote a sense of common belonging, dignity and respect. He explained that the independence of South Sudan has been brought about by the lack of effective diversity management mechanisms by successive governments in the North. He said that if the new nation of South Sudan wants to build a strong and inclusive state, it should not repeat the same mistakes.

Dr. Deng said that diversity though a challenge can be harnessed for the benefit of the country. He said that ethnic homogeneity is not necessarily a recipe for peace and national unity. He cited the case of Somalia which has a homogeneous society but has been torn apart by clan differences.
“South Sudan being one of the countries in Africa least affected by modernity should use its diverse cultural values for socio-economic development”, he said. Dr. Deng also said that South Sudan struggled for so long on the basis of the principles of democracy and good governance. He called on the leaders to respect and build these ideals.
He also called on the international community, which had played a great role in bringing peace in Sudan, to also help in consolidating peace in the country by resolving the outstanding issues and deal with the socio-economic consequences of war which spanned half a century.
“The swift acceptance of South Sudan by the international community demonstrates that the whole world recognizes the justice and intimacy of the cause of the struggle of the people of South Sudan”, he said. He also said that it shows appreciation of the way the Government of South Sudan handled the general elections, the referendum and its outcome.
The public lecture, which was organized by the Human Rights Office of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), was delivered at the New Sudan Hotel in Juba.

 


By: Christopher Zambakari 

As a means to reduce conflict and fulfil its citizens’ hopes, South Sudan’s key challenges revolve around the development of an inclusive, residency-based citizenship, writes Christopher Zambakari.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed on 9 January 2005, brought an end to the brutal civil war (1955-1972; 1983-2005) that had engulfed Sudan well before its independence in 1956. The CPA was the immediate culmination of the negotiations that ended the hostility between the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A).

It ultimately created a new political dispensation and landscape in South Sudan. An estimated two and a half million people have died and more than five million have been uprooted due to the civil war (UNMIS 2009; IDMC 2011). In fulfilling the mandate of the CPA, a referendum on self-determination was conducted in January 2011, and 98.83 per cent of South Sudanese effectively voted to secede from north Sudan. The General Assembly of the United Nations admitted the Republic of South Sudan into the community of nations as the 193rd member of the United Nations on 14 July 2011 (UN News Centre 2011).

With the celebration of independence slowly coming to an end, the South Sudanese citizens will start to demand the fulfilment of a long-awaited dream: freedom from oppression and domination, justice and equality, democracy and economic prosperity, peace and tranquillity. The South Sudanese will soon start to demand that the fruits of liberation be shared among the people. The expectation on South Sudan to deliver basic necessities such as security, water, food, healthcare and education will only grow with time.

South Sudan has seen a proliferation of consultants and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) over the past several years. Professor Mahmood Mamdani, director of Makerere Institute of Social Research, observed that the tendency today in Africa is to place the emphasis on the search for solutions while neglecting the crucial role of problem formulation (Mamdani 2011). Without devoting time to understand the issues that fuel violence, it is not possible to find sustainable solutions.

In the Sudanese context, nobody understood the challenge of Sudan better than the late chair and commander-in-chief of the SPLM/A, Dr John Garang. With the inception of the SPLM/A, Garang’s first task was to define the problem. The immediate task for Garang and challenge back then – as it was for Mandela in South Africa – was to reform the colonial state and fuse the various nationalities or tribes into a nation. The solution to the crisis of citizenship was summarised in the concept of the New Sudan.

The New Sudan vision presented at the Koka dam conference was a conceptual framework for a country which was inclusive of all its multiple ethnic groups, pluralistic and embracing all nationalities, races, creeds, religions and genders – a country in which all Sudanese would be equal stakeholders. Ironically, the challenge for the Republic of South Sudan today is the same as that outlined by Garang in 1986 (Garang 1992). How is the new republic going to build a democratic, all-inclusive nation out of so many ethnic groups in the nascent state? How is the country going to answer the question of citizenship?

The crisis of citizenship is rooted in the policy laid by the British in the early 20th century and inherited in the post-colonial period in Sudan. It also explains the cycle of violence in Darfur, in the west of what is now considered north Sudan, and the deadlock over the disputed regions, with Abyei being the most contested area. The problem in Abyei between the Ngok Dinka and the Misseriya, the conflict between the camel nomads of the north in Darfur against the agriculturalists in southern Darfur and the demand for a tribal homeland in southern Sudan all revolve around the same issues: political representation, access to pasture for cattle and claims to a tribal homeland. Without resolving those fundamental issues, the violence will not subside. Rather, new waves of violence – with higher frequency and intensity – will arise, with far more deadly consequences.

What is required in Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile is not a military solution to the problem. The problem being political, the solution must be political in nature. The question of citizenship and the colonial state, which reproduces and enforces political identities, needs a political reform that will join the two demands for citizenship, one ethnic in character and the second based on residence. The challenges in both Sudans are reflective of a larger challenge facing most post-colonial African countries (Mamdani 1996).

Every post-colonial African state deals with the question of building an effective plural society and managing diversity within an inclusive framework. This is because Africa is the most diverse continent in the world, populated by diverse nationalities, with a rich cultural heritage pre-dating recorded history and vibrant plural societies. Given that Sudan is the microcosm of Africa’s promises and problems – contained within its boundaries are all major African language groups and nationalities – the problems of Sudan are reflective of the larger continental political crisis facing all African countries (Garang 1992; Beshir 1968; Deng 1990).

FACING THE REACTIONARY RESUMPTION OF COLONIAL GOVERNMENTALITY

One of the most enduring legacies of colonialism in countries ruled by Great Britain is how power was organised. The colonial state functioned on a dual system of governance. This form of governance led to group discrimination based on ethnicity and privilege of one group at the expense of all others. Any policy designed to bring lasting peace in South Sudan must begin with the question of citizenship. At the heart of the colonial system of governance was a duality in how the colonised were ruled and how those deemed civilised were governed (Mamdani 1996). It was a project enforced by law. Whereas the urban civilised was governed under common law, the natives were governed under customary law. Customary law, in turn, discriminated against individuals based on membership in a tribal homeland. Customary law was a system that privileged those considered natives and discriminated against those considered aliens, foreigners and non-natives (Mamdani 2009).

In a recent report published by the London School of Economics it was shown that in matters of institutional reform, the new South Sudan has rather taken a contradictory path (LSE 2010). According to the CPA, too much centralisation of power in Khartoum was part of the problem of Sudan before the independence of South Sudan. Until then, decentralisation had become a de facto solution. In Southern Sudan the government experimented with decentralisation only to return to a highly centralised system. At the local level, the government policy was to enact a legislation called the Local Government Act in 2009, which was seen as a way to delegate power to local institutions. However, this policy was also tainted by something familiar in Sudanese history.

It was the mode of rule adopted by British strategists to govern Sudan in the first place. This was an administrative mechanism characterised by a duality in law which translated into parallel structures, one governing semi-proletarianised in urban areas and another governing peasants in rural areas. It was a policy which enabled British colonial administrators to divide up the majority of peasants into hundreds of smaller minorities and effectively deny them the political rights to mobilise or act as a majority. Today, it pre-empts the creation of a true inclusive state and focuses on a mode of governance, which produces many smaller nation-states within the larger state.

THE LAND QUESTION

The land question is one of the most tested in Sudan. The citizenship question and the land question are related. The definition of citizenship is either based on ethnicity or it is based on residence. These two claims converge in the area of representation in the state as well as claims made to access land and resources. Those who claim citizenship also claim that access to land be based on ethnicity, which is defined as those who are indigenous to the country. Here, Sudan is like its neighbours. When one asks the question, ‘Who are these indigenes?’, the immediate answer is ‘those of us who have always been here’ – in other words, the natives.

The second claim comes from migrant workers, immigrants, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). These groups claim that citizenship based on ethnicity is unacceptable. They claim that every citizen should have similar rights. Anyone with the remotest background on African history will notice something which is consistent throughout the continent. Migration has always taken place across Africa – both voluntary and forced. Africa is the original continent of migration. The colonial state was particularly harsh and discriminatory towards those who move out of the demarcated tribal homeland in search of better living conditions, e.g., migrant workers or those forcefully displaced or internally displaced persons.

The cases of the Banyarwanda in Uganda and in eastern Congo, the Ghanaians in Nigeria and the Burkinabe in Côte d’Ivoire are illustrative of these tendencies in the post-colonial period. In each of the mentioned situations, violence has been the outcome of a conflict that pitted those defined as natives – or indigenes – to those branded as non-native or non-indigene. Both claims should not be dismissed uncritically but understood to be based on the history of state formation in Africa. The first demand is rooted in the colonial period, reproduced by the post-colonial state, and the other rooted in the concept of nation-state which provides for equal rights to all citizens, with its genesis in the French Revolution.

Today, Sudan has the largest number of internally displaced persons in the world. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre puts the estimates around 5 million (IDMC 2011). Khartoum continues its policy of ethnic cleansing in the disputed regions with its systematic policy of driving out the Dinkas and replacing them with Misseriya in Abyei. In Southern Kordofan, a report quotes key members of the National Congress Party (NCP) explicitly demanding the ethnic cleansing of the Nubian people from their homeland (Africa Confidential 2011). Land allocation for returning IDPs is crucial for survival. This has been a particularly difficult process in relation to access to land, a vital source of livelihood for most Southern Sudanese, pastoralists, agriculturalists and nomads. One report by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and the Norwegian Refugee Council puts the challenge as follows:

‘Returnees are only allocated residential plots, but for their livelihoods they would also need agricultural land; however this is not being demarcated. The returnees have generally been told that they can cultivate any available land that they find. However, some returnees told IDMC that they would need permission from the local chiefs to acquire agricultural land; this would not be easy for those who were not returning to their original village (2011).’

Without resolving the crisis of citizenship, reforming land tenure laws and resolving the conflict in the border regions, South Sudan will remain in a perpetual state of war. Success hinges upon those unresolved, yet related, issues: citizenship and access to land, Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. These issues also hold the key to a successful nation-building project in the new republic.

ADDRESSING THE CITIZENSHIP QUESTION

In his recent keynote address to the East African Legislative Assembly Symposium, Mamdani stated that citizenship in Africa has been based on two post-colonial traditions: territorial and ethnic. Mamdani pointed out Tanzania’s exception among the East African countries, a group which South Sudan might soon become a member of unless it decides to opt out. He said that ‘Tanzania is the only part of the region where a group has not been persecuted collectively – as a racial or an ethnic group. Tanzania is the East African antidote to Nigeria’ (Mamdani 2011). It can even be argued that Tanzania is not only the antidote to Nigeria but the antidote to Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and the DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo), where conflicts rage over the citizenship question.

South Sudan and North Sudan will need to develop a legal framework to address the question of citizenship, particularly the problem of nomads and pastoralists in Sudan and elsewhere to avoid stateless people throughout the region. It demands the political imagination of deemphasising descent and emphasising residence as the basis of a common citizenship. In the first instance, this is a shift from exclusion to inclusion, which broadens the definition of the political community. The need to reform citizenship laws in the post-CPA era was pointed out in a report by a scholar based at the Open Society Foundation who wrote that ‘Non-discrimination on ethnic, racial and religious grounds is the foundation for a stable state while exclusion and discrimination sow seeds of political unrest, economic collapse and war’ (Manby 2011).

One way out of the citizenship crisis is to change the criteria for how citizenship is defined, lest the political right of citizenship be turned into an ethnically defined membership to a native authority (Mamdani 2010). This challenge requires that a person’s primary residence be used rather than the origin of the person, while incorporating other methods for assigning citizenship. By allowing consent and voluntary selection of where people want to live, violence can be preempted and the nation-building project given a chance to succeed.

CONCLUSION

The governments in Sudan and South Sudan do not necessarily have a monopoly over the instruments of war. In the south the government does not have the luxury to unilaterally impose. The alternative strategy is to compromise and build consensus around key fundamental issues and bring all key players into the fold. This strategy will be reflected in the new government that will be formed in the upcoming weeks.

This creates the necessary environment for political imagination based on the condition that is imposed upon the Sudanese by history and politics. Looking ahead, there is a need to reform the colonial state in both its public and customary spheres, thereby changing how the mass of the peasantry is organised, institute land reform laws that reconcile the question of rights with that of justice and find a political solution to conflict in the disputed regions.

The task ahead is not impossible. It simply demands that South Sudanese mobilise to build their country. It demands political imagination to go beyond the colonial state and build unity in diversity among the many nationalities in the South. The Russian-born economist Alexander Gerschenkron used to say that there are increasing disadvantages in developing late, but the exception was the advent of technology which could enable countries to catch up from way behind (Gerschenkron 1962). The strength of the South Sudanese society is capable of propelling the country forward if leadership is capable of creating an environment conducive to the task.

Christopher Zambakari is a candidate for a Law and Policy Doctorate (LPD) at the College of Professional Studies, Northeastern University, Boston, Massachusetts.

Zambakari expresses his gratitude for the support and constructive feedback received on this article from Tammy Michele Washington, Anschaire Aveved, Noah Japhet and Tijana Gligorevic.